Previous Marriage

576. Nature of the Impediment. 1. The impediment of bond consists in this, that a spouse bound by the bond of matrimony cannot enter valid matrimony unless the prior matrimony has first been duly dissolved: for one who has already handed over the right over his body to one person cannot hand over the same right to another unless the prior contract has been legitimately dissolved.¹

By the name bond is understood the matrimonial bond by which each spouse is bound to the other. This impediment was constituted so that the unity of matrimony may be preserved.

2. This impediment is founded on the dogma concerning the unity and indissolubility of matrimony. Wherefore it is of secondary natural law if the man attempts to enter another matrimony while his wife is still living; but if the wife attempts to enter matrimony while her husband is still living, the impediment is of primary natural law.

The Church has taught at every time that, while a prior matrimony exists, a new other matrimony cannot validly be entered, even if the second matrimony has been consummated and the first was only ratified. Wherefore it holds the second matrimony simply as concubinage, although a secular judge or religious sect has declared the first matrimony dissolved. But in the polygamy of infidels, the first wife is to be held as legitimate, unless the matrimony is shown to be invalid because of some diriment impediment.

¹ Matt. 19, 9. 1 Cor. 7, 39. Cn. 1069, 1: One invalidly attempts matrimony who is held by the bond of a prior matrimony, although not consummated, saving the privilege of the faith.

577. Certainty Concerning the Free State. 1. In order that a second matrimony can be licitly entered, it is required that it be established with moral certainty that the prior matrimony has truly been dissolved; nor is probability concerning the death of the spouse sufficient, however great it may be:¹ for it is not licit to expose a sacrament to danger of nullity outside a case of necessity. Wherefore a second matrimony entered without certain knowledge concerning the dissolution of the prior one is gravely illicit, but nevertheless valid if the prior matrimony has truly been dissolved.

2. Concerning the obtaining of this moral certainty several instructions of the Roman congregations have appeared,² from which these things are had:

a. The long absence of one spouse does not suffice, nor mere report concerning that person's death, nor the affirmation of one witness, unless he is above every exception and his testimony is confirmed from the circumstances. But positive and legitimate proof is required, such as ordinarily is either an authentic document or, if this cannot be had, the testimonies of two witnesses who are above every exception.

b. Extraordinarily, proof by indications is also admitted, which, taken together, suffice for obtaining moral certainty; relying on these, the ecclesiastical judge authentically declares the death of the spouse.

If the death of the spouse occurred in the very parish in which the second nuptials are celebrated, testimony is not required, since the matter concerns a fact publicly known. But if the spouse died in another place, the authentic testimony of the parish priest of the place where the death occurred is required. This testimony must be furnished with the parochial seal, and if it must be acquired from a distant diocese, also with the seal of the episcopal curia.³ If authentic testimony of this sort cannot be obtained, the matter no longer pertains to the parish priest, but must be referred to the ordinary. What must be done in this case is taught by the cited instruction of the Holy Office.

If a spouse in good faith contracted a new matrimony while the other party was still living, this matrimony, after the death of the other party has actually followed, does not become valid of itself, but consent must be renewed.

¹ Cn. 1069, 2: Although the prior matrimony is invalid or dissolved, it is not therefore licit to contract another before the nullity or dissolution of the prior one has been legitimately and certainly established.

² Instruction of the Holy Office (1870) for proving the death of some spouse; instruction of Clement X, August 21, 1670, which prescribes procuring full certainty concerning the free state of the contracting parties. Cf. Acta S. Sedis VI, p. 436 ff.

³ In order that matrimony be held valid in the civil forum, in Austria (G. A. n. 112 ff.) testimony of the civil authority concerning the death of the spouse is required; before this testimony has been obtained, the parish priest cannot proceed to the nuptials. Although this civil testimony does not suffice in the ecclesiastical forum, nevertheless the ecclesiastical judge can be assisted by it.

One who is already married cannot validly contract a second marriage unless the former bond is dissolved by one of the means described above, or by the death of the other spouse. Previous marriage, then, is a diriment impediment of a second marriage as long as it subsists, by the law of nature and by positive divine law. This impediment, therefore, binds all men, whether Christian or heathen. It is not lawful for one who has been married before to contract a second marriage, unless there is certain proof that the first marriage has been dissolved by lawful authority or by the death of the former spouse (Can. 1069).

If the decease is proved by a certificate of death or some similar authentic document, or by two witnesses who are above suspicion, or by any other legitimate means, the parish priest may allow the second marriage. If, however, there is no certain - proof to be had, and it is doubtful whether the party in question is free to marry, the case must be referred to the bishop, who will investigate the circumstances, and if any prudent doubt remain he will not allow the second marriage without consulting the Holy See. Sometimes in special circumstances the Pope allows a second marriage, even when strict proof of the death of the former spouse is not obtainable, as he did in the case of the wives of the Italian soldiers who perished in the battle of Adoua.¹

¹ S.0., July 20, 1898.

If a person has unlawfully contracted a second marriage without the necessary certainty concerning the death of a former spouse, it does not follow that the second marriage is invalid, and that the parties must separate. If there is only slight doubt about the death of the former spouse, after making fruitless inquiries, the parties may live together as man and wife. If only one of the parties is in bad faith and is not certain of the death of a former spouse, while the other knows nothing of the difficulty, he should render the marriage debt, but he has no right to ask it as long as he remains in bad faith. If both parties are in bad faith, they cannot lawfully use marriage as long as they are in that state. Inquiries should be made, and if probable reasons can be discovered for thinking that the former partner is dead, they may use marriage, according to a probable opinion. For even in this case the marriage has been contracted, it is probably valid, and it is not certain that anyone else has a prior right, so the parties should be allowed to use it. If the second marriage was contracted in good faith, and a doubt about the death of a former spouse arises subsequently, inquiries should be made, and if they are fruitless the parties may live as man and wife. Of course, in all cases when it is found out for certain that a former spouse is alive, the second marriage is invalid, and the parties must separate, or at any rate must not live as man and wife together.

English law enforces this impediment, but if a former spouse has not been heard of for seven years or more, it will not punish the other party as guilty of bigamy if he marries a second time, although he must separate if the former spouse appear subsequently.

IV. Honesty of matrimony; concerning which note:

1. Matrimony is objectively honorable. This is clear first from the fact that God instituted it, Christ raised it to the dignity of a sacrament, and Sacred Scripture commends it.¹ It is clear next from the fact that it is the single means of fittingly obtaining the propagation of the human race willed by God (n. 714); likewise from the fact that matrimony is ordered "not only to propagating the human race, but to begetting offspring for the Church, citizens of the saints and members of the household of God; namely, that a people might be procreated and educated for the worship and religion of the true God and of Christ our Savior."²

Corollary. All who are capable of matrimony can contract matrimony, unless they are prohibited by law (canon 1035). This also holds concerning those who can procreate only miserable offspring. "It is certainly not lawful," says Pius XI, "to burden with grave fault those men, otherwise capable of matrimony, who, even after all care and diligence have been employed, are conjectured to beget only defective offspring, if they contract marriage, although often matrimony must be dissuaded for them."³

Nor can the aforesaid persons of themselves, at least practically, be accused of light fault; for with regard to offspring, it is always better for the offspring to be thus than not to be;⁴ and with regard to the inconveniences that will arise for society and family, it is not established that the most valid right of contracting matrimony does not prevail over the avoidance of those inconveniences. Add that even those of whom we speak, by procreating offspring, however miserable, conduce to the good of the species (vol. I, n. 740). This is confirmed by the practice of the Church, which in no way keeps the said persons from matrimony (St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 64, a. 1, ad 4; St. Alphonsus VI, 951).

Whether the State can forbid matrimony to some will be explained under V.

2. Matrimony, although it is objectively honorable, does not oblige individual persons, because only that precept obliges individual persons which of itself and first regards the good of individuals. But the precept of matrimony of itself and first does not regard the good of individuals, but the good of the multitude or species (St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 3, ch. 137; II-II, q. 152, a. 2). Accidentally there can be an obligation, for example if someone has procreated offspring from some woman.

There are those who judge that the law of matrimony was imposed on the human race; this does not please others, because one cannot grasp a precept which does not oblige determinate persons and cannot be fulfilled by the community as such. Moreover, God can reach, and does reach, the willed end without a precept, that is, the propagation of the human race, namely by implanting in human nature the capacity and vehement inclination for generating.

Objection. From the fact that some power is conferred on man, an obligation of using it is rightly deduced. But the generative power is conferred on individual persons.

Response. The major, besides the fact that it must be distinguished in multiple ways, certainly is to be denied if it is a question of a power conferred for the good of the species, because it suffices that many use it. "Namely, from divine providence," says St. Thomas, "those things are given to man which are necessary for the whole species, and yet it is not necessary that every man use each one of them. For the industry of building and the power for fighting have been given to man, and yet it is not necessary that all be builders or soldiers. Similarly, although the power of generating and those things which are ordered to its act have been provided for man by God, nevertheless it is not necessary that every man intend the act of generation" (Contra Gentiles, book 3, ch. 136).

3. Matrimony, however honorable it is, nevertheless must be placed after virginity and chaste celibacy; likewise chaste widowhood after second nuptials.

The former has been proved and vindicated against objections in the treatise on the offices of clerics (vol. I, n. 1168); the latter is clear from canon 1142, and rests on the same principles.⁵

¹ 1 Cor. 7:9, 28, 36, 39; 1 Tim. 4:1-3; 5:14; Eph. 5:22-23; Heb. 13:4.

² Encyclical of Leo XIII, Arcanum, February 10, 1880; Encyclical of Pius XI, Casti connubii, December 31, 1930 (A.A.S. 1930, p. 544).

³ Encyclical Casti connubii (A.A.S. 1930, p. 565).

⁴ Cf. our little work On the Virtue of Chastity and the Opposed Vices, n. 98.

⁵ Cf. our little work On the Virtue of Chastity and the Opposed Vices, nn. 18-19.

I. Notion of the solemn blessing. The solemn blessing of nuptials, which is found in the Mass inscribed "Mass for Bridegroom and Bride," consists of three prayers, namely Propitiare, Deus qui potestate, and Deus Abraham. The first two are said immediately after the Pater noster, the third before the prayer Placeat tibi, Sancta Trinitas.

II. Nuptials which can be blessed. All nuptials can be blessed, except: 1° marriages between a Catholic party and a non-Catholic party (canon 1102, § 2); 2° if it is a question of a woman to whom the solemn blessing has once been given (canon 1143); 3° if there is question of a man who has once received the solemn blessing, unless a contrary custom is in force, for this must be observed;² 4° if it is a question of marriage with one notoriously excommunicated.³

III. Obligation of the solemn blessing. For the faithful there seems to be an obligation of requesting the solemn blessing on the occasion of marriage or afterwards. But the obligation lies upon the pastor of taking care that the faithful receive it at the time of the nuptials or shortly after. Yet the obligation of each is only light; indeed, if the spouses have already lived for a long time in marriage, a true obligation seems to be absent.

1. The obligation of the faithful seems to be deduced from the response of the Holy Office which speaks of "the precept of the Church."⁴

2. The obligation of the pastor follows from canon 1101, § 1, from the Roman Ritual,⁵ from several responses of the Sacred Congregations,⁶ and from the obligation of the faithful.

3. That the obligation is only light is admitted rather commonly (St. Alphonsus VI, 984, 988). That the obligation is absent if the spouses have already lived for a long time in marriage seems to have to be deduced from these words of canon 1101, § 1: "which can be given to them even after they have lived for a long time in marriage." If, however, it is requested, the pastor is bound to grant it.⁷

IV. At what time can the solemn blessing be imparted? 1. The solemn blessing cannot be given except within Mass (canon 1101, § 1).⁸

2. It can be imparted on all days, except:

a) During the closed time (canon 1101, § 1), that is, from the first Sunday of Advent up to and including the day of the Nativity of the Lord, and from Ash Wednesday up to and including Easter Sunday (canon 1108, § 2). Yet local Ordinaries can, with due regard for liturgical laws, permit it even in the aforesaid times for a just cause, with the spouses warned that they abstain from excessive pomp (canon 1108, § 3).⁹ If the nuptials are celebrated during the closed time, with the nuptial blessing not granted by the Ordinary, the Mass with its proper blessing is deferred to the day on which, outside the closed time, the Mass for Bridegroom and Bride or its commemoration is permitted.¹⁰

b) On the day of the Commemoration of All the Faithful Departed.¹¹

c) If only one Mass is celebrated on a day on which a funeral Mass must be said which cannot be deferred.

d) During a general local interdict (canon 2271, 2°); likewise in a parish church, during a particular local interdict laid upon that church (canon 2272, § 3, 2°).¹²

V. Who can impart the solemn blessing? Only that priest, either himself or through another, can give the solemn blessing who can validly and licitly assist at the marriage (canon 1101, § 2). Moreover, it is not prohibited that one person take part in the marriage, and another celebrate the Mass and also impart the solemn blessing - not another, for example a deacon.

VI. Things to be noted. 1. On days on which the Mass "for Bridegroom and Bride" is permitted, this Mass must be said,¹³ and it is illicit to add the nuptial blessing to the Mass of the office of the day; but when the said Mass is prohibited, the nuptial blessing is added to the Mass of the office of the day.

2. Within the same Mass several persons can receive the nuptial blessing, with the formulas of the blessing changed and pronounced only once.¹⁴

3. Although there is no obligation of communicating within the nuptial Mass, nevertheless the spouses are to be exhorted to communicate in the said Mass, or at least on that day.¹⁵

¹ We follow our little work On the Form of the Promise and Celebration of Matrimony.

² Roman Ritual, title VII, chapter 1, n. 18. The Holy See, however, sometimes permits that special prayers be recited over a widow already blessed; see the formula in the Roman Ritual, Appendix on Matrimony II.

³ Roman Ritual, loc. cit.; rescript of Pius VI to Cardinal de Franckenberg, July 13, 1782; Sacred Penitentiary, December 10, 1860.

⁴ July 6, 1817 (Collectanea, n. 725).

⁵ Roman Ritual, loc. cit., n. 16.

⁶ Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide, September 21, 1843, ad II (Collectanea, n. 971); Holy Office, August 31, 1881 (Collectanea, n. 1457).

⁷ Holy Office, August 31, 1881 (Collectanea, n. 1457).

⁸ Roman Ritual, title VII, chapter 1, n. 16; Sacred Congregation of Rites, June 23, 1853 (n. 1557); August 14, 1858 (n. 3079); Holy Office, August 31, 1881. The Holy See sometimes permits that, when Mass is not said, the nuptial blessing be granted outside Mass, according to the formula of the Roman Ritual, On Matrimony I.

⁹ Sacred Congregation of Rites, September 25, 1875, ad I (n. 3380).

¹⁰ Roman Missal, Additions and Variations II, n. 2.

¹¹ Roman Missal, Rubrics in the votive Mass for Bridegroom and Bride.

¹² Holy Office, September 3, 1817 (Collectanea, n. 726).

¹³ Holy Office, September 1, 1841, 5° (Collectanea, n. 938).

¹⁴ Sacred Congregation of Rites, June 23, 1853, ad I (n. 3016); June 30, 1896, ad VI (n. 3922).

¹⁵ Sacred Congregation of Rites, March 21, 1874 (n. 3329); June 30, 1896, ad VI (n. 3922).

I. Notion. By the impediment of bond is understood the bond of a valid marriage; while that bond endures, another marriage cannot validly be contracted.

II. Existence of the impediment. The bond diriments marriage by divine law, both natural and positive; this follows from what was said concerning the unity and indissolubility of marriage (St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 65, a. 1; St. Alphonsus VI, 1060). The impediment is confirmed by ecclesiastical law (canon 1069).

III. Cessation of the impediment. The impediment ceases through the dissolution of the matrimonial bond. In what ways this can happen, apart from the death of the other party, see n. 720 and following.

IV. Requisites in order that it be lawful to pass to new nuptials. Although the prior marriage is invalid or dissolved for any cause whatever, it is not therefore lawful to contract another before the nullity or dissolution of the prior marriage is legitimately and certainly established (canon 1069, § 2). Therefore it is required that concerning the nullity or dissolution of the prior marriage: 1° it be certainly established; 2° it be legitimately established. It must be certainly established, because it is not lawful to expose oneself either to the danger of inflicting injury upon the prior or possessing marriage, or to the danger of contracting the new marriage invalidly (St. Alphonsus VI, 981, 1060). It must be legitimately established because, since the matter concerns the external forum, private certainty does not suffice. Now:

1. In the case of nullity of marriage there is required a sentence of the competent ecclesiastical judge, rendered and announced with the order of law being observed. But spouses have the right of contracting new nuptials after ten days have elapsed from the announcement of the second sentence (canon 1987).

"When from a certain and authentic document, which is subject to no contradiction or exception, the existence of an impediment of disparity of cult, order, solemn vow of chastity, ligamen, consanguinity, affinity, or spiritual relationship has been established, and at the same time it has appeared with like certainty that a dispensation upon these impediments has not been given, in these cases, with the solemnities so far enumerated being omitted, the Ordinary, the parties having been cited, can declare the nullity of the marriage, but with the intervention of the defender of the bond" (canon 1990; cf. also canons 1991 and 1992). Indeed, if the union does not even have the appearance of marriage, as a merely civil marriage entered by persons subject to the ecclesiastical juridic form, the Ordinary, or even the pastor after consulting the Ordinary, can permit new nuptials, with every juridic formality being omitted and without intervention of the defender of the bond.¹ Finally, if in the judgment of the Ordinary the first marriage is certainly null, and in the place is unknown to all, we judge that for the internal forum the spouses are not to be disturbed in a second marriage contracted in good faith.²

Note. The Holy Office responded to the Bishops of Tonkin:³ "But if, after suitable investigations have been made, it is established that infidels entered marriage without observing those things which by the law or custom of the kingdom are required for validity, and one or the other of them comes to baptism and wishes to enter nuptials with a faithful person, those nuptials are not to be permitted unless license has been obtained from the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, or unless an interpellation made of the prior spouse has fallen to no effect."

2. In the case of dissolution of marriage by Pontifical dispensation or by religious profession, there is required an authentic document of the dispensation granted or of the profession made; if there is question of religious profession, the non-consummation of the marriage must also legitimately be evident.

3. In the case of dissolution of marriage by the death of the other party, the required certainty is first obtained through evidence of a public fact. But how it is to be acquired in a case in which the said evidence is lacking is set forth by the Instruction of the Holy Office.⁴ In view of it, first note that merely negative proofs, such as absence alone, however long continued, do not suffice,⁵ unlike what holds in civil law for several nations. Therefore positive proofs are required. Now:

a) Before others, "an authentic document must by all means be sought with diligent care: namely, one drawn from the registers of the parish or hospital or military service, or even, if it cannot be had from ecclesiastical authority, from the civil government of the place in which, as is supposed, the person died" (cited Instruction, n. 2; cf. canon 1813, § 1, 4°).

b) If the document is lacking, it must be seen whether two witnesses can be had who are trustworthy, sworn, and who depose concerning their own fact, knew the deceased, and agree with each other concerning the place and cause of death and the other substantial circumstances (cited Instruction, n. 3; cf. canons 1791 and 1828).

c) In default of two witnesses, even one witness is admitted, "provided that that witness is endowed with the conditions enumerated in n. 3, is subject to no exception, and moreover his deposition is supported by other grave aids, and at least nothing is found in his testimony which is not congruous and wholly probable" (cited Instruction, n. 4).

d) In default of any witness, "proof of death from conjectures, indications, and circumstances of any kind must certainly be procured by a careful and very cautious investigation, namely so that, with several things collected from here and there and their nature weighed..., the judgment of a prudent man can be moved to affirm death by the greatest probability, or moral certainty" (cited Instruction, n. 6).

e) Report also, aided by other supports, constitutes an argument concerning death, under these conditions, namely: that it be proved by at least two trustworthy and sworn witnesses, who depose concerning the reasonable cause of the report itself, whether they received it from the greater and sounder part of the people, and whether they themselves think rightly concerning the same report; nor must there be doubt that it was stirred up by those for whose benefit inquiry is being made (cited Instruction, n. 8).

If the matter remains doubtful, and if there is hope of success, let the Ordinary have recourse to the Holy See.

Corollary I. If someone, after waiting in vain for the return of the other party for several years, in bad faith marries another, the spouses must be separated.⁶

Corollary II. If persons, after waiting in vain for the return of the other party, judged that party to be dead, and in good faith entered new nuptials, the spouses should be left in good faith until news is had of the life of the other party.⁷

Corollary III. If the death of the prior spouse is legitimately and certainly established, the pastor can assist at the new nuptials without recourse to the Ordinary, unless there is question of vagi. If some doubt remains, the Ordinary should be consulted; and this must regularly be done if death cannot be proved except in the way set forth under d or e.

¹ Pontifical Commission, October 16, 1919, ad XVII (A.A.S. 1919, p. 476).

² Gasparri, I, n. 633.

³ September 24, 1915.

⁴ May 13, 1868.

⁵ Rescript of Pius VI to the Archbishop of Prague, July 11, 1788; cf. Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide, March 22, 1865, ad 1 (Collectanea, n. 1272).

⁶ Holy Office, March 22, 1865 (Collectanea, n. 1272, ad 1).

⁷ Holy Office, March 22, 1865 (Collectanea, n. 1272, ad 1).

4. Permission, made by the Holy See, to pass to other nuptials because of the presumed death of the spouse always carries with it dispensation from the impediment arising from adultery with promise or attempted marriage, if any such dispensation is needed, but by no means dispensation from the impediment of which canon 1075, nn. 2, 3 treats (canon 1053).¹

¹ Canon 1075, nn. 2, 3 treats of adultery with murder of a spouse and of murder of a spouse alone.

V. Penalty against bigamists. Bigamists, that is, those who, notwithstanding the conjugal bond, have attempted another marriage, even one merely civil, as they say, are infamous by the fact itself; and if, after the Ordinary's warning has been spurned, they persist in the illicit concubinage, they are to be excommunicated or punished with personal interdict according to the different gravity of guilt (canon 2356). Moreover, from infamy there arises irregularity (canon 984, 5°); if copula has followed, there arises the impediment of crime (canon 1075); the children are adulterine or, after the legitimate other party has died, illegitimate. The bigamists themselves - if the crime is public - are public sinners, and therefore, unless they repent, are to be barred from the sacraments (canon 855), from the office of sponsor (canon 765), and from ecclesiastical burial (canon 1240); besides this, the woman delivered of a child is to lack the blessing after childbirth.

1. Sabinus, wishing to contract marriage, asks the confessor whether he can effect this. The reason for his doubting is his natural debility, by force of which, although he himself can pour forth seed, nevertheless he experiences no erection. Without any hesitation the confessor responds affirmatively, because, he says, on the authority of many and grave theologians, it suffices that seed can be poured forth at the mouth of the vagina, which Sabinus can certainly accomplish.

It is asked: What is to be said to the case?

R. The confessor's undoubting response does not seem to be approved. For Sabinus first does not seem able licitly to contract marriage. For the wife could be wholly unwilling as to that imperfect mode of coming together. Then also, once marriage has been contracted, scandals can easily arise. For, with that imperfect mode of coitus standing, if dissensions arise between the spouses, they will immediately seek divorce, and will institute a lawsuit, and will introduce the cause from the head of the impotence of the man, as is evident from the fact itself. But neither does he seem able validly to enter marriage. For Sabinus labors under the impediment of impotence, which is called the impediment of frigidity. For this impediment, in impotence, is not in the impotence of generation, nor is it in the impotence of pouring forth seed, but it is in the impotence of coition, as is to be seen through almost the whole title de Frigidis et Maleficiatis. The impediment of impotence surely exists when there is impotence for consummating marriage. But then marriage is properly said to be consummated when it is established that copula sufficient for generation has intervened, as the S. C. C. teaches in the Nuscana marriage case, Sept. 11, 1880. Where, therefore, impotence is had for accomplishing that copula, an impediment is had to the marriage itself. Most clear on this matter is the doctrine of St. Thomas: "Although the act of carnal copula is not of the essence of marriage, nevertheless potency for this is of its essence, because through marriage there is given to each spouse power over the body of the other with respect to carnal copula." 4, D. 34, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1. Hence the Angelic Doctor then concludes, ibid. ad 6, that with respect to the impediment of marriage "the same judgment is to be made concerning the narrowness of the woman and the frigidity of the man," namely, because of impotence of coition in both cases.

2. Fabia, wishing to contract marriage with Fabius, asks her confessor whether she can; for she has purposely undergone the excision of an ovary, namely, so that, after marriage is then entered into, she may not have children. There is no difficulty, says the confessor. And he responds thus because he judges that marriage pertains also to the mutual assistance of life and to restraining concupiscence. D'Annib., p. 3, n. 431, note 9, ed. 3. Nevertheless the parish priest raises a difficulty, and requires the attestation of a surgeon, by which it may be established that generation is not physically impossible, with attention to the manner in which that excision of the ovary was accomplished. And when Fabia did not acquiesce in this decision, the matter was brought to the bishop, who wholly approved the decision of the parish priest.

It is asked: What is to be said to the case?

R. Certainly the most prudent manner of acting of the parish priest and the decision of the bishop are to be approved. For if it is established that the ovaries were altogether perfectly excised, so that generation is physically impossible, marriage is impossible. But otherwise, if that excision was wholly imperfect, of part of an ovary or of only one ovary. Likewise it is impossible that marriage be also for mutual assistance of life and for quieting concupiscence, unless it is marriage. But marriage is essentially a conjunction in order to offspring. Hence Augustine, praised by the Angelic Doctor, "says against Faustus that a woman ought not to marry for any other thing, except that she be a mother." But where offspring is physically impossible, conjunction in order to that offspring is impossible. S. Th., 3 p., q. 75, a. 2, apud Cajetan. Likewise from the same Angelic Doctor, apud the same Cajetan, q. 76, a. 1, the conjunction which is the sacrament in marriage is a conjunction which is for the office of nature. A conjunction which would not be for the office of nature cannot be marriage as a sacrament, and therefore neither a remedy of concupiscence. And once the office of nature has been excluded, neither can the assistance of life be had in a wife, namely such as nature itself intends. "Woman was made principally for this, that she might be a help to man for offspring; but man was not made for this." S. Th., ib., q. 75, a. 2, ad 1. And in the Council of Florence, Decree for the Armenians, marriage as sacrament is said to have been instituted by Christ Our Lord so that the Church may be CORPOREALLY INCREASED through it. Once the physical possibility of offspring has been excluded, and, on the contrary, the physical impossibility of offspring established, how can it any longer be true that this sacrament IS ORDERED TO THE MULTIPLICATION OF THE CHURCH, as the same Council of Florence has it? I. M. 994, 995.

3. "1. A certain woman, after she had waited in vain for two or three years for the return of her husband, was united in marriage to another man, notwithstanding the admonitions which the missionary made to both; now the second husband of this woman, repenting of the deed, would wish to leave her and pass to other vows. - 2. Another woman, since she also had waited in vain for the return of her husband, after three years, judging that he was already dead, in good faith joined herself in marriage to another man; and since it is now impossible to investigate whether the first husband is still living or is in reality dead, it is asked whether she herself can be left in the use of the second marriage contracted until certainty is had concerning the life of the first husband?"

R. The Holy Office, March 24, 1865, responded: "As to the first, that the spouses are to be separated, and that the man cannot enter second nuptials until it is morally certain that, at the time when he himself entered marriage with the woman in question, the first husband of that same woman had already died. As to the second, that they are to be left in good faith." Cf. E. M. 996.

4. There is a husband who, after 14 years, has not yet been able to have information concerning his wife. Can he enter other nuptials?

R. Negatively. "A lapse of time, of whatever length, is not sufficient for spouses to be permitted to enter new nuptials, unless first it has been established with moral certainty that the former spouse has died, as from c. In praesentia 19, de Sponsalibus." S. C. de P. F., Apr. 21, 1788; Collect. n. 1365, 1366, 1368; I. M. 996.

833. • By prior bond is understood the bond of matrimony by which spouses are so bound to one another that, while both are living, neither can enter a valid matrimony with any other person.

The impediment of prior bond is founded upon two attributes of matrimony, which are indissolubility and unity. Hence it is deduced that the impediment of prior bond is of divine law.

834. Resolutions. - 1. One who in good faith believes that a spouse is dead when in fact the spouse is living, and proceeds to other nuptials, does not indeed sin, but contracts invalidly and is bound to return to the prior spouse when that spouse appears.

2. Therefore, for entering a new matrimony, the absence alone of the spouse, however great it may be, does not suffice; rather, certain and authentic proofs of death are required ¹. - Thus from Canon law, canon In praesentia 19, On Betrothals.

¹ Concerning these indications or proofs, see Schmalzgrueber, book 4, title 21, nos. 10-11.

3. The moral certitude required by law is not obtained through even a public rumor unless it is supported by some positive proof, nor through a single witness unless other indications are present, concerning which it belongs to the Bishop alone to judge. Hence in doubt recourse must always be had to the Bishop ². But while the doubt remains, he cannot permit the celebration of the matrimony. Nevertheless, the matrimony which would be celebrated in such doubt would be valid, although gravely illicit, if the spouse concerning whose death doubt existed were in fact dead.

² Giraldi, on chapter In praesentia 19, On Betrothals, perhaps too harshly requires that recourse be had to the Ordinary if there is legitimate proof only through witnesses, as though that moral certitude which, according to the opinion of all, suffices could not be had in this manner.

803. Preliminary note. Enough was already said above, n. 659 ff., concerning the unity and indissolubility of matrimony, and therefore the things contained there are presupposed as known. From all history not even one certain example can be adduced in which a Pope permitted one man to have two wives at the same time, and much less one woman to have two husbands at the same time. But the things which are adduced concerning the Count of Gleichen, to whom Gregory IX is said to have conceded two wives, and concerning a Swiss man, to whom Pius VI is said to have granted the same, are fables meriting no belief.⁶⁴ - On the contrary, it is certain that Luther, with the consent of seven other Protestant theologians, on March 4, 1540, benignly granted that Philip, Landgrave of Hesse, while retaining his first wife, might take another.⁶⁵ This example is not unique among Protestants; indeed, even to our days they teach and effect the dissolution of even consummated matrimony as regards the bond. But the Catholic Church defined in the Council of Trent:⁶⁶ "If anyone says that it is lawful for Christians to have several wives at the same time, and that this is prohibited by no divine law, let him be anathema"; and she established in the Code of Canon Law, can. 1069: "One who is held by the bond of a prior matrimony invalidly attempts matrimony, although the prior matrimony has not been consummated, without prejudice to the privilege of faith" (that is, excepting the Pauline privilege).

Notion. The impediment of bond is the incapacity for contracting a new matrimony while the bond of a prior valid matrimony endures, whether ratified or consummated.

This impediment is of divine law, as is evident from the Council of Trent cited above, and it is never dispensed.⁶⁷ If the preceding matrimony is doubtfully valid, a judicial process is required by which the validity or invalidity of the matrimony is declared, as will be said below. But if there is doubt whether the first matrimony has been dissolved by the death of the spouse, then an authentic declaration of death is required, concerning which the following things are to be noted:

⁶⁴ Cf. Döllinger, Papstfabeln, 34 ff.; Wernz-Vidal, Ius can. V, n. 243, notes 18 and 21.

⁶⁵ Cf. Rockwell, Doppelehe Philipps, 1904.

⁶⁶ Sess. 24, can. 2, on the sacrament of matrimony (Denz., n. 972).

⁶⁷ How matrimony can be dissolved as regards the bond was said above, n. 665 ff.

804. A declaration of death must be pronounced by ecclesiastical authority. For a declaration of death made by civil governments, which are sometimes too lenient in this matter, by no means suffices. The general rule is: moral certainty is required concerning the death of the other party as having truly occurred, so that every prudent doubt is altogether excluded. But for affirming this moral certainty, the mere absence of the spouse for a long time, such as civil governments admit, does not suffice; rather, it is required that the method prescribed by the Holy Office⁶⁸ be observed, namely: a) first of all, an authentic document of death is to be diligently sought from the registers of the parish, military, hospital, or civil magistracy; b) if such a document cannot be had, at least two trustworthy witnesses are to be heard, who are bound to say under oath what they think in the case concerning the death. If they are not eyewitnesses, the testimony of hearsay witnesses can also be accepted. But if two witnesses cannot be found, even the testimony of one trustworthy witness has great weight. c) If not even one witness can be found who can give sufficient testimony of the death, proof of the death is to be investigated from conjectures, presumptions, indications, etc. - Thus, for example, the Holy Office on July 20, 1898, granted to the bishops of Italy the faculty of conceding a document of freedom to the wives of soldiers who fought at Adwa in Africa and of whom no memory remained, notwithstanding the investigations made by the government.

From what has been said it clearly appears that the parish priest cannot assist at nuptials unless he has moral certainty concerning the free state of each person about to marry; but if even a slight doubt remains, he must refer everything to the episcopal curia, whose office it is then to determine what must be done. But before issuing a declaration of death, the bishop must observe the statutes of the Instruction of the Holy Office cited above. In more difficult cases, however, it seems better (although not strictly necessary) to institute a judicial process or to have recourse to the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments.⁶⁹ But if, notwithstanding all the cautions employed, the declaration of death was false and the first spouse unexpectedly appears, the second nuptials are invalid and must be dissolved immediately.

⁶⁸ This entire Instruction, given on May 13, 1868, was printed again in Acta Ap. Sedis II, 199-203, in the year 1910.

⁶⁹ Cf. Sacred Congregation of the Council, December 14, 1889; and Holy Office, May 6, 1891, ad 3. See such cases resolved by the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments on December 18, 1914, and June 25, 1915 (Acta Ap. Sed. VII, 40 ff., 476 ff.).

805. Penalties against those violating the impediment of bond.

1. If someone in good faith contracted second nuptials while bound by the impediment of bond, he did not sin and therefore incurred no ecclesiastical penalty; nevertheless, when the truth of the matter has become known, he must immediately separate himself from the second spouse, as was just said. - Children born from such a matrimony are held to be legitimate, as born from a putative matrimony.

2. One who knowingly attempted second nuptials incurs a) the impediment of crime;⁷⁰ for which reason he cannot remain with the second spouse without a prior special dispensation, even after the death of the first spouse. How such a dispensation is to be given will be said below, where matrimonial dispensations will be discussed; b) irregularity because of bigamy; c) infamy of law; d) if, in contempt of the Ordinary's warning, he persists in the illicit cohabitation, he is to be excommunicated or punished with a personal interdict.⁷¹ By particular law, the faithful are sometimes punished with a latae sententiae excommunication reserved to the bishop if, after obtaining a civil divorce, they attempt a new matrimony.⁷² - Children born from such a matrimony are illegitimate, as being adulterine.

3. Polygamists are held to be public sinners, and therefore they are to be barred from the sacraments, the blessings of the Church, and ecclesiastical burial. Hence, for example, in this case a woman cannot receive the blessing of a woman after childbirth.⁷³

⁷⁰ Cf. below, n. 825.

⁷¹ c. 3, X, I, 21; Code of Canon Law, can. 2356.

⁷² Thus, for example, it was established for North America by the Third Council of Baltimore (1884), n. 124.

⁷³ Cf. Gasparri, De matrim. I, n. 632.

S. Th., Suppl., q. 65, a. 1.

881. The impediment of bond or ligamen (lien conjugal; bestaande huwelijksband) consists in this, that a spouse is incapable of entering a new matrimony while the bond of the prior one endures; therefore it is the very bond of the prior matrimony, whether consummated or non-consummated, by which one spouse is so bound to the other that, while that bond endures, he cannot enter matrimony with any other.

For this impediment two conditions are required:

1° That the prior matrimony be valid, whether it has been consummated or not consummated.

2° That the bond of the prior matrimony has not been legitimately dissolved, which happens by death, and can happen by solemn religious profession and pontifical dispensation for non-consummated matrimony, and, for consummated matrimony, by the Pauline privilege, namely of departing from the unbelieving party, if this is necessary in favor of the faith.

882. Principle. He who is held by the bond of a prior matrimony invalidly attempts matrimony, although it was not consummated, saving the privilege of the faith. - Thus can. 1069, § 1.

The impediment is of natural and divine law, which diriments matrimony to be contracted. For he who has handed over the right over his body to one person cannot hand over the same right to another, unless the prior contract has been legitimately dissolved. It is founded in the essential properties of matrimony, namely unity and indissolubility; and it also binds unbelievers.

Hence: 1° He who, in good faith thinking the other party dead while that party is still living, passes to other nuptials, contracts invalidly, although he does not sin; nevertheless offspring received from the second union is reputed legitimate (can. 1114).

2° On the contrary, one thinking the other party who is dead to be still living sins gravely when he enters a new union, although this can be valid, according to what was said n. 808, 2.

3° He who after contracting other nuptials discovers that the prior spouse is still living must separate himself from the second spouse, even if he has begotten offspring with that spouse and grave evils are to be feared from the separation, because the second nuptials are certainly null. And of himself he is bound to return to the prior spouse, unless a just cause of separation is given.

883. Practical corollary. - "Although the prior matrimony is invalid or dissolved from any cause whatever, it is not therefore licit to contract another before the nullity or dissolution of the prior one has been legitimately and certainly established," can. 1069, § 2; otherwise the matrimony is exposed to the danger of nullity, and the contracting parties to the danger of adultery.

a) It must be established certainly; therefore probability or verisimilitude does not suffice, nor a fortiori doubt or ignorance arising from the fact that the spouse after departure has sent no message; but true moral certitude is required.

b) It must be established legitimately; therefore in even a slight doubt there must be obtained an authentic declaration of the Ordinary or of the Holy See concerning the death of the spouse, or concerning the invalidity or legitimate dissolution or dissolubility of the prior matrimony. 1

884. Penalties against violators of the impediment acting in bad faith are noted in can. 2356: "Bigamists, i.e., those who, with a conjugal bond standing in the way, have attempted another matrimony, even only a civil one, as they say, are by the fact itself infamous; and if, after the admonition of the Ordinary has been scorned, they persist in illicit cohabitation, let them, according to the diverse gravity of guilt, be excommunicated or punished by personal interdict," namely by a sentence to be brought.

1. Concerning the mode by which the death of a spouse or the nullity of matrimony must be established, cf. decree of the Holy Office, Apr. 27, 1887, with instruction May 13, 1868; response July 20, 1898; and response of the interpreting commission, Oct. 16, 1919. Let it be noted that license to pass to other nuptials includes dispensation from the impediment of crime on account of adultery alone, even if a license of this kind was conceded by the local Ordinary (can. 1053 and its interpretation by the Commission for the Interpretation of the Code, March 26, 1952).

113. • I. Notion.

"He invalidly attempts matrimony who is held by the bond of a prior matrimony, although not consummated, saving the privilege of faith." (Can. 1069, § 1.)

It is a corollary of those things which we said concerning the two properties of matrimony, namely unity and indissolubility, chap. I, art. II, §§ 1 and 2.

114. • II. Nature of the impediment.

This impediment is of divine law, and therefore altogether indispensable. Yet remember the exceptions explained above, with respect to the not perfect indissolubility of matrimony ratified only and of matrimony contracted in unbelief, nn. 11-14.

115. • Concerning proving the free state.

a) In order that it be licit to contract a new matrimony, moral certitude is required concerning the dissolution or nullity of the prior marriage. (Cf. Can. 1069, § 2.)

b) In even a slight doubt it is necessary that an authentic declaration of the Ordinary or of the Holy See be obtained concerning the death of the spouse or concerning the invalidity of the prior matrimony.

c) Permission to pass to other nuptials includes dispensation from the impediment of crime on account of adultery alone with permission of matrimony, if a license of this kind emanates from the Holy See, but not if from the Ordinary.

116. • IV. Penalties against violators of this impediment.

One who in bad faith attempts a new matrimony, the prior matrimony not having been dissolved, incurs these penalties:

a) Infamy by the fact itself (can. 2356).

b) Irregularity from delict (can. 985, 3°).

c) Privation of the sacraments and, if he dies without signs of penitence, of ecclesiastical burial, as being a public sinner.

d) Excommunication or personal interdict to be imposed against him by the Ordinary if, having spurned his warning, they persist in illicit cohabitation. (Can. 2356.)

Bertha, twenty years of age, had married Caius, with whom she lived more or less peacefully for two years. Then Caius went to America because he could no longer earn in England the means by which he might support himself and his wife, and for some months faithfully sent letters and money to his wife, when suddenly the letters ceased and Bertha afterwards heard nothing about her husband. After some years, when Bertha had moved to another city, Titius, a non-Catholic who rented a room in her house, sought her as his wife. When Bertha consented, because of the impossibility of obtaining a dispensation from the Bishop, the wedding was celebrated in the Anglican Church. All these things happened before April 19, 1908; after that day, however, Bertha approached a confessor who, having heard the facts, affirmed that the marriage was invalid and that she ought to separate from Titius. Hence it is asked:

1. What is to be done when there is doubt about the free state of a betrothed person who wishes to enter marriage?

2. What is to be done after marriage has been contracted by someone uncertain of the death of a former spouse?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is to be done when it is doubtful whether one is free to marry who wishes to do so?

Inquiry must be made and if the death of the previous spouse is proved by a certificate of death or other authentic document, or by two witnesses who are above suspicion, or by other lawful means, the person may be allowed to marry again. If any reasonable doubt remains the case should be referred to the bishop, who without the leave of the Holy See will not allow a second marriage unless the freedom to marry is proved.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. ii, 296.

2. What should be done when a second marriage has been contracted by one who was not certain that a former spouse was dead?

“ If a person has unlawfully contracted a second marriage without the necessary certainty concerning the death of a former spouse, it does not follow that the second marriage is invalid, and that the parties must separate. If there is only slight doubt about the death of the former spouse, after making fruitless inquiries, the parties may live together as man and wife. If only one of the parties is in bad faith and is not certain of the death of a former spouse, while the other knows nothing of the difficulty, he should render the marriage debt, but he has no right to ask it as long as he remains in bad faith. If both parties are in bad faith, they can not lawfully use marriage as long as they are in that state. Inquiries should be made, and if probable reasons can be discovered for thinking that the former partner is dead, they may use marriage, according to a probable opinion. For even in this case the marriage has been contracted, it is probably valid, and it is not certain that any one else has a prior right, so the parties should be allowed to use it. If the second marriage was contracted in good faith, and a doubt about the death of a former spouse arises subsequently, inquiries should be made, and if they are fruitless the parties may live as man and wife. Of course in all cases when it is found out for certain that a former spouse is alive, the second marriage is invalid, and the parties must separate, or at any rate must not live as man and wife together.”¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. ii, 297; Ballerini, Opus Morale, vol. vi, 677.

3. The case. The confessor was wrong in deciding at once that Bertha must separate from Titius. The marriage with Titius was contracted in England where clandestinity was not a diriment impediment till 19 April, 1908. If when the marriage was celebrated Caius was dead, and if consent was given absolutely by both parties, and there were no other diriment impediment between Bertha and Titius, the marriage was valid though illicit. The confessor should therefore have made inquiries from Bertha as to whether Titius was baptized or not, whether there was any diriment impediment between them, whether Titius knew anything about her former marriage or not, whether there was any possibility of learning what had become of Caius. If Titius was a baptized Anglican and knew nothing about Bertha’s former marriage, and especially if there was no hope of learning anything about Caius, he could not be deprived of his marital rights without injustice. Under these same suppositions the confessor should tell Bertha how wrongly she acted in marrying Titius at all and especially in a Protestant Church, but that since in all probability her former husband is dead, she may live with Titius as his wife and frequent the sacraments. She should be told to pray for Titius’ conversion to the Faith, and if there are any children of the marriage to bring them up as Catholics. She should also be absolved from the excommunication which is incurred by marrying in a Protestant Church, if she was aware of the penalty.

Bertha, a foreigner, unable to speak English, came to this country at the age of sixteen years. She was without money, relatives or friends, and was on account of her helplessness impelled to a marriage with a worthless, drunken sot, a waiter in a restaurant. In less than a year Bertha was deserted by this man, who left her a physical wreck. In two years’ time she was fully cured and was proposed to by Cajus, a Catholic young man. She told Cajus of her former marriage and they spent a year in tracing the “whereabouts” of the first husband, but could find no trace of him whatsoever. Unsuccessful in their search, they concluded to get married, and have been living together ever since, i. e. about fifteen years. They now have a family of several children. They are respected by the community in which they live, are looked upon as good Catholics, and bringing up all their children in the faith. They feel that they can not separate, if for no other reason, for the children’s sake, and would like to have their case straightened out, if possible. During these years they have looked for some trace of the first husband with as much diligence as their circumstances would admit of, but have found absolutely no trace of him. He was a reckless dissipated roué fifteen years ago and they think he must be dead.

Answer. This is a difficult case. On the one hand there is a question of a diriment impediment, which can not be removed by any ecclesiastical dispensation, and on the other hand there is question of breaking up a family and stigmatizing the children, or of compelling the parents to live a continent life, which as Lacroix says, “it is exceedingly harsh to compel persons free from fault to lead a celibate life; yet they would be compelled to this if they could not make use of Marriage.” In the first place, there can be no question, practically speaking, of a separation. The children are young and require the care of both parents. The scandal and sensation that would necessarily follow a separation, would rule the very thought of it out of court. The only alternatives left for the confessor to consider are, whether the parties should be compelled “ut vitam coelibem ducant,” or is such a construction of the divine and ecclesiastical law possible that the parties “uti possint Matrimonio.”

There can be no question of the truth of what Lacroix says, “it is exceedingly harsh to compel persons free from fault to lead a celibate life.”

If Bertha and Cajus are at the present moment, in bona fide, or even in dubia fide, about the perfect legitimacy of their marital relations, then for the good of all concerned, their good faith— bona fides—must not be disturbed, and if they are in dubia fide, i. e., they do not know whether they are lawfully married in the eyes of God and the Church, it may be possible to change this fides dubia into fides bona et certa, that is to put their consciences at rest about their marriage, in which case prudence and discretion would dictate that this would be the line of conduct to be pursued.

The question for us to decide therefore is: Were Bertha and Cajus in good faith, when they got married? Did they believe honestly and sincerely that they had sufficient proof of the death of the first husband, to justify them in marrying? Or were they in dubia fide? That is, did they fear that notwithstanding their investigations, the first husband might nevertheless be alive, and the marriage they were then contracting might be invalid? And if they were in dubia fide, fifteen years ago, when they contracted the present marriage, are they necessarily now, and without further inquiry, still in dubia fide? Or may they not be in good faith now (i. e., judging honestly that the Church does not require any other proof of the death of the first husband than his complete disappearance for eighteen years, considering his character, and physical condition) even if they were in dubia fide when the marriage was contracted? There is no doubt but that Bertha and Cajus entered into the marriage contract before the death of the first husband was fully established. They did all that was in their power, considering their circumstances, to discover and establish the fact of the first husband’s death, but still the fact of his death remained uncertain. Now the question is, can they ever be said to have entered into the second marriage in good faith and may we proceed to judge their marriage according to the rules which presuppose them to have been in good faith when they contracted the second marriage? We are fully aware that some theologians deny the possibility of good faith under the circumstances. But other theologians, v. g. Lacroix, Lehmkuhl, etc., hold that it is not altogether impossible that in a given case, the second marriage may have been contracted in good faith, and the parties to it may be left undisturbed. Lacroix treats this case at considerable length in the VIth book of his treatise on marriage, p. iii. He says in effect, that Bertha may judge in good faith, upon probable arguments only, that her first husband is dead, and she may not know that any greater certainty is required on this point. Wherefore she may be said to have contracted in good faith, if she innocently thought that she could lawfully marry again, while there existed doubt about the death of her first husband, considering the circumstances of her case, although she might know in a general way, that it was not allowed to marry again during the lifetime of her first husband. On the contrary, continues Lacroix, if she entered into the second marriage, fearing that she might be sinning, she acted in bad faith. To this Lehmkuhl adds, that the fear or remorse which agitated Bertha, while contracting the second marriage, lest she might be committing sin, may have arisen from other causes, v. g. because she married outside the Church, without publication of the banns, etc., and the fact that she feared lest she might be sinning in contracting the second marriage, is not of itself conclusive proof of bad faith on account of a former marriage tie. The cause of such fear and remorse would have to be examined into, in order to discover whether it was evidence of bad faith or not.

In the present case, Bertha may have contracted the second marriage in dubia fide. That is she may have been in doubt as to whether she had sufficiently investigated the death of her first husband, according to the requirements of the Church. Three years had elapsed between the disappearance of her first husband and her second marriage. She may have doubted at the time whether there was a sufficient interval to justify her in taking for granted that her husband was dead, notwithstanding her fruitless efforts to trace him. But now it is eighteen years since he disappeared, and considering his character and physical condition at the time, she may very easily believe now that he is dead, although she did not believe it so firmly fifteen years ago, when she contracted the second marriage. She may therefore believe now bona fide, that any impediment ligaminis has long since been removed by death and that nothing prevents her being united now in lawful wedlock to Cajus.

The lapse of time has intervened to turn what was a fides dubia fifteen years ago, into a fides bona now. We do not say that this is so in the case of Bertha, because all we know about her is what is stated in the case as given above. But we judge that what we say will fit her case. And the circumstances of her case being what they are, we think, salvo meliori judicio, she might be permitted to renew her consent, which would confirm her good faith, and be left in peace. Note also the following decision:

The Holy Office was asked, March 22, 1865, whether a woman, who had waited in vain for the return of her husband, and who, judging after three years that he was dead, had married again in good faith, could be allowed to continue in the second union, until it be established beyond doubt that the first husband was living? The Holy Office answered:

“Leave them in good faith.”

“A woman, after she had waited in vain for her husband’s return, judging after three years that he was now dead, joined herself in good faith in marriage to another man; and since it is now impossible to investigate whether the first husband is still living or is in fact dead, it is asked whether she can be left in the use of the second marriage contracted until certainty is obtained concerning the life of the first husband?”

Resp. “They are to be left in good faith.”