Testing a suspect and diverting a sinner to a lesser sin

If I suspect the honesty of a servant, I do nothing wrong if I leave a sum of money where I know he will see it with the object of finding out whether he will steal it. If he is an honest man, no harm will follow; if he is a thief, my action does not make him one; I do but furnish the opportunity for him to betray himself, and in my own defence I am justified in doing that. It is of course morally wrong to use agents provocateurs in order to detect criminals; they are the cause of another’s sin, not merely the occasion.

If I know that someone has made up his mind to commit sin and there is no other way of preventing him, I may lawfully induce him to be satisfied with some less offence of God than he was bent on committing. And so if a man was determined to commit adultery, I do nothing morally wrong, but rather the contrary, by persuading him to commit fornication instead. Many theologians, indeed, deny this doctrine on the ground that we must not do evil that good may come of it. But there is no question here of doing evil one’s self; we are not justified in doing a less moral evil instead of a greater; we must abstain from all evil, great and small. The question is whether it is an evil action to persuade someone bent on committing a great sin to be satisfied with a less. This is denied by those who defend the above doctrine. And reasonably so, for it is a good action to persuade another to do less evil than he was bent upon doing. To lessen evil is surely to do good. This is the more probable view, according to St Alphonsus.¹

¹ Theol. Mor., 2, n. 57.

Is it licit to advise a lesser evil to someone already determined to carry out a greater one? Some deny it, because he who advises a lesser evil truly advises evil. Others more probably affirm it, because this kind of counsel tends formally to this, that the greater sin not be committed. Therefore formally it advises only good. And Sanchez with the Salmanticenses adds that this is licit not only for private persons, but also for confessors, parents, and others upon whom from office it is incumbent to impede the sins of subjects. L. 57; l. 5, n. 77.

Resolves: It is licit to induce someone to drunkenness so that he may be impeded from a graver evil, for example, from committing homicide. L. l. 5, n. 77. Cf. 337. - It is licit to advise one willing to inflict greater harm upon one person to inflict lesser harm upon the same person. The same person, because by reason of justice the same does not seem licit with respect to another determinate person, at least ordinarily and speaking per se, because then that counsel is a true cause, of itself efficacious, of another's harm, and unjust; for the other is not bound to suffer that harm, whence he would be reasonably unwilling. Ordinarily and speaking per se; for, as Viva affirms, prop. 36 Innoc.

XI, to one wishing to steal something from Peter, because of which Peter would be reduced to extreme poverty, it could be advised that he steal a little from Paul, a very rich man, who otherwise would be irrationally unwilling in this. Indeed there are those who hold that it is licit to advise a lesser evil even with respect to a different determinate person, because this is always only to turn away from a greater evil, and not also to induce to a lesser, and it is confirmed by the example of Lot, who offered his daughters to be violated in place of the guests. Gen. 19:1 seqq. Sanch., de Matr., l. 7, d. 11, n. 16 seqq.; Vasquez, Opusc. de Scand., art. 1, dub. 2, n. 14; L. l. 3, n. 565; Diana, t. 7, tr. 5, de Scand., r. 36.

Is it licit to permit an occasion of sinning, so that the guilty person may be corrected, and even to set it up? - R. Affirmatively, when the other is judged probably to be ready from another source to continue the sin. The reason is that to permit is not to induce to sinning, and there is a sufficient reason for permitting; because the permission is then impeditive of a greater evil, for one sin is permitted lest several be done. Likewise even to set up the occasion of sin is not from its nature to induce to sin, but is an act of itself indifferent, from which a twofold effect follows, one good, which is intended, the other evil, beside the intention of the agent and from the malice of the sinner; and besides there is a sufficient reason for positing that act. Thus more probably, and it can be confirmed by the example of Judith, who, when she saw that the permission of lust in Holofernes would be an impediment of very many evils for the whole Israelite people, voluntarily set before him an occasion, namely her adornment; and nevertheless in this they commonly judge that she did not sin. Judith 10. - Struggl, q. 5, n. 34; L. 58.

Resolves: It is lawful for a father and master not to remove an occasion of stealing from sons or servants, when they know them nevertheless to be inclined and ready to steal, so that thus, being caught, they may be punished and come to their senses. It is licit for a keeper of fields to hide himself, so that he may catch those causing damage and keep himself safe from the danger of damage to come. L. l. c.; S. Th. S. q. 62, a. 3 ad 4.

844. Disputed question. Here, moreover, it is asked whether it is licit to advise a lesser evil in order to prevent a greater one. (a) It is not licit to advise a lesser evil to which the neighbor is not yet determined; for example, if someone is ready to kill an enemy, it is not licit to advise him to theft, to which he was not determined; for evils are not to be advised that goods may come. (b) But if someone is already determined to perpetrate some evil, and cannot be turned from it, according to many it is licit, in order to avoid a greater evil, to advise him to a lesser evil of the same species; thus one who is ready to steal one hundred coins from Peter can be advised that he steal only fifty. We think this probable, provided however that the counselor so speak that he by no means seem to approve the evil action; for example, in the case brought forward, if Titius, after having tried with all his strength to turn Caius away from theft, says: at least do not steal one hundred, since fifty are enough for you. Or, in other words, to advise sin is forbidden; to turn away from a greater sin is licit.⁵

⁵ St. Alphonsus, n. 57; Laloux, De act. humanis, p. 344.

3. We are never allowed to seduce our neighbor to commit a lesser in order to keep him from a greater sin, but we may permit a lesser sin in order to prevent a more grievous one,⁸ or advise one who is firmly determined to perpetrate a major crime, to commit a minor one.

⁸ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 78, art. 4: “It is in no way lawful to induce a man to sin; it is lawful, however, to make use of another’s sin for a good, because even God makes use of all sins for some good.”—Ibid., 3a, Suppl., qu. 62, art. 3, ad 4: “Sometimes a man who has a wife suspected of adultery lies in wait for her, so that he may be able to catch her in the crime of fornication with witnesses, and thus may proceed to an accusation.”

The reason is that, in the words of St. Alphonsus, by so acting we do not seek something that is evil, but something that is good, namely, the preference of a lesser to a greater evil,⁹ which is an actio bona ex obiecto.¹⁰

⁹ St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. II, n. 57: “The second, more probable opinion holds that it is lawful to counsel a lesser evil if the other has already been determined to carry out a greater one. The reason is that then the counselor does not seek evil but good, namely, the choice of the lesser evil.” (Ed. Gaudé, I, 353).—St. Augustine, De Coniug. Adult., l. II, c. 15, n. 15: “If he is going to do what is not lawful, let him now commit adultery and not commit homicide, so that while his wife is alive he may marry another and not shed human blood.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 482).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 78, art. 4: “It is lawful for him who falls among robbers to disclose the goods which he has, which the robbers sin by plundering, in order that he may not be killed.”

¹⁰ The contrary opinion (non licet suadere minus malum ad evitandum maius) is defended, e. g., by V. Patuzzi, Ethica Christiana, III, 156 sq.—Cfr. this Handbook, Vol. I, p. 213, note 3.

XVII. Question XIII. Is it licit to persuade one who will certainly sin to sin more lightly, that he may omit a graver crime? Answer. The more probable opinion, and the true one to me, denies it: since it is never licit to counsel an evil, however small. An offender can be asked to desist from a grave crime, by permitting a lesser and light one; but this can in no way be persuaded. Wherefore it is not licit to persuade a poor man ready to steal to snatch money by theft from a rich man rather than from a poor one, whatever Molina and Sanchez say to the contrary, for the reason given: that it is never permitted to counsel an evil. Now the theft of the rich man's goods is an evil, though the theft committed against the poor man be graver.

This question pertains to the matter of scandal. It is understood, however, on the supposition that you cannot recall him in any other way; and he is thinking only of that great evil, not rather of choosing that lesser one, because if he were thinking of choosing that, you would be suggesting an evil absolutely.

The first opinion is negative. So teach Cajetan 2.2. quaest. 78. art. 4. notab. 3. Gabriel in 4. dist. 15. quaest. 11. art. 3. dub. 4. Azorius t. 1. lib. 12. cap. 16. quaestio 8. Covarruvias in 4. decr. p. 1. cap. 4. in princ. Valencia Tom. 3. disp. 5. quaest. 21. punct. 4. Sà, s.v. peccatum, number 8. Castro Palao Tom. 1. tract. 6. disp 6. p. 6. num. 9. Hurtado 2. 1. disp. 173. sect. 10. §. 110. Layman lib. 2. tract. 3. cap. 13. where he cites others. So Lyra Genes. 19. et Iudicum 19. St. Bonaventure also seems to, in 4. dist. 33. quaest. penult. ad 2.

The second opinion is the affirmative one. So Abbas in cap. super eo, num. 4. de usuris Adrian quodl. 1. art. 3. et quodl. 9. art. 3. Navarre cap. 14. num. 40. et cap. 17. num. 263. Soto lib 6. de Iustitia, quaest. 1. art. 5. Bartholomew Medina prima 2. quaest. 96. art. 4. Rodriguez tom. 1. sum. cap. 12 concl. 9. Molina t. 2. disp. 335. Sanchez lib. 7. de matrim. §. 11. num. 15. Becanus cap. 27. quaest. 4. Vasquez opusc. de scandalo, super quaest. 40. art. 1. dub. 1. Turrianus t. 1. Tom. 1. disp. 99. dub. 6. Basil Pontius de matrim. lib. 3. cap. 28. §. num. 16. Diana Part 3. Tract. 5. resol. 37. et p. 5. Tract. 7. resol. 18. Bassaeus, s.v. Restitutio, num. 4. and others cited by these.

¶ I assert first, that the first opinion is the more probable.

It is proved first. Evils are not to be done that good may come of them: therefore much less, that lesser evils may; yet that sin is truly an evil, and (as I suppose) forbidden: therefore. It is confirmed, because you are truly the cause of that sin by inducing it. This is the argument of St. Bonaventure loc. cit.

They answer, that that evil is not being urged absolutely; but under a condition, that the greater evil be willed; and that what is being urged is not that evil, but the preferring of the lesser evil, so that the greater be avoided, being otherwise unavoidable.

Against this; because it is still an evil, not to be chosen so that any good whatsoever come of it, as the Apostle presses; much less, so that a graver evil be avoided. For that lesser evil is still forbidden, and nowhere is it granted to be chosen, but to be avoided.

I assert second, that the second opinion is also probable.

It is proved first from Genes. 19. where Lot spoke to the Sodomites, that he might turn them away from that unspeakable intercourse with the young men: I have two daughters who as yet have not known man; I will bring them out to you, and abuse them, provided you do no evil to these men.

Layman answers that this was not counsel or an inducement, but a comparative permission, thus: Rather would I prostitute my daughters than permit this. In which sense Absalom spoke, that he might induce his Father to admit him freely into the hall: If thou rememberest my iniquity, kill me. So interpret Cajetan, Basil, Sà, Valencia in the places cited, Sanchez loc. cit. disp. 1. num. 28. Molina disp. 335. In this way the Holy Doctor concedes it.

Although St. Augustine, Abulensis, and Lyra think that Lot sinned; but less gravely, on account of the perturbation of mind, says Layman.

Surely his words clearly show the opposite, indeed a command: abuse them, and not merely a manner of speaking, which is set aside.^{1 1} Editor's note: the print/OCR reads 'non autem eum modum dicendi, qui praetetnur'; 'praetetnur' is not Latin; rendered 'qui praetereuntur' (which are passed over), per the translating agent's conjecture; 'praetenditur' (which is alleged) is also possible but the print's letterforms favor the former.

That Lot did not sin, however, I show; for at the time when he went out from Sodom, he is said to have been Just, 2. Petri 2. as Diana, Pontius, and others observe with St. Bonaventure in 1. dist. 43. dubio 2.

It is proved second from that passage of Iudic. 15. where the Levite urged fornication upon those most filthy men, that they might be recalled from things more unspeakable. That he did not sin, many assert, citing Lyra, although Lyra himself does not excuse him.

It is proved third from St. Augustine lib. 2. de adulterinis coniug. cap. 15. and it is cited in cap. si quod verius 33. quaestione 2. If he is going to do what is not licit, let him now commit adultery, and not homicide; and while his wife lives let him take another, and not shed human blood (that is, of his wife).

The Gloss answers that it was not the counsel of St. Augustine, but a comparative permission, namely, that if one of the two sins must be committed, he would rather permit adultery, although he urges neither; wherefore he straightway adds: But if both are unspeakable, namely, to kill the wife, and while she lives to take another, he ought not to perpetrate one for the other; but to avoid both.

It is proved fourth; for all confess that it is licit to ask justice of one's own cause from a Tyrant, as Cajetan, Armilla, Sà s.v. Tyran. Navarre cap. 14. num. 4. Lessius lib. 2. cap. 29. dub. 9. teach; and yet the Tyrant sins in exercising jurisdiction.

Layman answers that the Community tacitly consents that the Tyrant, meanwhile, while he will not yield his principate, judge at least justly. Hence no sin is committed while justice is demanded of him, as Lessius also notes num. 73.

Layman concedes loc. cit. with Azorius c. 17. quaestio 1. that the lesser sin can then be urged when it is part of a greater sin; as to a robber who wishes to carry off everything, I can urge that he at least leave part; to one who wishes to kill, that he be content with a blow on the possessions [as pledge]; to one who wishes to commit adultery, that he fornicate with an unmarried woman.

Yet he admonishes that the urging of the lesser evil ought not to be to the detriment of a third party, e.g. that he who wishes to commit adultery fornicate with such and such a determined woman; or that he who wishes to steal a hundred from Titius steal fifty from Caius.

Diana moves another example resol. 19. whether it is licit, for one who wishes to rob a poor man of his money, to urge him to steal a determined sum from a rich man.

Castro Palao Tom. 1. tract. 6. disp. 6. part. 6. num. 12. Hurtado 2. 2. disp. 173. sect. 10. §. 156. deny this last.

Yet Vasquez, as cited by Palao, Basil Pontius de Matrim. lib. 5. cap. 18. §. num. 28 Turrianus 2. 2. tom. 1. disp. 95. dub. 6. hold the opposite.

But that it is not licit when the person is not determined, Palao teaches. But Sanchez teaches the very opposite de matrim. Tom. 2. lib. 7. disp. 11. num. 24. Molina de Iust. tract. 2. disp. 335. Diana, Sanchez, and others add consequently that the one urging is not bound to make restitution to the rich man, if the theft has followed.

Diana adds nay more, that the one urging the lesser theft, with respect to the same person, can even cooperate, because he works for a good.

Yet it is not licit to cooperate for the goods of life, e.g. to cut off the nose of him whom he wished to kill: the reason for the disparity is, because he is master of the goods of fortune, and is presumed to assent, but not of the goods of life. So teach Diana loc. cit. Basil. Pontius loc. cit. cap. 18. §. 5. num. 28. Vasquez art. 1. num. 13. Turrian. disp. 95. dub. 6. Hurtado § 122. who §. 119. concedes even that to one who wills a greater evil another lesser evil can be proposed, not by urging, if he wills an unspeakable sin; let a greater pleasure be proposed, taken with women. But here he returns to our opinion; for such a lesser evil is proposed so that he be allured to it, and consent.

They raise a doubt: Whether, to prevent the betrayal of a city, it is licit to make a traitor drunk, if you cannot in any other way turn him aside.

Less. lib. 4. cap. 3. disp. 4. Villalob. tom. 2. tract. 60. diff. 6. assert it is, because drunkenness is then not an evil, and as I could strike him, so, etc. I wonder that Bassaeus reproves this, with Vulgers tract. de Temper. cap. 1. disp. 7. Laym. lib. 3. sect. 4. For the public good prevails over the private.

3. Is the sin of scandal committed by one who invites another to sin who was already determined to commit that sin?

St. Alphonsus teaches that at least with regard to those things that are intrinsically evil, such as fornication, the sin of scandal is committed by inviting another to execute what he was already determined on doing. The reason is because the execution of an evil purpose constitutes with that purpose a complete and perfect sin, distinct in species from the merely internal and habitual intention of sinning.¹

1 St. Alphonsus, book ii, treatise 3, no. 47.