Satisfaction for insults

662. Notions. 1. Insult (Beschimpfung) is the unjust injury to another's honor which is inflicted on a person in some way present. As honor consists in an external act by which one signifies esteem toward another, so insult consists in an external act (by word or deed) by which one signifies contempt toward another on account of some vice, whether true or fictitious.

a. Therefore it differs from detraction in object: for it injures honor, not reputation; and in mode: for it is not committed secretly and against an absent person after the manner of theft, but openly against one present after the manner of robbery.

b. As honor is greater than the good of reputation, since it includes reputation, so also insult is more grave than detraction if, together with honor, as often happens, reputation also is injured. But if honor alone is injured, it is a lighter sin than detraction, just as honor separated from reputation is a lesser good than reputation: for a man values reputation without honor more highly than honor without reputation.¹

c. Someone can be present either physically or morally (through something by which he is represented, for example an image or a legate): for it suffices for insult that the other know or at least be able to know that he has been dishonored. Something can also be committed against the honor of someone absent, yet with others hearing or looking on, as if abusive words and reproaches are cast against someone in conversation with others or in public sheets. Whether these are properly so-called insults can be disputed; nevertheless they are commonly held as insults.

2. Insult can be inflicted positively, that is, by words or deeds which contain contempt; for there are certain words and deeds which, from the common use of men, signify contempt, and by these insult can be inflicted. It can also be inflicted negatively, or by omission of an act, namely when the omission of due honor, for example of a greeting, involves contempt; that omission, by reason of this contempt, constitutes insult.

According to the diverse manner in which insult is inflicted there are distinguished: mockery, if someone is treated with contempt by words and laughter; derision, if by ridiculous gestures; and reproach and reviling, if someone is contemned by having a vice or defect cast against him.

¹ Cf. Lugo, disp. 14, n. 9.

663. Moral and specific malice. 1. Insult is a sin from its kind mortal against justice: Whoever shall say to his brother, Fool, shall be liable to the fire of Gehenna.¹ And indeed it injures the neighbor in the good of honor, which according to the common estimation of men is preferred to goods of fortune; but to violate goods of fortune in a grave matter is a grave sin. It is against justice: for anyone has the right not to be contemned, but that the honor due according to his condition be shown to him.

In order that a grave sin of insult be committed, it is not necessary that insulting words be uttered with the intention of dishonoring another; but it suffices that in themselves or by reason of the injured person they be gravely insulting and be uttered with full advertence to this thing.

2. All insults, although some are more grave than others, are of the same moral species: for the same essential malice is found in all, namely injury to honor, just as all thefts, although diverse, injure goods of fortune. Therefore for the integrity of confession it is not required that one declare how he injured honor (whether by words or deeds and by what abusive words).

¹ Matt. 5:22.

664. Gravity of matter. When the neighbor suffers a notable injury of honor, so that insult is a grave sin, must be taken from the prudent consideration of the one injuring, of the one injured, and of the words or deeds.

a. Hence Lacroix rightly teaches that abusive words by which women and men of the lowest populace call themselves harlots, adulteresses, rogues, commonly are not grave sins, because those saying such things do not truly think so, and those hearing do not believe words of this kind uttered in the heat of passion.¹ Likewise parents are excused from mortal sin who call their children by insulting names (stupid, donkeys), because for the same reason they are not judged gravely to injure the honor of the children. Indeed, if they do this for the sake of correction, they commit no sin, although it would be better to abstain from insulting words even in corrections.

b. Insulting words uttered against someone before others indeed, but with the person himself absent, are scarcely grave sins, unless the one uttering the insult wills that the offended person learn the matter, or foresees that the matter will be communicated to him.

c. Joking mockery concerning a slight defect of another, so that he is suffused with a little blush, can happen without sin if it is done without contempt and without the anger or sadness of the other; indeed it is an act of the virtue of eutrapelia if it is done among friends for honorable recreation. But he sins against charity who, in jesting, casts a small fault against another while foreseeing that the latter will bear this thing badly: for charity and prudence demand that another's anger or sadness be avoided in jokes.² Nevertheless the one jesting does not sin gravely, even if he knows that the other takes a light joke gravely, because the cause of this grave embarrassment is not the mockery of the one jesting, which is light in itself, but the foolishness of the other.

¹ L. 3, pr. 2, n. 1224.

² Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 72, a. 2, ad 1.

665. On restitution of honor. 1. He who inflicted an insult on another is bound to return the honor taken away and to repair the damages which followed from it and were foreseen at least confusedly: for he who by injury caused damage to another is bound to repair it.

That restitution of honor is required which, by reason of the manner in which the insult was inflicted and by reason of the condition of the person offended, is judged sufficient for removing the injury or for signifying true esteem. Hence he who inflicted an insult publicly must restore publicly, that is, before those who were witnesses of the insult, or at least in such a way that the reparation can come to their knowledge. He who injured honor secretly must likewise repair the injury, but it suffices that this be done secretly. Satisfaction, however, can always be made through another who asks pardon in the name of the offender.

2. The mode of repairing injured honor which certainly suffices is that which, by reason of the condition of the offended person, signifies true esteem for him; therefore it is clear that one mode must be chosen in order that satisfaction be shown to a superior, and another in order that it be shown to an equal or a subject.

a. Various modes of repairing injured honor, which are listed by authors, are: to greet in a friendly way or first, to speak kindly, to visit at home, to invite to table, to drink to someone, to ask pardon, to fall upon the knees. Besides, as Lessius wisely notes, by the petition of pardon any injury, even one inflicted on a most noble man, is sufficiently repaired; if he is not content with this satisfaction, he can be referred to the judge.¹

b. The offender is excused from restitution: a. if he rightly supposes that the offended person condones restitution; b. if he has been punished by the judge on account of the injury inflicted; c. if the offended person has taken vengeance; d. if the offender and the offended person mutually inflicted equal abusive words on one another.

Whether there is an obligation of asking pardon in order that honor be repaired.

a. Subjects and equals must ask pardon if the injured person, affected by grave insult, demands it and is unwilling to accept another satisfaction; but if the injured person does not demand it, subjects and equals can also satisfy in another way.

b. Superiors are never obliged to ask pardon from a subject who has suffered injury, as a master from a servant, a prelate from a religious, a teacher or superior from pupils: for the injured honor is abundantly repaired by some sign of benevolence.

3. He who has been affected by insult must patiently tolerate it without hatred and without zeal for vengeance. He can indeed, and sometimes even must, demand satisfaction and a just penalty; yet he must be so disposed that, if need be, he sustain the injury without any reparation, and even do good to his enemy.²

¹ Lessius, l. 2, c. 11, n. 145.

² Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 72, a. 3.

Inasmuch as contumely violates justice, proper satisfaction must be made for insults. The kind and manner of making satisfaction will depend much on the relative condition of the parties. Sometimes the person injured may be reasonably presumed not to wish the memory of the insult to be revived by formal apologies, and the danger of again arousing bitter and angry feelings may also excuse one from open acts of satisfaction.

462. • Contumely is the unjust injury of honor inflicted on one present and knowing it. But honor is the external testimony of esteem, which is held internally concerning someone's excellence. Now someone can be present either personally or physically, or morally through an image, and through something else in which he is represented in some measure.

But contumely can be done, 1. negatively, by omission of the honor due here and now; 2. positively, both by words and by deeds or signs of contempt.

To contumely are referred, 1. mockery, by which someone is contemned by words and laughter; 2. derision, by which someone is ridiculed by ridiculous gestures; 3. reproach, by which poverty, defects, or obscurity of birth are cast up to someone.

463. • I say I. Contumely is a mortal sin from its genus. For it is something graver than detraction, which per se is grave. It is clear besides from the words of Scripture, Matth. 5. 22: "But he who shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be guilty before the council; but he who shall say: Fool, shall be guilty of hell fire."

I say II. Contumely per se brings in a strict obligation of restoring honor and of repairing damages, if any have followed, at least if they were foreseen in general, as is clear from the things said concerning restitution of reputation. - St. Lig., n. 966.

Although we are bound to tolerate contumelies by casting away the spirit of vengeance, yet sometimes it will be expedient to repel contumelies, namely when tolerance could harm the common good; for example, if a Prelate by tolerating would be rendered contemptible, and thus the insolence of subjects would be increased, etc. - St. Lig., n. 966.

464. Resolves. - 1. Honor publicly taken away by contumely must be restored publicly before those who were witnesses of the dishonoring, or at least in such a way that the satisfaction can come to their knowledge. But it suffices that satisfaction be made through another person, who in the name of the dishonorer asks pardon. - St. Lig., n. 984.

2. Honor injured by hidden contumely must likewise be restored, because true damage of honor was inflicted on the neighbor; yet reparation can be made secretly. - St. Lig., n. 985.

3. That restitution of honor is required which is considered sufficient for manifesting esteem according to the condition of the person offended. For if he who dishonored was a Superior, it will suffice if he salutes the dishonored person, visits him at home, or shows him benevolence. But if he was an equal, or a fortiori an inferior, greater satisfaction is required, namely that he anticipate him in saluting, yield place, ask pardon, etc., if he cannot satisfy sufficiently in another way. - St. Lig., n. 986.

4. If the one dishonored took vengeance, for example, by beating another, wounding him..., for the most part further satisfaction is not required for honor; because he seems to accept vengeance as satisfaction, and the other by not resisting seems to confess his own fault and his esteem concerning the other. - St. Lig., n. 989. - Likewise peasants are exempted from restitution of honor if equal insults or reproaches have been hurled mutually among them, because by that very fact compensation is made.

5. In practice it is often expedient that the Confessor omit admonishing a penitent existing in good faith about the obligation of satisfaction, especially if he foresees that the admonition is not going to be of profit; or if he thinks that he who was dishonored will easily condone it, or will refuse reparation, especially public reparation, lest the memory of the injury return among others, or lest he himself be more affected with shame, etc. - St. Lig., n. 988. - See Cases, n. 434.

533. • Contumely is the unjust injury of honor inflicted on one present and knowing. But honor is the external attestation of the estimation which is held internally concerning someone's excellence. But someone can be present either personally or physically, or morally through an image, and through another thing in which he is in some way represented.

But contumely can be done 1° negatively, through omission of honor due here and now; 2° positively, both by words and by deeds or signs of contempt.

To contumely are referred 1° derision,³ by which someone is contemned by words and laughter; 2° mockery, by which someone is ridiculed by ridiculous gestures; 3° reproach, by which indigence, defects, or obscurity of birth is objected to someone.

534. • I say I. Contumely is a mortal sin from its own genus. For it is something graver than detraction, which of itself is grave. Besides, this is clear from the words of Scripture:⁴ But he who shall say to his brother: Raca, shall be guilty of the council; but he who shall say: Fool, shall be guilty of the hell of fire.

I say II. Contumely of itself induces the strict obligation of restoring honor and of repairing damages, if any have followed, at least if they have been foreseen in a confused way, as is clear from what was said about restitution of reputation.

But although we are bound to tolerate contumelies - by casting aside the spirit of vengeance - nevertheless sometimes it will be expedient to repel contumelies, namely when tolerance could harm the common good, for example if a Prelate by tolerating were rendered contemptible, and thus the petulance of subjects were increased, etc.

535. You will resolve. - 1° Honor publicly taken away through contumely is to be restored publicly before those who were witnesses of the dishonoring, or at least in such a way that the satisfaction can come to their knowledge. But it suffices that satisfaction be made through another person, who in the name of the one dishonoring seeks pardon.¹

2° Honor harmed through hidden contumely must likewise be restored, because a true damage of honor has been inflicted on the neighbor; yet reparation can be made secretly.²

3° That restitution of honor is required which is judged sufficient for manifesting estimation according to the condition of the person offended. For if he who dishonored was a Superior, it will suffice if he greets the dishonored man, visits him at home, or shows him benevolence. But if he was an equal, or a fortiori an inferior, greater satisfaction is required, namely that he anticipate in greeting, yield place, ask pardon, etc., if he cannot satisfy sufficiently in another way.⁴

4° If the dishonored man has taken vengeance, for example by striking the other, wounding, ... for the most part further satisfaction is not required for honor; because he seems to accept vengeance for satisfaction, and the other by not resisting seems to confess his own fault and estimation concerning the other.⁵ - Likewise rustics are exempt from restitution of honor if equal insults or reproaches have mutually been hurled between them, because by that very fact compensation is made.

5° In practice it is often expedient that the confessor omit admonishing a penitent existing in good faith concerning the obligation of satisfaction, especially if he foresees that the admonition will not be profitable; or if he thinks that he who has been dishonored will easily condone it, or will refuse reparation especially public, lest the memory of the injury return among others, or lest he himself be affected by more shame, etc.¹

St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 72; St. Alphonsus, III, 984; ed. G., II, p. 372; Lugo, disp. 14, n. 189; Soto, l. 5, q. 9; Lehmkuhl, 1, n. 1415; Berardi, Theol. mor., II, n. 128.

1210. Reputation and honor differ from one another. REPUTATION, as we have seen, is the estimation of many concerning someone's excellence; but honor is the testimony of this estimation. Hence, just as concerning the reputation of neighbor, so also concerning his honor there is a twofold obligation: one negative, namely the obligation of not injuring it, which is done through contumely; the other affirmative, namely the obligation of restoring it, if it has been unjustly taken away. Therefore we shall speak: 1. concerning contumely; 2. concerning restitution of honor.

1211. DEFINITION. Contumely is the unjust violation of honor brought upon one present and knowing. But someone can be present either personally or physically, or morally through an image or another thing in which he is represented. For constituting contumely, it is not required that there be present formally an intention of injuring neighbor.

Contumely can be brought: 1. BY WORD: Namely by reproach, by which a crime is objected to someone; by upbraiding, by which poverty or any other defect with disgrace is reproached to someone; by malediction, by which evil is wished to someone. 2. BY DEED: to which looks mockery, by which someone is contemned by laughter; illusion, by which someone is handed over to derision or deception; derision, by which he is mocked by ridiculous gestures; an infamous libel, a derisive picture (caricature), trampling of an image, etc. 3. BY OMISSION, if, for example, honor owed to a Superior is denied, provided it is done from contempt; otherwise, mere defect of observance would be present, whence a sin against the fourth precept.

Yet all contumelies, since they are against the same good of honor, are of the same species; although one can be graver than another, and have another malice joined to itself, for example of sin against piety, if the contumely is made against a Superior, or against charity, if imprecation is added.

1212. PRINCIPLES. I. Contumely is a mortal sin from its genus. It is established from the words of Christ (Matt., 5, 22): He who shall say to his brother: raca, shall be liable to the council; but he who shall say: fool, shall be liable to the gehenna of fire. Under the word raca is understood a light man, blameworthy, worthy of spittle; and one uttering it is said to be liable to the council, to which only grave crimes were brought. By the word fool are signified reproaches bringing grave injury; but one uttering it is said to be liable to the gehenna of fire. The reason is that contumely of this kind brings grave harm in goods of great moment, which per se are esteemed more than goods of fortune (III, 966).

Yet not rarely contumely is only venial fault from the circumstances of the person, of inadvertence, or of a soul unwilling to injure gravely. Thus parents are often excused from mortal sin when they call children donkeys, beasts, etc. Likewise women, boys, and men of lowest lot loading themselves with reproaches; because, since faith is not applied to them, honor is not gravely injured (V, 81; Praxis, 37).

Indeed, there is no sin: a) If reproach is made for due correction, in which way the Lord called the disciples foolish, and the Apostle called the Galatians senseless. b) If a light reproach is uttered for the sake of joke and recreation: "for to object light defects for the sake of recreation is urbanity," says St. Thomas (2. 2, q. 72, a. 2), provided the other is not saddened, nor moved to anger.

1213. II. We ought patiently to tolerate contumelies. The reason, because vengeance is the Lord's. "Yet sometimes (by the example of Christ saying: 'Why do you strike me?') it will be expedient to repel contumelies, namely when tolerance is foreseen to be ascribed to inability to resist or to stupidity, or if it can harm the common good, as if a prelate, by tolerating, would be rendered contemptible, and thus the petulance of subjects would be increased" (III, 966). See also the things said above n. 737.

1214. PRINCIPLES. I. He who has brought contumely upon someone is held to restore honor to him, and to repair other damages thence following and foreseen at least in a confused way. This is plain from the notion of justice.

Yet the one dishonoring is excused from restitution of honor: a) if the one offended is prudently presumed to have now remitted the offense; b) if he refuses public satisfaction, lest he be suffused with new shame: in which case it suffices to honor him in another mode; c) if he has already avenged the injury brought upon him; likewise, if sufficient penalty for repairing honor has already publicly been inflicted by a judge on the offender (III, 988 ff.; H. Ap., XI, 4).

1215. II. But the mode of restoring honor depends both on the character of the injury and on the condition of the one injuring and the one injured.

1. Honor taken away publicly must also be repaired publicly, for example by asking pardon from him before others who were witnesses of the contumely, or at least in such a way that the satisfaction becomes known to others. Yet it suffices if satisfaction is made through another person, who in the name of the one dishonoring asks pardon.

Honor injured through occult contumely must also be repaired according to the common and true opinion; but it can, or even must, be repaired occultly (III, 985; 1. El. qq. ref., 41).

2. That restitution of honor is required "which is judged sufficient for manifesting esteem, according to the condition of the person offended. For if the one dishonoring was a Superior, it will suffice if he honorably greets the dishonored one, invites him to the house, shows benevolence, etc.; otherwise, if he was equal or inferior: then greater satisfaction is required, namely that he anticipate in greeting, yield place, ask pardon, etc.," if he cannot satisfy sufficiently in another way.

And when the injury was very grave toward a Superior, it does not suffice if the subject simply asks pardon; but he is held to ask it with bent knees, or to show another similar humiliation: "which opinion indeed," says St. Alphonsus, "is more probable" (III, 986, 987).

1216. Note. In practice it is often expedient that the confessor omit to warn a penitent existing in good faith concerning the obligation of repairing honor, namely: 1. if he foresees that the warning is not going to be useful, indeed rather harmful (because many promise, and afterward do not fulfill); 2. if he probably thinks that the dishonored one more refuses than desires that public reparation, lest the memory of the injury return among others, or lest he himself be more affected with shame; 3. if it is probably to be feared that in the act of satisfaction hatreds between the offended and the offender be renewed; 4. if from signs remission made by the one offended plainly appears, namely if he of his own accord approaches the offender and treats with him very familiarly and jocularly. But otherwise, if he acts familiarly for avoiding disgrace, or another damage (III, 988).

447. Principle II. He who unjustly injures honor owed to someone is bound from justice to restore honor, and to repair all material damages which effectively and culpably followed from this.

For man has a strict right to honor just as to reputation, and therefore the violation of this right must be repaired, whether the contumely was public, or merely hidden. Cf. Mt. V, 23-24.

The manner of repairing honor which is required and sufficient is that which, with the gravity of the injury, the condition of the persons, all the circumstances, and the customs of the place considered, is apt for signifying an equitable estimation of the offended person and thus for repairing the damage inflicted, so that reasonably more cannot be demanded. Whence public contumely is repaired in one way, private in another; satisfaction is shown to a superior in one way, to an equal or subject in another.

Hence: 1. Honor taken away publicly is to be repaired by public reparation, i.e., offered before those who were witnesses of the contumely, or at least in that manner by which the satisfaction becomes known to them.

2. Hidden contumely is sufficiently compensated by hidden reparation, for example, by privately showing signs of sorrow to the offended person.

3. If a superior offended a subject, for the most part a friendly greeting or showing of benevolence suffices, which from the very quality of the one showing it has a greater value and greater signification; rarely will the asking of pardon be necessary, "lest," as Augustine says, "while too much humility is preserved, the authority of ruling be broken," although sometimes it is also useful for edification.

4. To an offended equal, signs of honor greater than usual should be shown: by yielding to him an honorable place, by inviting him to table, by drinking to his health, by procuring favor, etc.; or, if the injury is graver, pardon should be sought. Nevertheless in certain regions, or among persons of a certain condition, it is not the custom to seek pardon.

5. If an inferior offended a superior, often a humble direct or indirect entreaty for pardon will be necessary.

Nevertheless sometimes, if the offended person has taken vengeance, by inflicting a reciprocal injury, for example, by striking, wounding, etc., the other is not bound to further satisfaction: for then the one taking vengeance seems to accept the vengeance which he takes for the satisfaction owed to him, as the common persuasion of men judges. Thus also plebeians are exempted from restitution of honor, if equal abusive speeches have been made among them; because compensation was immediately present.

Let it be noted: a) through the seeking of pardon every injury of itself is sufficiently repaired, even one brought upon a most noble man; if he is not content with this satisfaction, he can be referred to a judge;

b) nevertheless the judge is not to be approached for obtaining greater satisfaction, unless honor and reputation, which someone needs for the common good or the good of a family, cannot be sufficiently preserved by another way;

c) honor itself is not repaired by the payment of money; nevertheless sometimes a fine to be paid can be imposed, for example, for the poor or for pious causes.

IT IS CERTAIN that a Christian is bound to have his soul prepared for bearing insults.

It is PROVED by D. Bonaventure, first sermon 3. on the Holy Apostles, from that axiom of D. Gregory, l. 1. of the Dialogues, chapter 5: Of what sort each one lies hidden within himself, the insult offered proves. Hence also those Politicians, in order to test whether Christ was just, used to say, Wis. 2: Let us examine him by insult: Hebraeus Lapide Lydio. For thus gold is proved by fire, and the just man by insults, as the Holy Doctor elegantly expounds in his 2. on Wisdom, on the passage cited.

It is PROVED especially by D. Bonaventure on 22. Luke, on those words: And he that hath no sword, let him sell his cloak and buy one. And on 19. John, on those words: Why strikest thou me? For this preparation of soul is necessary, according to the exposition of D. Augustine, epistle 5. to Marcellinus, and tractate 113. on John, on those words of Matthew 5: If anyone strike thee on one cheek, turn to him also the other. And according to the exposition of D. Ambrose, l. 10. on Luke, on those words of Luke 22., where he says: O Lord, why dost thou command me to buy a sword, which thou forbiddest to be drawn? Put up thy sword into its sheath. If one strike thee on one cheek, offer him the other? so that defense may be ready, not vengeance necessary, and it may be seen that he could have avenged the injury, but would not.

This preparation of soul is commanded by Christ under an affirmative precept; but an affirmative precept does not bind for always: therefore one is not always bound in fact to endure, but when reason requires it; and hence we may at times lawfully repel insults for our just defense. The Holy Doctor proves this by the example of Christ, who did not offer the other cheek, but answered: If I have spoken ill, give testimony of the evil: but if well, why strikest thou me? He confirms it by the example of Paul, Acts 23., who, struck on the cheek, answered: God shall strike thee, thou whited wall.

And with the Seraphic Doctor concur D. Thomas, question 72. article 4. Sotus, loc. cit. article 3. Sayrus, l. 4. chapter 4. number 11. Filliucius, tom. 2. tract. 40. on the eighth commandment, chapter 3. number 55. Fagundez, l. 8. chapter 2. on the eighth Commandment, Valencia, disp. 5. question 16. part 3. and others.

Here indeed many open ample ways for presumptuous defenses, against the Christian profession; against whom I have said something in my disputation on Homicide. And so the opinion of Diana, p. 1. tract. 15. resolution 15. Navarrus in his Manual, chapter 14. Peter Navarrus, de restitutione l. 2. chapter 5. number 83. Victoria, on the law of war, question 2. number 5. Henriquez, l. 14. chapter 10. number 3. in the Gloss, letter T., where he cites Corduba, Mantius, Pegna, and finally Fernandez in his Exam. p. 1. chapter 9. §. 1. number 16., that one may, gravely provoked in his feelings, pursue a fleeing man and kill him, if the killing is apt for reparation of the insult — is in no way proved to me. But more displeasing still is the opinion of the same Diana, who says there that the same may be done even before the insult is received, while it impends; against whom Megala, p. 2. l. 3. chapter 1. number 12. Lopez in his Instruct. p. 1. chapter 62., which opinion Azorius did not wholly reject, p. 3. l. 2. chapter 1. question 13.

To me indeed that sentence is most certain which holds this not lawful, even though, with metaphysical abstractions of intention, they would lick into shape that bloody and Turkish defense of one intending defense, not vengeance.

Therefore I assert, with Juan de la Cruz in his direct. p. 1. precept 5. doubt 6. Tanner, disp. 4. question 8. number 73. Toledo, l. 2. chapter 6. number 16. Rodriguez, l. 1. chapter 135. number 11. Tutriano, 2. 2. T. 2. disp. 27. dub. 3. Bass., s.v. Contumelia, number 8. who cite Bannes, Atag[ue], Sotus, Sal[on]io, 2. 2. question 64. article 7. controversy 1. Malderus, 2. 2. tract. 5. chapter 1. dub. 14., that this is in no way lawful. Nor do I admit even a speculative probability, granted by Lessius, l. 2. chapter 9. disp. 12. number 8. Reginaldus, T. 2. l. 21. chapter 5. number 63. Filliucius, tome 2. tract. 29. chapter 3. number 51. Bonacina, de contractibus disp. 2. last question, sect. 1. p. 10. number 8.

The reason is, because the command of the Lord, Matthew 5., obliges us at least to abstain from vengeance; but to pursue a fleeing man would not be defense, since he had already ceased from offense, but is evident vengeance.

Next, private vengeance is not lawful; otherwise judges would be cast down from their tribunals; the tribunals would be overturned. But who will believe that you sought to restore your honor in a Christian manner by mere defense, if you kill a man while he flees? You say that honor still remains with you, which in the act he takes away; just as one may pursue and kill a thief, if he carries off my goods, so also this man.

I should like to know how he takes away honor in act, while he withdraws from offense — nay, even if he does not flee, while he ceases from insults? That doctrine is indeed pernicious, not only for the Christian, but for the Political commonwealth also, as Megala deeply cries out. To this also recur the arguments adduced for this opinion in tom. 4. disp. 17. question 10. sect. 2., where whatever the adversaries bring forward for themselves is refuted by the decree of Alexander VII. in the year 1665.

And so neither is it lawful for a man of honor to kill an assailant who endeavors to thrust at him a stick, or a slap, that dishonor may be inflicted, if it cannot otherwise be avoided. So Tanner, number 74, against Lessius, chapter 9. number 12., who alleged others. He adds that neither is it lawful to kill one striking with a stick.

But I take up the reasoning of Diana: Defense is to check the aggressor and to prevent an imminent damage, or, if it has been inflicted, it remains in suspense. Now it remains as long as there is an incontinent return of the blow, but not after the enemy has withdrawn to his house. I should like to see the principles neatly established for the coming-to-be of this restoration of honor, lasting only through incontinence; for the privation of honor arises from the injury received, and always remains: therefore even after the offender has withdrawn into his house, it still remains, and consequently can be recovered.

I do not, however, hold with Fagundez, number 2., that one may repel an insult by due moderation, as if one who calls me a robber may call him a liar; yet he may not on that account cry out with "Ass" epithets¹, and to strike back one striking is not lawful; nor to strike one reviling, for this would already be to avenge an injury, not to repel it, as the learned Sotus also duly notes, l. 5. on Justice, question 9. article 3. §. Hoc tamen. By similar reasoning it is lawful to say to the insolent one: thou liest, as Aragon. asserts, 2. 2. question 70. article 3. Sà, s.v. infamare Clavis Reg. l. 12. chapter 4. Bassaeus, s.v. Contum. 8. For the insult must be rejected as false out of malice; therefore it does not suffice to say: thou deceivest, as Pasqualigo says, decis. 437. Diana, p. 6. tract. 6. Resol. 16. Pasqualigo adds, decis. 439. and Hurtado, t. 2. disp. 170 sect. 3., and Bannes, as cited by Bassaeus, that it may be so said, even though a true crime is objected. ¹ N. Editor's note: the print reads 'non licebit tamen eum alioqui Assaffinum reclamare'; 'Assaffinum' is a print/OCR corruption, rendered as 'cry out with "Ass" epithets' (probably 'Assassinum', 'call him an assassin'). 'licetbit' in the first transcription is 'licebit' in the print.

That it is not lawful to object crimes, say Sotus, l. 5. question 9. article 3. Hurtado, sect. 14. §. 120. Pasqualigo, disp. 438.

Know finally that the insolent one is bound to restore honor, as all teach, in a proportionate manner, whether by retracting and begging pardon before the hearers, or by some other fitting way. And if he has objected something hidden and grave, he is bound to say that he lied; Pasqualigo adds, decif. 443. and Bass., number 6., that if it be necessary that he be believed, an oath must be added. Milder ways of saluting, of calling a man friend, of inviting him to dinner, avail in lighter cases.