Thesis X

By an indivisible bond, in the marriage of Christians, the contract, that is, the marital union, and the sacrament are bound together; these are not two things, but two necessary aspects or formalities of the same thing. Wherefore among Christians the conjunction of man and woman, if it is not a sacrament, neither is it marriage; and if it is marriage, it is also a sacrament.

I. Marriage can exist of itself without being a sacrament properly so called. Such it was before the new economy was instituted, and such it still is among unbelievers, among whom it exists for the office of nature, for procreating and educating offspring, and as a remedy for concupiscence. Among unbelievers, therefore, marriage is nothing except a certain natural contract, or the marital union of man and woman instituted by nature itself, determined by the free consent of the contracting parties. But among Christians it is, besides, a sacrament. Wherefore these two can be distinguished by reason in Christian marriage: the contract (by which name the consent of each, which is the cause, and the abiding bond thence arisen, is signified), which would exist even in pure nature, and existed before Christ, and exists among unbelievers; and the sacrament, which is found only in Christians contracting. But the question is whether, just as by reason, so also in reality these two can be distinguished in Christian marriage, not indeed by complete separation, so that even the sacrament could exist without the contract (what that would be no one could attain), but at least by incomplete separation, so that the contract could be valid without the sacrament. Some theologians judged that there could be a true marriage among Christians which would not be a sacrament, and this opinion was willingly embraced by those who wished the priest to be its minister. But the Catholic doctrine is now sufficiently manifest: these two are inseparable, and indeed not insofar as they are two things which always demand to be together, but insofar as they are really one and the same thing, and therefore are only aspects or formalities, and indeed necessary ones, of the same thing. We say, namely, that the very same thing which is marriage among Christians is a sacrament, and that which is a sacrament is marriage, and that, if the thing itself is not a sacrament, neither is it marriage; that is, the consent of those who attempt to contract has no value, and no marital bond exists, but only base concubinage. Therefore it must be demonstrated that marriage among Christians is the sacrament itself and is necessarily a sacrament; for when these things have been proved, the truth of the Thesis will be clear.

II. And so, 1. Christian marriage and the sacrament itself are not two things but one. Marriage can be considered in fieri, which is the contract itself, and in the permanent facto esse, which is the bond arisen from it. Moreover the sacrament, when it comes to be, is not a thing other than the contract itself, and when it remains, it is not a thing other than the bond itself; therefore. The assumed point is proved. a) The mutual handing over and acceptance of power over the other is the matrimonial contract and is the cause of the matrimonial bond; but the same, Eugene bearing witness, is the efficient cause of the sacrament. Therefore marriage and sacrament are one thing. The consequence is proved. For matrimonial consent makes only one thing, namely that to which both consent, which is mutual power or the bond, that is, marriage; but their consent is also the cause of the sacrament; therefore the sacrament is the same thing as marriage. Or will you say that matrimonial consent, although it is one action physically, is nevertheless virtually multiple, so as thus to produce two distinct effects? But either those effects are so related that one is only the mode of the other, or that both are two things. If you say the first, this very thing is what we contend, when we assert that marriage and sacrament are the same thing, namely that the nature of sacrament is an intrinsic mode of the marriage of Christians. If you say the other, we deny that matrimonial consent is a virtually multiple cause in such a way as to produce two distinct things; for consent, taken as a whole, objectively effects nothing other than that to which consent is given, for it is ordered only to this. Therefore if another thing comes to be, another cause of it also will have to be assigned. On the contrary, the same one consent, if by the institution of God it obtains a supernatural mode, will be able to effect that one thing which it makes, augmented by a supernatural mode, so that the contract is a sacrament. Therefore if the cause of the sacrament is mutual consent, the marriage which comes to be and the sacrament are the same thing. But if the marriage which comes to be is not a thing other than the sacrament which comes to be, the marriage also in fieri will be a sacramental action, by which the sacrament comes to be, as is clear of itself; therefore.

b) This sacrament is called in the direct case marriage; but by this appellation not only the matter of the sacrament is directly represented, as happens in the appellation of the sacrament of Penance, but the whole sacrament is signified. For: "It is a dogma of faith," says Pius VI in the Brief to the Bishop of Motula, 16 Sept. 1788, "that marriage, which before the coming of Christ was nothing other than a certain indissoluble contract, after the coming of Christ became one of the seven sacraments of the Evangelical Law instituted by Christ the Lord, as the sacred Council of Trent defined under penalty of anathema against heretics and impious men raving mad in this age." Likewise Pius VII, in the schema of the Pontifical Constitution (Roskovani, Marriage in the Catholic Church Subject to Ecclesiastical Power, with a Very Ample Collection of Documents and Literature, vol. 2, p. 20 seq.): "For it is clear that marriage, which the Tridentine Synod defined to have been elevated by Christ the Lord to the dignity of a sacrament, is that very thing by which a man becomes one flesh with his wife, that which was wedlock in the old law, that which bears in itself the mystery of the union of Christ and the Church, that which from the beginning was instituted by God for the office of nature, namely the nuptials themselves or the society of nuptials, finally the conjugal bond itself, that is, the matrimonial contract itself. This certainly is what the Catholic Church has always held and holds." This manner of speaking is not used with regard to the other sacraments, of which only a certain matter existed before Christ. For it is not said, nor can it be said, that that same washing, for example of John the Baptist, became a sacrament in the New Law, or that that same contrition or penance which existed before became a sacrament of the New Law. Rather, it is said that by the accession of a new rite instituted by Christ these were elevated to the dignity of a sacrament. But there is another manner of speaking concerning Marriage. Namely, that which before the coming of Christ was nothing except a certain indissoluble contract, the same became a sacrament after Christ; that is, there did not accede to it some rite instituted by Christ, by which the sacrament would be constituted, as the use of the power of the keys accedes to acts of penance; but the whole contract itself became a sacrament. For that reason what is marriage, that same thing is sacrament; therefore Christian marriage and sacrament are not two things, but one.

c) The sacrament conferring grace is that which signifies the union of Christ with the Church; for this is the thing of which the Apostle speaks in Eph. V, and that to which sanctifying grace belongs is that by which that union is perfectly represented. But this, in facto esse, is the bond by which spouses are bound and become one flesh; in fieri, however, it is the contract itself or consent by which a man leaves father and mother and cleaves to his wife, and conversely the consent of the wife (Ephes. V). But that is nothing except marriage, and nothing else; therefore the sacrament is nothing other than the very marriage which Christians celebrate. Thus Leo XIII in the Encyclical on Christian Marriage: "For this reason marriage is a sacrament, because it is a sacred sign and efficacious of grace, and bears the image of the mystical nuptials of Christ with the Church. But the form and figure of these nuptials is expressed by that very bond of highest conjunction by which man and woman are joined together, and which is nothing else than marriage itself."

III. 2. Christian marriage is necessarily a sacrament. It is clear that the discussion is about marriage which is truly such, namely a legitimate contract from which the bond of mutual obligation arises. The necessity which is asserted is not from the nature of the thing, but from divine institution. It is proved, a) from the divine institution itself of the sacrament. It is clear from the things demonstrated that God elevated marriage among Christians to the dignity of a sacrament; for since Christ instituted the sacrament of marriage and willed it to exist among Christians, and this sacrament is nothing except marriage itself or the matrimonial contract, it must be said that marriage itself was elevated by Christ to the dignity of a sacrament. Therefore this proposition, already demonstrated, is true: the sacrament of marriage is nothing except the very marriage which is celebrated among Christians. But the question is whether this other proposition also is true: Christian marriage is necessarily a sacrament, so that by the very fact that the matrimonial contract comes to be, the sacrament cannot fail to come to be, and if the sacrament does not come to be, neither does marriage come to be. The question is, namely, whether Christ willed not only that the sacrament should come to be by the contract itself, just as he willed that baptism should come to be by the washing of water and by the invocation of the Trinity, but also that every legitimate contract should be a sacrament.

Now, that we may demonstrate the affirmative part, we argue thus. If Christ elevated marriage to the dignity of a sacrament, he certainly joined in marriage these two things: the aspect of contract and the aspect of sacrament. Moreover it must be presupposed that this conjunction was made by Christ by a certain antecedent absolute will, that is, independently of the will of men. For the institution of the sacraments pertains to the antecedent and absolute will by which the essence of the sacramental rite, or the efficacy of some rite for producing grace, is constituted wholly independently of the contingent will of men. Therefore, since the conjunction of the efficacy of grace with marriage pertains to the institution of the sacrament, and this is done by an antecedent absolute will, the conjunction of each aspect, contract and sacrament, was made by God by an absolute will. Therefore by his institution, which is directed immediately to the very thing which is elevated to the dignity of a sacrament (not by some simple precept given to human wills, by which indeed the use of the sacrament, not the institution itself, is established), Christ effected that Christian marriage is a sacrament and willed this to be, as it were, an intrinsic mode and property of Christian marriage. But this absolute institution joining the aspect of contract and of sacrament was made for every Christian marriage. For when Christ elevated marriage to the dignity of a sacrament, he did not elevate this or that marriage, but simply marriage, namely that which was instituted from the beginning, which is the sacrament or sign of the union of Christ with the Church (Eph. V), by which God himself joins man and woman (Matth. XIX). Nor did Christ institute some rite which of itself, according to the intention of the agent, can be referred to diverse ends; but he willed the matrimonial contract itself, which cannot be employed for anything other than that it be the marital union between man and woman, to be a sacrament. Therefore whatever among Christians, to whom alone the sacraments of Christ pertain, can be called marriage - namely every Christian marriage - has been elevated to the dignity of a sacrament. Therefore that absolute institution joining both aspects, contract and sacrament, is universal, comprehending any marriage whatsoever. And so, just as by Christ's institution the sacrament is nothing except marriage itself, so by the same institution the marriage of Christians, as such, and therefore every marriage of this kind, is a sacrament.

But from these things it follows, 1. that the dignity of a sacrament pertains to the essence of Christian marriage by the institution of Christ. For Christian marriage cannot fail to be that which by Christ, with an absolute will independent of the will of men, was made to be an efficacious sign of grace; nor can it fail to be that which Christ determined, by the same will, every and always Christian marriage to be. It follows, 2. that the disjunction of contract and sacrament does not depend on the will of men, so that there could be a contract of marriage without being a sacrament; for the conjunction of both aspects, contract and sacrament, was made for any marriage whatsoever by the absolute will of God. A man can indeed bring it about that it is not actually a sacrament, because for this the intention of the minister is also required; but he will not be able to bring it about that those two are disjoined, or that there exists a marriage which is not a sacrament. For that Christian marriage is a sacrament, is a sign of the union of Christ with the Church, is an efficacious sign of grace, this belongs by Christ's institution to the essence of Christian marriage; but the existence of the thing is indeed placed in the choice of the minister, not its essence.

IV. You will say: the intention of the minister can bring it about that that thing which would be a sacrament is not a sacrament, for example washing with the invocation of the Trinity; therefore it can also bring it about that marriage is not a sacrament, but only pure marriage, just as that is a pure washing and invocation of the Trinity. I respond: I distinguish the consequence. Therefore it can bring it about that it is not a sacrament, yet is marriage: I deny. It will be able to bring it about that it is not a sacrament, and therefore neither will it be marriage: I concede. Christ instituted that the sacrament of baptism be effected by the washing of water and the invocation of the Trinity; namely he instituted the rite of initiation and willed it to be perfected in this way, that is, by the washing of water and the invocation of the Trinity. But he did not institute that every washing with invocation of the Trinity, even freely posited, should by this very fact be a sacrament. But he did institute that any marriage whatsoever celebrated among Christians be a sacrament; namely he attributed to it the power of conferring grace. Wherefore if it is marriage, no one can prevent it from being a sacrament; and if it is not a sacrament, no one can bring it about that it be marriage. For when an essential property is lacking, no one can bring it about that the thing be; but it is an essential property of Christian marriage by the institution of Christ that it be a sacrament; nor can there be, against the absolute will of Christ, a marriage among Christians which is not a sacrament. And so, from the fact that marriage is a sacrament, it does indeed follow the manner of the other sacraments in this respect: that it depends on the intention of the minister of the sacrament of marriage whether it is or is not a sacrament; and if that intention which is required for the confecting of the sacrament is lacking ¹, it is not a sacrament. But at the same time, because of the institution of Christ, neither does the contract come to be, although that exterior material action is performed, and although there is the intention of doing it.

¹ What sort of intention there ought to be here is not the place to dispute; the moral theologians will teach it. We suppose that intention which, according to Catholic doctrine, is sufficient.

You will say: If Christ had instituted that every washing of water with invocation of the Trinity is a sacrament, nevertheless, if intention were lacking, there could have been washing and invocation without a sacrament; therefore likewise as regards marriage. I respond: I deny the consequence. The reason for the distinction depends on the nature of the action of each sacrament. Washing (say the same of invocation), if it is posited, cannot fail to be washing, since it is a purely physical action; therefore, unless God, using his omnipotence, had willed to prevent washing from existing whenever the due intention of the sacrament is lacking, he could not institute by an absolute will that every washing is a sacrament. But the sacramental action of marriage is a moral action producing a moral effect, namely obligation and right, and the same can physically be had without producing this moral effect. Therefore, Christ's institution being posited, when the intention of the sacrament is lacking in the ministers, an act can be physically posited by each without nevertheless being efficacious consent or contract; and thus it is always true that it is not marriage if it is not a sacrament. There is, namely, a certain divine nullification of consent, lest it be efficacious and effect marriage unless it is also a sacrament. Therefore the reason why the former act, not making a sacrament, also does not make a matrimonial contract is this: because by Christ's institution it is of the essence of marriage that it be a sacrament; wherefore it cannot exist unless it is a sacrament. And therefore the minister can indeed bring it about that the sacrament not exist, if the due intention is lacking; but with the sacrament lacking, he cannot bring it about that marriage remain, or the matrimonial contract, but only that material action of the words by which contracting is customarily done.

V. b) The same is confirmed from the doctrine of the Apostle to the Ephesians, c. V. For Paul there intimates that Christian marriage is a sacrament (Th. I); but Paul speaks universally of any Christian marriage whatsoever. For he discourses of man and woman, of the man who is the head of the woman, of the woman who is subject to the man; but this is the notion univocally common to every marriage. Moreover of these he affirms that they represent the union of Christ and the Church, and he intimates that their conjunction is effected sacramentally. Therefore every Christian marriage, according to Paul, is a sacrament, and therefore cannot exist without being a sacrament.

VI. c) The same is proved from the constant sense of the Church, which has always judged every Christian marriage to be necessarily a sacrament. A sense of this kind is clear from these things. The Church has always judged that authority belongs to herself over any marriages whatsoever of Christians as regards the bond itself; she ruled them by her laws, she established impediments for them, and for clandestine no less than for non-clandestine marriages. But the Church also judged that authority belongs to herself over the bond of marriage only because it is a sacrament. Thus Pius VI, after the words cited above under n. 1, immediately concludes: "Hence it comes about that to the Church alone, to which the whole care concerning the sacraments has been entrusted, belongs every right and power of assigning its own form to this contract, elevated to the more sublime dignity of a sacrament, and consequently of passing judgment concerning the validity or invalidity of marriages"... "These causes (matrimonial causes) pertain to the judgment of the Church alone for no other reason than because the matrimonial contract is truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of the Evangelical Law." Therefore the Church has always judged every marriage of Christians to be a sacrament. But this is the same as judging that marriage of this kind is necessarily a sacrament; for what belongs always and to every one is proper and necessary.

d) These are the words of Trent, Sess. XXIV: "But the grace which would perfect that natural love [of spouses], and would confirm the indissoluble unity and sanctify the spouses, Christ himself, the institutor and perfecter of the venerable sacraments, merited for us by his passion"; on account of which grace marriage is then said to be a sacrament. Therefore he so merited that this grace is actually conferred. That natural love by which man and woman unite themselves is necessarily nothing except the free consent of one to the other; for other affections can be absent, with marriage existing. Now if that natural love is present, there is also present, Trent bearing witness, sacramental grace; if grace is lacking, unless this is because of an obstacle, that natural love also ought to be lacking; otherwise the former statement would be false. Therefore contract and grace are bound together by a mutual bond, and in such a way that there cannot be a contract without being a sacrament.

VII. Finally Pius IX taught us this by his authentic magisterium in the Allocution delivered in secret consistory, 27 Sept. 1852: "No one among Catholics is ignorant or can be ignorant that marriage is truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of the Evangelical Law instituted by Christ the Lord; and therefore that among the faithful there cannot be a marriage without at one and the same time being a sacrament; and for that reason any conjunction whatever, even among Christians, of man and woman apart from the sacrament, made even by force of any civil law whatsoever, is nothing other than base and deadly concubinage, so greatly condemned by the Church; and consequently the sacrament can never be separated from the conjugal covenant." He confirmed this by condemning this proposition 73 in the Syllabus: "By force of a merely civil contract, there can exist among Christians a marriage of true name; and it is false either that the contract of marriage among Christians is always a sacrament, or that there is no contract if the sacrament is excluded." "It is settled," says Leo XIII in the cited Encyclical, "that in Christian marriage the contract is not dissociable from the sacrament, and therefore a true and legitimate contract cannot exist without being by that very fact a sacrament. For Christ the Lord augmented marriage with the dignity of a sacrament; but marriage is the contract itself, provided only it has been made by right."

Observe that Pius VII, in the schema cited above, has these things: "Whatever be the case concerning marriages which are entered into without sacred ministry in those places where the Tridentine Council has not been promulgated - which marriages indeed there are some who think subsist in the nature of contract, but in no way attain to the dignity of a sacrament, which question, following in the footsteps of our Predecessors, we leave undecided - nevertheless from the cited opinion, whatever finally it may be, it would by no means follow that the sacrament of marriage is a thing distinct and separable from the matrimonial covenant itself, just as from the fact that not every washing is a sacrament, it by no means follows that the sacrament of baptism is a thing distinct and separable from the washing itself conferred with due matter and under due form." In these words the Pontiff affirms the first part of our assertion: namely, that the sacrament is not a thing distinct from the contract; but he leaves undecided the other part: that a true marriage of Christians cannot exist without being a sacrament. Yet he does not leave it undecided in this sense, as if it were a doubtful thing or not sufficiently proved, but insofar as it had not yet been defined and he himself did not wish to define it, and therefore it was permitted to the disputation of Catholics. But what he did not wish to affirm, Pius IX soon afterward (whatever be the case whether this is a definition of faith) affirmed by the cited decrees; and certainly this truth can be demonstrated theologically, which Pius VII does not deny. Moreover it is fitting to remember that that document is nothing except a schema (Roskovani calls it a projectum, that is, a progetto) of a pontifical constitution.

And so from all the things demonstrated it is clear that the matrimonial contract of Christians and the sacrament are not two things, but two formalities, and those necessary formalities of the same thing; and therefore one cannot exist without the other.

Corollary. Therefore that doctrine is altogether false, and deservedly proscribed by the Apostolic See, which is the foundation of that institution which they call civil marriage, namely that the matrimonial contract can be separated among Christians from the sacrament. For by the divine authority by which marriage was first instituted, it was then effected that every marriage of Christians is a sacrament; the powers of the world can indeed blaspheme the force of this divine authority, but they cannot make it void.