Chapter III: On Injury of Honor

St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 72; St. Alphonsus, III, 984; ed. G., II, p. 372; Lugo, disp. 14, n. 189; Soto, l. 5, q. 9; Lehmkuhl, 1, n. 1415; Berardi, Theol. mor., II, n. 128.

1210. Reputation and honor differ from one another. REPUTATION, as we have seen, is the estimation of many concerning someone's excellence; but honor is the testimony of this estimation. Hence, just as concerning the reputation of neighbor, so also concerning his honor there is a twofold obligation: one negative, namely the obligation of not injuring it, which is done through contumely; the other affirmative, namely the obligation of restoring it, if it has been unjustly taken away. Therefore we shall speak: 1. concerning contumely; 2. concerning restitution of honor.

1211. DEFINITION. Contumely is the unjust violation of honor brought upon one present and knowing. But someone can be present either personally or physically, or morally through an image or another thing in which he is represented. For constituting contumely, it is not required that there be present formally an intention of injuring neighbor.

Contumely can be brought: 1. BY WORD: Namely by reproach, by which a crime is objected to someone; by upbraiding, by which poverty or any other defect with disgrace is reproached to someone; by malediction, by which evil is wished to someone. 2. BY DEED: to which looks mockery, by which someone is contemned by laughter; illusion, by which someone is handed over to derision or deception; derision, by which he is mocked by ridiculous gestures; an infamous libel, a derisive picture (caricature), trampling of an image, etc. 3. BY OMISSION, if, for example, honor owed to a Superior is denied, provided it is done from contempt; otherwise, mere defect of observance would be present, whence a sin against the fourth precept.

Yet all contumelies, since they are against the same good of honor, are of the same species; although one can be graver than another, and have another malice joined to itself, for example of sin against piety, if the contumely is made against a Superior, or against charity, if imprecation is added.

1212. PRINCIPLES. I. Contumely is a mortal sin from its genus. It is established from the words of Christ (Matt., 5, 22): He who shall say to his brother: raca, shall be liable to the council; but he who shall say: fool, shall be liable to the gehenna of fire. Under the word raca is understood a light man, blameworthy, worthy of spittle; and one uttering it is said to be liable to the council, to which only grave crimes were brought. By the word fool are signified reproaches bringing grave injury; but one uttering it is said to be liable to the gehenna of fire. The reason is that contumely of this kind brings grave harm in goods of great moment, which per se are esteemed more than goods of fortune (III, 966).

Yet not rarely contumely is only venial fault from the circumstances of the person, of inadvertence, or of a soul unwilling to injure gravely. Thus parents are often excused from mortal sin when they call children donkeys, beasts, etc. Likewise women, boys, and men of lowest lot loading themselves with reproaches; because, since faith is not applied to them, honor is not gravely injured (V, 81; Praxis, 37).

Indeed, there is no sin: a) If reproach is made for due correction, in which way the Lord called the disciples foolish, and the Apostle called the Galatians senseless. b) If a light reproach is uttered for the sake of joke and recreation: "for to object light defects for the sake of recreation is urbanity," says St. Thomas (2. 2, q. 72, a. 2), provided the other is not saddened, nor moved to anger.

1213. II. We ought patiently to tolerate contumelies. The reason, because vengeance is the Lord's. "Yet sometimes (by the example of Christ saying: 'Why do you strike me?') it will be expedient to repel contumelies, namely when tolerance is foreseen to be ascribed to inability to resist or to stupidity, or if it can harm the common good, as if a prelate, by tolerating, would be rendered contemptible, and thus the petulance of subjects would be increased" (III, 966). See also the things said above n. 737.

1214. PRINCIPLES. I. He who has brought contumely upon someone is held to restore honor to him, and to repair other damages thence following and foreseen at least in a confused way. This is plain from the notion of justice.

Yet the one dishonoring is excused from restitution of honor: a) if the one offended is prudently presumed to have now remitted the offense; b) if he refuses public satisfaction, lest he be suffused with new shame: in which case it suffices to honor him in another mode; c) if he has already avenged the injury brought upon him; likewise, if sufficient penalty for repairing honor has already publicly been inflicted by a judge on the offender (III, 988 ff.; H. Ap., XI, 4).

1215. II. But the mode of restoring honor depends both on the character of the injury and on the condition of the one injuring and the one injured.

1. Honor taken away publicly must also be repaired publicly, for example by asking pardon from him before others who were witnesses of the contumely, or at least in such a way that the satisfaction becomes known to others. Yet it suffices if satisfaction is made through another person, who in the name of the one dishonoring asks pardon.

Honor injured through occult contumely must also be repaired according to the common and true opinion; but it can, or even must, be repaired occultly (III, 985; 1. El. qq. ref., 41).

2. That restitution of honor is required "which is judged sufficient for manifesting esteem, according to the condition of the person offended. For if the one dishonoring was a Superior, it will suffice if he honorably greets the dishonored one, invites him to the house, shows benevolence, etc.; otherwise, if he was equal or inferior: then greater satisfaction is required, namely that he anticipate in greeting, yield place, ask pardon, etc.," if he cannot satisfy sufficiently in another way.

And when the injury was very grave toward a Superior, it does not suffice if the subject simply asks pardon; but he is held to ask it with bent knees, or to show another similar humiliation: "which opinion indeed," says St. Alphonsus, "is more probable" (III, 986, 987).

1216. Note. In practice it is often expedient that the confessor omit to warn a penitent existing in good faith concerning the obligation of repairing honor, namely: 1. if he foresees that the warning is not going to be useful, indeed rather harmful (because many promise, and afterward do not fulfill); 2. if he probably thinks that the dishonored one more refuses than desires that public reparation, lest the memory of the injury return among others, or lest he himself be more affected with shame; 3. if it is probably to be feared that in the act of satisfaction hatreds between the offended and the offender be renewed; 4. if from signs remission made by the one offended plainly appears, namely if he of his own accord approaches the offender and treats with him very familiarly and jocularly. But otherwise, if he acts familiarly for avoiding disgrace, or another damage (III, 988).