Question — Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Question Two: On the Parts of Prudence

22.

22. State of the question. - All moral virtues are reduced to the cardinal virtues as their subjective or potential parts; moreover they have integral parts.

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Integral parts (éléments qui intègrent, auxiliaires; aanvullende of volledigende deelen) are so called by a likeness to the integral parts of a body, for example, the eye, arm, hand, etc., without which the body is not perfect; and therefore they are conditions, acts, dispositions, without which the act or use of some virtue is not perfect.

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Subjective parts (sous-espèces; ondersoorten of onder deelen) are those into which a virtue is divided, as a genus into species: in the same way a lion and an ox are called parts of animal.

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Potential parts (dépendances; aangehoorigheden, machtelijke deelen) are so called by a likeness to the powers of the soul, for example, the sensitive, nutritive, and volitional powers, which have power from the soul but not its whole power; and therefore they are habits which in something agree with the cardinal virtue, but in something else fall short of its perfect notion. They are called annexed virtues (vertus annexées, ou qui s'y rattachent; toegevoegde deugden).

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Besides, to the individual principal virtues there corresponds some one of the gifts of the Holy Spirit (I, n. 633).

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All these things must now be determined for prudence.

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  1. Moderns are accustomed to affirm that certain other virtues are reduced to the cardinal virtues also as integral parts. But, according to St. Thomas, integral parts are not virtues, but conditions of virtue. Cf. I-II, q. 57, a. 6, ad 4; and III Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, qc. 1.

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