Article — Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis
Article II: On the Essence of the Sacrament and Its Constitutive Parts
S. Th., Suppl. q. 42, a. 1 and a. 3, ad 2; q. 44, a. 1, ad 2; q. 45, a. 2 and 5.
784. Errors. - The traditional doctrine in the Church is that the sacrament is not something extrinsically added to the matrimony of Christians, but that these things are intimately connected and really inseparable; namely, that matrimony itself was elevated to the dignity of a sacrament, so that between the baptized there cannot be a valid matrimony unless it is a sacrament. To this doctrine various errors and opinions are opposed, both concerning the essence and concerning the constitution of this sacrament.
A. Concerning the essence of the sacrament:
1° Certain ones said that the sacrament is adequately distinct from the matrimonial contract, and extrinsic to it, as being accessory and supervening upon it, and that it consists, for example, in the nuptial blessing of the priest, or in a religious contract, or one entered before the Church.
Thus Marcus Antonius de Dominis, bishop of Spalato, who became a heretic, in the book De Republica Christiana; likewise Launoy and the Regalists; and in the nineteenth century Nuytz, professor of Turin, and many politicians and civil jurists.
2° Others held that the sacrament is really but inadequately distinct from the contract, so that the contract alone would be the matter, and the priestly blessing the form constituting the sacrament. Thus Melchior Cano and several theologians after him.
3° Others, finally, affirmed that the contract is in no way, not even imperfectly, distinct in reality from the sacrament, but by reason alone, and nevertheless that it is separable, so that in certain cases there can be a valid matrimonial contract between the baptized without its being a sacrament, as if by their intention they wished to enter the contract but did not wish the sacrament. Thus Vasquez, the Salmanticenses, Billuart, and the Wurzburg theologians.
B. Consequently concerning the constitutive parts of the sacrament, namely, the matter and form:
1° Others, as has already been said, stated that the contract itself is the matter of the sacrament, but the form the blessing of the priest: I join you... William of Paris perhaps held this, but afterward Melchior Cano, Estius, Sylvius, Tournely, and several others formally taught it.
2° Others posited the internal consent as the matter, but the words expressing the consent as the form. Thus Navarrus, Capreolus, Scherer, and Schnitzler.
3° Others said that the contracting persons, or the bodies, are the matter, but that the words by which they hand over the body or consent to the handing over of the body are the form. Thus St. Bonaventure, Paludanus, St. Antoninus, Laymann, Vasquez.
4° Others finally said that the matter is the words expressing the consent of the first contracting party, and the form the words expressing the consent of the later contracting party. Thus Richard, Victoria, Grisaldus, B. Ledesma, Henriquez, Vivaldus.
785. Thesis I. Christ elevated matrimony itself to the dignity of a sacrament, so that between the baptized there cannot be a true matrimony unless it is a sacrament (can. 1012). - It is certain.
It is proved: a) From the documents of tradition, which implicitly suppose this, since they assert that matrimony itself, which was instituted by God in the beginning, just as it existed as an office of nature, was elevated to sacramental dignity; but this is nothing other than the contract itself and the consequent bond.
Hence the Scholastics, without restriction concerning all marriages between Christians, said that the mutual consent itself expressed by words is the sacramental sign (S. Th., loc. cit.), and the Council of Florence asserts: "The seventh is the sacrament of Matrimony..., the efficient cause of matrimony regularly is mutual consent expressed by words concerning the present"; and the Council of Trent teaches, sess. 24, de ref., c. 1, that clandestine marriages were ratified and true marriages, as long as the Church did not make them invalid, although in them there is nothing except the matrimonial contract.
b) From explicit declarations of the Pontiffs, made in more recent time.
Thus Pius VI, ep. September 16, 1788; Pius IX in the brief of August 22, 1851; in the epistle to the king of Sardinia, September 19, 1852; in the allocution of September 27, 1852; in the Syllabus, prop. 65, 66, and 73; Leo XIII in the encyclical Arcanum; and Pius XI in the encyclical Casti connubii.
It is objected: In every sacrament the minister by his intention can cause the rite, for example, ablution, to be placed merely materially and externally, and not to be sacred or a sacrament; therefore also in matrimony the ministers, the contracting parties, can cause it not to be a sacrament, but only a contract.
Resp. I deny the consequence. Ministers can impede it from being a sacrament, but at the same time by impeding the contract, because Christ instituted that every true matrimonial contract between the baptized should be a sacrament. The difference is 1) that the rite, in the other sacraments, for example in Baptism, is a merely physical action, which remains such if it is placed materially; but the action of the spouses is a moral action, namely, a contract which has as its effect a moral bond and obligation. Whence, if they have the intention of placing the action merely materially and externally, the bond is now lacking and the contract is not present. Hence 2) it is possible to intend ablution without intending the sacrament; it is impossible to intend the contract without intending the sacrament.
786. Corollaries. - From the aforesaid doctrine it follows:
1° Catholics, even heretics or schismatics provided they have been baptized, when they validly celebrate matrimony, at the same time also receive the sacrament, even if they are ignorant of it or deny it (q. 51, a. 2, ad 2); - indeed even if they do not wish it, provided that with a prevailing will they intend to enter matrimony and do not wholly exclude the sacrament: for in this case they would not contract validly.
2° The sacrament of matrimony is distinguished from the contract and conjugal society, not indeed in reality, but nevertheless by reason, as St. Thomas has it, q. 49, a. 2, ad 7: "Although matrimony is a sacrament, nevertheless it is one thing for matrimony to be matrimony, and another for it to be a sacrament: because it was instituted not only for this, that it should be as a sign of a sacred thing, but also that it should be as an office of nature. And therefore the character of a sacrament is a certain condition coming to matrimony considered according to itself."
3° The sacrament of matrimony, just like the contract, can validly be entered between absent persons, for example, by letters, by messengers, or by a procurator: thus against Cajetan (can. 1088).
4° The matrimony of unbelievers, by the fact that both spouses are baptized, by that very fact becomes a sacrament, even if they were ignorant of it; because the matrimonial contract virtually perseveres in them and subsists in the bond itself, which, when Baptism comes, by that very fact becomes a sacred sign; as St. Thomas intimates, q. 59, a. 2, ad 1, indeed also St. Paul speaking to the Ephesians who were married before Baptism: thus against Vasquez, the Salmanticenses, Billuart, and others.
5° On the contrary, matrimony between a believer and an unbeliever is never a sacrament: for since the contract is numerically one and perfectly bilateral, it cannot be in one and not in the other; therefore likewise as to the sacrament, which cannot be separated from it. Matrimony cannot limp; whence the bond cannot be stricter and firmer in one than in the other, ratified and sacred in one, not in the other. Thus the more common opinion.1 Moreover, the Holy Office calls a matrimony of this kind a natural bond.
1 That this may appear more evident, observe that consent does not immediately signify sacramental grace, but by means of the bond, which in Christian matrimony is sacred, as representing in a special way the union of Christ and the Church, and thus is an efficacious sign of grace. But the bond is a relation which cannot limp; and therefore the sign is efficacious of grace in both, or it is not.
787. Thesis II. The constitutive parts, or the matter and form of the sacrament, are the constitutive elements of the contract itself, namely, the mutual handing over and acceptance of bodies expressed by words or signs. - It is today an almost common opinion.
It is proved: The sacrament of matrimony is nothing other than the contract elevated to sacramental dignity; therefore that is the matter and form of the sacrament which is the matter and form of the contract. But in a contract the handing over of the thing, or the consent to the handing over externally expressed, is the matter; the acceptance, or the consent to acceptance externally expressed, is the form. Therefore it is so in the sacrament of matrimony. And indeed: a determinable element has the character of matter, a determinative element the character of form; but in a contract the offering or handing over is something determinable by which it is begun, but it is completed in the character of a perfect contract through acceptance, which has itself as the determinative element; therefore handing over is the matter, acceptance the form.
It is confirmed, because consent to the handing over, although it is expressed by words, does not have itself as speech, but as an offer-making action; on the contrary, the expression of acceptance formally is speech and signification.
Hence: 1) The thing which is handed over, or the remote matter about which the contract is made, is the very persons or bodies of the contracting parties, or rather the power over the body of the other in order to acts of themselves apt for generation; but they are not the proximate matter from which the contract of matrimony is constituted.
- The internal consent itself, although necessarily required, nevertheless is not as such the constitutive element of the external sign and of the contract in the character of an external act, as being not sensible.
- The consent of the first contracting party is not the sole and whole matter, nor the consent of the later contracting party the sole and whole form; but each, as offering himself or herself to the other, begins the contract and places the matter, and, as accepting the other, perfects the contract and places the form.
788. Observation. - Consent, as causing the conjugal bond, is the efficient cause of matrimony; as determining the handing over of the co-party, it is the form; as a handing over to be determined by the acceptance of the co-party, it is the matter of the sacrament.