Article II: On Matter, Form, And Minister

1968. Among all Catholic authors it is certain that the MATTER of this Sacrament is the matrimonial contract; as regards the FORM and MINISTER, various opinions have been handed down. - Certain Theologians, led by Melchior Cano, taught that the minister is the priest, but that the form is had in these words: "I join you in matrimony." But the opinion which has always been more common, and has now become common, teaches that the ministers are the contracting parties themselves, and that the form consists in their mutual acceptance. - With these things briefly set forth beforehand, let the following be held.

1969. Principles. I. The REMOTE matter of this Sacrament is the bodies of the contracting parties, to be handed over mutually, or the mutual right over the body of the other. The PROXIMATE matter is the handing over itself of the right in the bodies, made through words or signs expressing consent. Thus commonly.

For this Sacrament has the nature of a contract; therefore just as in other contracts the things are the remote matter, and the handing over of the thing the proximate matter, so consequently it is in matrimony, where the right in the bodies is handed over.¹

1970. II. The FORM consists in the mutual acceptance of the contracting parties, expressed by words or signs. Thus commonly, and it will be clear from what is soon to be said concerning the minister.²

1971. III. The MINISTERS of the Sacrament of Matrimony are THE FAITHFUL THEMSELVES contracting. - This is the common opinion, and altogether certain. The evident reason is that in places where the impediment of clandestinity does not exist, matrimony is contracted validly without the presence of a priest. Therefore if a true Sacrament is effected even when the priest is absent, it must certainly be concluded that the contracting parties themselves, and not the priest, are the ministers.³ Nevertheless the priest is the minister of the solemnity of matrimony, as will be explained below (n. 2073).

Hence, for the contracting parties there apply those things which were said in their places both concerning the administration and concerning the reception of the Sacraments (cf. n. 1416, 1433, 1434, 1436). But,

YOU WILL ASK: Whether it is licit to enter matrimony with a PUBLIC SINNER, and consequently to minister the Sacrament to him? - RESP. This is prohibited at least under venial sin, as many probably say; indeed according to St. Alphonsus, more probably under grave sin, on account of reverence due to the Sacrament. A just cause EXCUSES from every sin, e.g. if someone cannot withdraw from matrimony without grave inconvenience. Except, however, if the other is an excommunicate to be avoided, with whom to communicate in a sacred matter is altogether illicit.⁴

1972. IV. The CONSENT by which matrimony is perfected and the Sacrament is administered must be personal, internal, deliberate, mutual, concerning the present, and externally manifested.

1. It must be PERSONAL; for "in matrimony consent cannot be supplied by any human power."⁵

2. TRUE and INTERNAL; for it is an act of one's own will, which freely imposes on itself a new obligation. - Hence, if both, or either one of the contracting parties, should consent not from the soul but FICTITIOUSLY, there is no matrimony. In the first case the matter is clear of itself; in the other, because, since the matrimonial contract cannot limp, the consent of the other being lacking, the contract is null. The one contracting fictitiously commits both the sin of sacrilege, because he renders the Sacrament null; and the sin of injustice, if the counterpart contracts in good faith, because he deceives that person and inflicts on him or her a grave injury, which he is bound to repair by removing the fiction and truly contracting (cf. n. 2083). If this cannot be done, or if the deceived party does not will it, he is bound at least to repair the other damages. Except, if the other party also deceived, or if the deception was done in order that the deceiver might decline fear unjustly inflicted. Nevertheless Authors commonly say that it is not illicit to simulate the celebration of nuptials, on account of a just cause, e.g. on account of a diriment impediment, when namely the celebration cannot be omitted without grave damage, as was said n. 1430, at the end.⁶

3. DELIBERATE, i.e. furnished with sufficient knowledge and due liberty. Force and error stand in the way of deliberation; but concerning these there will be discussion where impediments are treated.

4. MUTUAL; because a contract burdensome on both sides and transferring a mutual right in the bodies, as the matrimonial contract is, is not effected except through the reciprocal consent of the contracting parties. Wherefore it must also be noted: union and at least moral simultaneity are required between the consent of one and of the other, such as namely is required in civil contracts (cf. n. 1044, 3).

5. CONCERNING THE PRESENT, namely by which the contracting parties mutually accept each other here and now as true spouses; for in this matrimony differs from betrothals (cf. n. 1950, It is said 5).

6. EXTERNALLY MANIFESTED; otherwise mutual acceptance would not be possible. - It is not indeed required for the VALIDITY of matrimony that consent be expressed by words; it suffices that it be expressed by signs, which Innocent III declared,⁷ saying: "The deaf and mute can contract matrimony through consent without words." A sufficiently adequate sign would be if the woman, after the man's consent has already been expressed, should extend her hand to him; but not if she should not withdraw her hand when it has been seized by him. Nor would the giving of a ring suffice, or the leading of the bride into the house of the man, unless by the custom of the place signs of this sort expressed consent. But as regards LICEITY, unless modesty or another reasonable cause excused, it would be a venial sin to express consent by signs alone; because it would be against the rubric of the Ritual and against the custom of the Church.⁸

But sometimes explicit consent is not required. For, in places where the impediment of clandestinity does not prevail, BETROTHALS THEMSELVES, to which free and consummated intercourse is added, pass into true matrimony; provided the intercourse was had with marital affection: and this affection indeed is always presumed in the external forum; but in the internal forum, presumption yields to truth.⁹

1973. Questions. Q. 1. Whether matrimony can be contracted VALIDLY and LICITLY THROUGH A PROCURATOR?

Resp. 1. It can be contracted VALIDLY, as is clear from law. The reason is that Christ, in elevating matrimony to the being of a Sacrament, did not change the nature of the contract, which is such that it can be entered into among absent persons through a procurator. - But for this many things are REQUIRED, namely: 1) A special mandate, which can be given orally; for writing is not demanded. - 2) That the mandate be concerning contracting with a determinate person. - 3) That the procurator contract by himself; for he himself cannot delegate another, unless he has express and special permission from the mandator. - 4) That the mandate has not been revoked by the mandator, even mentally, before the matrimony is celebrated. And this runs even if the revocation is made tacitly, namely if someone gave a mandate of contracting with one woman, and afterward celebrates betrothals with another. - 5) That, in places where the impediment of clandestinity prevails, the procurator show the mandate to the pastor and witnesses, and before them contract matrimony according to the form of Trent. - 6) That he not exceed the limits of the mandate. But in this it must be adverted that, if the condition is required by the mandator, namely that contraction be made with such a dowry, at such a time, etc., if the condition is not observed, the matrimony will be null. But if the condition is required by law, namely that contraction be made after denunciations have been premised, after permission of the Bishop has been obtained, etc., then the matrimony entered without them will be valid.¹⁰

Resp. 2. It can also be contracted LICITLY, but only when a grave cause suffices, as, e.g., among Princes; for one must not easily recede from the ordinary practice of the Church. And hence it is why the pastor ought not, without consulting the Bishop, to assist at such a matrimony.¹¹

Q. 2. Whether matrimony can be contracted through a LETTER?

Resp. Affirmatively, on account of the same reason as above. But it is contracted in the following manner: "The groom writes to the bride that he himself hands himself over to her as husband, and from that moment accepts her as wife. The bride writes the same in return to the man; this response is read before the pastor and witnesses. Moreover, it is also enough that the man write to the woman in the way related, and that the bride, without writing back to the groom, open the letters before the pastor and witnesses, and furnish her consent."¹² - But that this be done LICITLY, a grave cause is required. Hence it is plainly to be advised that the pastor do nothing in this matter without the permission of the Bishop. Except, unless perhaps it is a question of revalidating matrimony, in which case one party would refuse to present himself before the pastor.¹³

Q. 3. Whether matrimony can be contracted UNDER CONDITION?

Resp. Affirmatively, because neither the sacred canons nor the very nature of matrimony altogether impede certain conditions from being added to matrimonial consent. - But according to the variety of conditions, various things must be DISTINGUISHED:

1. If the condition, even a base one, is concerning the past or concerning the present, the matrimony is valid if the condition stands; on the contrary, if it is lacking, it is not valid, because consent is lacking.

2. If the condition is concerning a necessary future thing, e.g. if the sun rises tomorrow, the matrimony is valid at once, unless the contracting parties intend to suspend consent until the time of the fulfilled condition. Thus commonly.

3. If the condition is against the substance of matrimonial obligation, e.g. if one says to the other: "I contract with you, if you avoid the generation of offspring; or until I find another more worthy in honor or wealth; or if you hand yourself over to be adulterated for gain:" thus it must be DISTINGUISHED: 1) if the condition is added with the intention of not undertaking the obligations which are essential to matrimony, which can easily happen in regions where divorce is permitted by laws and is in use, the matrimony is invalid; 2) if it is added with the intention indeed of undertaking them, but of not fulfilling them, it is valid, and the depraved will must be corrected.¹⁴ - But here it is customary to ask whether the condition of not consummating matrimony is against the good of offspring? - The more common and more probable opinion denies it; wherefore matrimony entered into under this condition is valid, provided the contracting parties intend to hand over to each other the mutual right in the body and to bind only the use of it (cf. n. 1963).

4. If the condition is concerning an impossible or base thing, which nevertheless is not repugnant to the substance of matrimony, again it must be DISTINGUISHED: 1) if there is evidence of a serious will not to contract unless the added condition has been fulfilled, matrimony entered into under an impossible condition is null; but one entered into under a base condition is not null by that very fact, but before the condition has been fulfilled, it obliges to nothing; when it has been fulfilled, however, it becomes absolute matrimony. - 2) But if there is no evidence of that serious will, the base or impossible condition is held as not added, and the matrimony is immediately valid.

5. Finally, if the condition is concerning a future contingent and honorable thing, the matrimony remains suspended until the condition is fulfilled; but when this has been fulfilled, it becomes absolute. While the condition is pending, it is not licit for one, against the will of the other, to revoke consent.¹⁵

But note as regards LICEITY, that the pastor cannot, without a most urgent cause, admit conditional marriages of this sort; namely on account of the many inconveniences and difficulties which afterward can occur and be moved against their validity.¹⁶

Q. 4. Whether, when the condition has been fulfilled, NEW CONSENT is required for matrimony?

Resp. Some indeed affirm, because matrimony is not only a contract, but also a Sacrament, whose validity cannot be pending.

But others, more truly and commonly, deny it, because the condition having been fulfilled, the contract becomes absolute, and consequently by that very fact also is constituted in the nature of a Sacrament.¹

Q. 5. What if a demonstration, cause, or mode is added to consent?

Resp. DEMONSTRATION, e.g. I marry you, who are noble; CAUSE, e.g. I marry you, because you are a virgin; MODE, e.g. I marry you, that you may serve me, differ altogether from condition in this, that they do not suspend consent; wherefore matrimony becomes immediately absolute, unless perhaps the demonstration, cause, or mode have, in the mind of the contracting parties, the nature of a condition, or unless substantial error lies hidden in them.²

Q. 6. Whether the CONSENT OF PARENTS is required for the matrimony of children-of-the-family?

Resp. 1. Negatively, as regards validity: and this is of faith against the Lutherans and Calvinists. For Trent (sess. 24, cap. 1) "condemns with anathema those who falsely affirm that marriages contracted by children-of-the-family without the consent of parents are invalid, and that parents can make them ratified or invalid." Reason is added: for the contracting parties have power over their own body, nor do parents have power over the body of their children in order to matrimony. - But if CIVIL LAW requires the consent of parents for the validity of matrimony, its force extends only to merely civil effects.

Resp. 2. It is required, at least speaking regularly, for liceity; so that children-of-the-family sin gravely if parents justly contradict, or if they are judged to be reasonably unwilling. We said speaking regularly; for when a just cause intervenes, it is certain that children can, while parents are ignorant of it or even unwilling, enter matrimony³ (see n. 1951, query 1).

But when parents contradict justly, and when unjustly, cannot easily be defined: wherefore a prudent confessor will indeed persuade children that, in a matter of so great moment, they should not stand against the will of parents; but very rarely will he impose on them an obligation of withdrawing from entering matrimony, especially because greater evils, for the most part, are to be feared from this.