Section III. On the Institution, Ends, Goods, Honesty, and Governance of Matrimony

I. Institution of matrimony. God Almighty instituted matrimony, insofar as it is merely a contract, in the very creation of male and female. For he willed, as is clear even from the very capacity and inclination of male and female for generating, that the human race be preserved and propagated, and this fittingly, that is, in such a way that provision is of itself made for the preservation and education of offspring. But this does not happen fittingly except through those who are joined by the matrimonial bond. In addition, God also promulgated by positive law matrimony, instituted in creation itself and promulgated through the light of reason, namely through the mouth of Adam, who, led by divine instinct, declared: "This now is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called Woman, because she was taken from man. Wherefore a man shall leave his father and mother, and shall cling to his wife; and they shall be two in one flesh."¹ Finally, God himself, after he had already instituted matrimony, solemnly signified that it is ordered to propagating the human race: "Increase and multiply."²

Concerning the institution of matrimony insofar as it is a sacrament, see n. 729.

Note. Insofar as God wills that the human race be propagated through matrimony, and to that end communicated to human nature the capacity and inclination for generating, matrimony is customarily called an office of nature.

¹ Gen. 2:23-24.

² Gen. 1:28.

II. Ends of matrimony. The primary end of matrimony is the procreation and education of offspring; the secondary end is mutual aid and the remedy of concupiscence (canon 1013, § 1). The assigned ends are the intrinsic ends of matrimony, to which several extrinsic ends can be added, which can be intended by the contracting parties. Therefore:

1. The intrinsic ends are:

a) Procreation and education of offspring; these constitute the principal end. Education, however, is understood as education both according to the body and according to the soul, and in the worship of God (St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 59, a. 2; n. 701).¹

b) Mutual aid, which is a secondary end together with the end to be assigned under c).

c) The remedy of concupiscence, or its mastery. The Apostle assigns this end in these words: "But because of fornication, let each man have his own wife";² and: "For it is better to marry than to burn."³ Matrimony attains this end both by quieting concupiscence through conjugal acts, and, insofar as it is a sacrament, by the power of sacramental grace, by which spouses use matrimony rightly and guard against illicit things both in and outside matrimony.⁴

2. Multiple extrinsic ends are licitly intended by contracting parties, for example heirs to be left, splendor of family,⁵ peace to be established, health of body, etc. (St. Alphonsus VI, 881-883).

¹ Encyclical Casti connubii, December 31, 1930 (A.A.S. 1930, p. 144).

² 1 Cor. 7:2.

³ 1 Cor. 7:9.

⁴ Buys, Nederlandsche Katholieke Stemmen, 1930, pp. 326 and 333.

⁵ Cf. Roman Catechism, q. 13.

III. Goods of matrimony. A threefold good of matrimony is customarily assigned, and is also assigned by Pius XI,¹ namely:

1. The good of offspring, which consists in the conception, birth, and education of offspring both as to the body and as to the soul, and, as to the soul, both spiritual and religious (St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 59, a. 2).

2. The good of faith or fidelity, which is situated in this: that the debt is neither denied to the consort nor permitted to anyone else, and that not even to the consort is granted what, as contrary to divine laws and most alien from conjugal fidelity, can never be granted.

3. The good of the sacrament, by which are denoted both the indissolubility of the bond and the elevation of the matrimonial contract into an efficacious sign of grace.

¹ Encyclical Casti connubii (A.A.S. 1930, p. 543).

IV. Honesty of matrimony; concerning which note:

1. Matrimony is objectively honorable. This is clear first from the fact that God instituted it, Christ raised it to the dignity of a sacrament, and Sacred Scripture commends it.¹ It is clear next from the fact that it is the single means of fittingly obtaining the propagation of the human race willed by God (n. 714); likewise from the fact that matrimony is ordered "not only to propagating the human race, but to begetting offspring for the Church, citizens of the saints and members of the household of God; namely, that a people might be procreated and educated for the worship and religion of the true God and of Christ our Savior."²

Corollary. All who are capable of matrimony can contract matrimony, unless they are prohibited by law (canon 1035). This also holds concerning those who can procreate only miserable offspring. "It is certainly not lawful," says Pius XI, "to burden with grave fault those men, otherwise capable of matrimony, who, even after all care and diligence have been employed, are conjectured to beget only defective offspring, if they contract marriage, although often matrimony must be dissuaded for them."³

Nor can the aforesaid persons of themselves, at least practically, be accused of light fault; for with regard to offspring, it is always better for the offspring to be thus than not to be;⁴ and with regard to the inconveniences that will arise for society and family, it is not established that the most valid right of contracting matrimony does not prevail over the avoidance of those inconveniences. Add that even those of whom we speak, by procreating offspring, however miserable, conduce to the good of the species (vol. I, n. 740). This is confirmed by the practice of the Church, which in no way keeps the said persons from matrimony (St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 64, a. 1, ad 4; St. Alphonsus VI, 951).

Whether the State can forbid matrimony to some will be explained under V.

2. Matrimony, although it is objectively honorable, does not oblige individual persons, because only that precept obliges individual persons which of itself and first regards the good of individuals. But the precept of matrimony of itself and first does not regard the good of individuals, but the good of the multitude or species (St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 3, ch. 137; II-II, q. 152, a. 2). Accidentally there can be an obligation, for example if someone has procreated offspring from some woman.

There are those who judge that the law of matrimony was imposed on the human race; this does not please others, because one cannot grasp a precept which does not oblige determinate persons and cannot be fulfilled by the community as such. Moreover, God can reach, and does reach, the willed end without a precept, that is, the propagation of the human race, namely by implanting in human nature the capacity and vehement inclination for generating.

Objection. From the fact that some power is conferred on man, an obligation of using it is rightly deduced. But the generative power is conferred on individual persons.

Response. The major, besides the fact that it must be distinguished in multiple ways, certainly is to be denied if it is a question of a power conferred for the good of the species, because it suffices that many use it. "Namely, from divine providence," says St. Thomas, "those things are given to man which are necessary for the whole species, and yet it is not necessary that every man use each one of them. For the industry of building and the power for fighting have been given to man, and yet it is not necessary that all be builders or soldiers. Similarly, although the power of generating and those things which are ordered to its act have been provided for man by God, nevertheless it is not necessary that every man intend the act of generation" (Contra Gentiles, book 3, ch. 136).

3. Matrimony, however honorable it is, nevertheless must be placed after virginity and chaste celibacy; likewise chaste widowhood after second nuptials.

The former has been proved and vindicated against objections in the treatise on the offices of clerics (vol. I, n. 1168); the latter is clear from canon 1142, and rests on the same principles.⁵

¹ 1 Cor. 7:9, 28, 36, 39; 1 Tim. 4:1-3; 5:14; Eph. 5:22-23; Heb. 13:4.

² Encyclical of Leo XIII, Arcanum, February 10, 1880; Encyclical of Pius XI, Casti connubii, December 31, 1930 (A.A.S. 1930, p. 544).

³ Encyclical Casti connubii (A.A.S. 1930, p. 565).

⁴ Cf. our little work On the Virtue of Chastity and the Opposed Vices, n. 98.

⁵ Cf. our little work On the Virtue of Chastity and the Opposed Vices, nn. 18-19.

V. That the governance of matrimony may be distinctly explained, two things must be distinguished: 1° the marriages of baptized persons and of non-baptized persons; 2° the bond itself, namely its validity and liceity, and its effects, set forth in n. 724.

1. Marriages of baptized persons. The marriage of baptized persons is governed not only by divine law, but also by canon law (canon 1016), and not by civil law. This is clear both from innumerable ecclesiastical documents,¹ and from the fact that the marriage of baptized persons is a sacrament. But the governance of the sacraments belongs to the Church alone.

Corollary I. The Church can establish diriment and impedient impediments (canons 1016, 1038), and by her own right treat cases which regard the bond, that is, its validity and liceity, its inseparable effects, likewise its separable ecclesiastical effects (canon 1960), and, if they are treated incidentally and accessorily, even merely civil effects (canon 1961).

Corollary II. The civil State is bound to recognize the rights of the Church and the things established by her. But it cannot, with regard to the marriages of baptized persons, establish diriment or prohibitive impediments; nor treat cases which regard the bond of those marriages, their inseparable effects, and their separable ecclesiastical effects. It is competent, however, concerning the merely civil effects of matrimony (canon 1016), and concerning cases about those same effects, if they are treated principally (canon 1961). Likewise it can, not by reason of matrimony considered in itself, but for the sake of protecting social order, prescribe certain formalities, for example the registration of marriage in the registers of civil status, and punish by civil penalties, for example monetary fines or the withdrawal of certain merely civil effects, spouses who have neglected those formalities; nevertheless it cannot establish conditions without whose fulfillment matrimony by baptized persons cannot be entered.

Corollary III. The civil legislator cannot simply forbid matrimony to any baptized person. This follows from the things said above. Yet he can require that, for example, those bound to military service abstain from matrimony for a time; nor by this is there conceded to the civil State a faculty of establishing impediments properly so called, or impediments directly impeding matrimony. For such a disposition cannot be made by reason of matrimony itself, but so that social order may be provided for; hence one who transgresses these things does not sin against religion, as does one who does not observe ecclesiastical statutes. Besides this, the civil State can sometimes indirectly keep someone from matrimony, for example by casting a guilty person into prison.

Corollary IV. Of itself there is no obligation of observing civil laws which exceed the power of the civil legislator. Accidentally, however, there is commonly such an obligation, namely so that disturbance and damages otherwise going to follow for the spouses and offspring may be forestalled.

2. Marriages of non-baptized persons. The marriage of non-baptized persons is governed not only by divine law, but also by civil law, and not by ecclesiastical law. This is clear both from the documents to be assigned in Corollary I, and from the fact that the common good requires that the matrimonial contract be governed by positive human law. But the governance of the matrimonial contract entered by non-baptized persons does not belong to the Church, because she lacks power over non-baptized persons. Therefore it remains that it belongs to the civil legislator, and not to the Church. Let him beware, however, lest he exceed the limits of his power, for example by simply forbidding matrimony to some, etc., matters which we shall set forth more fully in the corollaries.

Corollary I. The civil legislator can, much more probably, establish impediments, both prohibitive ones properly so called and diriment ones, between non-baptized persons; likewise he can treat cases regarding those marriages.² For, first, the public good seems to require that laws looking to this be able to be enacted. But besides civil rulers no competent legislator can be assigned who would be able to frame such laws.

The major is clear: a) from the fact that the Church herself judged such laws necessary with regard to the marriages of her subjects; b) from the common practice of peoples somewhat cultivated;³ c) from the fact that it is especially fitting that some marriages be illicit and invalid which, considered under natural law alone, would be valid, for example marriages entered before marriageable age or without any public form.

The minor follows first from the fact that the competent legislator is not the Church, to whom infidels are not subject; nor another religious authority, since such an authority does not exist, or at least is not legitimate. Therefore it remains that we say that the said power belongs to the civil legislator. A second argument is drawn from the solutions of the Holy Office⁴ and of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide.⁵ The power set forth is usually called devolutive, because power over matrimony, as being a sacred thing, belongs of itself to the religious power alone.

Corollary II. The civil legislator cannot absolutely forbid matrimony to a non-baptized person who is capable of matrimony, for example for reasons called eugenic.⁶ So Leo XIII⁷ and Pius XI.⁸ The reason is that the right of contracting matrimony is older than the State itself, and therefore must rather be protected by the State, as being destined for the good of citizens, but cannot be extinguished by it. Add that human authority cannot directly impede the good of the species, that is, enact a law with the end that procreation be impeded. But if the prohibition has place, practically it is made for that end. The major is drawn from the fact that the good of the species is not subordinated to the end of the civil State.

Corollary III. The civil legislator cannot render anyone, even a non-baptized person, incapable of matrimony, for example by the means assigned in note 6. So Pius XI⁹ and the Holy Office.¹⁰ Add the reasons just brought forward in Corollary II. Add that neither can public authority directly mutilate an innocent person (vol. I, n. 740).¹¹

But insofar as the civil legislator can deprive a criminal, as punishment, of the generative faculty, this has been set forth in vol. I, n. 742.

Corollary IV. The civil legislator cannot, as we think, prescribe a medical inspection to be carried out before nuptials, unless a grave abuse would counsel it. For a matter which is an impediment to liberty in this matter, and so intimately affects an individual affair, ought not to be imposed except for a most grave cause, practically for a true abuse. But a true abuse - I am not speaking of particular cases - will not easily have place, nor will it easily be established. Hence these things should be left to parents, or even to those about to marry, who, if they please, can request the testimony of an approved physician.

¹ Cf. Council of Trent, session 24, canons 3, 4, 9, 12; constitution of Pius VI Auctorem fidei; Syllabus of Pius IX, propositions 68-70, 74; constitution of Leo XIII Arcanum.

² Cf. Resemans, De competentia civili.

³ Cf. Esmein, Le Mariage, I, p. 343.

⁴ October 29, 1739; September 20, 1854.

⁵ October 8, 1631; June 26, 1820.

⁶ The eugenic system intends the improvement of the race, and, to obtain that end, promotes laws which forbid matrimony to some or render them incapable of generating, for example through vasectomy in men, tubectomy or salpingectomy in women, etc.

⁷ Encyclical Rerum novarum, May 15, 1891.

⁸ Encyclical Casti connubii (A.A.S. 1930, p. 564).

⁹ Encyclical Casti connubii (A.A.S. 1930, pp. 564 and 565).

¹⁰ March 31, 1931.

¹¹ Encyclical Casti connubii, loc. cit.