Question IV: Whether it is lawful to persuade one resolved upon a great evil to a lesser evil

This question pertains to the matter of scandal. It is understood, however, on the supposition that you cannot recall him in any other way; and he is thinking only of that great evil, not rather of choosing that lesser one, because if he were thinking of choosing that, you would be suggesting an evil absolutely.

The first opinion is negative. So teach Cajetan 2.2. quaest. 78. art. 4. notab. 3. Gabriel in 4. dist. 15. quaest. 11. art. 3. dub. 4. Azorius t. 1. lib. 12. cap. 16. quaestio 8. Covarruvias in 4. decr. p. 1. cap. 4. in princ. Valencia Tom. 3. disp. 5. quaest. 21. punct. 4. Sà, s.v. peccatum, number 8. Castro Palao Tom. 1. tract. 6. disp 6. p. 6. num. 9. Hurtado 2. 1. disp. 173. sect. 10. §. 110. Layman lib. 2. tract. 3. cap. 13. where he cites others. So Lyra Genes. 19. et Iudicum 19. St. Bonaventure also seems to, in 4. dist. 33. quaest. penult. ad 2.

The second opinion is the affirmative one. So Abbas in cap. super eo, num. 4. de usuris Adrian quodl. 1. art. 3. et quodl. 9. art. 3. Navarre cap. 14. num. 40. et cap. 17. num. 263. Soto lib 6. de Iustitia, quaest. 1. art. 5. Bartholomew Medina prima 2. quaest. 96. art. 4. Rodriguez tom. 1. sum. cap. 12 concl. 9. Molina t. 2. disp. 335. Sanchez lib. 7. de matrim. §. 11. num. 15. Becanus cap. 27. quaest. 4. Vasquez opusc. de scandalo, super quaest. 40. art. 1. dub. 1. Turrianus t. 1. Tom. 1. disp. 99. dub. 6. Basil Pontius de matrim. lib. 3. cap. 28. §. num. 16. Diana Part 3. Tract. 5. resol. 37. et p. 5. Tract. 7. resol. 18. Bassaeus, s.v. Restitutio, num. 4. and others cited by these.

¶ I assert first, that the first opinion is the more probable.

It is proved first. Evils are not to be done that good may come of them: therefore much less, that lesser evils may; yet that sin is truly an evil, and (as I suppose) forbidden: therefore. It is confirmed, because you are truly the cause of that sin by inducing it. This is the argument of St. Bonaventure loc. cit.

They answer, that that evil is not being urged absolutely; but under a condition, that the greater evil be willed; and that what is being urged is not that evil, but the preferring of the lesser evil, so that the greater be avoided, being otherwise unavoidable.

Against this; because it is still an evil, not to be chosen so that any good whatsoever come of it, as the Apostle presses; much less, so that a graver evil be avoided. For that lesser evil is still forbidden, and nowhere is it granted to be chosen, but to be avoided.

I assert second, that the second opinion is also probable.

It is proved first from Genes. 19. where Lot spoke to the Sodomites, that he might turn them away from that unspeakable intercourse with the young men: I have two daughters who as yet have not known man; I will bring them out to you, and abuse them, provided you do no evil to these men.

Layman answers that this was not counsel or an inducement, but a comparative permission, thus: Rather would I prostitute my daughters than permit this. In which sense Absalom spoke, that he might induce his Father to admit him freely into the hall: If thou rememberest my iniquity, kill me. So interpret Cajetan, Basil, Sà, Valencia in the places cited, Sanchez loc. cit. disp. 1. num. 28. Molina disp. 335. In this way the Holy Doctor concedes it.

Although St. Augustine, Abulensis, and Lyra think that Lot sinned; but less gravely, on account of the perturbation of mind, says Layman.

Surely his words clearly show the opposite, indeed a command: abuse them, and not merely a manner of speaking, which is set aside.^{1 1} Editor's note: the print/OCR reads 'non autem eum modum dicendi, qui praetetnur'; 'praetetnur' is not Latin; rendered 'qui praetereuntur' (which are passed over), per the translating agent's conjecture; 'praetenditur' (which is alleged) is also possible but the print's letterforms favor the former.

That Lot did not sin, however, I show; for at the time when he went out from Sodom, he is said to have been Just, 2. Petri 2. as Diana, Pontius, and others observe with St. Bonaventure in 1. dist. 43. dubio 2.

It is proved second from that passage of Iudic. 15. where the Levite urged fornication upon those most filthy men, that they might be recalled from things more unspeakable. That he did not sin, many assert, citing Lyra, although Lyra himself does not excuse him.

It is proved third from St. Augustine lib. 2. de adulterinis coniug. cap. 15. and it is cited in cap. si quod verius 33. quaestione 2. If he is going to do what is not licit, let him now commit adultery, and not homicide; and while his wife lives let him take another, and not shed human blood (that is, of his wife).

The Gloss answers that it was not the counsel of St. Augustine, but a comparative permission, namely, that if one of the two sins must be committed, he would rather permit adultery, although he urges neither; wherefore he straightway adds: But if both are unspeakable, namely, to kill the wife, and while she lives to take another, he ought not to perpetrate one for the other; but to avoid both.

It is proved fourth; for all confess that it is licit to ask justice of one's own cause from a Tyrant, as Cajetan, Armilla, Sà s.v. Tyran. Navarre cap. 14. num. 4. Lessius lib. 2. cap. 29. dub. 9. teach; and yet the Tyrant sins in exercising jurisdiction.

Layman answers that the Community tacitly consents that the Tyrant, meanwhile, while he will not yield his principate, judge at least justly. Hence no sin is committed while justice is demanded of him, as Lessius also notes num. 73.

Layman concedes loc. cit. with Azorius c. 17. quaestio 1. that the lesser sin can then be urged when it is part of a greater sin; as to a robber who wishes to carry off everything, I can urge that he at least leave part; to one who wishes to kill, that he be content with a blow on the possessions [as pledge]; to one who wishes to commit adultery, that he fornicate with an unmarried woman.

Yet he admonishes that the urging of the lesser evil ought not to be to the detriment of a third party, e.g. that he who wishes to commit adultery fornicate with such and such a determined woman; or that he who wishes to steal a hundred from Titius steal fifty from Caius.

Diana moves another example resol. 19. whether it is licit, for one who wishes to rob a poor man of his money, to urge him to steal a determined sum from a rich man.

Castro Palao Tom. 1. tract. 6. disp. 6. part. 6. num. 12. Hurtado 2. 2. disp. 173. sect. 10. §. 156. deny this last.

Yet Vasquez, as cited by Palao, Basil Pontius de Matrim. lib. 5. cap. 18. §. num. 28 Turrianus 2. 2. tom. 1. disp. 95. dub. 6. hold the opposite.

But that it is not licit when the person is not determined, Palao teaches. But Sanchez teaches the very opposite de matrim. Tom. 2. lib. 7. disp. 11. num. 24. Molina de Iust. tract. 2. disp. 335. Diana, Sanchez, and others add consequently that the one urging is not bound to make restitution to the rich man, if the theft has followed.

Diana adds nay more, that the one urging the lesser theft, with respect to the same person, can even cooperate, because he works for a good.

Yet it is not licit to cooperate for the goods of life, e.g. to cut off the nose of him whom he wished to kill: the reason for the disparity is, because he is master of the goods of fortune, and is presumed to assent, but not of the goods of life. So teach Diana loc. cit. Basil. Pontius loc. cit. cap. 18. §. 5. num. 28. Vasquez art. 1. num. 13. Turrian. disp. 95. dub. 6. Hurtado § 122. who §. 119. concedes even that to one who wills a greater evil another lesser evil can be proposed, not by urging, if he wills an unspeakable sin; let a greater pleasure be proposed, taken with women. But here he returns to our opinion; for such a lesser evil is proposed so that he be allured to it, and consent.

They raise a doubt: Whether, to prevent the betrayal of a city, it is licit to make a traitor drunk, if you cannot in any other way turn him aside.

Less. lib. 4. cap. 3. disp. 4. Villalob. tom. 2. tract. 60. diff. 6. assert it is, because drunkenness is then not an evil, and as I could strike him, so, etc. I wonder that Bassaeus reproves this, with Vulgers tract. de Temper. cap. 1. disp. 7. Laym. lib. 3. sect. 4. For the public good prevails over the private.