The Essence of the Sacrament of Matrimony

I. Contract and sacrament in Christian marriage cannot be separated, so that a matrimonial contract between Christians cannot exist without being a sacrament. So teach Pius VI in the letter to the Bishop of Motula;¹ Pius IX in the Apostolic letter to the king of Sardinia;² Leo XIII in the encyclical Arcanum;³ and the same is gathered from the Council of Trent⁴ and from canon 1012, § 2.

II. The matrimonial contract constitutes the whole nature of the sacrament, so that neither the blessing of the priest, nor indeed even his presence, belongs to its essence. This follows from canon 1012, § 1; likewise from the Council of Trent, which declared that clandestine marriages, that is, marriages not contracted before the pastor and witnesses, were ratified and true marriages as long as the Church had not made them invalid⁵ (St. Thomas, In IV, dist. 26, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1; St. Alphonsus VI, 897, 898).

III. The matter and form of the sacrament of matrimony are:

1. The remote matter is the bodies of the contracting parties, or rather the mutual right over the body of the other. This right is called remote matter in the sense that it is the matter about which the matrimonial contract is concerned (St. Alphonsus VI, 880).

2. The proximate matter and form is the consent itself expressed by words or by another sign. Namely, here the proximate matter is consent insofar as it signifies mutual handing over, and the form is consent insofar as it expresses mutual acceptance. So Benedict XIV in the letter Paucis abhinc to the Archbishop of Goa.⁶ And indeed, since the matrimonial contract itself, as has been proved, constitutes marriage, the matter, that is, the determinable part, and the form, that is, the determining part, must necessarily be found in the contract itself or in the expressed consent. Now in every contract the handing over of the thing, as being the beginning of the contract, is the determinable part or matter; but acceptance, as being the completion of the contract, is the determining part or form (St. Alphonsus VI, 880, 897).

Corollary. The nature of the sacrament is in matrimony in fieri, that is, in the contract which is now placed or obtains its effect. This follows from the things said. It is disputed whether the nature of the sacrament is also in matrimony in facto esse, that is, in the bond; in other words, whether matrimony, after the contract has been entered, persists in its being as a sacrament, after the likeness of the Holy Eucharist. Concerning this opinion Pius XI in the encyclical Casti connubii⁷ says thus: "Therefore let them [the spouses] meditate on these words of St. Cardinal Robert Bellarmine, full indeed of solid consolation, who, with other theologians of great name, thus piously thinks and writes: 'The Sacrament of Marriage can be considered in two ways: in one way, while it is being made; in another way, while it remains after it has been made. For it is a sacrament similar to the Eucharist, which is a sacrament not only while it is being made, but also while it remains; for while the spouses live, their society is always the sacrament of Christ and the Church.'"

Question 1. Whether a marriage between two infidels, after Baptism has been received by each spouse, becomes a sacrament.

Response. Some simply deny it; others affirm it, but among these some require that the spouses elicit new consent, or approve the prior consent by words, nods, or marital intercourse; others think it suffices that the consent not be retracted; others abstract from the influence of consent, and judge that the marriage by the very fact that Baptism is received becomes a sacrament. Now it seems that it must be said that the said marriage truly becomes a sacrament; both because on the one hand it must be admitted that the married Ephesians to whom Paul directed his epistle truly received the sacrament of matrimony,⁸ and on the other hand it cannot be admitted that they entered marriage only after receiving Baptism; and because marriages of infidels, consummated after Baptism has been received by each party, seem to be entirely indissoluble (p. 552), which also seems to have to be ascribed to their sacramentality (pp. 552 and 553). Moreover, the opinion is preferable which teaches that the reception of Baptism itself suffices for the marriage to become a sacrament, or for the sacrament, which was already present in potency, to pass into act (cf. St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 59, a. 2, ad 1; St. Alphonsus VI, 897).

Question 2. Whether the marriage of an infidel party who is baptized becomes a sacrament if the other party is not baptized; likewise whether a marriage which a faithful person validly contracts with an infidel is a sacrament.

Response. Concerning each case there is dispute. Some deny it, because just as the contract, so also the sacrament will be either in each party or in neither party. But it is not in the infidel party; therefore neither is it in the faithful party. Others probably affirm it, because their opinion is not repugnant: one and the same contract can be a sign conferring grace for the one who is capable of the sacrament, but only potentially for the one who because of a defect extrinsic to the contract is not yet capable of the sacrament.

¹ September 16, 1788.

² September 19, 1852.

³ February 10, 1880.

⁴ Decree on the reform of Matrimony, chapter 1.

⁵ Session 24, Decree on the reform of Matrimony, chapter 1.

⁶ March 19, 1758.

⁷ A.A.S. 1930, p. 583.

⁸ Ephesians 5.

765. • I. The remote matter of the Sacrament of Matrimony is the bodies of the spouses to be mutually handed over in the matrimonial contract.

The proximate matter, however, is the handing over itself of the bodies, which is perfected through words or signs expressing consent. - Thus commonly the Theologians.

There are some who constituted the proximate matter in the imposition of the hands of the Priest; but this opinion is altogether without foundation and must be rejected as obsolete ¹.

¹ This question has now been defined. For after it is established that there is no matrimony among Christians which is not a Sacrament, and that marriages which may be celebrated without a priest in places where the Tridentine Decree concerning the form of matrimony does not have force must be held valid, it is manifest that neither the imposition of hands nor anything else furnished by the priest pertains in any way to the matter of the Sacrament. Therefore that opinion also is altogether obsolete which placed the form of matrimony in words pronounced by the Priest. See below, no. 768.

766. • II. The form consists in the mutual acceptance of the contracting parties expressed in words or signs. - Thus likewise more commonly.

But in what manner does the consent, or contract, of the contracting parties expressed in words or signs constitute the form of the Sacrament, since it is also found in the matter? It must be said that the contract, or consent, of the spouses is found both in the matter and in the form of the Sacrament of Matrimony, but under a different respect. It is in the matter insofar as it expresses the mutual handing over of the power of one to the other; but it is in the form insofar as it signifies acceptance of this handing over. Or, as others explain, the words and signs of the spouses in contracting are at once matter and form: they are matter insofar as they express the handing over of the bodies; they are form insofar as they exhibit acceptance of the handing over. - Thus commonly.

Whatever may be the case, in practice no inconvenience is to be feared, provided that in celebrating the contract the form prescribed by the Church is observed. - See what is to be said in the following chapter concerning the minister of the Sacrament of Matrimony.

It is a sensible sign, instituted by Our Lord Jesus Christ, to produce the grace which it signifies. Essentially, therefore, there are in every Sacrament an exterior sensible sign,

and a grace signified, which is also produced by the application of the sign.

Our Lord established as the sensible sign the exchange of consent by which the spouses give themselves to each other for the conjugal life.

It is the grace which is needed for a union worthy of Christians; hence one that is sufficient for the exercise of all the rights, for the accomplishment of all the duties, for the shouldering of all the burdens, for the innocent enjoyment of all the benefits which such a union implies. This grace, called sacramental grace, includes first sanctifying grace, or rather, since matrimony is a Sacrament of the living, normally an increase of sanctifying grace; and also all the actual helps which are absolutely needed or useful in conjugal life; in a word, all the graces which are proper to that state of life. This Sacrament not only increases sanctifying grace, the permanent principle of the supernatural life, in those who, as the expression is, place no obstacle (obex) in its way, but also adds particular gifts, dispositions, seeds of grace, by elevating and perfecting the natural powers in such a way that the parties are assisted not only in understanding but in knowing intimately, in adhering to firmly, in willing effectively, and in successfully putting into practice those things which pertain to the marriage state, its aims and duties. In fine, it gives them the right to the actual assistance of grace, whensoever they need it for fulfilling the duties of their state.¹ The Encyclical, therefore, distinguishes between a group of actual helps, which it calls particular gifts, good inclinations, seeds of grace (sanctifying grace is meant)— synonymous expressions, all these—whose immediate purpose is to reinforce supernaturally, that is to elevate, the natural powers; and a group of aids which are to go into operation only at the prayer of the parties to the marriage. The Encyclical thus attributes a peculiar efficacy to the prayer of the parties to obtain what is necessary or useful to them in every situation in which they may find themselves. In fact, according to the teaching of St. Augustine,² God does give ^Pp. 33, 34. **De bono perseverantiae , throughout, e. g. Ch. XI; Latin Patrology, 45, 1017.

certain graces directly, whereas for other graces He waits for our cooperation with the grace of prayer which He always gives.

¹ Pp. 33, 34.

² De dono perseverantiae, passim, e. g. Ch. XI; PL, 45, 101[-]. (The final digit is illegible in the scan. — ed.)

An opinion which has some authority, but which is not obligatory extends to all the Sacraments what we must hold as certain in the case of the three Sacraments that imprint a character on the soul: Baptism, Confirmation, and Orders. This character is a real supernatural quality which is immediately signified by the exterior sign, and which itself in turn immediately signifies the sacramental grace to which it confers a title. Thus through Baptism in the name of the Holy Trinity man receives the character of a Christian; by Confirmation he receives the mark of a soldier of Christ; by Orders, that of a minister of sacred offices. The Christian needs the sacramental grace of a Christian life; the soldier needs the grace of supernatural weapons required or useful in battles; the sacred minister needs the gifts which are necessary for the fulfilment of his sacred mission. Now whereas it is only in these three Sacraments that we have to acknowledge the physical reality of a character, yet the analogy of the Sacraments and the natural proximate meaning of the exterior sign lead us to recognize the immediate title as sign for receiving grace as inhering in a reality of the moral order,¹ which is directly or immediately signified by the exterior sign. Let us apply this to marriage. What does the consent of the parties signify? What does it immediately produce? A permanent bond. But this permanent bond involves the conjugal life, with all its rights and duties, its fecundity, its vicissitudes; it, moreover, requires the graces of that state of life. Consequently the meaning of the grace of matrimony clearly appears in this bond, which is thus found to be signified by the consent, and at the same time significative of the sacramental grace. The need of this supernatural grace, and the right to it, appear still more evident when we learn from the Apostle that Christians must represent or symbolize the union of Christ and His Church.

¹ A reality of the moral order is for example some quality which without affecting a person physically yet confers upon him rights and duties. Such is the jurisdiction of a judge, the authority of a ruler.

1968. Among all Catholic authors it is certain that the MATTER of this Sacrament is the matrimonial contract; as regards the FORM and MINISTER, various opinions have been handed down. - Certain Theologians, led by Melchior Cano, taught that the minister is the priest, but that the form is had in these words: "I join you in matrimony." But the opinion which has always been more common, and has now become common, teaches that the ministers are the contracting parties themselves, and that the form consists in their mutual acceptance. - With these things briefly set forth beforehand, let the following be held.

1969. Principles. I. The REMOTE matter of this Sacrament is the bodies of the contracting parties, to be handed over mutually, or the mutual right over the body of the other. The PROXIMATE matter is the handing over itself of the right in the bodies, made through words or signs expressing consent. Thus commonly.

For this Sacrament has the nature of a contract; therefore just as in other contracts the things are the remote matter, and the handing over of the thing the proximate matter, so consequently it is in matrimony, where the right in the bodies is handed over.¹

1970. II. The FORM consists in the mutual acceptance of the contracting parties, expressed by words or signs. Thus commonly, and it will be clear from what is soon to be said concerning the minister.²

1971. III. The MINISTERS of the Sacrament of Matrimony are THE FAITHFUL THEMSELVES contracting. - This is the common opinion, and altogether certain. The evident reason is that in places where the impediment of clandestinity does not exist, matrimony is contracted validly without the presence of a priest. Therefore if a true Sacrament is effected even when the priest is absent, it must certainly be concluded that the contracting parties themselves, and not the priest, are the ministers.³ Nevertheless the priest is the minister of the solemnity of matrimony, as will be explained below (n. 2073).

Hence, for the contracting parties there apply those things which were said in their places both concerning the administration and concerning the reception of the Sacraments (cf. n. 1416, 1433, 1434, 1436). But,

YOU WILL ASK: Whether it is licit to enter matrimony with a PUBLIC SINNER, and consequently to minister the Sacrament to him? - RESP. This is prohibited at least under venial sin, as many probably say; indeed according to St. Alphonsus, more probably under grave sin, on account of reverence due to the Sacrament. A just cause EXCUSES from every sin, e.g. if someone cannot withdraw from matrimony without grave inconvenience. Except, however, if the other is an excommunicate to be avoided, with whom to communicate in a sacred matter is altogether illicit.⁴

1972. IV. The CONSENT by which matrimony is perfected and the Sacrament is administered must be personal, internal, deliberate, mutual, concerning the present, and externally manifested.

1. It must be PERSONAL; for "in matrimony consent cannot be supplied by any human power."⁵

2. TRUE and INTERNAL; for it is an act of one's own will, which freely imposes on itself a new obligation. - Hence, if both, or either one of the contracting parties, should consent not from the soul but FICTITIOUSLY, there is no matrimony. In the first case the matter is clear of itself; in the other, because, since the matrimonial contract cannot limp, the consent of the other being lacking, the contract is null. The one contracting fictitiously commits both the sin of sacrilege, because he renders the Sacrament null; and the sin of injustice, if the counterpart contracts in good faith, because he deceives that person and inflicts on him or her a grave injury, which he is bound to repair by removing the fiction and truly contracting (cf. n. 2083). If this cannot be done, or if the deceived party does not will it, he is bound at least to repair the other damages. Except, if the other party also deceived, or if the deception was done in order that the deceiver might decline fear unjustly inflicted. Nevertheless Authors commonly say that it is not illicit to simulate the celebration of nuptials, on account of a just cause, e.g. on account of a diriment impediment, when namely the celebration cannot be omitted without grave damage, as was said n. 1430, at the end.⁶

3. DELIBERATE, i.e. furnished with sufficient knowledge and due liberty. Force and error stand in the way of deliberation; but concerning these there will be discussion where impediments are treated.

4. MUTUAL; because a contract burdensome on both sides and transferring a mutual right in the bodies, as the matrimonial contract is, is not effected except through the reciprocal consent of the contracting parties. Wherefore it must also be noted: union and at least moral simultaneity are required between the consent of one and of the other, such as namely is required in civil contracts (cf. n. 1044, 3).

5. CONCERNING THE PRESENT, namely by which the contracting parties mutually accept each other here and now as true spouses; for in this matrimony differs from betrothals (cf. n. 1950, It is said 5).

6. EXTERNALLY MANIFESTED; otherwise mutual acceptance would not be possible. - It is not indeed required for the VALIDITY of matrimony that consent be expressed by words; it suffices that it be expressed by signs, which Innocent III declared,⁷ saying: "The deaf and mute can contract matrimony through consent without words." A sufficiently adequate sign would be if the woman, after the man's consent has already been expressed, should extend her hand to him; but not if she should not withdraw her hand when it has been seized by him. Nor would the giving of a ring suffice, or the leading of the bride into the house of the man, unless by the custom of the place signs of this sort expressed consent. But as regards LICEITY, unless modesty or another reasonable cause excused, it would be a venial sin to express consent by signs alone; because it would be against the rubric of the Ritual and against the custom of the Church.⁸

But sometimes explicit consent is not required. For, in places where the impediment of clandestinity does not prevail, BETROTHALS THEMSELVES, to which free and consummated intercourse is added, pass into true matrimony; provided the intercourse was had with marital affection: and this affection indeed is always presumed in the external forum; but in the internal forum, presumption yields to truth.⁹

1973. Questions. Q. 1. Whether matrimony can be contracted VALIDLY and LICITLY THROUGH A PROCURATOR?

Resp. 1. It can be contracted VALIDLY, as is clear from law. The reason is that Christ, in elevating matrimony to the being of a Sacrament, did not change the nature of the contract, which is such that it can be entered into among absent persons through a procurator. - But for this many things are REQUIRED, namely: 1) A special mandate, which can be given orally; for writing is not demanded. - 2) That the mandate be concerning contracting with a determinate person. - 3) That the procurator contract by himself; for he himself cannot delegate another, unless he has express and special permission from the mandator. - 4) That the mandate has not been revoked by the mandator, even mentally, before the matrimony is celebrated. And this runs even if the revocation is made tacitly, namely if someone gave a mandate of contracting with one woman, and afterward celebrates betrothals with another. - 5) That, in places where the impediment of clandestinity prevails, the procurator show the mandate to the pastor and witnesses, and before them contract matrimony according to the form of Trent. - 6) That he not exceed the limits of the mandate. But in this it must be adverted that, if the condition is required by the mandator, namely that contraction be made with such a dowry, at such a time, etc., if the condition is not observed, the matrimony will be null. But if the condition is required by law, namely that contraction be made after denunciations have been premised, after permission of the Bishop has been obtained, etc., then the matrimony entered without them will be valid.¹⁰

Resp. 2. It can also be contracted LICITLY, but only when a grave cause suffices, as, e.g., among Princes; for one must not easily recede from the ordinary practice of the Church. And hence it is why the pastor ought not, without consulting the Bishop, to assist at such a matrimony.¹¹

Q. 2. Whether matrimony can be contracted through a LETTER?

Resp. Affirmatively, on account of the same reason as above. But it is contracted in the following manner: "The groom writes to the bride that he himself hands himself over to her as husband, and from that moment accepts her as wife. The bride writes the same in return to the man; this response is read before the pastor and witnesses. Moreover, it is also enough that the man write to the woman in the way related, and that the bride, without writing back to the groom, open the letters before the pastor and witnesses, and furnish her consent."¹² - But that this be done LICITLY, a grave cause is required. Hence it is plainly to be advised that the pastor do nothing in this matter without the permission of the Bishop. Except, unless perhaps it is a question of revalidating matrimony, in which case one party would refuse to present himself before the pastor.¹³

Q. 3. Whether matrimony can be contracted UNDER CONDITION?

Resp. Affirmatively, because neither the sacred canons nor the very nature of matrimony altogether impede certain conditions from being added to matrimonial consent. - But according to the variety of conditions, various things must be DISTINGUISHED:

1. If the condition, even a base one, is concerning the past or concerning the present, the matrimony is valid if the condition stands; on the contrary, if it is lacking, it is not valid, because consent is lacking.

2. If the condition is concerning a necessary future thing, e.g. if the sun rises tomorrow, the matrimony is valid at once, unless the contracting parties intend to suspend consent until the time of the fulfilled condition. Thus commonly.

3. If the condition is against the substance of matrimonial obligation, e.g. if one says to the other: "I contract with you, if you avoid the generation of offspring; or until I find another more worthy in honor or wealth; or if you hand yourself over to be adulterated for gain:" thus it must be DISTINGUISHED: 1) if the condition is added with the intention of not undertaking the obligations which are essential to matrimony, which can easily happen in regions where divorce is permitted by laws and is in use, the matrimony is invalid; 2) if it is added with the intention indeed of undertaking them, but of not fulfilling them, it is valid, and the depraved will must be corrected.¹⁴ - But here it is customary to ask whether the condition of not consummating matrimony is against the good of offspring? - The more common and more probable opinion denies it; wherefore matrimony entered into under this condition is valid, provided the contracting parties intend to hand over to each other the mutual right in the body and to bind only the use of it (cf. n. 1963).

4. If the condition is concerning an impossible or base thing, which nevertheless is not repugnant to the substance of matrimony, again it must be DISTINGUISHED: 1) if there is evidence of a serious will not to contract unless the added condition has been fulfilled, matrimony entered into under an impossible condition is null; but one entered into under a base condition is not null by that very fact, but before the condition has been fulfilled, it obliges to nothing; when it has been fulfilled, however, it becomes absolute matrimony. - 2) But if there is no evidence of that serious will, the base or impossible condition is held as not added, and the matrimony is immediately valid.

5. Finally, if the condition is concerning a future contingent and honorable thing, the matrimony remains suspended until the condition is fulfilled; but when this has been fulfilled, it becomes absolute. While the condition is pending, it is not licit for one, against the will of the other, to revoke consent.¹⁵

But note as regards LICEITY, that the pastor cannot, without a most urgent cause, admit conditional marriages of this sort; namely on account of the many inconveniences and difficulties which afterward can occur and be moved against their validity.¹⁶

Q. 4. Whether, when the condition has been fulfilled, NEW CONSENT is required for matrimony?

Resp. Some indeed affirm, because matrimony is not only a contract, but also a Sacrament, whose validity cannot be pending.

But others, more truly and commonly, deny it, because the condition having been fulfilled, the contract becomes absolute, and consequently by that very fact also is constituted in the nature of a Sacrament.¹

Q. 5. What if a demonstration, cause, or mode is added to consent?

Resp. DEMONSTRATION, e.g. I marry you, who are noble; CAUSE, e.g. I marry you, because you are a virgin; MODE, e.g. I marry you, that you may serve me, differ altogether from condition in this, that they do not suspend consent; wherefore matrimony becomes immediately absolute, unless perhaps the demonstration, cause, or mode have, in the mind of the contracting parties, the nature of a condition, or unless substantial error lies hidden in them.²

Q. 6. Whether the CONSENT OF PARENTS is required for the matrimony of children-of-the-family?

Resp. 1. Negatively, as regards validity: and this is of faith against the Lutherans and Calvinists. For Trent (sess. 24, cap. 1) "condemns with anathema those who falsely affirm that marriages contracted by children-of-the-family without the consent of parents are invalid, and that parents can make them ratified or invalid." Reason is added: for the contracting parties have power over their own body, nor do parents have power over the body of their children in order to matrimony. - But if CIVIL LAW requires the consent of parents for the validity of matrimony, its force extends only to merely civil effects.

Resp. 2. It is required, at least speaking regularly, for liceity; so that children-of-the-family sin gravely if parents justly contradict, or if they are judged to be reasonably unwilling. We said speaking regularly; for when a just cause intervenes, it is certain that children can, while parents are ignorant of it or even unwilling, enter matrimony³ (see n. 1951, query 1).

But when parents contradict justly, and when unjustly, cannot easily be defined: wherefore a prudent confessor will indeed persuade children that, in a matter of so great moment, they should not stand against the will of parents; but very rarely will he impose on them an obligation of withdrawing from entering matrimony, especially because greater evils, for the most part, are to be feared from this.

1554. Principles. - I. The remote matter of Matrimony is the bodies of the contracting parties, insofar as they are mutually handed over to one another in order to the generation of offspring. - Thus commonly.

But the proximate matter is the handing over itself of the bodies, which is perfected by the words or signs expressing consent. - Thus commonly. Benedict XIV, Constitution Paucis abhinc.

II. The form consists in the mutual acceptance of the contracting parties expressed by words or signs. - Thus likewise more commonly.

See the Dogmaticians.

S. Th., Suppl. q. 42, a. 1 and a. 3, ad 2; q. 44, a. 1, ad 2; q. 45, a. 2 and 5.

784. Errors. - The traditional doctrine in the Church is that the sacrament is not something extrinsically added to the matrimony of Christians, but that these things are intimately connected and really inseparable; namely, that matrimony itself was elevated to the dignity of a sacrament, so that between the baptized there cannot be a valid matrimony unless it is a sacrament. To this doctrine various errors and opinions are opposed, both concerning the essence and concerning the constitution of this sacrament.

1° Certain ones said that the sacrament is adequately distinct from the matrimonial contract, and extrinsic to it, as being accessory and supervening upon it, and that it consists, for example, in the nuptial blessing of the priest, or in a religious contract, or one entered before the Church.

Thus Marcus Antonius de Dominis, bishop of Spalato, who became a heretic, in the book De Republica Christiana; likewise Launoy and the Regalists; and in the nineteenth century Nuytz, professor of Turin, and many politicians and civil jurists.

2° Others held that the sacrament is really but inadequately distinct from the contract, so that the contract alone would be the matter, and the priestly blessing the form constituting the sacrament. Thus Melchior Cano and several theologians after him.

3° Others, finally, affirmed that the contract is in no way, not even imperfectly, distinct in reality from the sacrament, but by reason alone, and nevertheless that it is separable, so that in certain cases there can be a valid matrimonial contract between the baptized without its being a sacrament, as if by their intention they wished to enter the contract but did not wish the sacrament. Thus Vasquez, the Salmanticenses, Billuart, and the Wurzburg theologians.

1° Others, as has already been said, stated that the contract itself is the matter of the sacrament, but the form the blessing of the priest: I join you... William of Paris perhaps held this, but afterward Melchior Cano, Estius, Sylvius, Tournely, and several others formally taught it.

2° Others posited the internal consent as the matter, but the words expressing the consent as the form. Thus Navarrus, Capreolus, Scherer, and Schnitzler.

3° Others said that the contracting persons, or the bodies, are the matter, but that the words by which they hand over the body or consent to the handing over of the body are the form. Thus St. Bonaventure, Paludanus, St. Antoninus, Laymann, Vasquez.

4° Others finally said that the matter is the words expressing the consent of the first contracting party, and the form the words expressing the consent of the later contracting party. Thus Richard, Victoria, Grisaldus, B. Ledesma, Henriquez, Vivaldus.

785. Thesis I. Christ elevated matrimony itself to the dignity of a sacrament, so that between the baptized there cannot be a true matrimony unless it is a sacrament (can. 1012). - It is certain.

It is proved: a) From the documents of tradition, which implicitly suppose this, since they assert that matrimony itself, which was instituted by God in the beginning, just as it existed as an office of nature, was elevated to sacramental dignity; but this is nothing other than the contract itself and the consequent bond.

Hence the Scholastics, without restriction concerning all marriages between Christians, said that the mutual consent itself expressed by words is the sacramental sign (S. Th., loc. cit.), and the Council of Florence asserts: "The seventh is the sacrament of Matrimony..., the efficient cause of matrimony regularly is mutual consent expressed by words concerning the present"; and the Council of Trent teaches, sess. 24, de ref., c. 1, that clandestine marriages were ratified and true marriages, as long as the Church did not make them invalid, although in them there is nothing except the matrimonial contract.

b) From explicit declarations of the Pontiffs, made in more recent time.

Thus Pius VI, ep. September 16, 1788; Pius IX in the brief of August 22, 1851; in the epistle to the king of Sardinia, September 19, 1852; in the allocution of September 27, 1852; in the Syllabus, prop. 65, 66, and 73; Leo XIII in the encyclical Arcanum; and Pius XI in the encyclical Casti connubii.

It is objected: In every sacrament the minister by his intention can cause the rite, for example, ablution, to be placed merely materially and externally, and not to be sacred or a sacrament; therefore also in matrimony the ministers, the contracting parties, can cause it not to be a sacrament, but only a contract.

Resp. I deny the consequence. Ministers can impede it from being a sacrament, but at the same time by impeding the contract, because Christ instituted that every true matrimonial contract between the baptized should be a sacrament. The difference is 1) that the rite, in the other sacraments, for example in Baptism, is a merely physical action, which remains such if it is placed materially; but the action of the spouses is a moral action, namely, a contract which has as its effect a moral bond and obligation. Whence, if they have the intention of placing the action merely materially and externally, the bond is now lacking and the contract is not present. Hence 2) it is possible to intend ablution without intending the sacrament; it is impossible to intend the contract without intending the sacrament.

786. Corollaries. - From the aforesaid doctrine it follows:

1° Catholics, even heretics or schismatics provided they have been baptized, when they validly celebrate matrimony, at the same time also receive the sacrament, even if they are ignorant of it or deny it (q. 51, a. 2, ad 2); - indeed even if they do not wish it, provided that with a prevailing will they intend to enter matrimony and do not wholly exclude the sacrament: for in this case they would not contract validly.

2° The sacrament of matrimony is distinguished from the contract and conjugal society, not indeed in reality, but nevertheless by reason, as St. Thomas has it, q. 49, a. 2, ad 7: "Although matrimony is a sacrament, nevertheless it is one thing for matrimony to be matrimony, and another for it to be a sacrament: because it was instituted not only for this, that it should be as a sign of a sacred thing, but also that it should be as an office of nature. And therefore the character of a sacrament is a certain condition coming to matrimony considered according to itself."

3° The sacrament of matrimony, just like the contract, can validly be entered between absent persons, for example, by letters, by messengers, or by a procurator: thus against Cajetan (can. 1088).

4° The matrimony of unbelievers, by the fact that both spouses are baptized, by that very fact becomes a sacrament, even if they were ignorant of it; because the matrimonial contract virtually perseveres in them and subsists in the bond itself, which, when Baptism comes, by that very fact becomes a sacred sign; as St. Thomas intimates, q. 59, a. 2, ad 1, indeed also St. Paul speaking to the Ephesians who were married before Baptism: thus against Vasquez, the Salmanticenses, Billuart, and others.

5° On the contrary, matrimony between a believer and an unbeliever is never a sacrament: for since the contract is numerically one and perfectly bilateral, it cannot be in one and not in the other; therefore likewise as to the sacrament, which cannot be separated from it. Matrimony cannot limp; whence the bond cannot be stricter and firmer in one than in the other, ratified and sacred in one, not in the other. Thus the more common opinion.¹ Moreover, the Holy Office calls a matrimony of this kind a natural bond.

¹ That this may appear more evident, observe that consent does not immediately signify sacramental grace, but by means of the bond, which in Christian matrimony is sacred, as representing in a special way the union of Christ and the Church, and thus is an efficacious sign of grace. But the bond is a relation which cannot limp; and therefore the sign is efficacious of grace in both, or it is not.

787. Thesis II. The constitutive parts, or the matter and form of the sacrament, are the constitutive elements of the contract itself, namely, the mutual handing over and acceptance of bodies expressed by words or signs. - It is today an almost common opinion.

It is proved: The sacrament of matrimony is nothing other than the contract elevated to sacramental dignity; therefore that is the matter and form of the sacrament which is the matter and form of the contract. But in a contract the handing over of the thing, or the consent to the handing over externally expressed, is the matter; the acceptance, or the consent to acceptance externally expressed, is the form. Therefore it is so in the sacrament of matrimony. And indeed: a determinable element has the character of matter, a determinative element the character of form; but in a contract the offering or handing over is something determinable by which it is begun, but it is completed in the character of a perfect contract through acceptance, which has itself as the determinative element; therefore handing over is the matter, acceptance the form.

It is confirmed, because consent to the handing over, although it is expressed by words, does not have itself as speech, but as an offer-making action; on the contrary, the expression of acceptance formally is speech and signification.

Hence: 1) The thing which is handed over, or the remote matter about which the contract is made, is the very persons or bodies of the contracting parties, or rather the power over the body of the other in order to acts of themselves apt for generation; but they are not the proximate matter from which the contract of matrimony is constituted.

2. The internal consent itself, although necessarily required, nevertheless is not as such the constitutive element of the external sign and of the contract in the character of an external act, as being not sensible.

3. The consent of the first contracting party is not the sole and whole matter, nor the consent of the later contracting party the sole and whole form; but each, as offering himself or herself to the other, begins the contract and places the matter, and, as accepting the other, perfects the contract and places the form.

788. Observation. - Consent, as causing the conjugal bond, is the efficient cause of matrimony; as determining the handing over of the co-party, it is the form; as a handing over to be determined by the acceptance of the co-party, it is the matter of the sacrament.

By an indivisible bond, in the marriage of Christians, the contract, that is, the marital union, and the sacrament are bound together; these are not two things, but two necessary aspects or formalities of the same thing. Wherefore among Christians the conjunction of man and woman, if it is not a sacrament, neither is it marriage; and if it is marriage, it is also a sacrament.

I. Marriage can exist of itself without being a sacrament properly so called. Such it was before the new economy was instituted, and such it still is among unbelievers, among whom it exists for the office of nature, for procreating and educating offspring, and as a remedy for concupiscence. Among unbelievers, therefore, marriage is nothing except a certain natural contract, or the marital union of man and woman instituted by nature itself, determined by the free consent of the contracting parties. But among Christians it is, besides, a sacrament. Wherefore these two can be distinguished by reason in Christian marriage: the contract (by which name the consent of each, which is the cause, and the abiding bond thence arisen, is signified), which would exist even in pure nature, and existed before Christ, and exists among unbelievers; and the sacrament, which is found only in Christians contracting. But the question is whether, just as by reason, so also in reality these two can be distinguished in Christian marriage, not indeed by complete separation, so that even the sacrament could exist without the contract (what that would be no one could attain), but at least by incomplete separation, so that the contract could be valid without the sacrament. Some theologians judged that there could be a true marriage among Christians which would not be a sacrament, and this opinion was willingly embraced by those who wished the priest to be its minister. But the Catholic doctrine is now sufficiently manifest: these two are inseparable, and indeed not insofar as they are two things which always demand to be together, but insofar as they are really one and the same thing, and therefore are only aspects or formalities, and indeed necessary ones, of the same thing. We say, namely, that the very same thing which is marriage among Christians is a sacrament, and that which is a sacrament is marriage, and that, if the thing itself is not a sacrament, neither is it marriage; that is, the consent of those who attempt to contract has no value, and no marital bond exists, but only base concubinage. Therefore it must be demonstrated that marriage among Christians is the sacrament itself and is necessarily a sacrament; for when these things have been proved, the truth of the Thesis will be clear.

II. And so, 1. Christian marriage and the sacrament itself are not two things but one. Marriage can be considered in fieri, which is the contract itself, and in the permanent facto esse, which is the bond arisen from it. Moreover the sacrament, when it comes to be, is not a thing other than the contract itself, and when it remains, it is not a thing other than the bond itself; therefore. The assumed point is proved. a) The mutual handing over and acceptance of power over the other is the matrimonial contract and is the cause of the matrimonial bond; but the same, Eugene bearing witness, is the efficient cause of the sacrament. Therefore marriage and sacrament are one thing. The consequence is proved. For matrimonial consent makes only one thing, namely that to which both consent, which is mutual power or the bond, that is, marriage; but their consent is also the cause of the sacrament; therefore the sacrament is the same thing as marriage. Or will you say that matrimonial consent, although it is one action physically, is nevertheless virtually multiple, so as thus to produce two distinct effects? But either those effects are so related that one is only the mode of the other, or that both are two things. If you say the first, this very thing is what we contend, when we assert that marriage and sacrament are the same thing, namely that the nature of sacrament is an intrinsic mode of the marriage of Christians. If you say the other, we deny that matrimonial consent is a virtually multiple cause in such a way as to produce two distinct things; for consent, taken as a whole, objectively effects nothing other than that to which consent is given, for it is ordered only to this. Therefore if another thing comes to be, another cause of it also will have to be assigned. On the contrary, the same one consent, if by the institution of God it obtains a supernatural mode, will be able to effect that one thing which it makes, augmented by a supernatural mode, so that the contract is a sacrament. Therefore if the cause of the sacrament is mutual consent, the marriage which comes to be and the sacrament are the same thing. But if the marriage which comes to be is not a thing other than the sacrament which comes to be, the marriage also in fieri will be a sacramental action, by which the sacrament comes to be, as is clear of itself; therefore.

b) This sacrament is called in the direct case marriage; but by this appellation not only the matter of the sacrament is directly represented, as happens in the appellation of the sacrament of Penance, but the whole sacrament is signified. For: "It is a dogma of faith," says Pius VI in the Brief to the Bishop of Motula, 16 Sept. 1788, "that marriage, which before the coming of Christ was nothing other than a certain indissoluble contract, after the coming of Christ became one of the seven sacraments of the Evangelical Law instituted by Christ the Lord, as the sacred Council of Trent defined under penalty of anathema against heretics and impious men raving mad in this age." Likewise Pius VII, in the schema of the Pontifical Constitution (Roskovani, Marriage in the Catholic Church Subject to Ecclesiastical Power, with a Very Ample Collection of Documents and Literature, vol. 2, p. 20 seq.): "For it is clear that marriage, which the Tridentine Synod defined to have been elevated by Christ the Lord to the dignity of a sacrament, is that very thing by which a man becomes one flesh with his wife, that which was wedlock in the old law, that which bears in itself the mystery of the union of Christ and the Church, that which from the beginning was instituted by God for the office of nature, namely the nuptials themselves or the society of nuptials, finally the conjugal bond itself, that is, the matrimonial contract itself. This certainly is what the Catholic Church has always held and holds." This manner of speaking is not used with regard to the other sacraments, of which only a certain matter existed before Christ. For it is not said, nor can it be said, that that same washing, for example of John the Baptist, became a sacrament in the New Law, or that that same contrition or penance which existed before became a sacrament of the New Law. Rather, it is said that by the accession of a new rite instituted by Christ these were elevated to the dignity of a sacrament. But there is another manner of speaking concerning Marriage. Namely, that which before the coming of Christ was nothing except a certain indissoluble contract, the same became a sacrament after Christ; that is, there did not accede to it some rite instituted by Christ, by which the sacrament would be constituted, as the use of the power of the keys accedes to acts of penance; but the whole contract itself became a sacrament. For that reason what is marriage, that same thing is sacrament; therefore Christian marriage and sacrament are not two things, but one.

c) The sacrament conferring grace is that which signifies the union of Christ with the Church; for this is the thing of which the Apostle speaks in Eph. V, and that to which sanctifying grace belongs is that by which that union is perfectly represented. But this, in facto esse, is the bond by which spouses are bound and become one flesh; in fieri, however, it is the contract itself or consent by which a man leaves father and mother and cleaves to his wife, and conversely the consent of the wife (Ephes. V). But that is nothing except marriage, and nothing else; therefore the sacrament is nothing other than the very marriage which Christians celebrate. Thus Leo XIII in the Encyclical on Christian Marriage: "For this reason marriage is a sacrament, because it is a sacred sign and efficacious of grace, and bears the image of the mystical nuptials of Christ with the Church. But the form and figure of these nuptials is expressed by that very bond of highest conjunction by which man and woman are joined together, and which is nothing else than marriage itself."

III. 2. Christian marriage is necessarily a sacrament. It is clear that the discussion is about marriage which is truly such, namely a legitimate contract from which the bond of mutual obligation arises. The necessity which is asserted is not from the nature of the thing, but from divine institution. It is proved, a) from the divine institution itself of the sacrament. It is clear from the things demonstrated that God elevated marriage among Christians to the dignity of a sacrament; for since Christ instituted the sacrament of marriage and willed it to exist among Christians, and this sacrament is nothing except marriage itself or the matrimonial contract, it must be said that marriage itself was elevated by Christ to the dignity of a sacrament. Therefore this proposition, already demonstrated, is true: the sacrament of marriage is nothing except the very marriage which is celebrated among Christians. But the question is whether this other proposition also is true: Christian marriage is necessarily a sacrament, so that by the very fact that the matrimonial contract comes to be, the sacrament cannot fail to come to be, and if the sacrament does not come to be, neither does marriage come to be. The question is, namely, whether Christ willed not only that the sacrament should come to be by the contract itself, just as he willed that baptism should come to be by the washing of water and by the invocation of the Trinity, but also that every legitimate contract should be a sacrament.

Now, that we may demonstrate the affirmative part, we argue thus. If Christ elevated marriage to the dignity of a sacrament, he certainly joined in marriage these two things: the aspect of contract and the aspect of sacrament. Moreover it must be presupposed that this conjunction was made by Christ by a certain antecedent absolute will, that is, independently of the will of men. For the institution of the sacraments pertains to the antecedent and absolute will by which the essence of the sacramental rite, or the efficacy of some rite for producing grace, is constituted wholly independently of the contingent will of men. Therefore, since the conjunction of the efficacy of grace with marriage pertains to the institution of the sacrament, and this is done by an antecedent absolute will, the conjunction of each aspect, contract and sacrament, was made by God by an absolute will. Therefore by his institution, which is directed immediately to the very thing which is elevated to the dignity of a sacrament (not by some simple precept given to human wills, by which indeed the use of the sacrament, not the institution itself, is established), Christ effected that Christian marriage is a sacrament and willed this to be, as it were, an intrinsic mode and property of Christian marriage. But this absolute institution joining the aspect of contract and of sacrament was made for every Christian marriage. For when Christ elevated marriage to the dignity of a sacrament, he did not elevate this or that marriage, but simply marriage, namely that which was instituted from the beginning, which is the sacrament or sign of the union of Christ with the Church (Eph. V), by which God himself joins man and woman (Matth. XIX). Nor did Christ institute some rite which of itself, according to the intention of the agent, can be referred to diverse ends; but he willed the matrimonial contract itself, which cannot be employed for anything other than that it be the marital union between man and woman, to be a sacrament. Therefore whatever among Christians, to whom alone the sacraments of Christ pertain, can be called marriage - namely every Christian marriage - has been elevated to the dignity of a sacrament. Therefore that absolute institution joining both aspects, contract and sacrament, is universal, comprehending any marriage whatsoever. And so, just as by Christ's institution the sacrament is nothing except marriage itself, so by the same institution the marriage of Christians, as such, and therefore every marriage of this kind, is a sacrament.

But from these things it follows, 1. that the dignity of a sacrament pertains to the essence of Christian marriage by the institution of Christ. For Christian marriage cannot fail to be that which by Christ, with an absolute will independent of the will of men, was made to be an efficacious sign of grace; nor can it fail to be that which Christ determined, by the same will, every and always Christian marriage to be. It follows, 2. that the disjunction of contract and sacrament does not depend on the will of men, so that there could be a contract of marriage without being a sacrament; for the conjunction of both aspects, contract and sacrament, was made for any marriage whatsoever by the absolute will of God. A man can indeed bring it about that it is not actually a sacrament, because for this the intention of the minister is also required; but he will not be able to bring it about that those two are disjoined, or that there exists a marriage which is not a sacrament. For that Christian marriage is a sacrament, is a sign of the union of Christ with the Church, is an efficacious sign of grace, this belongs by Christ's institution to the essence of Christian marriage; but the existence of the thing is indeed placed in the choice of the minister, not its essence.

IV. You will say: the intention of the minister can bring it about that that thing which would be a sacrament is not a sacrament, for example washing with the invocation of the Trinity; therefore it can also bring it about that marriage is not a sacrament, but only pure marriage, just as that is a pure washing and invocation of the Trinity. I respond: I distinguish the consequence. Therefore it can bring it about that it is not a sacrament, yet is marriage: I deny. It will be able to bring it about that it is not a sacrament, and therefore neither will it be marriage: I concede. Christ instituted that the sacrament of baptism be effected by the washing of water and the invocation of the Trinity; namely he instituted the rite of initiation and willed it to be perfected in this way, that is, by the washing of water and the invocation of the Trinity. But he did not institute that every washing with invocation of the Trinity, even freely posited, should by this very fact be a sacrament. But he did institute that any marriage whatsoever celebrated among Christians be a sacrament; namely he attributed to it the power of conferring grace. Wherefore if it is marriage, no one can prevent it from being a sacrament; and if it is not a sacrament, no one can bring it about that it be marriage. For when an essential property is lacking, no one can bring it about that the thing be; but it is an essential property of Christian marriage by the institution of Christ that it be a sacrament; nor can there be, against the absolute will of Christ, a marriage among Christians which is not a sacrament. And so, from the fact that marriage is a sacrament, it does indeed follow the manner of the other sacraments in this respect: that it depends on the intention of the minister of the sacrament of marriage whether it is or is not a sacrament; and if that intention which is required for the confecting of the sacrament is lacking ¹, it is not a sacrament. But at the same time, because of the institution of Christ, neither does the contract come to be, although that exterior material action is performed, and although there is the intention of doing it.

¹ What sort of intention there ought to be here is not the place to dispute; the moral theologians will teach it. We suppose that intention which, according to Catholic doctrine, is sufficient.

You will say: If Christ had instituted that every washing of water with invocation of the Trinity is a sacrament, nevertheless, if intention were lacking, there could have been washing and invocation without a sacrament; therefore likewise as regards marriage. I respond: I deny the consequence. The reason for the distinction depends on the nature of the action of each sacrament. Washing (say the same of invocation), if it is posited, cannot fail to be washing, since it is a purely physical action; therefore, unless God, using his omnipotence, had willed to prevent washing from existing whenever the due intention of the sacrament is lacking, he could not institute by an absolute will that every washing is a sacrament. But the sacramental action of marriage is a moral action producing a moral effect, namely obligation and right, and the same can physically be had without producing this moral effect. Therefore, Christ's institution being posited, when the intention of the sacrament is lacking in the ministers, an act can be physically posited by each without nevertheless being efficacious consent or contract; and thus it is always true that it is not marriage if it is not a sacrament. There is, namely, a certain divine nullification of consent, lest it be efficacious and effect marriage unless it is also a sacrament. Therefore the reason why the former act, not making a sacrament, also does not make a matrimonial contract is this: because by Christ's institution it is of the essence of marriage that it be a sacrament; wherefore it cannot exist unless it is a sacrament. And therefore the minister can indeed bring it about that the sacrament not exist, if the due intention is lacking; but with the sacrament lacking, he cannot bring it about that marriage remain, or the matrimonial contract, but only that material action of the words by which contracting is customarily done.

V. b) The same is confirmed from the doctrine of the Apostle to the Ephesians, c. V. For Paul there intimates that Christian marriage is a sacrament (Th. I); but Paul speaks universally of any Christian marriage whatsoever. For he discourses of man and woman, of the man who is the head of the woman, of the woman who is subject to the man; but this is the notion univocally common to every marriage. Moreover of these he affirms that they represent the union of Christ and the Church, and he intimates that their conjunction is effected sacramentally. Therefore every Christian marriage, according to Paul, is a sacrament, and therefore cannot exist without being a sacrament.

VI. c) The same is proved from the constant sense of the Church, which has always judged every Christian marriage to be necessarily a sacrament. A sense of this kind is clear from these things. The Church has always judged that authority belongs to herself over any marriages whatsoever of Christians as regards the bond itself; she ruled them by her laws, she established impediments for them, and for clandestine no less than for non-clandestine marriages. But the Church also judged that authority belongs to herself over the bond of marriage only because it is a sacrament. Thus Pius VI, after the words cited above under n. 1, immediately concludes: "Hence it comes about that to the Church alone, to which the whole care concerning the sacraments has been entrusted, belongs every right and power of assigning its own form to this contract, elevated to the more sublime dignity of a sacrament, and consequently of passing judgment concerning the validity or invalidity of marriages"... "These causes (matrimonial causes) pertain to the judgment of the Church alone for no other reason than because the matrimonial contract is truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of the Evangelical Law." Therefore the Church has always judged every marriage of Christians to be a sacrament. But this is the same as judging that marriage of this kind is necessarily a sacrament; for what belongs always and to every one is proper and necessary.

d) These are the words of Trent, Sess. XXIV: "But the grace which would perfect that natural love [of spouses], and would confirm the indissoluble unity and sanctify the spouses, Christ himself, the institutor and perfecter of the venerable sacraments, merited for us by his passion"; on account of which grace marriage is then said to be a sacrament. Therefore he so merited that this grace is actually conferred. That natural love by which man and woman unite themselves is necessarily nothing except the free consent of one to the other; for other affections can be absent, with marriage existing. Now if that natural love is present, there is also present, Trent bearing witness, sacramental grace; if grace is lacking, unless this is because of an obstacle, that natural love also ought to be lacking; otherwise the former statement would be false. Therefore contract and grace are bound together by a mutual bond, and in such a way that there cannot be a contract without being a sacrament.

VII. Finally Pius IX taught us this by his authentic magisterium in the Allocution delivered in secret consistory, 27 Sept. 1852: "No one among Catholics is ignorant or can be ignorant that marriage is truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of the Evangelical Law instituted by Christ the Lord; and therefore that among the faithful there cannot be a marriage without at one and the same time being a sacrament; and for that reason any conjunction whatever, even among Christians, of man and woman apart from the sacrament, made even by force of any civil law whatsoever, is nothing other than base and deadly concubinage, so greatly condemned by the Church; and consequently the sacrament can never be separated from the conjugal covenant." He confirmed this by condemning this proposition 73 in the Syllabus: "By force of a merely civil contract, there can exist among Christians a marriage of true name; and it is false either that the contract of marriage among Christians is always a sacrament, or that there is no contract if the sacrament is excluded." "It is settled," says Leo XIII in the cited Encyclical, "that in Christian marriage the contract is not dissociable from the sacrament, and therefore a true and legitimate contract cannot exist without being by that very fact a sacrament. For Christ the Lord augmented marriage with the dignity of a sacrament; but marriage is the contract itself, provided only it has been made by right."

Observe that Pius VII, in the schema cited above, has these things: "Whatever be the case concerning marriages which are entered into without sacred ministry in those places where the Tridentine Council has not been promulgated - which marriages indeed there are some who think subsist in the nature of contract, but in no way attain to the dignity of a sacrament, which question, following in the footsteps of our Predecessors, we leave undecided - nevertheless from the cited opinion, whatever finally it may be, it would by no means follow that the sacrament of marriage is a thing distinct and separable from the matrimonial covenant itself, just as from the fact that not every washing is a sacrament, it by no means follows that the sacrament of baptism is a thing distinct and separable from the washing itself conferred with due matter and under due form." In these words the Pontiff affirms the first part of our assertion: namely, that the sacrament is not a thing distinct from the contract; but he leaves undecided the other part: that a true marriage of Christians cannot exist without being a sacrament. Yet he does not leave it undecided in this sense, as if it were a doubtful thing or not sufficiently proved, but insofar as it had not yet been defined and he himself did not wish to define it, and therefore it was permitted to the disputation of Catholics. But what he did not wish to affirm, Pius IX soon afterward (whatever be the case whether this is a definition of faith) affirmed by the cited decrees; and certainly this truth can be demonstrated theologically, which Pius VII does not deny. Moreover it is fitting to remember that that document is nothing except a schema (Roskovani calls it a projectum, that is, a progetto) of a pontifical constitution.

And so from all the things demonstrated it is clear that the matrimonial contract of Christians and the sacrament are not two things, but two formalities, and those necessary formalities of the same thing; and therefore one cannot exist without the other.

Corollary. Therefore that doctrine is altogether false, and deservedly proscribed by the Apostolic See, which is the foundation of that institution which they call civil marriage, namely that the matrimonial contract can be separated among Christians from the sacrament. For by the divine authority by which marriage was first instituted, it was then effected that every marriage of Christians is a sacrament; the powers of the world can indeed blaspheme the force of this divine authority, but they cannot make it void.

The ministers of the sacrament are the contracting parties themselves who contract marriage; their contract, insofar as it is the mutual handing over of power, can be held as the proximate matter, and insofar as it is the mutual acceptance of the same, as the form of the sacrament. Moreover the contract is sacrament only, the grace which is conferred is thing of the sacrament only, and the bond which remains is both thing and sacrament.

I. The question concerning the minister and the question concerning the form and matter of this sacrament cannot be separated. Melchior Canus judged (De Locis Theologicis, L. VIII, c. 5), and sharply asserted with several arguments bearing in that age some appearance of probability, that the minister of the sacrament of marriage is the priest, and therefore that the form of the sacrament is the words uttered by him, by which he joins the spouses, while the contract is nothing except the matter of this sacrament. Once the opinion of Canus was admitted, it was easy to infer that in marriage the sacrament can be separated from the contract of Christians. But this question was being debated among Catholics. Certain others supported Canus, especially those who wished a way to lie open for them to defend the rights of secular princes over the marriages of Christians. Cf. Tournely, De Matrimonio, quaest. II, a. 11, § 3. Although formerly the opinion of Canus seemed probable to Benedict XIV, De Synodo Dioecesana, L. VIII, c. 13, nevertheless now the contrary is to be held as certain.

II. Indeed the opinion of Canus was new in the School, both because he was able to bring forward no one from the School who had certainly handed it down, and because the common doctrine of the older Scholastics resists it. For Canus appeals to three Scholastics: William of Paris, Paludanus, and St. Thomas. But the opinion of St. Thomas is wholly other, as we shall see. But what he says in IV, D. I, q. 1, a. 3 - "marriage according as it is for an office, and penance according as it is a virtue, do not have any form of words; but according as each is a sacrament consisting in the dispensation of the ministers of the Church, each has some words: just as in marriage there are words expressing consent, and again blessings instituted by the Church" - does not signify that the words of the priest pertain to the essence of the sacrament; indeed, he manifestly teaches the opposite. For the Church does not institute the forms of the sacraments; but if any words are the form of the sacrament, they are the words expressing consent. Cf. what we shall give at the end of this part. But St. Thomas does not consider the sacrament only, but the sacrament according as it is dispensed by the ministers of the Church. Marriage, however, is dispensed by the ministers of the Church, not indeed insofar as it is made by them, but insofar as it is governed by the Church, and from her ministers has a certain solemnity through blessing. He teaches the same in IV, book Contra Gentiles, c. 78, saying: "Insofar as marriage is ordered to the good of the Church, it must be subject to ecclesiastical rule; but those things which are dispensed to the people through the ministers of the Church are called sacraments." In these words it is manifest that something must be supplied, so that the determinate notion of a true sacrament may be had; for not whatever the ministers of the Church dispense to the people is a sacrament properly so called.

Nor does Paludanus favor Canus when he teaches in IV, D. V, q. 2, that a man and woman contracting, even if they are sinners and do not do penance, are not guilty of sacrilege. For he says: "It does not seem that a sinner contracting marriage sins, although the essence of marriage consists in mutual consent expressed through the words of one to the other; for this consent ministers the sacrament, not the priest blessing, who only applies a certain sacramental." What could be clearer? Why, then, are they not guilty of sacrilege? They are not guilty of sacrilege insofar as they administer, because they are not ministers specially ordained or consecrated for this (cf. St. Alphonsus, De Matrimonio, n. 884, coll. De Sacramentis in genere, n. 32).

As regards William, this sort of opinion is indeed attributed to him also by others (Roskovani, op. cit., T. 1, p. 16); but there is no certain reason why he should be thought to have asserted it. For he seems to have wished to say only this: that, in order that marriage be contracted honorably and grace actually obtained, it must be celebrated in the face of the Church and the blessing of the priest must be applied. For in the Work on the Sacraments, On Marriage, c. 6, he says: "Marriage also has (note that also; namely, it has it also of itself) no little sanctity from the blessing or priestly prayer, without which marriage must never be celebrated; whoever have contemned or declined it, unless from just fear or some other necessary cause, are not to be held as spouses, but as fornicators, nor are their children to be reckoned legitimate. For neither is food to be taken without priestly prayer and blessing," etc. But if the blessing or prayer of the priest were essential and the form of the sacrament, even if it were omitted from just fear or another necessary cause, they would not be spouses; yet William denies this. Besides, if the blessing or prayer of the priest is necessary for nuptials as it is for taking food, it is sufficiently clear that it is not required for the validity of the act, but for a certain fitting honorableness. Moreover those who contract clandestinely in this way he does not properly say are fornicators, but that they are to be held as such; for he speaks according to the norm of the law then still in force, which in the civil forum regarded conjunctions of this sort as fornications, that is, did not regard their children as legitimate and inheritable. For thus has chapter 463, book 3, of the Collection of Capitularies of Benedict the Levite, ninth century (Migne, P. L., vol. XCVII, p. 859): "A marriage does not become legitimate otherwise than if the wife is sought from those who seem to have dominion over the woman and by whom she is guarded, and is espoused by nearer parents, and is lawfully dowered, and in its own time is blessed priestly, as is the custom (a thing of custom, not of divine law), with prayers and oblations by the priest.... For in such manner they will both please the Lord and will beget children not spurious but legitimate and inheritable." But in chapter 9 of the same treatise, William, asking "whether it is a sacrament of true name and sacramental power, if it is contracted apart from the nuptial blessing and prayer which it can have," responds: "But it is certain that it is both a sacred sign and sanctifying or consecrating by essential power or by contrariety (namely, by which it is opposed to concupiscence, according to the doctrine of the Master), as we have said, and perhaps by merit, provided the nuptial blessing is not contemned" (understand: provided it is not omitted out of contempt); "but it has no sacramental power at all, nor is it a sacrament of true name except as we have said"

(namely, he had said a little before in this same chapter that sacramental power is the power of blessing and prayer which is accustomed to be made over those marrying). "Hence also marriage among the faithful and among unbelievers is said equivocally: among unbelievers, namely, only as we have said" (that is, a legitimate conjunction opposed to fornicatory prostitution and sodomitical abomination); "but as regards the faithful, both in that way and, besides, consecrating by the power of blessing, which is proper to true sacraments of full power." These words (although they display sufficiently obscure ideas of the author in this matter), when compared with the preceding things, seem able to be taken in such a way that the blessing of the priest is a certain sacramental, as it is commonly called, contempt of which deprives the contracting parties of the attainment of grace, and the use of which increases and completes the grace which the spouses obtain by marriage itself.

III. Moreover that the common opinion of the preceding School resists Canus is directly clear from this, that the others think otherwise, as Canus himself concedes, and that the Scholastics call the blessing of the priest, or the words which he utters, a certain sacramental. We have already heard this from Paludanus. St. Thomas, in IV, D. XVI, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1: "The words by which matrimonial consent is expressed are the form of this sacrament, but not the blessing of the priest, which is a certain sacramental." And in D. XXVIII, q. 1, a. 3, he teaches the same more expressly. Moreover St. Bonaventure, ibid., q. 2, says: "Others say" (since no writing of these exists, for neither did Canus find them, they must be said to have been theologians of the lowest note teaching in his age, unless perhaps the holy Doctor and those who thereafter copied him looked to William of Paris, to whom they attributed this opinion) "that in the sacrament of marriage grace is given by reason of the superadded blessing.... But this position does not seem to avail, because that blessing is sacramental" (that is, a certain sacramental), "and if a sacramental effects, how much more the sacrament?" Namely, if some sacramental effects grace, how much more must the sacrament itself be said to effect it, which is marriage or the consent of man and woman. Bonaventure himself, in the immediately preceding question, teaching what that is which in the sacrament of marriage is sign only (which indeed is the essential rite itself of the sacrament), places it in the words or nods of the contracting parties expressing consent, as does St. Thomas. Dionysius the Carthusian has the same in the same place, q. 1. And the Master, in the fourth book, disputing concerning Marriage as a sacrament, and defining it first, D. XXVI, by that definition which represents the marriage of the faithful only, then in the following distinction by a definition taken from Roman law, next teaches that its efficient cause is consent expressed by words of the present; therefore the priest does not posit the sacrament, but the contracting parties do. But an opinion new in the School, opposed to the doctrine of the whole preceding School concerning a matter which can be known by revelation alone, which pertains to the dogmas of faith, cannot be true.

IV. The intrinsic demonstration of this truth is what we handed down in the preceding Thesis. For if the sacrament is the marital union itself of Christians, the contract itself, it is necessary that the minister of this sacrament be the minister of the contract, or the one who makes the contract; but this is none other than each contracting party. But the rite posited by the priest will indeed be some blessing or consecration of the marriage, but it cannot be or be called the marriage itself. Moreover from these things it is clear that both truths, both of the preceding Thesis and of this one, are bound together by a mutual bond and derive from the same principles; and therefore those things which we shall now further bring forward for this thesis, sought from the practice and sense of the Church, also avail to confirm the preceding Thesis.

V. And so, that we may more fully demonstrate the truth of each thesis, we gather these things from perpetual doctrine and practice. a) Innocent III, Tuas dudum, De Sponsa duorum, has these words: "We wish you to observe this, that after legitimate consent concerning the present has intervened between legitimate persons, which suffices in such things according to the canonical sanctions, and if it alone is lacking, the other things even celebrated together with intercourse are frustrated," etc. The obvious sense of these words is: if consent is lacking, even if the other things are present, nothing comes to be; if consent is present, even if the other things are lacking, marriage comes to be; therefore even if the act of the priest is lacking; and therefore he is not here the minister of the sacrament. You will say that, according to Innocent, consent suffices so that there be a natural contract, not so that there be a sacrament. I respond that this distinction, unknown to the ancients for the marriages of Christians (the preceding Thesis), here conflicts with the very words of Innocent, who speaks of marriage which is governed by canonical sanctions, which is nothing except a sacrament (cf. preceding Thesis, n. III, lit. c).

b) The Council of Trent, Sess. XXIV, in the Decree on the Reform of Marriage, says: "It is not to be doubted that clandestine marriages made by the free consent of the contracting parties are ratified and true marriages, as long as the Church has not made them invalid." Now according to the solemn ecclesiastical formula of speaking, the appellation of ratified marriage is made of a sacramental marriage, so that only among the faithful is marriage said to be ratified. Therefore the Tridentine Fathers signify that those marriages were sacraments. And indeed marriages of this sort the Church ruled by her laws, held subject to impediments constituted by herself, valid or invalid according as a canonical impediment stood in the way or did not, no otherwise than the other marriages, and she could invalidate them, as the Tridentine Fathers signify. But marriage as regards the bond is not subject to the power of the Church except because it is a sacrament, as we have already admonished. Now in clandestine marriages there is no action of a priest; therefore.

c) Eugene IV, in the Decree for the Armenians, handing down the doctrine of the sacraments of the New Law, says: "The seventh is the sacrament of marriage, which is the sign of the conjunction of Christ and the Church, according to the Apostle," etc. "The efficient cause of marriage regularly is mutual consent expressed by words of the present." Moreover it is inept to think that the marriage of which the efficient cause is assigned is not the sacrament, but a mere contract; because here the discussion is only about the sacraments, and Eugene had immediately before called it a sacrament, nor does he at all intimate mention of another marriage. But if mutual consent is its efficient cause, the priest is not the minister of the same, because then the action of the priest would be its efficient cause; therefore. Nor should you say that here mention of the minister is not made by Eugene; for this is simply false. For when he says that mutual consent (certainly of the contracting parties) expressed by words of the present is the efficient cause, by this very fact he says that the contracting parties are the ministers. Moreover that word regularly does not insinuate that there is another extraordinary cause; for this is wholly new in the whole tradition, that there is a twofold cause of marriage, one ordinary and the other extraordinary. Rather, it must be referred to these words: expressed by words; for consent can also be expressed by nods; indeed, in that age, with intercourse following espousals, matrimonial consent was presumed to have been signified.

d) From the Declaration of Benedict XIV concerning marriages of heretics among themselves and then mixed marriages in Holland, which declaration was afterward extended by the authority of the Apostolic See to other provinces, it is clear that there can be Christian marriages which are contracted without the presence of the priest. And from the instruction of Pius VI, extending that declaration to the Duchy of Cleves on 19 June 1793, it is clear that there can be Christian marriage when the pastor, unwilling, assists, proving it by no positive act, which is prohibited to him, or confirming it by his express consent and authority, but conducting himself merely passively and only hearing the consent of each. Thus also on 22 April 1792 the Congregation deputed for the affairs of the Gallican Church responded; for the question was asked: "Supposing that a marriage has been celebrated without the blessing of a priest, who then (in the time of the Gallican rebellion) could not be had, whether it is fitting or not that the aforesaid blessing be supplied. To this question, already proposed formerly, the response then was: the faithful are to be exhorted that, when they can have the presence of a priest, they seek a blessing from him; he, however, will declare to them that a blessing of this sort does not in the least pertain to validity." Now that the marriages of heretics have always been held by the Apostolic See as sacraments, we are made more certain from the fact that the marriages of heretics also among themselves are per se subject to canonical impediments. Benedict XIV teaches this manifestly in the cited declaration, and Gregory XVI in the Brief to the Bishops of Bavaria, dated 28 May 1832, and Pius VII in the Brief to the Archbishop of Mainz, dated 8 Oct. 1803. But Benedict XIV calls mixed marriages a sacrilegious bond. Moreover marriage is subject to the power of the Church for constituting impediments because it is a sacrament, and it cannot be held to be a sacrilege unless the sanctity of a sacrament is violated. But as regards marriages of Catholics celebrated without a priest, if the Apostolic See had not held them as sacraments, she certainly would have ordered them afterward to be celebrated before a priest, lest the faithful be deprived of the grace of the sacrament, or would have made mention of this harm in order to lead the faithful to this celebration.

e) Likewise from the history of the Council of Trent it is clear that the Fathers required the presence of the pastor not as the minister of the sacrament, but as a qualified witness. In the first formulas of the decree no mention had been made of the pastor, but only of three witnesses. Then, when there was agreement concerning the necessity of some stable witness, it was debated whether this ought to be a scribe or public notary, or the pastor; and finally the pastor was constituted. And indeed in the words of the invalidating decree mention is made only of the presence of the pastor. But by presence alone, apart from any action, no one is the minister of a sacrament. Therefore, since only the presence of the pastor, not some action of his, is essentially required, it is clear that the pastor is not required by the Council as the minister of the sacrament, but as witness.

f) Finally the Council, in the same place, speaking of the celebration of marriage, says: "The pastor, after questioning the man and woman and understanding their mutual consent, either says: I join you in marriage, in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, or uses other words according to the received rite of each province." Tournely says (q. III, c. I): "If the Synod had purposely wished to intimate that the priest is the minister of the sacrament of marriage, and that the words by which he joins the contracting parties are the form or quasi-form, it could not have used more significant words." But rather the contrary must be said. Indeed it would be foreign to the usage of the Church that a sacramental form, in which is the principal force of the sacrament, and which, when the words are changed, can easily be changed also as to sense, be permitted to the choice of each province.

You will say: the Tridentine Fathers knew the rites of the individual provinces and held them as legitimate. But 1. that is asserted altogether gratuitously; 2. the words of the Council, which have perpetual force, avail also for the future and for rites that would exist (cf. the Ritual of Paul V). Did the Tridentine Fathers know these also? Besides, although no one is ignorant that accidental changes can happen to the forms of the sacraments, nevertheless, when the Church wishes to teach the faithful the form of some sacrament, she proposes it absolutely, adding, if necessary, that the same form remains if the words are changed a little, not the sense. But here no form is proposed absolutely; even that which is expressed is proposed disjunctively with others. Therefore the Fathers most openly intimated that the form of the sacrament of marriage is not the words of the priest.

VI. But that it may be clear that this doctrine is ancient, Tertullian has these things concerning clandestine marriages in the book On Modesty: "Therefore among us hidden conjunctions also, that is, those not previously professed before the Church, run the risk of being judged next to adultery and fornication." Namely, such conjunctions were not judged to be such of themselves, but they brought in suspicion of this thing. Hence even among the Montanists the action of the priest was not held as essential. But since Tertullian says these things in praise of his own sect, which he commends for severity, much more must it be held that clandestine marriages were held valid among Catholics. Likewise in the collection of canons of their synod, which Ebedjesu, Metropolitan of Soba and Armenia, wrote at the beginning of the fourteenth century (in Angelo Mai, SS. VV. Nova Collectio, T. X, p. 44), tract. II, c. 2, it is prescribed that nuptials be made with the blessing of priests, and they are said to be consummated thereby, and thus the nuptials of Christians are distinguished from the nuptials of Jews and Gentiles. Nevertheless in c. 3 it is said that if priests are lacking, four or five witnesses are to be called, the Our Father is to be recited, the ring is to be given, and thus the espousal is to be perfected until they come to the priests: "But if the priest shall not come before the time of the bridal chamber, in like manner also let them perfect the chamber" (that is, let them consummate the marriage). From these things it is clear that the action of a priest, even among heretics anciently separated from the Church, was not held as essential for effecting the marriage of Christians.

As regards the ancient rituals, Martene reports these things generally concerning these ancient rites (On the Ancient Rites of the Church, part II, c. 9, a. 1): "Constitution for celebrating nuptials. When the day arrived, the bridegroom and bride to be blessed were presented by parents or attendants to the priest at the doors of the Church. Then, after they had given each other right hands, he required consent from each, in which the ancients placed the whole essence of the sacrament of marriage.

For unheard among them were those words of the pastor: I join you in the name, etc., in which some of the more recent Scholastics constitute the form of this sacrament. Yet these are lacking in two ancient manuscript rituals of the monastery of Bec, in the Rheims pontifical of 300 years (the work was published by Martene in the year 1709), in the ancient ritual of Bourges, and in almost all the others which will afterward be exhibited by us. To these we can add the constitutions of Richard, Bishop of Salisbury (year 1217), in which I read these things: Likewise we command that priests teach the persons contracting this form of words in French or in English: I, N., receive you, N., as mine. And similarly let the woman say: I receive you as mine. For in these words the great force consists and marriage is contracted." From these things it is clear that blessings of the priest of this sort were anciently held as a certain sacramental, as the Scholastics afterward called them; therefore.

VII. This certainly was the opinion of St. Thomas. For in IV, D. XXVIII, q. I, a. 3, speaking of marriage as a sacrament, he says: "Consent expressed by words of the present between persons legitimate for contracting makes marriage, because these two are of the essence of the sacrament; all other things, however, are of the solemnity of the sacrament, because they are applied to this end, that marriage may be made more fittingly." And ad 2: "In marriage our acts are a sufficient cause for inducing the proximate effect, which is obligation, because whoever is master of himself can bind himself to another. And therefore the blessing of the priest is not required in marriage as though of the essence of the sacrament." You see here that marriage is considered by St. Thomas not simply as it is a contract, but as it is at the same time a sacrament.

Wherefore D. XXVI, q. 11, a. 3, ad 1 says: "Just as the water of baptism has this, that it touches the body and washes the heart, from the touch of Christ's flesh, so marriage has this from the fact that Christ by his passion (in which he espoused the Church to himself) represented it, and not principally from some sanctification of the priest."

VIII. They object, however. 1. Priests according to the Apostle, 1 Cor. IV. 1, are dispensers of the mysteries of God, that is, of the sacraments; therefore. I respond, a) that by the name of mysteries the Apostle there designates not precisely the sacraments but the mysteries of faith, or evangelical doctrine. For Paul looks to this, that he may prescribe for the Corinthians the mode of rendering honor to the heralds of the Gospel, since some were extolling them too much, others depressing them too much. Therefore he says that they are to be regarded as ministers of Christ and dispensers of the mysteries of God. b) Priests, or the ruling Church, dispense marriage, insofar as she rules it and by her laws determines the manner in which it can rightly be contracted.

2. Those who confect the sacraments intend to do what the Church does; but the Church acts through her ministers, and the ministers of the Church are priests; therefore also the minister of the sacrament of marriage is the priest.

I respond that these words, what the Church does, are not to be taken in such a way that the Church is said to act insofar as the universal Church or her supreme head administers the sacraments through her ministers as through an instrumental cause; for the principal cause in the sacraments is only God. Rather they are to be taken thus: that the Church is said to act insofar as something is done in her and through her, that is, through those who in her are ministers of sacred things, and according to her doctrine and institutions. Therefore this would be the response to the argument in form. He intends to do what the Church does, that is, what is done in the Church according to the faith of the Church: I concede. What the Church does, I distinguish: what the universal Church or her visible head does as a principal cause: I deny the supposition; what the Church teaches is to be done and those do who in her are ministers either because of special consecration or by divine deputation because of baptism: I concede.