Parts

The Parts or Kinds of Prudence.—As the divisions of parts correspond with the divisions of wholes, we should note that there are three kinds of wholes: a subjective, an integral, and a potestative whole.

(a) A subjective whole is one that is present as to its entire essence and all its power in each of the parts. This kind of whole is found in the genus, each of whose species partakes of the entire nature and energy included in the generic concept, just as the mode of being and of acting expressed by the term “animal” is found fully in dogs, cats, horses, and so on with the other kinds of animals.

(b) An integral whole is one that is not present in all its fullness either of essence or of power in the single parts. This kind of whole is found in a finished composite made up of heterogeneous units, such as a house; for neither walls, nor roof, nor foundation, nor any other single portion of the building is a complete house or has all the uses of a house, but if any one of them is lacking the house is not integral or complete.

(c) A potestative whole is one that is present in all its essence, but not in all its power in each single part. This kind of whole is exemplified in an active principle functioning through diverse faculties, such as the soul which thinks, wills, perceives, accomplishes by means of mind, will, sense, and bodily organs. The soul is present in its entirety in each of these, since it is a simple substance, but in one it exercises one power, in another a different power, in none of them all its powers.

It is customary to speak also of the integral, subjective and potestative parts of a moral virtue. (a) Thus, the quasi-integral parts of a virtue are those functions without which its act is not perfectly performed; and with which it is more perfect. (b) The subjective parts are the species into which the virtue is divided. (e) The quasi-potestative parts are certain subsidiary or annexed virtues which have to do with the secondary acts of a principal virtue, as not having the full efficacy of the latter.

631. The parts of prudence, not otherwise than of any other cardinal virtue, are of three kinds, namely a) integral, b) subjective, c) potential.

a) Integral parts are so called, not because from them as from parts the habit is composed, as, e.g., a house is composed from walls; for virtues are one habit and not something composed from several parts. But they are called integral parts because virtues cannot exercise acts in every respect perfect without those parts. Therefore integral parts are certain prerequisites for the perfect act of virtue. For prudence such prerequisites are enumerated by St. Thomas¹⁸ as eight, namely memory, understanding, docility, shrewdness, reason, foresight, circumspection, and caution; the five former of these pertain to prudence according as it is cognitive, but the three remaining according as it is preceptive by applying knowledge to work.

1. Memory¹⁹ (which here is not taken for the memorative power, but for the very recollection of past things) is very necessary for the perfect act of prudence, because it was deservedly said by the ancients: "Nothing new under the sun"; or, that which happened in past times in similar adjuncts of things will happen also now, if the circumstances are the same or similar. Hence from past experience we can with sufficient probability judge concerning present acts to be done, and for this reason it is certain that a good and vivid memory of past events is the best assistance of prudence. Hence also it is clear that those who have many experiences are generally more prudent than those who have not had such long experience. - Oblivion is opposed to memory. But since oblivion regards knowledge alone, while prudence consists not in knowledge alone but also in right appetite, oblivion can indeed impede prudence in some way, but not totally take it away.²⁰

2. Understanding or intelligence likewise is not taken here for the intellective power, but both for knowledge of present things and for right estimation of some end, or of a particular moral principle.²¹ That understanding accepted in this sense greatly concurs toward the act of prudence is self-evident; for, that someone may prudently dispose his actions, it is required that he have the present state of the matter well viewed, that he rightly know that moral principle which must be applied to the practical conclusion here and now.

3. Docility is an affection and promptitude for learning. That docility is necessary for perfect prudence is clear from this, that prudence is concerned with particular operable things, in which there are almost infinite diversities, which cannot be known and considered by one man. Hence man needs to be instructed by others. But contempt for hearing others, living or deceased, is a cause of imprudence. This will and promptitude for learning is docility.

4. Shrewdness or sagacity (eustochia) is a prompt conjecture concerning means congruent for obtaining some intended end, or shrewdness is a certain perspicacity of swiftly apprehending the means, which happens from natural aptitude and also from exercise.²² That this shrewdness helps very greatly for exercising prudence is self-evident. Shrewdness is indeed often a natural gift and not granted to all in the same degree; nevertheless it can also be acquired in some way by diligent exercise.

5. Reason, i.e. promptitude for reasoning or for collecting one thing from another, likewise is necessary for prudence, since often there is need of long reasoning before one arrives at a prudent practical judgment.

6. Foresight is taken here in a twofold sense, namely either for the ordering of means to an end,²³ or for the consideration of future events which can follow from a work.²⁴ Concerning foresight St. Thomas says: "For it is the principal part of prudence, to which the other two parts are ordered; namely memory of past things and understanding of present things, according as from past things remembered and present things understood we conjecture concerning future things to be provided for."²⁵

7. Circumspection²⁶ is attentive consideration of circumstances; for it happens that something considered according to itself is good and suitable to the end; nevertheless from some circumstances it is rendered evil and unsuitable for attaining the end. Hence it is clear that circumspection is necessary for prudence.

8. Caution²⁷ is the care of avoiding all evils and impediments by which from without the work of virtue could be vitiated or impeded, e.g. lest damage be incurred, lest neighbor be offended.²⁸

¹⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 48, a. unic.

¹⁹ Erinnerung, souvenir.

²⁰ S. theol. l. c. q. 47, a. 16.

²¹ A clear survey of the state of the matter and sound moral judgment. S. theol. l. c. q. 49, a. 2 ad 1, and a. 5 ad 3.

²² Resourcefulness, swift insight into the causes of an appearance, presence of mind; presence d'esprit, sagacity. Cf. S. theol. l. c. q. 49, a. 4.

²³ Plan of execution.

²⁴ Foreseeing the consequences of an act; prevoyance.

²⁵ S. theol. 1, q. 22, a. 1.

²⁶ Circumspection.

²⁷ Caution; precaution.

²⁸ Concerning the accurate difference between foresight, circumspection, and caution, see Cajetan in 2, 2, q. 49, a. 8.

632. b) Subjective parts of some cardinal virtue are the species into which it is divided. Besides natural and supernatural prudence, concerning which there was speech above n. 626, prudence is divided into personal prudence, by which someone governs himself, and governing or regnative prudence, through which someone governs a multitude.

Governing prudence²⁹ was divided by the ancients into various species, according to the different species of multitude. Now there is a certain multitude united for some special business, as an army is gathered together for fighting. - Ruling prudence over an army is called military prudence. Prudence by which a family is governed is called economic prudence. Prudence by which some kingdom is governed is called regnative or legislative prudence. In subjects there corresponds to the governing prudence of the superior political prudence, through which they direct themselves in obeying rulers for the common good.³⁰ - Personal prudence is a species really distinct from political and governing prudence, because it has a different end, namely personal rectitude, while governing and political prudence besides this intends and directly procures the rectitude of the community. Certainly there are many holy men who, although perfect in every virtue, nevertheless do not have governing prudence so perfectly. Hence St. Celestine abdicated the Supreme Pontificate, because he felt himself unequal to directing the Church in those most difficult times. Nevertheless he who has great sanctity can deservedly be called very prudent, because he directs all his acts in a perfect manner to the true end and to true beatitude. Therefore the Blessed Virgin, who was most holy, is called the most prudent virgin.

²⁹ Talent for governing.

³⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 50, a. 2.

633. c) Potential parts of prudence are called the joined virtues which are ordered to some secondary acts or secondary matters, and are three, namely eubulia, synesis, gnome.

1. Eubulia is the habit of taking counsel rightly.³¹ As was said above, to take counsel well or to deliberate well is an act of prudence, but this must be understood in such a way that prudence exercises this act not immediately through itself, but by means of the virtue of eubulia; or in other words: "it pertains to prudence to take counsel well imperatively, but to eubulia elicitively."³²

2. Synesis is a virtue judging well concerning operable things according to common rules, i.e. according to natural and positive law.³³

3. Gnome³⁴ is a judging virtue according to higher principles in those things in which sometimes one must recede from the common law, but not from the mind of the legislator. Therefore gnome produces the act of epikeia in the observance of law.

³¹ Capacity for considering well and taking counsel.

³² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 51, a. 2 ad 1.

³³ Capacity for judging rightly, according to the law, concerning actions to be performed; the faculty of judging well according to the law.

³⁴ Capacity, in extraordinary occurrences, to judge rightly not according to the wording but according to the sense of the law; the faculty of judging well against the letter of the law in an extraordinary case.

22. State of the question. - All moral virtues are reduced to the cardinal virtues as their subjective or potential parts; moreover they have integral parts.

Integral parts (éléments qui intègrent, auxiliaires; aanvullende of volledigende deelen) are so called by a likeness to the integral parts of a body, for example, the eye, arm, hand, etc., without which the body is not perfect; and therefore they are conditions, acts, dispositions, without which the act or use of some virtue is not perfect.

Subjective parts (sous-espèces; ondersoorten of onder deelen) are those into which a virtue is divided, as a genus into species: in the same way a lion and an ox are called parts of animal.

Potential parts (dépendances; aangehoorigheden, machtelijke deelen) are so called by a likeness to the powers of the soul, for example, the sensitive, nutritive, and volitional powers, which have power from the soul but not its whole power; and therefore they are habits which in something agree with the cardinal virtue, but in something else fall short of its perfect notion. They are called annexed virtues (vertus annexées, ou qui s'y rattachent; toegevoegde deugden).

Besides, to the individual principal virtues there corresponds some one of the gifts of the Holy Spirit (I, n. 633).

All these things must now be determined for prudence.

1. Moderns are accustomed to affirm that certain other virtues are reduced to the cardinal virtues also as integral parts. But, according to St. Thomas, integral parts are not virtues, but conditions of virtue. Cf. I-II, q. 57, a. 6, ad 4; and III Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, qc. 1.

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 11 and 12; q. 48 and 50.

27. Prudence is divided into several species, and indeed it is monastic (solitary) or personal (persoonlijke v.), by which one rules himself in order to his proper good, or governing (leidende, bestierende v.), ruling a multitude in order to the common good. This latter is divided into diverse species according to the diverse species of multitude and rule. For a multitude is united either a) for a special business, namely an army for fighting for the common good, which military prudence rules (krijgsbeleid); or b) united for ordering the whole of life, as the multitude of one house or family, which economic prudence rules (domestique; huishoudelijke v.; huisbeleid); or c) as the city itself or kingdom, to which political prudence belongs (stadhoudelijke v.), especially regnative (royale; regeerende, wetgevende v., Staatsbeleid) and positive of laws in the prince who rules others, and simply political or civil prudence (burgerlijke v.), in subjects who rule themselves, voluntarily obeying princes, in order to the good of the community.

1. Military prudence is art insofar as it knows how one must fight; prudence insofar as it commands for the due end. Some, besides military prudence, here posit several species of prudence for diverse particular affairs; but this seems to be contrary to St. Thomas and Cajetan, q. 49, a. 4, ad 2.

2. Political prudence directs legal justice.

3. Lessius understands civil prudence otherwise: not as the virtue of subjects who obey laws, but of judges and magistrates who see to it that laws are observed and govern the whole republic. He says, namely, that Aristotle posits two parts of this: consultative and judicial; the former furnishes counsel in doubts, the latter exercises judgments in tribunals, each of which belongs to a public person. He adds that there is no need of a peculiar prudence in a citizen, so that he may obey the laws of the community, just as neither in domestic persons, so that they may obey the precepts of the father of the family. Nevertheless these things are not conformed to the interpretation of St. Thomas.

28. Observations. - 1. Personal prudence is prudence absolutely and simply so called (Aristotle, book VI Ethics, c. 8), because it renders man honorable and immediately orders him to the ultimate end; the others are prudence in a qualified way, with an adjunct and determination, and render a man a good citizen, a good king, a good father of a family, etc.

2. Nevertheless regnative prudence is the most perfect: "for rule is the more perfect the more universal it is, and the more it extends itself to many things, and the further end it touches. And therefore to a king, to whom it belongs to rule a city or kingdom, prudence belongs according to a special and most perfect notion of itself" (q. 50, a. 1). For if there are "diverse ends of which one is ordered to another..., as the good of one person is ordered to the good of the multitude...; from this it follows that the habit which is ordered to the further end is the more principal and commands the other habits" (q. 47, a. 11, ad 3).

3. Yet these virtues are connected, as St. Thomas has it, q. 47, a. 11, ad 2, and Cajetan shows there. For he who has perfect proper prudence is disposed to rule others prudently, because he has this in proximate potency and is proximately apt for it.

4. Indeed, they can mutually include one another. For monastic prudence indirectly regards the common good as the proper good of a part, and political prudence indirectly regards the proper good insofar as it is part of the common good. "Personal prudence can embrace the others," says Lessius, c. 2, dub. 1, "because it can extend itself to all their functions, by dictating concerning the same actions, but under another aspect, insofar as they are the honorable good of one's own action, for example, so that one may satisfy his office: thus a magistrate does not satisfy his office if he does not know how to administer the republic. Therefore it includes all as parts, adding over and above a respect to one's proper good," which is to act honorably.

5. Nevertheless they are not confused. Monastic prudence regards the proper good immediately, the common good indirectly and mediately; political prudence regards the common good immediately and per se.

1. Cf. St. Thomas, on Aristotle, lecture 7.

UNANIMOUSLY the Philosophers acknowledge that Prudence has certain parts; of which Aristotle 6. Ethic. cap. 8. and following. Cicero lib. 2. de Invent. August. lib. 83. qq. quaest. 61. Macrobius lib. 1. in somn. Scipionis, cap. 8. relates them; from these the S. Doctor everywhere lib. 5. Compend. Theol. cap. 34. And 3. p. Centileg. sectione 41. and the opusc. de quatuor virtutibus Cardinalibus.

The parts of Prudence are of THREE kinds. Some are integral, without which the perfect use of Prudence is not had: Others are subjective, in the manner in which species, subjected to a genus, are called subjective parts of the genus, as Man and Lion are parts of animal, because, namely, animal is predicated of them as of a subject. Others are potential parts of Prudence by similitude with the potential parts of the soul.

The Integral Parts of Prudence, which integrate it as it were in the manner in which members integrate a body, are eight. Memory, which is cognition of past things; Understanding, which is cognition of present things; Docility, which is cognition through another's instruction; Solertia, which is cognition through one's own discovery; nem; Ratio of this, is because it is cognition by the inference of one thing from another; Providence, which is the ordination of means to an end; Circumspection, which is the consideration of the circumstances of the business; Caution, which is a certain contrivance against those things which can stand in the way and be an impediment.

The perfect use of Prudence indeed depends on Memory, because it depends on experience; and this on many experiments, and experiments on many memories, as D. Thom. teaches quaest. 49. art. 1. ex Aristotle at the beginning of 1. Metaph.

It depends also on Understanding, which is the cognition of particulars with which Prudence is concerned, which cognition is from the intellect, partly through conversion to phantasms, partly also in the interior sense, or the cogitative power.

It DEPENDS on Docility, which Cicero praises Lib. 2. qq. Academ.; hence the S. Doctor defines it to be the power of instructing first oneself; then others.

It DEPENDS on Solertia, which is swift conjecture, as Aristotle teaches 6. Eth. cap. 9. and D. Thom. quaest. 49. art. 4.

It DEPENDS on reason, which is the cognition of one thing from another by inference; for Consultation, on which the decrees of Prudence depend, is altogether with ratiocination, as the Philosopher teaches 6. Eth. cap. 10. and D. Thomas art. 5.

It DEPENDS on Prudence, which is the ordination of suitable means to an end; for Prudence is concerned with things to be done on account of an end, as the S. Doctor explains in the places alleged, and D. Thom. art. 6.

It DEPENDS on Circumspection; for prudence is concerned with particular things to be done, good on every side, consonant with reason; but the goodness of human actions depends on the circumstances, as I showed prima secundae, Treatise 1. disput. 9. question 5. and 10.

It DEPENDS also on Caution, which is provision against contrary evils, which the S. Doctor calls the Prudence of discerning vices, bearing the appearance of virtues.

As to the subjective parts of Prudence, D. Thom. treats quaest. 50. It is divided into governing Prudence and the particular prudence of the one acting. Again, Gubernativa is divided into Legislative, which is in the Prince, or Republic; into Political, which is in subjects concerning the same good of the Kingdom, or city; into Oeconomical, which is concerning the domestic good; and Military, concerning which the good of the army is concerned. Of the Gubernativa the S. Doctor treats excellently de Eccl. Hierarchia. But particular prudence is one most special species.

The potential Parts of Prudence are three intellectual virtues adjoined, serving prudence, namely, EUBULIA, which is rightly counseltative, as you have 6. Eth. cap. 9. SYNESIS is rightly judgmental by common rules; and GNOMES, which is rightly judgmental in natural reason beyond the common rules, when these fail because of the circumstances of a particular case. See D. Thomas quaest. 51., easily declaring these.

Of these S. Bonaventure also treats in the places everywhere adduced here.

SINCE the Church Militant is governed and ordered according to the order of the Church Triumphant, as it is said sap 9. Thou hast commanded me to build a temple, and an Altar according to the likeness of thy holy Tabernacle, which thou hast prepared from the beginning, the Seraphic Bonaventure, the wonderful sublimity of whose genius shines forth pre-eminently here, discourses on how the threefold state of those to be saved is conformed to the threefold Choir of Angels, both in public and private governance: And he says this threefold state is designated in that Ezechielis 14. If there be in the city these three men (namely Daniel, Noe, and Iob), shall they deliver their own souls. Daniel indeed, obtaining that supernatural Understanding by the merit of Abstinence, bears the Type of the Cloistered, who by abstaining even from things licit and illicit merit to be illumined from above. Noe, however, Governing the Ark, indicates prelates, to whom the Ark of the Church, to be saved from the Deluge of sin, has been entrusted by God. Truly Iob, a married man, intent on the works of piety and mercy, designates the assembly of the active and of married men.

Of these, the first, entrusted to God by the vow of Religion, and emulating the supreme perfection and the better Charisms, are compared to the supreme choir of Angels; for these indeed pre-eminently surpass the others both in the fire of Love and in the privilege of Knowledge and in the balance of Justice.

The SECOND, however, who exercise the office of Prelacy, are assimilated to the other Angelic choir; for Prelacy was instituted by God, either for the discipline and correction of morals, on account of which there is the sacerdotal dignity — to the Dominations they correspond: or for rescinding disputes and composing peace, which the judicial power serves, conformed to the Powers: or finally for coercing malice and Tyranny; and for this end the Regal, or Imperial Power was given, configured to the Potestates.

The LAST are truly compared to the third choir; for if they are subjects and humble, they are like the principalities; if continent, like the Archangels; if finally devoted to the works of piety, they are configured to the ANGELS.

Of the first state we must first treat briefly in certain sections.

S. Doctor SUPPOSES here those three Hierarchical operations, to Purify, to Illuminate, and to Perfect; and by the names of Angels he proves at once private persons on account of certain excellences, and also rectors and Princes on account of their governance. Thus Matth. 11. John is called an Angel; and II. Reg. 14. and 19. David is compared to an Angel. So too in Apoc. the Rectors of the Churches are called Angels.

Therefore he first applies the supreme Hierarchy to the Religious, and to all perfect in vows.

He calls the Religious SERAPHIM, named from the divine fires of Charity, to whom he applies Heb. I. Who maketh his angels spirits, and his ministers a flame of fire, and Apoc. 10. I saw an Angel, whose face was as the sun, and his feet as a pillar of fire. And Isa. 6. One of the Seraphim flew to me, and in his hand a live coal, etc. Therefore thus the servants of God, kindled, ought to imitate the nature of fire: for fire is always raised upward, it consumes rust, and resolves earthly things into itself; it is moved most swiftly, it spreads itself to all things to be converted to itself.

THUS the Religious, kindled with the fire of Charity, will be proved, if they ascend swiftly, despising earthly things; if they strive to resolve all things into the love of God; if they work swiftly and with speed, as it is said: Isa. 18. Go, ye swift angels, and Ezech. I. Whithersoever the Spirit went, the wheels were lifted up following him, for the spirit of life, etc.; that is, they ought to shine with the best example of Charity, for the life of the religious is the exemplar of others. Therefore Deuter. 17. They shall receive the exemplar of the law from the priests, and I Timot. IV. Be thou an example of the faithful.

They ought moreover to PURIFY others, as it is said Malach. III. He shall sit like a refiner's fire, and shall purge the sons of Levi. Therefore the Seraphim say to Isaias: Thy iniquity shall be taken away, and thy sin shall be purged.

They ILLUMINATE also, Matth. V. You are the light of the world, Ephes. V. Walk as children of the light in love.

FROM the Seraphim of Isa. VI. shining forth, he argues what kind of flame the religious ought to shine with, for the example of others.

FIRST they are said to have been two, whereby is expressed their dwelling together in Charity. Therefore also the Lord sent his disciples two by two. Lucae X. and Ecclesiasticus IV. It is better that there be two together than one: for they have the advantage of their society. And Genes. XIX. Two Angels were sent into Pentapolis. Whereby a grave precept of prudence is given, that life in the Coenobia is safer than in the solitude of the Anachoretic life.

SECONDLY, those Seraphim were not seated, but stood. Whence in Psalm. 121. Our feet were standing in thy courts, O Jerusalem.

HIEREMIAE VI. Stand upon your ways, and see, and ask which is the good way? and Psalm. V. In the morning I will stand before thee, and will see, and Habac. II. I will stand upon my watch, and Apoc. VIII. An Angel stood near the altar of the temple. Therefore the unwearied raising of the intention to God is handed down in all things.

Each had six wings singly, that is twelve, whereby the spiritual and corporal works of mercy are signified, and they were joined one to another, as is said Ezech. I. With these wings he ought swiftly to work for the salvation of all.

With these wings they veiled their hands and their feet, by working, that they might not be seen, of which Matth. VI. Let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doth. Therefore he veils his head, hands, and feet, who desires neither in the beginning, nor in the end, nor in the middle to be praised for his works.

THESE flew, because the religious ought always to be borne higher into God. Whence Psalm. 54. Who will give me wings, etc. Therefore with the multiplied motion of spiritual wings, they ought assiduously by contemplation and action to ascend on high, never languishing, nor ever idling.

THESE cried: HOLY, HOLY, HOLY, one to the other, because in the Divine praises they are held to cry out perpetually. Thrice they pray, that they may be rightly instructed, promoted, and brought to salvation. Therefore Ioan. XVII. Sanctify them in truth, that they themselves may be sanctified, and consummated in one, etc.

WHEN indeed the lips of Isaias, defiled, were purged with a burning coal, and it kindled him, that he might offer himself for the divine missions, it expresses that the religious, most pure in themselves, are held bound to purify others with holy fire, to illuminate, and to kindle them unto works of salvation; thus Moses Num. XI. purged Mary the leper by prayers in a figure, and S. Job his friends, Iob in the last chapter.

There FOLLOWS the order of the Cherubim from the wisdom, with which religious men are held to be endowed and to illuminate others. Now this wisdom is practical, or prudence, as the holy Doctor advertises, Lib. I. cap. 3., which is not worldly wisdom, of which Lucae XVI. The children of this world are more prudent than the children of the light, which is in the avaricious; nor ought it to be the prudence of the flesh, which is death, as is said Rom. VIII., and it is in the voluptuous, because this wisdom is not found in the land of them that live sweetly, Iob 28.; nor ought it to be diabolical, of which Isa. V. Woe to you that are wise in your own eyes, etc. Therefore recourse must be had to the wisdom that is from above, which is chaste, peaceable, etc.

Now TWO Cherubim of gold are indicated Exodi 25., because there must be in them a twofold wisdom, and prudence. One of the things to be done concerning themselves and their neighbor: the other of the things to be done concerning God; and both golden, that is of Charity. Therefore gold most pure is given for the Cherubim, primo Paral. 28., which signifies the purity of conscience, from which it follows that they see God, which is beatitude, given to the clean of heart. Then indeed it follows that, radiated with divine light, they see most clearly (as the holy Doctor says). Therefore the Cherubim Ezech. I. and Apoc. IV. were full of eyes before and behind, because men compared to the Angels, the Cherubim, by the grace of circumspection, and the gift of providence, which are parts of prudence, see gilded on every side, they provide, and each keeps watch over the perils of the other. Whence also the Cherubim looked upon one another above the Propitiatory.

THESE are raised up into God with holy quiet. Therefore God dwells in them, who sitteth over the Cherubim; and these also draw others. Therefore Ezech. X. when the Cherubim were lifted up, the others also were lifted up; for upon the holiness of the religious hangs also the salvation of seculars. Therefore Iudith, cap. 8., says: and now, brethren, since you are the priests in the people of God, upon you depends their soul.

THESE are the interpreters of God; therefore in a figure from the propitiatory, between the two Cherubim, the voice of God went forth, Num. VII. and Ezech. I.: The sound of the wings of the Cherubim was as the voice of God.

THESE ought to keep the way of the tree of life, and to show it with the flaming sword, as is said Genes. III., and to cry out to all that word of Hierem. VI. This is the way, walk ye in it.

The THIRD order is that of the Thrones, in which Divine Justice dwells, Psalm. IX. Thou sittest upon the throne, who judgest justice.