Article Second. On Insult

662. Notions. 1. Insult (Beschimpfung) is the unjust injury to another's honor which is inflicted on a person in some way present. As honor consists in an external act by which one signifies esteem toward another, so insult consists in an external act (by word or deed) by which one signifies contempt toward another on account of some vice, whether true or fictitious.

a. Therefore it differs from detraction in object: for it injures honor, not reputation; and in mode: for it is not committed secretly and against an absent person after the manner of theft, but openly against one present after the manner of robbery.

b. As honor is greater than the good of reputation, since it includes reputation, so also insult is more grave than detraction if, together with honor, as often happens, reputation also is injured. But if honor alone is injured, it is a lighter sin than detraction, just as honor separated from reputation is a lesser good than reputation: for a man values reputation without honor more highly than honor without reputation.¹

c. Someone can be present either physically or morally (through something by which he is represented, for example an image or a legate): for it suffices for insult that the other know or at least be able to know that he has been dishonored. Something can also be committed against the honor of someone absent, yet with others hearing or looking on, as if abusive words and reproaches are cast against someone in conversation with others or in public sheets. Whether these are properly so-called insults can be disputed; nevertheless they are commonly held as insults.

2. Insult can be inflicted positively, that is, by words or deeds which contain contempt; for there are certain words and deeds which, from the common use of men, signify contempt, and by these insult can be inflicted. It can also be inflicted negatively, or by omission of an act, namely when the omission of due honor, for example of a greeting, involves contempt; that omission, by reason of this contempt, constitutes insult.

According to the diverse manner in which insult is inflicted there are distinguished: mockery, if someone is treated with contempt by words and laughter; derision, if by ridiculous gestures; and reproach and reviling, if someone is contemned by having a vice or defect cast against him.

¹ Cf. Lugo, disp. 14, n. 9.

663. Moral and specific malice. 1. Insult is a sin from its kind mortal against justice: Whoever shall say to his brother, Fool, shall be liable to the fire of Gehenna.¹ And indeed it injures the neighbor in the good of honor, which according to the common estimation of men is preferred to goods of fortune; but to violate goods of fortune in a grave matter is a grave sin. It is against justice: for anyone has the right not to be contemned, but that the honor due according to his condition be shown to him.

In order that a grave sin of insult be committed, it is not necessary that insulting words be uttered with the intention of dishonoring another; but it suffices that in themselves or by reason of the injured person they be gravely insulting and be uttered with full advertence to this thing.

2. All insults, although some are more grave than others, are of the same moral species: for the same essential malice is found in all, namely injury to honor, just as all thefts, although diverse, injure goods of fortune. Therefore for the integrity of confession it is not required that one declare how he injured honor (whether by words or deeds and by what abusive words).

¹ Matt. 5:22.

664. Gravity of matter. When the neighbor suffers a notable injury of honor, so that insult is a grave sin, must be taken from the prudent consideration of the one injuring, of the one injured, and of the words or deeds.

a. Hence Lacroix rightly teaches that abusive words by which women and men of the lowest populace call themselves harlots, adulteresses, rogues, commonly are not grave sins, because those saying such things do not truly think so, and those hearing do not believe words of this kind uttered in the heat of passion.¹ Likewise parents are excused from mortal sin who call their children by insulting names (stupid, donkeys), because for the same reason they are not judged gravely to injure the honor of the children. Indeed, if they do this for the sake of correction, they commit no sin, although it would be better to abstain from insulting words even in corrections.

b. Insulting words uttered against someone before others indeed, but with the person himself absent, are scarcely grave sins, unless the one uttering the insult wills that the offended person learn the matter, or foresees that the matter will be communicated to him.

c. Joking mockery concerning a slight defect of another, so that he is suffused with a little blush, can happen without sin if it is done without contempt and without the anger or sadness of the other; indeed it is an act of the virtue of eutrapelia if it is done among friends for honorable recreation. But he sins against charity who, in jesting, casts a small fault against another while foreseeing that the latter will bear this thing badly: for charity and prudence demand that another's anger or sadness be avoided in jokes.² Nevertheless the one jesting does not sin gravely, even if he knows that the other takes a light joke gravely, because the cause of this grave embarrassment is not the mockery of the one jesting, which is light in itself, but the foolishness of the other.

¹ L. 3, pr. 2, n. 1224.

² Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 72, a. 2, ad 1.

665. On restitution of honor. 1. He who inflicted an insult on another is bound to return the honor taken away and to repair the damages which followed from it and were foreseen at least confusedly: for he who by injury caused damage to another is bound to repair it.

That restitution of honor is required which, by reason of the manner in which the insult was inflicted and by reason of the condition of the person offended, is judged sufficient for removing the injury or for signifying true esteem. Hence he who inflicted an insult publicly must restore publicly, that is, before those who were witnesses of the insult, or at least in such a way that the reparation can come to their knowledge. He who injured honor secretly must likewise repair the injury, but it suffices that this be done secretly. Satisfaction, however, can always be made through another who asks pardon in the name of the offender.

2. The mode of repairing injured honor which certainly suffices is that which, by reason of the condition of the offended person, signifies true esteem for him; therefore it is clear that one mode must be chosen in order that satisfaction be shown to a superior, and another in order that it be shown to an equal or a subject.

a. Various modes of repairing injured honor, which are listed by authors, are: to greet in a friendly way or first, to speak kindly, to visit at home, to invite to table, to drink to someone, to ask pardon, to fall upon the knees. Besides, as Lessius wisely notes, by the petition of pardon any injury, even one inflicted on a most noble man, is sufficiently repaired; if he is not content with this satisfaction, he can be referred to the judge.¹

b. The offender is excused from restitution: a. if he rightly supposes that the offended person condones restitution; b. if he has been punished by the judge on account of the injury inflicted; c. if the offended person has taken vengeance; d. if the offender and the offended person mutually inflicted equal abusive words on one another.

Whether there is an obligation of asking pardon in order that honor be repaired.

a. Subjects and equals must ask pardon if the injured person, affected by grave insult, demands it and is unwilling to accept another satisfaction; but if the injured person does not demand it, subjects and equals can also satisfy in another way.

b. Superiors are never obliged to ask pardon from a subject who has suffered injury, as a master from a servant, a prelate from a religious, a teacher or superior from pupils: for the injured honor is abundantly repaired by some sign of benevolence.

3. He who has been affected by insult must patiently tolerate it without hatred and without zeal for vengeance. He can indeed, and sometimes even must, demand satisfaction and a just penalty; yet he must be so disposed that, if need be, he sustain the injury without any reparation, and even do good to his enemy.²

¹ Lessius, l. 2, c. 11, n. 145.

² Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 72, a. 3.