Section 2: Conflict of Duties

1. When a man has two or more duties, but is able to fulfil only one, he is confronted by what moralists call a conflict of duties.

At first blush it would seem that such a conflict can exist only in the mind. If what we call law is primarily a communication of truth to the human intellect, by which knowledge is increased and the moral judgment sharpened, it must be possible for the average man to inform himself with regard to the spirit of existing laws and their mutual relations so as to avoid perplexity of conscience. ¹ Furthermore, the law is supposed to safeguard conscience in all important matters against doubt and error. This contention is strengthened by a consideration of the ultimate basis on which the concept of duty rests, —i. e., the will of God, who cannot contradict Himself.

¹ Cfr. St. Jerome, Tract. sive Hom. in Ps. (ed. G. Morinus): "Nunquam christiano nox est; semper christiano sol iustitiae oritur."

In reality, however, since the fall of our first parents, conditions are such as to make a conflict of duties possible, nay in many instances real.

1. The moral order is seriously and permanently disturbed by sin. This disturbance is an objective and universal fact which permeates the whole of society. Man, on being born, enters a world full of grievous disorders. He is surrounded all through life by false notions and immoral deeds. Perplexity of conscience arises indeed primarily and immediately from defective knowledge. But the underlying error is more than subjective or individual. It is an objective fact resulting from the general condition of things and the dependence of each individual on the ideas and acts of his fellowmen.

2. In consequence of the disturbed moral order man's destiny and his position in the universe are twofold, —temporal and eternal, earthly and heavenly, —and it requires extraordinary insight and more than a purely natural wisdom to harmonize the respective duties of both spheres —to provide for the needs of the body without detriment to the soul.

Moreover, man is not merely an individual; he is also a social being, and as such has duties to his fellowmen and to society. These duties (devotion to family and country, etc.) often clash with the duties he owes to himself, and every collision gives rise to doubts and conflicts, which are not merely the product of subjective and vincible error in the mind, but actually exist in rerum natura as a consequence of the disturbance of the moral order.

II. Moralists have laid down certain general rules by which a man is enabled to choose between conflicting duties according to their relative importance. Though all obligations have the same source (i. e., the will of God), they differ in degree according to the order of the various laws, the relative importance of the objects which they are intended to promote, and the social standing of the persons concerned. 1. Some duties derive their relative importance from the laws by which they are imposed. a) Duties based upon the moral law of nature precede those enjoined by positive divine or human law. Hence it is not allowed to tell a lie in order to obey one's parents, but it is allowed to do servile labor on the Lord's Day to assist a fellowman in need.² Likewise it is never permitted to commit a grievous sin in order to prevent a venial sin.³ It goes without saying that divine laws rank higher than purely human laws and that, all other things being equal, the religious precepts imposed by the Church involve a heavier obligation than purely civil ordinances.⁴ b) Negative take precedence over affirmative duties; in other words, it is a higher duty to avoid sin than to perform good works. Hence it is not permitted to violate the truth in order to satisfy the obligation of sanctifying Sunday, for the end does not justify immoral means.⁵ c) Duties corresponding to a strict right (called duties of justice) as a rule precede those enjoined by charity. Hence no man is permitted to steal in order to give alms. Note, however, that there are circumstances in which, for the sake of some higher consideration, duties of charity may take precedence over duties of justice. Thus a man is bound to assist a fellowman in extreme need before paying his own legitimate debts. d) The duties of one's vocation or office take precedence over purely personal and family duties, but only in so far as their non-observance would jeopardize the common good. Thus a priest must remain at his post in times of persecution or during an epidemic, but this duty does not bind when he is himself ill and a substitute can be had.

² Cfr. Matth. XII, 1-14; Mark II, 23-28; III, 1-5; Luke VI, 1-11. Cfr. 1 Kings XXI, 1-6.

³ Gen. XIX, 8; Judg. XIX, 24.—In regard to the question, “Whether it is lawful to counsel or advise a lesser evil in order to avoid a greater one?” the Fathers and theologians differ. Cfr. H. G. Zschokke, Die biblischen Frauen des Alten Testaments, Freiburg 1882, pp. 73 sqq.; F. Heiner, Des Grafen Paul v. Hoensbroech neuer Beweis des “jesuitischen” Grundsatzes: Der Zweck heiligt die Mittel, 3rd ed., Freiburg 1904, pp. 28 sqq.; Dr. Fidelis, Hoensbroech contra Dasbach, Klagenfurt 1904, pp. 5, 8, 13; G. F. Dasbach, Dasbach gegen Hoensbroech, Treves 1904, I, pp. 19 sqq.; II, 2nd ed., Treves 1905.

⁴ Cfr. Acts IV, 19; V, 29. —The Syllabus of Pius IX condemns the proposition (n. 42): "In a conflict between the laws of the two powers, civil law prevails." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1742).

⁵ Cfr. Gen. XIX, 31 sqq.; XXVII, 6 sqq.

e) Certain duties take precedence over uncertain or doubtful duties.

2. With regard to the relative importance or value of the objects which laws are intended to promote, the salvation of the soul ranks higher than the welfare of the body.⁶ Hence a man is not allowed to commit a sin (e. g., to deny the faith) in order to save his life. Life and health are more important and more valuable than liberty, liberty comes before honor, and honor ranks above purely material goods. The duties connected with these objects are graded accordingly. Note, however, that, in concrete, the decision between conflicting duties depends largely on circumstances. A soldier engaged in war for the defense of his country will often esteem honor higher than liberty, nay than life itself.

⁶ Cfr. Matth. X, 28, 32-33, 37-39; XVI, 24-26.

3. In regard to the social rank or standing of the persons to whom duties are owing, they may be grouped into classes according to family, religion, ⁷ nationality, etc. Inside the family group, the duties a person owes his blood relations take precedence over those he owes to relatives by marriage. Parents are more closely bound to their children than to their progenitors. "Amor plus descendit quam ascendit." Illness or debility will, of course, modify this relation in not a few instances. Again, a man's relation to his parents is closer than to his adult brothers or sisters, his relation to his sisters is closer than to his brothers, provided immaturity, disease, unemployment, or other circumstances do not change the regular order. In saying that man's duties towards those of his own faith or religion take precedence over the duties he owes to his nationality or country, we do not, of course, mean to intimate that important patriotic duties may be neglected in favor of an enemy who happens to be of the same faith.

⁷ Cfr. Gal. VI, 10.

These general rules will in most cases enable a sensible and practical man to decide a conflict of duties. Where doubts remain, a prudent Catholic will consult his confessor or a reliable author. Recourse should also be had to prayer. He who employs these means conscientiously will, as a rule, receive sufficient grace to enlighten his conscience. When it is impossible to decide which of several duties is the more urgent, or what course of action is fraught with least danger to the soul, one will do best to follow the ancient rule which Bishop Martin restates as follows: "If I am unable to decide which of two or more conflicting duties I am bound to fulfil, it suffices to choose the more probable one, and if probability is unattainable, I am free to use my own judgment. Even were I to make a mistake, I should not sin, for God will regard the intention rather than the act. 'Who/ asks St. Augustine,⁸ 'sins by doing what he cannot possibly avoid?'"⁹

⁸ "For who sins in that which can in no way be avoided?"—De Lib. Arbit., III, c. 18, n. 50 (Migne, P.L., XXXII, 1295); cfr. the same writer's Retractationes, I, c. 9, n. 3 and 5 (P. L., XXXII, 596 sq.).

⁹ Bishop Conrad Martin, Lehrbuch der kath. Moral, 5th ed., p. 123.

Different systems have been devised with a view to obtaining greater certainty than can be gained by the application of this simple rule. But despite the acumen of their inventors, these systems have not brought a satisfactory solution. Bishop Linsenmann does not hesitate to say that all the systems thus far devised could be cut out of the body of Catholic Moral Theology without drawing one drop of blood.

READINGS. —Th. Meyer, S.J., Institutiones Juris Naturalis, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 448 sqq. —A. A. Waibel, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, Ratisbon 1839, pp. 235 sq. —F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, Freiburg 1878, pp. 105 sqq. —J. E. Pruner, Katholische Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 3rd ed., p. 101. —G. Schulze, Ueber den Widerstreit der Pflichten, Halle 1878.—W. McDonald, The Principles of Moral Science, Dublin 1904, pp. 188 sqq.