Article III. On the Theological Virtue of Charity

The theological virtue of charity,¹ with which we must now deal, holds primacy among the other virtues; therefore St. Paul, speaking of it, says: "But now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; and the greatest of these is charity."² St. Clement of Rome deservedly wrote of it: "You see, dearly beloved, how great and admirable a thing charity is, and that its perfection cannot be explained."³ Yet, that we may in some measure behold its excellence, we shall investigate four things: namely its notion, object, subject, and qualities.

¹ Cf. Van Roey, De virtute caritatis.

² 1 Cor. 13:13.

³ Epistula I ad Corinthios, c. 50 (M.P.G. 1, col. 311).

I. Notion of Charity. Charity is: a theological virtue inclining man to love God on account of Himself, and ourselves and our neighbor on account of God. It is said:

1. To love God. By these words is indicated the primary material object of charity, while the words and ourselves and our neighbor denote its secondary material object.

2. On account of Himself, and ourselves and our neighbors on account of God. This indicates the formal object of this virtue.

II. Object of Charity. 1. Material object. The material object of charity, or the object to whom we will good, and indeed the primary one, is God Himself. This is clear from Sacred Scripture, which calls the love of God the greatest and first commandment.¹ It is confirmed by reason. For the material object of some virtue is said to be that which primarily stands under the formal object of charity and by reason of which the other things are attained. But God primarily stands under the formal object of charity, and the other things are attained by reason of God; for the formal object of charity is divine goodness in itself, which is essentially in God and participatively in others.

The secondary material object, therefore, is constituted by all things which can be attained by the virtue of charity by reason of God; and by reason of God all rational creatures can be attained, whether the Blessed or those capable of beatitude, since they participate, or at least are able to participate, in God Himself through grace and the light of glory.

Corollary. To the secondary material object pertain: 1. all the Blessed, whether men or angels; 2. all souls in purgatory; 3. all wayfarers, indeed the wayfarer himself in relation to himself; 4. the body of the neighbor and of the lover himself insofar as, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, "from the enjoyment of the soul a certain beatitude redounds to the body" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 25, a. 5, ad 5). But the damned, whether angels or men, cannot pertain to the secondary object; for they are incapable of grace and of the light of glory.

2. Formal object. The formal object of theological charity is the supernatural goodness of God, lovable in itself and on account of itself. It is said:

a) The supernatural goodness of God, that is, the goodness of God insofar as it is known by the light of faith, so that it may be distinguished from the goodness of God insofar as it is known by the light of reason, which would be the formal object of natural love.

b) Lovable in itself and on account of itself. And thus the distinction is had between the formal object of charity and of hope; for the formal object of hope is the relative goodness of God, while it must be said "that by charity God is loved on account of Himself" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 25, a. 3, ad 2). In this doctrine all theologians agree, except one or another; but they disagree in assigning what the supernatural goodness of God must involve in order to be the formal object of charity. Two opinions chiefly exist concerning this question. Some say that any divine perfection whatever suffices for the formal object of charity. But others, with St. Thomas,² to whom St. Alphonsus adheres (Theologia moralis, II, 24, conference VI, 436, and Homo Apostolicus, tr. 4, n. 9), teach that this goodness is composed of all God's perfections, and therefore of the goodness of the essence and of all the attributes. The reason for this opinion is that by the virtue of charity God is loved as the supreme good; but in order that He can be so loved, He must first be known as the supreme good, according to the saying: nothing is willed unless known. But he who loves God from the motive of one attribute taken separately does not know Him in this attribute as the supreme good; for the attribute contains God as the supreme good only implicitly and virtually. But things which are only implicitly and virtually contained in something explicitly known are not known in such a way that they can be a motive for acting. There is added the fact that the formal object of charity on the way and in the homeland must be the same, since the virtue is specifically the same, as the Apostle bears witness: "Charity never falleth away."³ Now charity in the homeland has as its formal object the goodness of God composed of all God's perfections; otherwise the one loving would not be blessed, because he would not see God as He is.

Corollary I. The desire of possessing God on account of God's own glory, that is, so that He may be loved perfectly by us, is a perfect act of charity; but the desire of possessing God on account of attaining one's own beatitude is an act of hope, or of the love of concupiscence (St. Alphonsus, II, 24, distinction 1).

Corollary II. The love of God on account of His benefits is an act of charity if the one loving looks at the benefits as communications of divine goodness, since then he loves not his own utility, but the goodness of God in itself. But if he looks at the benefits as conferred on us, it is an act of a grateful soul, or of gratitude.

¹ Matt. 22:37.

² Cf. Salmanticenses, disp. 2, dub. 2, §§ 2-3, where they indicate various places of St. Thomas.

³ 1 Cor. 13:8.

III. Subject of Charity. 1. The subject by which and partial of the theological virtue of charity is the will. For theological charity is occupied around the good of God Himself as good to Him; but good is the object of the will. Therefore the virtue of charity has the will as the immediate subject of inherence. And thus it is clear that charity is really distinguished from sanctifying grace, since the latter immediately inheres in the essence of the soul.

2. The subject which and total of the theological virtue of charity is everyone, and only one, who is supernaturally just. It is said:

a) Everyone who is supernaturally just, because together with justifying or sanctifying grace charity too is infused.

b) Only one who is supernaturally just, because mortal sin, together with justifying or sanctifying grace, also destroys charity; for charity is conversion to God, while mortal sin is aversion from Him; these cannot be present together in relation to the same terminus.

IV. Properties of Charity. Two properties especially of theological charity remain to be briefly explained here: its being the form of the other virtues, and its necessity.

1. Its being the form of the other virtues. This property consists in this, that every virtue draws its perfection from charity. For the perfection of every virtue consists in attaining the ultimate end. But no virtue immediately attains the ultimate end as ultimate end except charity. Hence it remains that the other virtues have this perfection through charity. Yet this is not to be understood as if charity were intrinsic to the other virtues, "but that which is left in faith (and in the other virtues) from charity is intrinsic to faith," says St. Thomas (De veritate, q. 14, a. 5, ad 4); and in another place he says: "That which is of perfection in faith is derived from charity, so that charity has it essentially, but faith and the other virtues participatively" (ibid., art. 1).

2. Necessity. a) The habit of charity, or habitual charity, is necessary for salvation for all men by necessity of means. For no one is saved without sanctifying grace. But the habit of charity is indivisibly connected with sanctifying grace. Therefore, just as sanctifying grace is necessary by necessity of means, so also is the habit of charity.

b) In what respect the act of charity, or actual charity, is necessary, we shall say in Book II, where we treat of the cultivation of virtues.