Question II: How a Christian ought to conduct himself when assailed by contumelies

IT IS CERTAIN that a Christian is bound to have his soul prepared for bearing insults.

It is PROVED by D. Bonaventure, first sermon 3. on the Holy Apostles, from that axiom of D. Gregory, l. 1. of the Dialogues, chapter 5: Of what sort each one lies hidden within himself, the insult offered proves. Hence also those Politicians, in order to test whether Christ was just, used to say, Wis. 2: Let us examine him by insult: Hebraeus Lapide Lydio. For thus gold is proved by fire, and the just man by insults, as the Holy Doctor elegantly expounds in his 2. on Wisdom, on the passage cited.

It is PROVED especially by D. Bonaventure on 22. Luke, on those words: And he that hath no sword, let him sell his cloak and buy one. And on 19. John, on those words: Why strikest thou me? For this preparation of soul is necessary, according to the exposition of D. Augustine, epistle 5. to Marcellinus, and tractate 113. on John, on those words of Matthew 5: If anyone strike thee on one cheek, turn to him also the other. And according to the exposition of D. Ambrose, l. 10. on Luke, on those words of Luke 22., where he says: O Lord, why dost thou command me to buy a sword, which thou forbiddest to be drawn? Put up thy sword into its sheath. If one strike thee on one cheek, offer him the other? so that defense may be ready, not vengeance necessary, and it may be seen that he could have avenged the injury, but would not.

This preparation of soul is commanded by Christ under an affirmative precept; but an affirmative precept does not bind for always: therefore one is not always bound in fact to endure, but when reason requires it; and hence we may at times lawfully repel insults for our just defense. The Holy Doctor proves this by the example of Christ, who did not offer the other cheek, but answered: If I have spoken ill, give testimony of the evil: but if well, why strikest thou me? He confirms it by the example of Paul, Acts 23., who, struck on the cheek, answered: God shall strike thee, thou whited wall.

And with the Seraphic Doctor concur D. Thomas, question 72. article 4. Sotus, loc. cit. article 3. Sayrus, l. 4. chapter 4. number 11. Filliucius, tom. 2. tract. 40. on the eighth commandment, chapter 3. number 55. Fagundez, l. 8. chapter 2. on the eighth Commandment, Valencia, disp. 5. question 16. part 3. and others.

Here indeed many open ample ways for presumptuous defenses, against the Christian profession; against whom I have said something in my disputation on Homicide. And so the opinion of Diana, p. 1. tract. 15. resolution 15. Navarrus in his Manual, chapter 14. Peter Navarrus, de restitutione l. 2. chapter 5. number 83. Victoria, on the law of war, question 2. number 5. Henriquez, l. 14. chapter 10. number 3. in the Gloss, letter T., where he cites Corduba, Mantius, Pegna, and finally Fernandez in his Exam. p. 1. chapter 9. §. 1. number 16., that one may, gravely provoked in his feelings, pursue a fleeing man and kill him, if the killing is apt for reparation of the insult — is in no way proved to me. But more displeasing still is the opinion of the same Diana, who says there that the same may be done even before the insult is received, while it impends; against whom Megala, p. 2. l. 3. chapter 1. number 12. Lopez in his Instruct. p. 1. chapter 62., which opinion Azorius did not wholly reject, p. 3. l. 2. chapter 1. question 13.

To me indeed that sentence is most certain which holds this not lawful, even though, with metaphysical abstractions of intention, they would lick into shape that bloody and Turkish defense of one intending defense, not vengeance.

Therefore I assert, with Juan de la Cruz in his direct. p. 1. precept 5. doubt 6. Tanner, disp. 4. question 8. number 73. Toledo, l. 2. chapter 6. number 16. Rodriguez, l. 1. chapter 135. number 11. Tutriano, 2. 2. T. 2. disp. 27. dub. 3. Bass., s.v. Contumelia, number 8. who cite Bannes, Atag[ue], Sotus, Sal[on]io, 2. 2. question 64. article 7. controversy 1. Malderus, 2. 2. tract. 5. chapter 1. dub. 14., that this is in no way lawful. Nor do I admit even a speculative probability, granted by Lessius, l. 2. chapter 9. disp. 12. number 8. Reginaldus, T. 2. l. 21. chapter 5. number 63. Filliucius, tome 2. tract. 29. chapter 3. number 51. Bonacina, de contractibus disp. 2. last question, sect. 1. p. 10. number 8.

The reason is, because the command of the Lord, Matthew 5., obliges us at least to abstain from vengeance; but to pursue a fleeing man would not be defense, since he had already ceased from offense, but is evident vengeance.

Next, private vengeance is not lawful; otherwise judges would be cast down from their tribunals; the tribunals would be overturned. But who will believe that you sought to restore your honor in a Christian manner by mere defense, if you kill a man while he flees? You say that honor still remains with you, which in the act he takes away; just as one may pursue and kill a thief, if he carries off my goods, so also this man.

I should like to know how he takes away honor in act, while he withdraws from offense — nay, even if he does not flee, while he ceases from insults? That doctrine is indeed pernicious, not only for the Christian, but for the Political commonwealth also, as Megala deeply cries out. To this also recur the arguments adduced for this opinion in tom. 4. disp. 17. question 10. sect. 2., where whatever the adversaries bring forward for themselves is refuted by the decree of Alexander VII. in the year 1665.

And so neither is it lawful for a man of honor to kill an assailant who endeavors to thrust at him a stick, or a slap, that dishonor may be inflicted, if it cannot otherwise be avoided. So Tanner, number 74, against Lessius, chapter 9. number 12., who alleged others. He adds that neither is it lawful to kill one striking with a stick.

But I take up the reasoning of Diana: Defense is to check the aggressor and to prevent an imminent damage, or, if it has been inflicted, it remains in suspense. Now it remains as long as there is an incontinent return of the blow, but not after the enemy has withdrawn to his house. I should like to see the principles neatly established for the coming-to-be of this restoration of honor, lasting only through incontinence; for the privation of honor arises from the injury received, and always remains: therefore even after the offender has withdrawn into his house, it still remains, and consequently can be recovered.

I do not, however, hold with Fagundez, number 2., that one may repel an insult by due moderation, as if one who calls me a robber may call him a liar; yet he may not on that account cry out with "Ass" epithets¹, and to strike back one striking is not lawful; nor to strike one reviling, for this would already be to avenge an injury, not to repel it, as the learned Sotus also duly notes, l. 5. on Justice, question 9. article 3. §. Hoc tamen. By similar reasoning it is lawful to say to the insolent one: thou liest, as Aragon. asserts, 2. 2. question 70. article 3. Sà, s.v. infamare Clavis Reg. l. 12. chapter 4. Bassaeus, s.v. Contum. 8. For the insult must be rejected as false out of malice; therefore it does not suffice to say: thou deceivest, as Pasqualigo says, decis. 437. Diana, p. 6. tract. 6. Resol. 16. Pasqualigo adds, decis. 439. and Hurtado, t. 2. disp. 170 sect. 3., and Bannes, as cited by Bassaeus, that it may be so said, even though a true crime is objected. ¹ N. Editor's note: the print reads 'non licebit tamen eum alioqui Assaffinum reclamare'; 'Assaffinum' is a print/OCR corruption, rendered as 'cry out with "Ass" epithets' (probably 'Assassinum', 'call him an assassin'). 'licetbit' in the first transcription is 'licebit' in the print.

That it is not lawful to object crimes, say Sotus, l. 5. question 9. article 3. Hurtado, sect. 14. §. 120. Pasqualigo, disp. 438.

Know finally that the insolent one is bound to restore honor, as all teach, in a proportionate manner, whether by retracting and begging pardon before the hearers, or by some other fitting way. And if he has objected something hidden and grave, he is bound to say that he lied; Pasqualigo adds, decif. 443. and Bass., number 6., that if it be necessary that he be believed, an oath must be added. Milder ways of saluting, of calling a man friend, of inviting him to dinner, avail in lighter cases.