Article II: On the Subjective Parts

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 11 and 12; q. 48 and 50.

27. Prudence is divided into several species, and indeed it is monastic (solitary) or personal (persoonlijke v.), by which one rules himself in order to his proper good, or governing (leidende, bestierende v.), ruling a multitude in order to the common good. This latter is divided into diverse species according to the diverse species of multitude and rule. For a multitude is united either a) for a special business, namely an army for fighting for the common good, which military prudence rules (krijgsbeleid); or b) united for ordering the whole of life, as the multitude of one house or family, which economic prudence rules (domestique; huishoudelijke v.; huisbeleid); or c) as the city itself or kingdom, to which political prudence belongs (stadhoudelijke v.), especially regnative (royale; regeerende, wetgevende v., Staatsbeleid) and positive of laws in the prince who rules others, and simply political or civil prudence (burgerlijke v.), in subjects who rule themselves, voluntarily obeying princes, in order to the good of the community.

1. Military prudence is art insofar as it knows how one must fight; prudence insofar as it commands for the due end. Some, besides military prudence, here posit several species of prudence for diverse particular affairs; but this seems to be contrary to St. Thomas and Cajetan, q. 49, a. 4, ad 2.

2. Political prudence directs legal justice.

3. Lessius understands civil prudence otherwise: not as the virtue of subjects who obey laws, but of judges and magistrates who see to it that laws are observed and govern the whole republic. He says, namely, that Aristotle posits two parts of this: consultative and judicial; the former furnishes counsel in doubts, the latter exercises judgments in tribunals, each of which belongs to a public person. He adds that there is no need of a peculiar prudence in a citizen, so that he may obey the laws of the community, just as neither in domestic persons, so that they may obey the precepts of the father of the family. Nevertheless these things are not conformed to the interpretation of St. Thomas.

28. Observations. - 1. Personal prudence is prudence absolutely and simply so called (Aristotle, book VI Ethics, c. 8), because it renders man honorable and immediately orders him to the ultimate end; the others are prudence in a qualified way, with an adjunct and determination, and render a man a good citizen, a good king, a good father of a family, etc.

2. Nevertheless regnative prudence is the most perfect: "for rule is the more perfect the more universal it is, and the more it extends itself to many things, and the further end it touches. And therefore to a king, to whom it belongs to rule a city or kingdom, prudence belongs according to a special and most perfect notion of itself" (q. 50, a. 1). For if there are "diverse ends of which one is ordered to another..., as the good of one person is ordered to the good of the multitude...; from this it follows that the habit which is ordered to the further end is the more principal and commands the other habits" (q. 47, a. 11, ad 3).

3. Yet these virtues are connected, as St. Thomas has it, q. 47, a. 11, ad 2, and Cajetan shows there. For he who has perfect proper prudence is disposed to rule others prudently, because he has this in proximate potency and is proximately apt for it.

4. Indeed, they can mutually include one another. For monastic prudence indirectly regards the common good as the proper good of a part, and political prudence indirectly regards the proper good insofar as it is part of the common good. "Personal prudence can embrace the others," says Lessius, c. 2, dub. 1, "because it can extend itself to all their functions, by dictating concerning the same actions, but under another aspect, insofar as they are the honorable good of one's own action, for example, so that one may satisfy his office: thus a magistrate does not satisfy his office if he does not know how to administer the republic. Therefore it includes all as parts, adding over and above a respect to one's proper good," which is to act honorably.

5. Nevertheless they are not confused. Monastic prudence regards the proper good immediately, the common good indirectly and mediately; political prudence regards the common good immediately and per se.

1. Cf. St. Thomas, on Aristotle, lecture 7.