¹ "Honor thy father and thy mother."

Ex. 20:12.

This precept, insofar as it is affirmative, directly commands that due worship be shown to parents; but indirectly it also commands those things to which parents are bound toward their children. And insofar as it is negative, it forbids that the same parents be affected by irreverence or injury. By the name of parents come not only carnal parents, who properly are so called, but also all other superiors, both spiritual and secular, who improperly are called parents, because they are in some way participants of paternal dignity and authority.

The fourth precept, which orders and determines relation toward other men, and those superiors who are for us the principle of life and governance, prescribes the social obligations which belong to man insofar as he is a member of a twofold society, namely the family and the state. In fulfilling these obligations he chiefly exercises the virtue of piety. This virtue, since it shows worship to those who are for us the principle of life, has obtained the promise of life: "Honor thy father and thy mother, that it may be well with thee, and thou mayest be long-lived upon the earth."²

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 101-105. St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 333-355. Lessius, De iustitia, l. 2, c. 46. Sporer-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis decalog., I, tract. 3, n. 612-690. Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theol. mor.^3, II, n. 815-847. Genicot, Theologiae moralis instit.^6, I, n. 345-359.

² Ex. 20:12; Eph. 6:2 s.

281. By divine disposition man, by his very nature social, must live life in society so that he may attain his end, both the immediate end of this life and the ultimate end of the other life. From this natural sociality of man it has come about that man has always and everywhere lived, and henceforth lives, in a twofold society, domestic and civil. The first society, and the foundation and essential condition of the other societies, civil and ecclesiastical, is domestic society. It is composed of a threefold social element: of conjugal society, which consists in the conjunction of man and wife; of parental society, which arises between parents and children; of masterly society, which arises between master and servants. From these three societies the family is completely constituted. Therefore obligations of a threefold kind are had within the family: obligations of spouses, obligations of parents and children, obligations of masters and servants. And on account of the analogy, on the one hand, of parents and children with teachers and pupils, and on the other hand of masters and servants with employers and workers, in this place there must also be treated the obligations of teachers and pupils and the obligations of employers and workers.

Article First. On the Obligations of Spouses

The root of the obligations which fall upon spouses is marriage, by which domestic society is constituted. But the obligations which flow from this root are of three kinds: namely, some are referred to the persons, some to the goods, some to the body of the spouses. Only the obligations of the first kind pertain to this precept; of these, some are mutual, while others are proper to either spouse.

282. Mutual obligations. Since Christian marriage, in which these obligations are founded, is an image of the union of Christ and the Church, to which Christ communicated Himself wholly, between spouses there ought to flourish the most perfect union and communion both of souls and of bodies.

1. Therefore spouses are bound to mutual love: husbands are commanded to love their wives, wives to love their husbands.¹ So intimate ought this union of love to be that a spouse ought to prefer spouse, in effective love or in bringing help, even to parents and children, unless these are in extreme necessity.

Therefore spouses sin against piety who pursue one another with hatred, offend one another with quarrels and insults, spread calumnies, and by jealousy, harshness, or neglect of duties render life very troublesome to the other party.

2. They are bound to bring mutual assistance to each other, both as to body and as to soul.²

Spouses complete each other not only insofar as they are the principle of generation, but also in the actions and necessities of human life. In the work of salvation they promote each other, both because they pray for one another and because they help one another by word and example, and especially because they patiently bear defects committed from human frailty.

3. They are bound to render mutually to each other the conjugal debt and also to preserve conjugal fidelity;³ hence it happens that every sin, whether internal or external, committed against chastity with another person or concerning another person, has the character of adultery.

4. Since they cannot satisfy these obligations otherwise, spouses are bound to common habitation, indeed also to common table and bed.⁴

a. Yet this obligation does not affect husband and wife in the same way. For the choice of domicile pertains to the husband, but the wife must follow the husband to the chosen domicile, even if he changes domicile without a just cause. But the husband is not bound to follow a wife migrating elsewhere, unless the migration is made from a necessary cause.

b. Spouses can by mutual consent separate from each other even for a longer time, unless there is present danger of incontinence or the education of children would suffer detriment from it. But one spouse cannot without grave fault depart for a long time against the will of the other unless a grave cause is present. And although the husband of himself can be absent for a brief time even without the wife's knowledge and against her will, nevertheless, with attention to the relation of love between spouses, it is not becoming that the husband be absent even for a day without the wife's knowledge.

¹ Cf. Eph. 5:25; Col. 3:18; Tit. 2:4; 1 Tim. 2:15.

² Gen. 2:18.

³ 1 Cor. 7:4.

⁴ Cf. Matt. 19:5.

283. Obligations and rights of the husband. 1. To the husband from legitimate marriage belongs marital power, by force of which he is the head of the wife, who in the governance of domestic affairs and of the family is truly subject to him; but he must protect the wife and treat her as spouse and companion.

Although coercive power is not contained in marital power, nevertheless the husband has the right of requiring from the wife not only reverence and obedience, but also labor suitable to her state and condition.

2. He is bound to support his wife, by furnishing food, clothing, habitation, and other things necessary for life, so that according to her condition she can live at home and abroad.

He sins if he refuses or neglects to provide for his wife according to the measure of her state concerning things necessary for food and clothing, even if he married her without dowry; if he does not care for the governance of the house and the family estate; if he treats her harshly after the manner of a maidservant; if he demands from her things which women of the same dignity and condition are not accustomed to furnish.

3. To the husband belongs paternal power over children, by force of which he can order not only their things and actions, but even their persons, to the good of the family.

Not only the ancient pagan peoples extended this power beyond just limits, who against natural right vindicated to themselves the power of killing and selling their children, but also the Christian peoples of the Middle Ages, who contracted betrothals and marriages for their children or offered them to monasteries.

284. Obligations and rights of the wife. 1. Although the wife is subject to the husband, nevertheless she is the husband's wife, not concubine; the husband's companion, not maidservant; and as mother she has the right of educating the offspring, certainly dependently on the father.

From the mode by which God made the first parents, it is clear that dominion belongs to the man: for man is not from woman, but woman from man;¹ moreover, God indeed gave the same nature to woman, yet added her to man as a help: "Let us make him a help like unto himself";² "Man was not created for woman, but woman for man."³ St. Paul both expressly calls the man the head of the woman,⁴ and implicitly does so by comparing the union of man and woman to the conjunction of Christ and the Church, whose head Christ is.⁵ Hence he infers: "As the Church is subject to Christ, so also let women be to their husbands in all things."⁶ What we learn from revelation, the nature of the thing also teaches: for domestic society, as any society, needs authority; but domestic authority by the institution of nature is in the man.

2. She has the right of receiving from the husband congruous support; likewise the right and obligation of caring for the family estate, yet with due dependence on the husband.⁷

She sins if from the goods of the family she makes expenses without the consent of the husband and against the custom of women of the same condition; if she arrogates to herself command or administration of the house, except the case in which the man neglects it or is unfit for it; if she omits care of the family or domestic business.

3. Ordinarily she is bound to follow the domicile which the husband has chosen as head of the family.

¹ 1 Cor. 11:8.

² Gen. 2:18.

³ 1 Cor. 11:9.

⁴ 1 Cor. 11:3.

⁵ Eph. 5:23.

⁶ Eph. 5:24.

⁷ Col. 3:18; 1 Pet. 3:1.

The Fourth Commandment is: “ Honour thy father and thy mother.”¹ By this Commandment not only are children bound to be dutiful in their conduct towards their parents, but these latter are also implicitly bidden to perform all the obligations which nature imposes on them towards their offspring, inasmuch as rights imply corresponding obligations. The mutual obligations of parent and child may be extended to all who hold an analogous position towards each other, and so under this heading theologians commonly treat of the mutual obligations of other relations, and of superiors and subjects, both ecclesiastical and civil.

¹ Summa, 2-2, q. 101, a. 3.

CHILDREN owe their existence to their parents, and for many years, until they come to maturity, they stand in need of their constant care and direction. It is but right, therefore, that children should love, reverence, and obey the authors of their being and their natural guardians. This is due to parents from their children on account of the special relationship in which they stand towards them, and so, as St Thomas teaches,” there must be a special virtue which regulates the mutual obligations of parent and child. This virtue is called piety in Catholic theology, and it regulates not only the mutual offices of parents and children towards each other, but our duty to other near relatives, and to our country and fellow-countrymen. It is a virtue similar to charity, but it binds more strictly, so that while charity prescribes a general love for all mankind, piety obliges us to a special love for those who are near to us, and for the country in which we were born.¹

If, then, hatred or want of love for our fellow-men is of itself a grave sin, as we saw above, it will be still easier to commit a grave sin by want of proper affection for our parents. To show dislike of them or contempt for them, or to show that we are ashamed of them, will be a grave sin if our unfilial conduct is likely to cause them serious grief. In the same way, serious want of reverence and respect shown in word or action is grievously sinful. To strike a parent, or even to threaten to do so, will usually be mortally sinful.

By the duty of obedience children are bound to obey their parents in all that belongs to their bringing up and to domestic discipline. Sins of disobedience will be grievous if the matter is sufficiently important and the command is given with the serious intention of imposing a strict obligation.

Children are only bound to support their parents when they cannot support themselves, for whatever property a child may have or may acquire belongs exclusively to him. Among the working classes it is usual for elder brothers or sisters who have begun to work to throw their earnings into the common stock for the support of the family until they leave home and get an establishment of their own. This is quite as it should be, for the money which they earn is scarcely sufficient to pay for their own keep; or if it does more, there are little brothers and sisters or aged parents who are dependent on them, and whom they are bound to help to support.

¹ St Thomas, Summa, 2-2, q. 101, a. I.

The other obligations of children towards their parents are permanent and last as long as life, but that of obedience ceases with their emancipation, In England children are emancipated from the control of their parents when they become twenty-one years of age, when they marry, or when they enter into religion; for as soon as they have attained the age of puberty they are independent of their parents in what concerns the salvation of their souls and the choice of a state of life.

A minor may also enlist as a soldier without his parents’ consent according to the English law.

Moreover, when a child has attained years of discretion, which he is considered to do at sixteen, it would seem that he may lawfully depart from home and provide for himself, if it be for his advantage. This, of course, supposes that the necessities of his parents or of his brothers and sisters do not require that he should remain at home. If a youth has acted in this way, and it appears to be for his benefit, English courts will not compel him to return home, and it was the common teaching of the classical moralists that in acting thus a youth would do nothing wrong.¹

¹ Laymann, lib. 3, tract. 4, c. 8, n. 13.

Nature herself teaches parents their duties towards the offspring that they have brought into the world, and which stands in need of their loving care for many years before it arrives at maturity, so as to be able to lead an independent life.

Parents, then, are bound first and foremost to love their children with that special affection which belongs to the virtue of piety. They will commit grievous sin if they are indifferent to their children’s welfare, if they deliberately curse them, if they show great and foolish preference for one child over others to the serious discontent of the latter.

They are bound to support their children until these can support themselves. Even before the child’s birth, the mother must take care not to risk its life or natural development. After birth she is bound at least under venial sin to nourish it with her own milk, unless some good reason excuse her. Then there is the obligation of providing sufficiently for the child’s maintenance, according to its position in life, by a prudent administration of the family property, or by earning money and saving what is necessary for the purpose. Grave sin is committed by a father who will not work, or who squanders his wages in drink or gambling, so that wife and children are deprived of proper support. Parents are bound to instruct their children in all that is required to enable them to lead a good Christian life; they must warn them of dangers into which their inexperience would lead them, and correct them when they do wrong. Above all, they must be careful to give them good example by leading a good Catholic life themselves, and by never being a source of scandal to their children in word or deed. They must watch to see with what companions their children associate, what they read, and what places they frequent.

The Elementary Education Act, 1876, declared it to be the duty of the parent of every child between the ages of five and fourteen years to cause it to receive efficient elementary instruction in reading, writing, and arithmetic; and penalties were imposed on parents who neglected this duty. As such an education can in most cases only be given in a school, it becomes a practical moral question of great importance as to what sort of school Catholic parents should select. The education of their children belongs primarily by the law of nature to the parents, and if they entrust a portion of their task to others they are bound to select such as can and will educate them according to Catholic principles. The Church, too, has received a divine commission to teach, and those who by baptism have become subject to her authority are obliged to be guided by her directions in this all-important matter. The Church condemns all non-Catholic schools, whether they be heretical and schismatical or secularist, and she declares that as a general rule no Catholic parent can send his young children to such schools for educational purposes without exposing their faith and morals to serious risk, and therefore committing a grave sin. A Catholic child, if educated away from home, should be placed in a Catholic school, under Catholic masters or mistresses. Sad experience in many different countries has shown how necessary this is for the preservation of the Catholic faith. If, however, there is no suitable Catholic school to which children can be sent, they may be sent to a non-Catholic school provided that the proximate danger can be made remote by using the proper means, and provided that the parents see to the religious instruction of their children. In many countries, as in England, the Bishops have reserved to themselves the decision as to whether in any particular case these conditions are fulfilled. A priest, therefore, should not take it upon himself to deny the sacraments to parents who send their children to a non-Catholic school; the case should be sent to the Bishop (cf. Can. 1113, 1374).

What has just been said applies specially to primary and secondary schools, for the question about non-Catholic universities is somewhat different. The Church would indeed wish that all who desire it might be able to obtain a higher education in a Catholic university. As this, however, is impossible in England, the Holy See has permitted Catholic parents to send their sons to Oxford or Cambridge on account of the grave necessity, and because when a young man has already received a sound secondary education among Catholic surroundings, if there is any character in him, he can be trusted to hold his own, Suitable safeguards, however, are prescribed for the young men who avail themselves of this permission, among which is the obligation of attending Catholic lectures which are provided by the Bishops.

In order that parents may fulfil their obligations towards their children, the law of nature itself confers on them the requisite authority and the right to look after their children until these can provide for themselves. It would, then, be against natural justice if children were removed from their parents’ control or if there were any interference with the parental authority as long as it is rightly exercised.1 Although parental authority is derived from the law of nature, yet its precise extent and its limits are not defined by natural law; this is left to positive law, ecclesiastical and civil.

Parental authority extends to the person and to the property of a child. i. (a2) The right to the custody of the person of a child belongs to the father during his life, and after his death to the mother. Until emancipation at the age of twenty-one or until marriage a father can enforce his right by writ of habeas corpus.

An action also lies for loss of services against anyone who entices a minor away from the custody of his parents. Moreover, abduction of a girl under sixteen or under eighteen for immoral purposes is rigorously punished by English criminal law.

However, if a child who has reached years of discretion chooses to depart from home, our courts will not compel him to return, if the departure seems to be for his benefit.

(6) A parent or one who is in loco parentis may moderately chastise a minor who has been guilty of fault.

(c) The consent of the parent is required for the lawfulness of a minor’s marriage. ii. The parent as such has no rights over the property of his child according to English law. If, however, no other guardian has been lawfully appointed, the father will be regarded as the guardian of his child, and he will be compelled to administer its property for its benefit, and he can be compelled to render an account of his administration. Gifts which have been freely made by children to their parents are considered valid by our law, but there is a presumption against their being free gifts, unless this is proved. 1 St Thomas, Summa, 2-2, q. 10, a. 12.

The duties of parents extend to illegitimate as well as to legitimate children. The duty of caring for an illegitimate child falls primarily on the mother, who, before a year has elapsed from its birth, may obtain from the magistrates a maintenance order against the reputed father, providing for the child’s support and education at his expense.

A husband is bound by our law to support the children of his wife by a former husband as well as his own.

What has been said concerning the mutual obligations of parent and child applies proportionately to those of other near relations. These are also bound to love each other, not only out of charity, but out of piety, and they are under a grave obligation of rendering each other assistance not only in extreme but also in grave necessity. English law only enforces on relatives the obligation of maintaining a poor relation who is unable to support himself when he would otherwise be chargeable to the parish where he happens to be. Those who are so compellable are the wife and husband, the father and grandfather, the mother and grandmother or the children of the pauper. The law of charity and piety obliges more frequently and extends further.

Guardians are sometimes appointed according to law to take care of the person and property of minors.

Parents are legally the guardians by nature and nurture of the persons of their children until these reach the age of twenty-one, as we saw above.

Of the many kinds of guardians recognized by English law the following are still of practical importance: Statutory guardians, guardians appointed by the high court and guardians appointed for special purposes.

(a) Statutory guardians. By a statute of Charles II a father may appoint by deed or by will a guardian or guardians to have the custody of his infant child, and to manage its property until it reach the age of twenty-one. The Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, made the mother on the death of the father the guardian of her infant children, either alone if no guardian was appointed by him, or jointly with the guardian or guardians appointed by the father. The mother can also by deed or will appoint one or more guardians to act after her death and that of the father. She may also appoint a guardian to act provisionally after her death jointly with the father.

(b) Guardians appointed by the High Court. An infant may be made a ward of court by settling a sum of money on it and bringing a suit for its administration. 183 This may be done even though the father be still alive, or a testamentary guardian has been appointed. Where the court is satisfied that it would be for the good of the ward, it may remove a guardian from his office and appoint another in his place, even though the infant be not a ward of court.

(c) Guardians for special purposes are sometimes appointed to consent to an infant’s marriage, or for some other object under different statutes.

A guardian has a right to the custody of the person of his ward, and in general he exercises the rights, and is under the obligations of a father towards his ward. He administers the ward’s property, and must render an account of his administration.

No one may marry a ward of court or remove it out of the jurisdiction without the court’s permission.

The wishes of the father, as a general rule, according to English law, must be followed with regard to the religion in which a ward is educated by his guardian.

BESIDES the obligations which are treated of under Marriage, and the rights and obligations arising out of property belonging to married people, which are discussed under the Seventh Commandment, there are certain obligations arising from marriage inasmuch as it places the husband in a position of authority and the wife in one of subjection. A word must here be said concerning their mutual obligations in this respect.

The wife becomes by marriage subject to her husband, and owes him love, reverence, and obedience, as to a superior. ““ Let women be subject to their husbands as to the Lord,” says St Paul. ‘‘ Because the husband is the head of the wife: as Christ is the head of the Church. ... Therefore as the Church is subject to Christ, so also let wives be to their husbands in all things.”¹ However, a wife is not the slave or servant of her husband, but rather his companion, and so, though subject and bound to obey in all that relates to family life and conduct, yet she should be treated with love, consideration, and deference, and consulted in what concerns the family affairs.

¹ Eph. v 22-24.

The wife will commit grave sin if she shows great contempt for her husband, habitually neglects his commands, and arrogates his authority to herself without just cause.

The husband is bound to support his wife and family according to English law, who therefore have a claim in justice upon him as well as in piety. The husband sins grievously by treating his wife with habitual harshness and neglect, and by not providing for her necessities and those of her children. In this latter case the wife would not be guilty of sin if she took from her husband without his knowledge what was necessary for the decent support of the family.

SERVANT is here understood in a wide sense so as to comprise both domestic servants and workmen who work for a master. The relation in modern times arises out of a contract freely entered into by the parties, and it is less intimate than that which in ancient times subsisted between the lord and the slave or serf. In spite of this, however, the nexus of cash payment is not the only bond between master and servant. By the very fact that one enters into the service of another, the latter becomes his superior, assumes the duty of caring for him, and in fitting proportion he acquires a claim to those marks of honour and reverence which are due to all who exercise authority over us.¹

¹ St Thomas, Summa, 2-2, q. 102, a. 1.

Servants, then, owe to their masters reverence, fidelity, and obedience.

(a) They are bound to show their masters due honour and respect, and grave sin may be committed by displaying open contempt for them, ridiculing them, and making known their secret defects. ‘‘ Whosoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all honour.’”¹

(b) They must faithfully discharge the duties imposed on them by the nature of their charge. If they waste the time which belongs to their master, wilfully neglect their duties, damage or destroy the property of their master by not taking ordinary care of it, they sin against justice and are bound to restitution. If special charge of what belongs to the master is committed to a servant, he will be obliged to guard it against damage or loss caused by others, and he will sin against justice and be bound to make restitution if he fail to do so. Where no such special charge has been laid on a servant, he will only be bound in charity, not in justice, to protect the property of his master.

(c) A workman who does not live in his master’s house will be bound to obey his master’s commands in all that relates to the work that he undertook to do.

A domestic servant is a member of the master’s household, and the obligation of obedience extends to what concerns domestic discipline, as well as to the special work which was expressly undertaken by the contract. ‘“‘ Servants,” says St Paul, “‘ be obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with fear and trembling in the simplicity of your heart, as to Christ: not serving to the eye, as it were pleasing men, but as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart, with a good will serving, as to the Lord, and not to men.”² Still one who contracted to be a cook would not be bound to obey if ordered to do housemaid’s work; neither explicitly nor implicitly was such an obligation undertaken when the contract was entered into.

These duties of a servant toward his master are touched upon by Leo XIII in his encyclical letter on the condition of the working classes, May 15, 1891. “‘ Thus religion teaches the labouring man and the artisan to carry out honestly and fairly all equitable agreements freely entered into; never to injure the property, nor to outrage the person, of an employer; never to resort to violence in defending their own cause, nor to engage in riot and disorder; and to have nothing to do with men of evil principles, who work upon the people with artful promises, and excite foolish hopes which usually end in useless regrets, followed by insolvency.”

¹ 1 Tim. vi 1.

² Eph. vi 5-7.

The duties are not all on one side and the rights on the other in the relation of master and servant. Each has his rights and each his duties, and their good and the good of the community largely depends on both sides faithfully and loyally fulfilling their mutual obligations.

(a) A master must treat his servant not as a mere instrument of production, but as a fellow-Christian: “‘ Religion teaches the wealthy owner and the employer that their work-people are not to be accounted their bondsmen; that in every man they must respect his dignity and worth as a man and as a Christian; that labour is not a thing to be ashamed of if we lend ear to right reason and to Christian philosophy, but is an honourable calling, enabling a man to sustain his life in a way upright and creditable; and that it is shameful and inhuman to treat men like chattels to make money by, or to look upon them merely as so much muscle or physical power.

(b) “ Again, therefore, the Church teaches that, as religion and things spiritual and mental are among the working man’s main concerns, the employer is bound to see that the worker has time for his religious duties; that he be not exposed to corrupting influences and dangerous occasions, and that he be not led away to neglect his home and family or to squander his earnings.”¹ The general obligation of fraternal correction will more frequently impose a duty on the master of admonishing and correcting a domestic servant than an ordinary workman of his.

(c) “‘ Furthermore, the employer must never tax his workpeople beyond their strength or employ them in work unsuited to their age or sex.”² According to English common law, the contract between employer and employed involves on the part of the former the duty of taking reasonable care to provide appliances and to maintain them in a proper condition, and so to carry on his operations as not to subject those employed by him to unnecessary risk. This common law liability has been further increased and defined by the Employers’ Liability Acts and Workmen’s Compensation Acts, which, however, will as a rule only affect the conscience after the sentence of a competent authority, except in so far as there was grave culpable negligence on the part of the employer.

(d) The employer’s “ great and principal duty is to give everyone a fair wage. Doubtless before deciding whether wages are adequate, many things have to be considered; but wealthy owners and all masters of labour should be mindful of this, that to exercise pressure upon the indigent and the destitute for the sake of gain, and to gather one’s profit out of the need of another, are condemned by all laws, human and divine. To defraud anyone of wages that are his due is a crime which cries to the avenging anger of heaven. Behold, the hire of the labourers . . . which by fraud hath been kept back by you, crieth aloud; and the cry of them hath entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth.³ “ Lastly, the rich must religiously refrain from cutting down the workmen’s earnings, whether by force, by fraud, or by usurious dealing; and with all the greater reason because the labouring man is, as a rule, weak and unprotected, and because his slender means should in proportion to their scantiness be accounted sacred. Were these precepts carefully obeyed and followed out, would they not be sufficient of themselves to keep under all strife and all its causes?”⁴ Sums must not be deducted from a servant’s wages on account of temporary illness, though by English law a master is not bound to provide medical aid or medicines for a sick servant, though he is for an apprentice. If he sends for medical assistance for a servant whilst under his roof, he is liable. In the same encyclical of Leo XIII a general rule is laid down for deciding what a fair wage is: ‘‘ Let it, then, be taken for granted that workman and employer should, as a rule, make free agreements, and in particular should agree freely as to the wages; nevertheless, there underlies a dictate of nature more imperious and more ancient than any bargain between man and man—namely, that the remuneration must be sufficient to support the wage-earner in reasonable and frugal comfort. If through necessity or fear of a worse evil, the workman accept harder conditions, because an employer or contractor will afford him no better, he is made the victim of force and injustice.”

The workman, then, has a right to a living wage, and the employer who grows rich by sweating his work-people commits a sin against justice and is bound to make restitution of his ill-gotten wealth. If, however, the employer gives as good wages as he can afford, or as good as the labour is worth, he will be excused from any sin against justice; occasionally in bad times he may be bound out of charity to give employment without profit to himself or even at a personal loss.

¹ Leo XIII, l.c.

² ibid.

³ Jas. v 4; Can. 1524.

⁴ Leo XIII, l.c.

It is sometimes the duty of the State to interpose its authority in order to settle labour questions. As Leo XIII says: ‘‘ If by a strike, or other combination of workmen, there should be imminent danger of disturbance to the public peace; or if circumstances were such that among the labouring population the ties of family life were relaxed; if religion were found to suffer through the operatives not having time and opportunity afforded them to practise its duties; if in workshops and factories there were dangers to morals through the mixing of the sexes or from other harmful occasions of evil; or if employers laid burdens upon their workmen which were unjust, or degraded them with conditions repugnant to their dignity as human beings; finally, if health were endangered by excessive labour or by work unsuited to sex or age—in such cases there can be no question but that, within certain limits, it would be right to invoke the aid and authority of the law.” A little further on Pope Leo again refers to strikes: “* When work-people have recourse to a strike, it is frequently because the hours of labour are too long, or the work too hard, or because they consider their wages insufficient. The grave inconvenience of this not uncommon occurrence should be obviated by public remedial measures, for such paralyzing of labour not only affects the masters and their work-people alike, but is extremely injurious to trade and to the general interests of the public; moreover, on such occasions, violence and disorder are generally not far distant, and thus it frequently happens that the public peace is imperilled. The laws should forestall and prevent such troubles from arising; they should lend their influence and authority to the removal in good time of the causes which lead to conflicts between employers and employed.”¹

It is unlawful for workmen to strike when by so doing they violate a just contract which they have freely entered into, or when they cannot hope to gain anything substantial, so that there is no adequate compensation for the sufferings, losses, and risks which generally accompany a strike. It is wrong to use violence and threats to compel other workmen to strike against their will, or to prevent them accepting work if they desire to do so.

If, however, other means of obtaining redress or of securing their rights have failed, it is not wrong for workmen to strike in order to obtain a diminution of excessive hours of toil, or a just wage, or other just, reasonable, and adequate advantage.

¹ Leo XIII, l.c.

The contract of hiring may be terminated by mutual consent of the parties concerned, or for just cause by one of the parties, provided that the laws and customs which regulate the matter be duly observed. Generally speaking, a month’s notice, or a month’s wages, is required by English law to determine a general hiring of a domestic servant. If, however, the servant is incompetent to do what he undertook, is habitually disobedient, or is guilty of immorality, or unlawfully absents himself from his work, he may be dismissed without notice.

SCHOOLMASTERS and schoolmistresses are put in the place of the parents to educate children in letters and good conduct. They therefore to a certain extent share the obligations and the rights of parents. Furthermore, they are bound in justice by contract to fulfil the special duties which are annexed to their office of training the children committed to their charge.

Pupils are bound to love, reverence, and obey their masters and mistresses in all things that pertain to their education in letters and morals. However, in estimating the gravity of sins of disobedience toward masters and mistresses, we must consider not only whether the matter be grave and there be a serious intention of imposing an obligation, as in other cases of disobedience, but also whether the authority of the master or mistress enables them to give a precept which binds under pain of grave sin. Such ample authority is usually not committed to inferior masters and mistresses.

ALL those to whom the care of souls is committed in the Church of God are bound by divine precept and by the very nature of their office to fulfil the duties of their charge If they fail in their duty, they sin not only against charity and obedience, but also against justice; for everyone who voluntarily undertakes an office implicitly thereby undertakes to discharge the duties annexed to it. In general, therefore, ecclesiastical superiors are bound to love, watch over, and instruct by word and by example those committed to their charge. The special obligations of each one depend on the office which he holds, and are treated of elsewhere.

Subjects also owe to their ecclesiastical superiors love, reverence, obedience in all that belongs to their office, and temporal support. This is obvious from what has already been said, and it is inculcated in several places of Holy Writ.”

It has been the constant teaching of the Catholic Church that all public and legitimate authority is of divine right, in the sense that God is the Author of man’s nature by which he is a social animal, formed to live in society, which necessarily implies a distinction of rulers and ruled. The rulers may, indeed, be designated in various ways, their power may be more or less absolute; this power may be in the hands of one or of many, but it is derived from God, the Author of man’s nature and of human society. This is the teaching of St. Paul: “‘ Let every soul be subject to higher powers; for there is no power but from God; and those that are, are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. And they that resist, purchase to themselves damnation.”¹ As Leo XIII says in his encyclical letter, Diuturnum, June 29, 1881, this doctrine is taught in many passages of Holy Writ, and has been constantly inculcated by the Catholic Church. ² Rom. xiii 1-2.

In English-speaking countries the people have a large share in the election of their rulers, and such an important duty should be faithfully and religiously fulfilled. There may easily be a moral obligation to vote at elections in order to prevent the election of one who would do grave public harm if elected, or in order to secure the election of one whose election would be a great public benefit. If the only choice lies between candidates who are equally good or equally bad, there will be no moral obligation to vote.

Those who hold any civil office are bound to perform its duties faithfully, not only out of charity, but out of justice.

¹ Trent, sess. 23, c. 1, de Ref.

² x Tim. v 17; Heb. xiii 17.

For Catholics it is a matter of religious obligation to love, reverence, and obey those who wield civil power. As Leo XIII teaches: ‘‘ We are bound to love dearly the country whence we have received the means of enjoyment this mortal life affords, but we have a much more urgent obligation to love with ardent love the Church to which we owe the life of the soul, a life that will endure for ever. Moreover, if we would judge aright, the supernatural love for the Church and the natural love of our own country proceed from the same eternal principle, since God himself is their Author and originating Cause. ... Law is of its very essence a mandate of right reason, proclaimed by a properly constituted authority, for the common good. But true and legitimate authority is void of sanction, unless it proceed from God, the supreme Ruler and Lord of all. The Almighty alone can commit power to a man over his fellow-men; nor may that be accounted as right reason which is in disaccord with truth and with divine reason; nor that held to be true good which is repugnant to the supreme and unchangeable good, or that wrests aside and draws away the wills of men from the charity of God. Hallowed, therefore, in the minds of Christians is the very idea of public authority, in which they recognize some likeness and symbol, as it were, of the divine Majesty, even when it is exercised by one unworthy. A just and due reverence to the laws abides in them, not from force and threats, but from a consciousness of duty; for God hath not given us the spirit of fear.”’+ 1 Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter, January 10, 1890.

(St. Thomas, II-II, qq. 101-105; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, bk. III, nn. 333-362; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 7.)

The fourth precept of the Decalogue explicitly speaks only of the honor which children owe to parents; implicitly, however, it comprehends both the duties of parents toward children, and the duties of other blood-relatives, spouses, and other superiors and inferiors toward one another. Therefore we shall speak first of the duties of children toward parents, then of the duties both of other blood-relatives and of spouses, finally of the duties of domestic masters and servants; fifth, of the duties of non-domestic masters and servants; sixth, of the duties of teachers and pupils; seventh, of the duties of civil rulers and subjects.

On the schools of heretics. - "... Fathers and mothers become guilty of a most enormous sin all the more who, truly cruel toward the souls of their children, send them to the schools of Protestants; and even worse, if they compel them to go. The matter is evident: parents of this kind are to be reproved and detested in their crime, and their amendment is to be sought by all possible means; and at times they are to be kept far from the Sacraments, as being incapable and unworthy, until they have recalled their children from schools of this kind. - The children also, the matter considered in itself, certainly become guilty of grave fault by going to such schools. But in the case of true coercion, the confessor, having weighed the circumstances of the person and of the fact, should act toward them according to the rules proposed by approved authors for cases of this kind." Instr. of the Cardinal Vicar for the Parish Priests of Rome, 12 July 1878.

"Moreover, what had to fall under deliberation first of all was the very manner of instructing youth, proper and peculiar to schools of this kind, non-Catholic schools. This seemed to the Sacred Congregation, even of itself, full of danger and very adverse to the Catholic cause. For the students of such schools, since their own plan excludes every doctrine of religion, will learn neither the rudiments of faith nor be instructed in the precepts of the Church, and therefore will lack knowledge most necessary for man, without which one does not live as a Christian... In the aforesaid schools... teachers are used indiscriminately from every sect, so that it is free to pour errors and seeds of vices into tender minds. A certain corruption also threatens further from this, that in the same schools, or at least in many of them, adolescents of both sexes are gathered into the same room for hearing lessons, and males are ordered to sit on the same bench next to females. All these things bring it about that youth is miserably exposed to harm concerning faith, and morals are placed in danger. - But unless this danger of perversion is made remote from nearby, such schools cannot be frequented with a safe conscience. The natural and divine law itself cries this out... And these things indeed, as founded on natural and divine right, state a certain general principle and have universal force, and pertain to all those regions where this most pernicious method of instructing youth has unhappily been introduced... - Moreover, the Sacred Congregation is not ignorant that the circumstances of things are sometimes such that Catholic parents can, in conscience, entrust their offspring to public schools. But they will not be able to do this unless they have sufficient cause for so acting; and whether such a sufficient cause is or is not present in some particular case will have to be left to the conscience and judgment of Bishops. According to the things reported, it will then generally be present when either no Catholic school is at hand, or the one which is at hand is little suited for instructing adolescents suitably and congruently to their condition. But in order that public schools can be approached in conscience, the danger of perversion, which is more or less always connected with their own plan, must be made remote from nearby by opportune remedies and precautions. Therefore it must first of all be seen whether, in the school about whose attendance there is question, the danger of perversion is of such a kind that it plainly cannot be made remote, as often as there are either taught or done there certain things contrary to Catholic doctrine or good morals, which cannot be heard or done without loss to the soul. Truly such a danger, as is evident of itself, must be wholly avoided with any temporal harm whatever, even of life. - Moreover, in order that youth can in conscience be entrusted to public schools, they must duly and diligently receive the necessary Christian instruction and education, at least outside school time. Wherefore let parish priests and missionaries... diligently apply themselves to catecheses... But let the parents themselves, or those who are in their place, carefully watch over their children... It is manifest from Catholic moral doctrine that those parents who neglect to impart this necessary Christian instruction and education to their children; or who allow them to frequent such schools in which ruin of souls cannot be avoided; or finally who, although a suitable Catholic school is present in the same place and aptly instructed and prepared, or although they have the faculty of educating their offspring as Catholics in another region, nevertheless entrust them to public schools without sufficient cause and without the necessary precautions by which the danger of perversion is made remote from nearby, cannot, if they are contumacious, be absolved in the Sacrament of Penance." Instr. S. C. de P. F. on public schools to the Most Reverend Bishops in the United States of North America, 30 June 1875, approved by the Supreme Pontiff 24 Nov. of the same year.

On non-Catholic Universities. - "By letters given on 3 Feb. 1865 to the Right Reverend Fathers and Lords, the sacred Prelates of England, the Sacred Council called Propaganda signified that it had most willingly confirmed the opinion unanimously proposed by the praised Bishops in the recent London meeting, concerning colleges not to be erected near the English Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and concerning Catholic parents to be opportunely persuaded not to send their sons to those Universities; namely, because the same Sacred Council had seen the judgment of the Bishops to be especially consonant with the principles handed down by itself according to the mind of the Supreme Pontiff, as often as it had been consulted concerning the dangers of mixed schools... But since not all have carried the same judgment concerning non-Catholic Universities to be avoided, and since there were even some who judged that it could be tolerated that Catholic youth frequent the aforesaid institutes, either because of the temporal advantages which are obtained in them, or because in their opinion no certain law appears by which access to them is absolutely prohibited, I think it worthwhile that Your Excellency explain clearly in the Pastoral Letter the doctrine concerning proximate occasions of sinning gravely which are to be avoided, to which no one can expose himself without lethal sin, unless grave and proportionate necessity urges, and unless such precautions are employed by which the proximate danger of sinning is removed. Now truly in the matter of which there is question, to which, from the declaration of the Supreme Pontiff, there belongs an intrinsic and most grave danger, not only for honesty of morals, but especially for faith, which is altogether necessary for salvation, who does not see that there scarcely can, or indeed scarcely even can, be given those circumstances in which non-Catholic Universities may be frequented without sin? The lightness of mind and instability of adolescents, the errors which are drunk in, as it were with the air, in the said Institutes without the antidote of sounder doctrine, the very great force which human respect and mockeries of companions exercise upon youths, bring upon adolescents so present and so proximate a danger of falling that generally no sufficient reason can be conceived on account of which adolescents may be entrusted to non-Catholic Universities..." Instr. S. C. de P. F. 6 Aug. 1867.

On mixed schools of heretics. - "1. Whether it is lawful for parents to entrust their children to be instructed in schools of this kind, mixed schools? - Resp. Generally speaking, it is not lawful, but in particular cases this must be left to the judgment and conscience of the Ordinary; nevertheless it will be his office to take diligent care that not only by himself and by parish priests, but also by individual parents, opportune remedies be applied by which the danger of perversion is removed from the students, and at the same time to strive with magistrates and presidents that violence not be done to the conscience of Catholics by using books which are hostile to the Catholic religion; and finally assiduously and earnestly to admonish and exhort all, and especially those who have the means, that they send their children to other regions where they may be educated as Catholics."

2. "Whether it is lawful for a priest in the aforesaid schools to hand down the teachings of the Christian faith, or to discharge the office of Chaplain? - Resp. In the affirmative and according to the mind; the mind is that care is to be taken that priests, or upright laymen of well-known religion, be placed in charge, as far as can be done, not only of handing down the Christian faith, but also of schools of other disciplines. But so that every fear of scandal may cease, the people are to be admonished that this is done so that the evils which flow from schools of this kind may be averted as far as can be done; and that this therefore ought to serve no one as an excuse not to send his children to merely Catholic schools, in which their faith and morals are in no way endangered."

3. "Even if those mixed schools can somehow be tolerated, is it lawful for the Catholics of the Jura to send notice that they renounce their right founded on public agreements, by force of which it is unlawful for anyone to take up the office of teaching in their public schools who does not profess the Catholic religion?" - "Resp. In the negative, whether there is question of an express cession, or even of a tacit cession from silence and culpable tolerance. Therefore, although care must be taken that nothing be done imprudently by which the ferocity of adversaries is stirred up to inflicting graver evils, nevertheless nothing is to be remitted of industry and constancy, so that legitimate means which are in the power of Catholics may be employed to recover the aforesaid right together with the sanctity of the compact and the indemnity of the Catholic Religion." Instr. S. I. C. to the Bishops of Switzerland, 17 Jan. 1866.

On Catholic schools without religious instruction. - "By a very recent decree the catechism is cast out of the municipal Catholic schools; a decree worthy of censure, it removes the barrier against rampant heresy and unbelief... But while, in the name of Religion, we lift up our voices to defend its sacred rights, we also will that it become known to anyone how much a mad plan of this kind is opposed to the good of society... For it is not lawful to renew upon the child the judgment of Solomon and irrationally and inhumanely to divide the same in the middle as regards his intelligence and will; because while the first is cultivated, the second must be directed to acquiring virtuous habits and pursuing the ultimate end... And the matter shines with such splendor that it would be held as true, even at the price of contradiction, by those same persons who desire that the document of Religion be cast out of schools; while they direct their efforts not only to the intellect, but to the will also, striving that ethics, which they call civil and natural, be taught in schools, and taking care that youth be directed to the acquisition of civil and social virtues. But moral philosophy of this kind not only is unable to lead man to the higher end, constituted by the Divine Goodness in the beatific vision of God, but also becomes unequal to this, that the mind of the child be instructed toward true virtue and be able to remain constant on the right path. And rightly have we used the word cast out: because the method devised of offering religious instruction only to those children whose parents expressly request it becomes altogether a mockery. For it is not easy to grasp how the authors of an impious plan did not weigh with what bad feeling a child would be affected who would see himself undertaking religious instruction by a manner wholly different from others... But if there should be parents, as is not difficult, driven either by depravity of mind or by ignorance and sluggishness, who would not ask the benefit of religious instruction for their children, a great part of the young would lack most salutary teachings, with the greatest risk not only to the innocent souls of those children, but also to civil Society itself.

When benefits of lesser moment also were expected, elementary instruction was made obligatory by law, with parents being driven by fines to send their children to schools. Who now will dare to snatch away from Catholic youth religious instruction, which presents itself as a wiser protection for living life uprightly? Is it not cruel to require that children of this kind grow up without any notion of religion...?" Letter of Leo XIII to the Most Eminent Cardinal Vicar, Tot inter, 26 June 1878.

"The Church, guardian and vindicator of the integrity of faith, which, by the authority handed to it by God its founder, must call all nations to Christian wisdom, and likewise carefully see by what precepts and institutions youth, which is within its power, is cultivated, has always openly condemned schools which are called mixed or neutral, having admonished fathers of families again and again that, in a matter of such importance, they should turn their mind to caution." Encyclical Letter of Leo XIII, Nobilissima Galliarum, to the Bishops of France, 8 Feb. 1884.

On mixed schools of Catholics. - "... It can be tolerated that Schismatic girls be admitted into a college which sisters direct, provided that they show a good disposition, that they be instructed according to the things set forth, and yet that they not be obligated to assist at the Sacrifice of the Mass and other ecclesiastical functions, but that this be left to their judgment; with it forbidden indeed that they ever have disputations with Catholic girls about matters pertaining to religion, or go to a Schismatic temple to receive sacraments from Schismatic ministers. But if in some case this can in no way be prevented, let the sisters behave passively. And likewise with it forbidden that the girls be visited by friends and relatives, except parents and tutors, without the license of the Ordinary. Concerning all these things, the parents or tutors of the same girls are to be clearly and explicitly instructed and to consent to them before the girls themselves are admitted to the College. And let this be written to the Right Reverend Archbishop, the Ordinary, with the warning that he take care of the execution of all these things and of the spiritual good of the girls, as far as can be done, even after departure from the college; and let the sisters be instructed that if any girl asks to be converted to the Catholic faith, the matter is to be referred to the Archbishop himself, who will prudently provide according to the circumstances of the case, and should carefully take care that from the admission of Schismatic girls there be no danger, not even the least, of perversion or indifferentism for the Catholic girls. Feria VI, place IV, 1 June 1866." From this decision it can be concluded what is the mind of the S. C. S. O., and what precautions were prescribed by it in this matter. Nevertheless the decree reported cannot be held as a general rule to be applied to any other mixed boarding school, because of the diverse circumstances of each particular case. Instr. S. C. de P. F. 25 April 1880, n. 66. Cf. Collectan. Constit., etc., for the use of Apostolic Workers, Paris, 1868.

Honor thy father and thy mother.

Exod. xx, 12.

1. "The precepts of the Decalogue are ordered to the love of God and of neighbor. But among neighbors we are most bound to parents. And therefore immediately after the precepts ordering us to God there is placed the precept ordering us to parents, who are the particular principle of our being, just as God is the universal principle. And thus there is a certain affinity of this precept to the precepts of the first table." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 122, a. 5.

2. This precept primarily and directly regards the obligations of children toward parents, but secondarily and implicitly looks to the obligations of parents toward children, and also to the mutual obligations of other blood-relations, and of other Superiors and inferiors. "The use of this Precept extends most widely, for besides those who begot us, there are many others whom we ought to reverence in the place of parents, under the title of power, or dignity, or usefulness, or of some eminent duty and office." Roman Catechism, P. 3, C. 5, nn. 2, 8. "Something is owed first to parents rather than to country and blood-relations, because through the fact that we were born of parents, both blood-relations and country pertain to us. And therefore, since the precepts of the Decalogue are precepts of law, through them man is ordered more to parents than to country or to other blood-relations. Nevertheless, in this precept, which concerns the honoring of parents, there is understood to be commanded whatever pertains to rendering what is due to any person whatever, just as the secondary is included in the principal." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 122, a. 5, ad 2.

3. This fourth precept, as regards acts per se, belongs to the virtue of piety, observance, dulia, obedience, and besides, gratitude.

4. Piety is taken 1. in a broader sense for religion, and thus to be pious is the same as to be religious; and the pious are called worshipers of God, but the impious idolaters and sinners. "God is the principle of being and governance in a far more excellent way than father or country. And therefore religion, which offers worship to God, is a virtue other than piety, which offers worship to parents and country. But the things which belong to creatures are transferred to God through a certain superexcellence and causality... Hence by excellence piety is named the worship of God; just as God is excellently called Our Father." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 3, ad 2. - It is taken 2. likewise in a broader sense for mercy or a benign affection toward those needing our help. "As Augustine says: ... according to common usage the name of piety is also frequently used in works of Mercy. I think this has happened for this reason, because God principally commands these things to be done, which He testifies please Him before sacrifices; from this custom it has happened that even God Himself is called pious." St. Thomas, l. c., a. 1, ad 2. - Piety is taken 3. properly; and it is a special virtue, to which it belongs to offer worship to parents and country. "It must be said that some virtue is special from the fact that it regards some object according to some special reason. But since it pertains to the notion of justice that it render to another what is due, wherever there is found a special reason of debt to some person, there is a special virtue there. Now something is owed to someone specially because he is the connatural principle producing into being and governing. But piety regards this principle, insofar as it spends duty and worship upon parents and country, and upon those who are ordered to these." St. Thomas, l. c., a. 3.

5. As in every virtue pertaining to justice, which is a virtue toward another, so also in piety a threefold object is distinguished, namely the object to whom, the object which, or material object, and the objective formal reason.

6. The object to whom of piety is 1. parents, because after God they are the chief authors of our origin and of our education; 2. country, because country also is in some way the principle of our origin and education; 3. other blood-relations, not because they are the principle of our origin, but because in them, by communion of blood, parents are in some way represented; 4. the well-wishers of the country, because in them we behold the favor and assistance of the country. Therefore, just as on account of parents piety pays worship to blood-relations, so on account of country it pays worship to the well-wishers and allies of the country. "It must be said that man becomes debtor to others in diverse ways according to their diverse excellence and the diverse benefits received from them. But in each respect God obtains the highest place, who both is most excellent and is for us the first principle of being and governing. But secondarily the principles of our being and governance are parents and country, from whom and in which we were born and nourished. And therefore after God man is most debtor to parents and country. Hence just as it pertains to religion to offer worship to God, so in the secondary degree it pertains to piety to offer worship to parents and country. But in the worship of parents there is included the worship of all blood-relations; because blood-relations also are so called from the fact that they proceeded from the same parents... But in the worship of country there is understood the worship of all fellow citizens and all friends of the country. And therefore to these piety principally extends itself... The communications of blood-relations and fellow citizens are referred more to the principles of our being than other communications, and therefore the name of piety extends more to these." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 1.

7. Therefore piety is also between spouses and with respect to children, "since between spouses there is worship and duty toward each other, as cohelpers for the conservation of the blood-relationship of each, which each spouse has from his own parents: for by the propagation of children the blood of each parent is conserved. And we say the same about children, because they are regarded by the virtue of piety as conservers of the blood-relationship received from the parents." Cajetan on 2.2, q. 101, a. 1.

8. The object which, or material object, of piety is worship, service, and duty; worship indeed and service per se, duty per accidens. "Something is owed to parents and fellow citizens in two ways: in one way per se, in another way per accidens. Per se there is owed to them that which befits a father insofar as he is a father, who, since he is superior, existing as a kind of principle of the son, is owed reverence and service by the son. But per accidens something is owed to a father which it befits him to receive according to something that happens to him; for instance, if he is sick, that he be visited and that attention be given to his cure; if he is poor, that he be sustained, and so with other things of this kind; all of which are contained under the debt of service. And therefore Tully says... piety exhibits both duty and worship, so that duty is referred to service, but worship to reverence or honor; because, as Augustine says... we are said to cultivate men whom we honor with either remembrance or presence." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 2.

9. Therefore the worship due to parents consists in reverence and honor to be shown to them; service, in this, that the son "obey their command, and while living repay their benefits according to his manner," St. Thomas, l. c., q. 102, a. 2; duty, in supplying to them any necessary assistance of life, if they need it. As duty is contained in service, so duty and service are comprehended in worship. For "in worship not only honor is understood, but also whatever other things pertain to fitting acts by which man is ordered to another." St. Thomas, l. c., ad 1. Likewise "in the honoring of parents there is understood every assistance which ought to be shown to parents, as the Lord interprets in Matthew 15. And this is because assistance is given to a father from debt as to one greater." St. Thomas, l. c., q. 101, a. 2, ad 1. "To parents as such there is owed the honor of reverence. But sustenance and other things of this kind are owed to them by reason of some accident, for instance insofar as they are needy, or servants, or something of this kind, as was said above, q. 101, a. 2. And because what is per se is prior to that which is per accidens, therefore among the first precepts of the law also, which are the precepts of the Decalogue, the honoring of parents is specially prescribed, in which, as in a certain principal thing, sustenance is understood to be commanded, and whatever else is owed to parents." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 122, a. 5, ad 3. "With this honor," says the Roman Catechism, P. 3, c. 5, n. 7, "all these things are conjoined: love, observance, obedience, and worship. But wisely in the Law the word of honor was placed, not of love or fear, although parents are greatly to be loved and feared. For he who loves does not always observe and venerate; he who fears does not always love; but whom someone honors from the soul, he also loves and reveres."

10. The objective formal reason of piety is the special honesty which is in that worship; arising proximately from the reason of debt of that worship, remotely from the reason of the principle of our origin, which is in our parents. For piety offers worship and service to parents because this is due to them; but this is due to them because they are the principle of our origin. Therefore piety is wholly distinguished from charity toward neighbor. For charity indeed wills good and does good to parents, but on account of God, namely insofar as they are ordered to God. But piety wills good to them and does good to them according as they are the principle of being for us. "Just as religion is a certain protestation of faith, hope, and charity, by which man is primordially ordered to God; so also piety is a certain protestation of the charity which someone has toward parents and country." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 3, ad 1. Likewise piety is wholly distinguished from legal justice, which indeed "regards the good of the country, but according as it is the common good" to be obtained through observance of the laws: "Piety extends itself to the country according as it is a certain principle of being for us." St. Thomas, l. c., ad 3.

11. Observance is a virtue "through which worship and honor are shown to persons constituted in dignity." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 102, a. 1. Hence the object to whom, the object which, and the objective formal reason of observance are clear.

12. The object to whom of observance is all persons constituted in dignity, namely superiors who actually govern us, and all others endowed with some excellence, since they are fit to govern us. "It is necessary that virtues be distinguished in an ordered descent in the same way as the excellence of the persons to whom something is to be rendered. But just as the carnal father particularly participates in the account of principle, which is universally found in God, so also a person who in some respect exercises providence over us particularly participates in the account of father; because the father is the principle both of generation and education and discipline and all things which pertain to the perfection of human life; but a person constituted in dignity is as a principle of governance with respect to certain matters: as the prince of the city in civil matters, the leader of an army in military matters, a teacher in disciplines, and there is the like in other matters. And thence it is that all such persons are called fathers because of the likeness of care; just as in 4 Kings 5 the servants of Naaman said to him: Father, and if the Prophet had told thee some great thing, etc. And therefore, just as under religion, through which worship is given to God, there is found piety, through which parents are worshiped, so under piety there is found observance, through which worship and honor are shown to persons constituted in dignity." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 102, a. 1. And hence it is clear that persons constituted in dignity, as has already been said, are properly here those who not only have excellence, but also power of governing: kings, masters, teachers, the Supreme Pontiff, Bishops, and all others who have fitness to govern us by reason of their excellence. And thus the same Angelic Doctor, l. c., ad 2, says: "It must be said that someone, from the fact that he is constituted in some dignity, not only has a certain excellence of status, but also a certain power of governing subjects, whence the account of principle belongs to him, insofar as he is governor of others. But from the fact that someone has perfection of knowledge or virtue, he does not obtain the account of principle as regards others, but only a certain excellence in himself. And therefore a certain special virtue is determined to showing honor and worship to those who are constituted in dignity. But because through knowledge and virtue, and all other things of this kind, someone is rendered fit for the state of dignity, the reverence which is shown to some persons because of any excellence whatsoever pertains to the same virtue." But because of the various dignity there is various observance: civil, religious; natural, supernatural, which, offered to the saints, is called dulia.

13. The object which, or material object, of observance is honor, and worship or service; the former is owed by reason of the excellence of the person constituted in dignity, the latter by reason of power over subjects. "It must be said," says St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 102, a. 2, "that to those who are constituted in dignity it belongs to govern subjects. But to govern is to move some persons to a due end, as a sailor governs a ship by leading it to port. Now everything moving has a certain excellence and power above that which is moved. Hence it is necessary that in him who is constituted in dignity there be considered first the excellence of status with a certain power over subjects, and second the office itself of governance. Therefore by reason of excellence honor is owed to him, which is a certain recognition of someone's excellence. But by reason of the office of governance worship is owed to him, which consists in a certain service, namely while someone obeys their command and repays in turn their benefits according to his manner... To the excellence of those who are constituted in dignity there is owed honor by reason of the higher grade, but fear by reason of the power which they have for coercing; but to the office of their governance there is owed obedience, by which subjects are moved to the command of those presiding, and tributes, which are certain stipends of their labor."

14. Honor certainly imports a certain testification concerning someone's excellence, either by words or by deeds, as by inclinations, or even by exterior things, for instance by the offering of gifts. It is distinguished from praise, because praise consists in words alone. It is distinguished from glory, which is the effect of honor and praise, because from the fact that we testify concerning someone's goodness, his goodness becomes clear in the knowledge of many; and this the name of glory imports, which is clear knowledge with praise. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 103, a. 1.

15. The objective formal reason of observance is that special honesty which shines forth in worship and honor shown to persons constituted in dignity, which arises proximately from the reason of debt of that worship, remotely from that dignity. Now there is a twofold debt. "One indeed is legal, to the rendering of which man is compelled by law, and thus man owes honor and worship to those who are constituted in dignity and have prelation over him. But the other is a moral debt, which is owed from a certain honesty; and in this way we owe worship and honor to those who are constituted in dignity, even if we are not subject to them." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 102, a. 2, ad 2. Now persons constituted in dignity can be considered in two ways: according to their personal dignity, and according as they are ordered to the common good. Worship shown to them insofar as it is ordered to the common good pertains not to observance, but to piety. But worship shown to them which pertains specially to their personal usefulness and glory properly pertains to observance, according as it is distinguished from piety. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 102, a. 3. But since piety shows worship and honor, as observance also shows worship and honor, piety, although properly distinguished from observance, can by a certain excellence be called observance; just as, although piety properly so called is distinguished from religion, religion by a certain supereminence is called piety. St. Thomas, l. c., a. 1, ad 1.

16. As regards dulia, "dulia can be taken in two ways. In one way commonly, according as it shows reverence to any man whatsoever by reason of any excellence whatsoever. And thus it contains under itself piety and observance, and any virtue of this kind which shows reverence to man. And according to this it will have parts diverse in species. In another way it can be taken strictly, insofar as, according to it, a servant shows reverence to a master: for dulia is called servitude... And according to this it is not divided into diverse species, but is one species of observance... because by one account a servant reveres a master, a soldier a commander, a disciple a teacher, and so concerning other things of this kind." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 103, a. 4. Dulia "is a certain species of observance; because through observance we honor any persons whatsoever excelling in dignity; but through dulia properly taken servants venerate their masters. For dulia in Greek is called servitude." St. Thomas, l. c., a. 3. And hence it is clear that observance is not a special virtue in the most specific species, but a special virtue in a subalternate species. And the Angelic Doctor insinuates this by saying, q. 102, a. 1, that it pertains to observance to cultivate and honor prince, commander, teacher, master, etc., whom he asserts, q. 103, a. 4, to be cultivated and honored by a diverse account.

17. Obedience, although it is comprehended under religion, piety, and observance, nevertheless properly is a special virtue. "For since inferiors must show many things to their superiors, among the rest this is one special thing, that they are bound to obey their precepts. Hence obedience is a special virtue; and its special object is a tacit or express precept. For the will of the superior, in whatever way it becomes known, is a certain tacit precept. And obedience seems so much the more prompt, as it anticipates the expressed precept by obeying, once the will of the superior has been understood." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 2. Indeed the will of the superior is the rule of the subject. But this subject can be subject to a superior, even if the superior does not expressly command; and therefore then he still renders true obedience. - And q. 104, a. 3, ad 1, the same Holy Doctor says: "It must be said that obedience proceeds from reverence, which shows worship and honor to superiors. And as to this it is contained under diverse virtues, although considered according to itself, insofar as it regards the account of precept, it is one special virtue. Therefore insofar as it proceeds from reverence for prelates, it is in some way contained under observance; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for parents, under piety; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for God, under religion, and it pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion." But insofar as it proceeds from procuring the common good, it is contained under legal justice, and pertains to it. Indeed, "if obedience is taken broadly for the execution of anything whatever which can fall under precept, and disobedience for the omission of the same from whatever intention, thus obedience will be a general virtue and disobedience a general sin." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 2.

18. Finally, as regards gratitude, "it must be said that according to the diverse causes from which something is owed, it is necessary that the account of rendering what is due be diversified; yet so that always in the greater that which is lesser is contained. But in God first and principally is found the cause of debt, because He Himself is the first principle of all our goods. But secondarily in a father, because he is the proximate principle of our generation and discipline. Thirdly, in a person who excels in dignity, from whom common benefits proceed. Fourthly, in some benefactor, from whom we have received certain particular and private benefits, for which we are particularly obligated to him. Therefore, because not whatever we owe to God, or to a father, or to a person excelling in dignity, do we owe to some benefactor from whom we have received some particular benefit, thence it is that after religion, by which we pay due worship to God; and piety, by which we worship persons excelling in dignity; there is grace, or gratitude, which recompenses favor to benefactors; and it is distinguished from the foregoing virtues, as each of the later is distinguished from the prior, as it were falling short of it." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 106, a. 1. Therefore to a benefactor there is owed also per se honor and reverence, because he has the account of principle, and per accidens assistance or sustenance, if he is in need. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 107, a. 3. But grace or gratitude recompenses a benefit by thanksgiving and by bestowing something gratuitously. St. Thomas, l. c., a. 6. To it is opposed ingratitude, which, according to the diversity of circumstances, is sometimes a lethal, sometimes a venial sin. It is not grave unless the ingratitude has been great. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 107.

19. Some children are legitimate and natural, others natural, others legitimate. - Legitimate and natural children are those who are born from a man and his wife. - Those are presumed in law to be legitimate and natural who are born from a mother joined in a just marriage, unless it is juridically certain that their origin is from someone other than the mother's husband. For he is held to be the father whom the nuptials demonstrate. The mother indeed is certain; but the father is presumed. And this presumption also has force in the forum of conscience. C. B. (Cod. Germ.) 1591, 1717, 1720.

20. The fetus is usually brought forth in the ninth month from the time when it was conceived, sometimes at the beginning of the seventh, sometimes at the completion of the tenth, namely not before 180 days, nor after 300 days, C. I. (Cod. Ital.) 161 seqq.; C. G. (Cod. Gall.) 315; C. H. (Cod. Hisp.) 108; C. A. (Cod. Austr.) 138, 163; C. B. 1592, 1717; C. L. (Cod. Lusit.) 101. - Hence of him who is born either after the seventh month from the marriage entered, or before the tenth month from the marriage dissolved, that one is the father whom the nuptials demonstrate, unless something else is most evident; C. L. 103. Nor indeed does it stand in the way that the mother was adulterous, C. I. 165; C. G. 313; C. H. 109; C. A. 158, or that she herself professed the son to be adulterine, C. A. 158, unless she brings forward such indications as would be sufficient in the external forum, Lugo de Iust. d. 12, n. 26, although she be most worthy of faith, and under oath, and dying, asserts it; for no one merits belief when alleging his own turpitude, C. Inter 8, sect. ult. de Donat.; L. 654, 924. - A fetus brought forth before the seventh month from the marriage entered is held legitimate only if the husband either knowingly and willingly married the pregnant woman, or, when he was present, did not wholly repudiate the born child, C. I. 161; C. G. 314; C. H. 110; C. L. 102. A fetus brought forth later, after the tenth month from the dissolution of the marriage, is held as illegitimate, unless the health and morals of the mother and the circumstances of things persuade otherwise, C. I. 169; C. G. 315; C. H. 111; C. L. 102 seqq.

21. Natural or illegitimate children are those who are born outside marriage. These by canon law are irregular; by civil law they are distinguished from legitimate chiefly as regards succession to the paternal inheritance. C. A. 155, 165; C. H. 114, 127, 134, 139. - Natural children, if they are born from a man and woman between whom marriage could not have been entered, whether by natural law or by divine and canon law, by the same canon law are called spurious, or born from a condemned intercourse, C. 3, 10 Qui fil. sint legit.; and they are adulterine, sacrilegious, incestuous, and nefarious; these latter are those who are born from ascendants and descendants. But by civil law all are called illegitimate and cannot be recognized, in various cases nevertheless determined by the various laws, C. I. 180; C. H. 119; C. G. 335; C. B. 1732; C. L. 122, 134. But in other cases not excepted by the laws they can be acknowledged and legitimated. C. I. 179, 195; C. G. 331, 334; C. L. 119. - They are acknowledged by the confession of the parents, by civil law authentic, C. I. 181; C. G. 334; C. H. 131; C. B. 1718; by canon law simple and bare, C. 10 de Probat.; and after they have been acknowledged, they follow the condition of the one acknowledging, whether mother, or father, or both, C. I. 185. - But those acknowledged are legitimated by subsequent marriage, by the law itself, C. 1, 6 Qui fil. sint leg.; C. I. 194; C. G. 331; C. H. 120, 121; C. A. 161; C. B. 1719; C. L. 119; and they can also be acknowledged after the marriage has already been contracted, C. I. 197; C. H. 121. Cf. C. G. 331. - But from the time they have been legitimated they are held just as if they had been brought forth from a just marriage, C. 6 Qui fil. sint leg.; C. I. 194; C. G. 333; C. H. 122; C. A. 161; C. L. 121. Cf. Benedict XIV, de Syn. l. 13, c. 24, n. 16. But one merely acknowledged is understood to be the child only of him who acknowledged him. C. I. 182; C. G. 336; C. H. 129, 134. - From C. B. 1589, 1705, it is established altogether against natural law that a natural son and father are not reputed blood-relations! and, on the contrary, in his relations with his mother he has the juridical condition of a legitimate son! - In doubt whether someone was born from a legitimate marriage, he must be presumed legitimate. C. I. 120. - L. l. 3, n. 951.

22. Legitimate children are legitimated natural children, and adopted children, C. I. 737. Adoption is an act by which someone who is not such by nature is admitted into the place of a child. From more recent laws, the adopted person is held just as the legitimate and natural son only of him who adopted him, and he acquires the right of succession to him, C. I. 202, 204, 210, 737; C. G. 343, 344, 350; C. B. 1741, 1757; C. L. 124, 129. But he is not exempted from the power of his natural father, nor does he pass into the power and family of the adopting father; C. I. 210, 212; C. G. 348, 349. It is otherwise from C. A. 183; C. H. 177; C. B. 1765. This adoption is perpetual and is not dissolved even by mutual consent, C. I. 217. And so also the French Jurisconsults. It is otherwise from C. A. 185; C. B. 1768.

23. Legitimate and natural children, as regards receiving donations and as regards the right of succession, are held such from the time when they were really conceived, provided that afterwards they are born viable, C. I. 724; C. G. 725; C. A. 138. One is born viable who is born after the 180th day from conception, C. I. 160, 162; C. G. 312, 314; C. A. 138, and has been perfectly born. In doubt, one who was brought forth alive is presumed to have been born viable, C. I. 724. Abortive children, if they do not survive, are held as born dead. - Merely natural children, whether legitimated or acknowledged, acquire the right of succession from the marriage of the parents entered, or from that time at which they afterwards were acknowledged, C. I. 197; C. H. 124. - Merely legitimate children acquire the right of succession from that time at which they were adopted, as if then first they had been conceived. C. I. 210, 217; C. B. 1754, 1757. From C. H. 177, an adopted person acquires no right of succession except from a testament or from a prior agreement. From C. B. 1767, the right of succession can be excluded in the contract of adoption. - Therefore a donation can be made to one scarcely conceived, and, when a pregnant widow has been left, the inheritance in the meantime pertains to the son to be born. But, when he is born dead, it devolves to the nearer cognates of the father.

24. Those younger than seven are called infants, as if non-speaking, unable to speak. If they have already attained the use of reason, although they are not held by human laws, nevertheless they are held by natural law. - From the seventh year to the fourteenth, if male; to the twelfth, if female, they are called impubes; but beyond the aforesaid age they are called pubes, namely from the proximate power of generation attained at that age. - Impubes, if they cease to be under the power of the father, by the father's death or by the emancipation of the children, are called pupilli, L. 239 de Verb. sign.; having become pubes, they are called minors up to the twenty-fifth year of age by Roman Law, L. 1 de Minoribus. - By more recent Law, every other distinction having been removed, whoever, male or female, has not yet completed the twenty-first year of age is called a minor; with such age completed, he is called of age, C. I. 323, 240; C. G. 388, 488; C. B. 2; C. L. 97, 311. From C. H. 320, majority is established when the twenty-third year has been completed; C. A. 21, 174, the twenty-fourth year. - A cleric is of age in beneficial and other spiritual causes when he has completed the fourteenth year of age. C. Si annum 3 de Iudic. in 6. - At a minor age the son, unless he is emancipated, is constituted under paternal power. C. I. 220; C. B. 1626. But one of age regularly manages his own affairs. From C. L. 311, he can freely dispose of his person and goods.

25. Since children have existence from parents, therefore, besides love, they owe them piety. For as the love of parents is for doing good, so the love of children is for honoring parents, St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 31, a. 3, ad 3; q. 26, a. 9, ad 1, ad 3. But although love does not import honor, honor includes love, since whom we honor from the soul we also love. Therefore when by a sin of children only charity toward parents is injured, the only malice contained in it is that alone which is against filial piety. But if that sin has another malice against another virtue, then this new species is superadded to the former. - Piety per se requires two things, reverence and service, but per accidens help to be furnished, if they are in need. Hence it is that a sin against piety can injure both love and reverence and service toward parents; as, for example, if a son conceives internal hatred against parents, or externally by words or another action saddens them, he sins against love; if he curses his parents he sins against love and against reverence; if he contemns parents and the precept of parents, he sins against reverence and obedience. Another species can also accede to the species against piety, for example, if a son defames or strikes his father, he sins against piety and against justice. - Even at a greater age children owe parents love, honor, and reverence, because they are always children, those always parents. - St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 26, a. 9, 10; q. 101, a. 7; L. 333; C. I. 220; C. G. 371; C. H. 154; C. A. 144, 154.

26. From Sacred Scripture, in several places under grave penalties, love, honor, and obedience toward parents are prescribed. Eccli. 3:8, 9, 18; 7:29, 30; Prov. 19:26; Deut. 27:16; Exod. 21:15; Eph. 6:1; Col. 3:20. - And this precept is also clear by reason; because parents have a threefold respect to children, namely by reason of cause, by reason of preeminence, and by reason of governance. Consequently children ought to love them as authors of their existence, honor them as Superiors, and obey them as rulers delegated by God. But this precept is grave per se. - "For among neighbors we are most bound to parents." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 122, a. 5. The reason is that, as the same St. Thomas teaches, 2.2, q. 102, a. 3, the persons of parents are more substantially joined to us than any other persons constituted in dignity. For generation and governance, of which parents are the principle, pertain more to substance than exterior governance, of which other persons constituted in dignity are the principle. Besides, "the showing of honor or worship must be proportioned not only to the person to whom it is shown, considered according to himself, but also according as he is compared to those showing it. Therefore although the virtuous considered according to themselves are more worthy of honor than the persons of parents; nevertheless children are more obligated, because of benefits received from the parents themselves and natural conjunction, to show worship and honor to parents than to virtuous strangers." St. Thomas, l. c.

27. Therefore although love, honor, and obedience, as they are shown to other men, pertain precisely to the virtue of charity, observance, and obedience, nevertheless as they are shown to parents they pertain to the virtue of piety, according as it is a certain special virtue which furnishes worship and duty to parents as the chief authors of life after God, and to other blood-relations, in whom, because of communion of blood, parents are in some way represented. But only those sins bear before themselves a special malice against piety which immediately injure their person, or intrinsic personal goods, such as hatred, detraction, striking; not theft. Nevertheless, since a father with respect to a son, and the same is true of a son with respect to a father, retains his own right as regards life, reputation, honor, a son sinning against his father in these things sins at once against piety and justice. But secretly taking away the goods of the father, against the father's will, a son sins per se only against commutative justice, and per se is bound to restitution.

28. For piety, which is between children and their parents, does not exclude strict justice between them. Those duties which are had between children and parents, as also between husband and wife, between brothers and sisters, and between other blood-relations, if they regard only these conditions of these persons, contain a certain deficient just, and pertain only to piety, as, for example, the education of children does. But those duties which regard the same persons among themselves insofar as they are men contain a just strictly such, and look to commutative justice. Therefore theft committed by a son against a father is theft injuring commutative justice, as any other theft. Likewise if a son kills his father, he sins against justice, as any other homicide, but besides there is also added a graver malice against piety. Similarly, if a spouse does not keep conjugal fidelity, he sins against justice, as any other person violating faith given in a bilateral and onerous contract; but besides there is added a graver malice against piety. The reason is that those duties which pertain to piety recede from the perfect distinction and otherness of persons which is properly required by commutative justice.

29. To the point St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 57, a. 4: "Right, or the just, is said by commensuration to another. But another can be said in two ways: in one way, that which is simply another, as that which is altogether distinct, as appears in two men, one of whom is not under the other, but both are under one prince of the city, and between such persons there is the simply just. In another way something is called another not simply, but as existing as something of him; and in this way in human affairs a son is something of the father, because he is in some way part of him, and a servant is something of the master, because he is his instrument. And therefore there is not a comparison of father to son as to one simply other; and on account of this there is not there the simply just, but a certain just, namely paternal; and by the same reason neither between master and servant, but there is between them dominative just. But a wife, although she is something of the husband, because she is compared to him as to his own body, nevertheless is more distinguished from the husband than a son from a father, or a servant from a master; for she is assumed into a certain social life of marriage; and therefore between husband and wife there is more of the account of the just than between father and son, or master and servant: because, since husband and wife have an immediate relation to domestic life, therefore between them there is not even the simply political just, but rather the economic just." But, as the same Angelic Doctor has ibid. ad 2: "A son, insofar as he is a son, is something of the father; and similarly a servant, insofar as he is a servant, is something of the master; nevertheless each, insofar as he is considered as a certain man, is something subsisting according to himself, distinct from others. And therefore, insofar as each is a man, justice is toward them in some way; and on account of this also some laws are given concerning those things which are of father to son, or of master to servant."

Hence it is clear that children under paternal power can well have dominion of things. But this dominion regards things given to them by any translative title of dominion, or acquired by their own industry. For as regards paternal goods, no strict right to paternal goods belongs to children while the father is living. Hence, if children under paternal power steal anything from these goods, they are bound to restitution per se. Per se, namely unless there is question of a thing of lesser moment, and it is prudently presumed that the father remits that obligation.

30. Now as regards love, one does not sin against it if parents are saddened by the manner of acting of children, when a just and grave cause urges that something be done, and it is clear that the offense of the parents arises from their mere moroseness.

But children, whether they are legitimate, that is, born in legitimate marriage from husband and wife, or illegitimate, that is, born outside legitimate marriage; likewise whether they are natural, generated from father and mother, or adopted, not from generation but from adoption, all owe parents love, honor, and obedience. But all owe love both by internal affection and by exterior work, also by furnishing them assistance if they are found in necessity, whether corporal or spiritual. For as love is contained under honor, so also the assistance of necessities is contained under the same honor. St. Thomas, Quodl. 3, a. 16.

31. As regards reverence, every irreverence and contempt toward parents, other things being equal, is graver than toward other neighbors, even relatives, even those constituted in dignity, because of the greater conjunction with them, which obtains the first grade after God, because of their greater dignity. But although, if children have injured the honor of parents, they ought to repair the injured honor to them by asking pardon from them, even before others in whose sight they sinned, nevertheless it can certainly be presumed, at least for the most part, where children refused to do this, that parents remit this obligation to the children, lest the children again incur offense of God and undergo eternal danger to the soul. Cf. St. Alphonsus n. 334.

32. Reverence can be injured by words, gestures, and deeds, namely gravely, even in those things which as regards others are light, provided that they are not altogether light. Therefore children sin gravely: by Words, by everywhere addressing parents harshly; or even by showing them no sign of benevolence; by calling them, when present, by contumelious words; or by cursing them from the soul; by Gestures, by looking at them with fierce eyes, by mocking and deriding them when present; by Deeds, by lifting hands against them with deliberation, as a sign of striking them, by accusing them of crimes, unless there is question of crimes pernicious to the republic, such as heresy, treason, etc. - L. 333, 334.

33. Service likewise is gravely injured by not obeying parents in those things which look to domestic governance and economy, or pertain to good morals, if nevertheless parents command seriously and in a grave matter; except the election of a state, the entering of marriage, the entering of religion, unless nevertheless parents for a just cause contradict children in this matter. Likewise a grave sin is committed by not acknowledging them as parents, unless this is done from a just cause and only by outwardly concealing that one is their son. But they by no means sin by fulfilling the duties of religion against the prohibition of parents. For as regards all those things which pertain to salvation, they "are immediately subject to God, by whom they are instructed through the natural or written law." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 5, ad 2. - L. 334, 335; St. Thomas, Quodl. 2, a. 9, 2.2, q. 104, a. 2, 5; C. A. 148; C. L. 142.

34. The obedience to be furnished by children to parents is not unlimited, but has its own boundaries by which it is circumscribed. - The reason is that obedience is to be furnished according to the power of the Superior; namely, in those things to which the right of prelation extends. But paternal power does not exceed the rule and governance of the family, and the right education of the children. Aptly St. Thomas, Quodl. 2, q. 5, a. 9: "It must be said that, since obedience is owed to a prelate, the debt of obedience extends to those things to which the right of prelation extends. But a carnal father has the right of prelation over a son, first indeed as regards domestic conversation. For the father of a family is in the house as the king is in the kingdom; hence, just as subjects of the king are bound to obey the king in those things which pertain to the governance of the kingdom, so also children and others are bound to obey the father of the family in those things which pertain to the dispensation of the house. Secondly as regards discipline of morals, whence the Apostle says at Heb. 12:9: We had fathers of our flesh as instructors and we obeyed them. For the father owes the son not only education, but also discipline, as the Philosopher says. Therefore in these things the son is bound to obey the carnal father, and not in others."

35. And this doctrine is general: any subject whatever ought not obey his superior in all things, but only in those which pertain to his own subjection and to the superior's prelation. Man owes obedience in all things to God alone, because he is subject to God as regards all things; to any other human superior he is subject only according to a certain limited and determinate account. To the point St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 5: "In those things which pertain to the disposition of human acts and things, a subject is bound to obey his superior according to the account of superiority; as a soldier obeys the commander of the army in those things which pertain to war, a servant his master in those things which pertain to carrying out servile works, a son his father in those things which pertain to discipline of life and domestic care, and so concerning others... Man is subject to God simply as regards all things, both interior and exterior, and therefore he is bound to obey Him in all things. But subjects are not subject to their superiors as regards all things, but as regards some things determinately, and as regards those things they are intermediaries between God and subjects. But as regards other things they are immediately subject to God, by whom they are instructed through the natural or written law."

36. Ought a son, concerning the election of a state, to consult parents and obey them? - R. 1. If there is question of the conjugal state, theologians more commonly teach that a son per se is bound to consult parents. The reason is that this is required by the service to be furnished by children to parents, that in a matter so grave, and in which they have greater experience, they should hear their counsel. But this obligation per se is light. For first, a grave obligation is not clear, since it is much disputed among the Doctors. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 849. Besides, this obligation cannot be grave, since children are not bound also to follow the counsel of parents, but are free. And they can sufficiently, either by themselves or through other prudent men, know what things occur in such an affair, lest they err in it. - But if there is question of the religious state, it is certain that per se they are not bound, nor is it expedient, commonly speaking, that children await the counsel of parents; because parents in this matter have no knowledge and experience, indeed often in this affair they are not friends, but enemies. St. Thomas, Opusc. 17, Against Those Withdrawing Men from Entrance into Religion, c. 9.

“The domestic society or entire family borrows the whole reason of its existence from civil law alone; and therefore all the rights of parents over their children, but especially the right of providing for their instruction and education, emanate and depend upon civil authority alone.” Proposition condemned by Pius IX in the Encyclical Quanta cura.

“45. The entire government of public schools in which the youth of any Christian commonwealth is instructed—with episcopal seminaries alone excepted in some manner—can and ought to be attributed to the civil authority, and indeed so attributed that no right of interfering in the discipline of the schools, in the government of studies, in the conferring of degrees, or in the selection or approval of teachers is acknowledged in any other authority whatsoever. — 46. Indeed, even in seminaries of clerics the method of studies to be employed is subjected to the civil authority. — 47. The best ordering of civil society requires that popular schools, which are open to all boys of every class of the people, and public institutions generally, which are destined for imparting letters and the more rigorous disciplines and for providing for the education of youth, be exempted from every authority, governing power, and interference of the Church, and be subjected to the full judgment of the civil and political authority, according to the pleasure of rulers and according to the exact measure of the common opinions of the age. — 48. That manner of instructing youth which is separated from the Catholic faith and from the power of the Church, and which regards only, or at least primarily, the knowledge of natural things and the ends of earthly social life, can be approved by Catholic men.” Propositions condemned by Pius IX in the Syllabus; A. S. S., vol. 21, p. 691.

“The clergy, as being enemies of true and useful knowledge and of the progress of civilization, are to be removed from every care and office of instructing and educating youth.” Proposition condemned by Pius IX in the Encyclical Quanta cura.

“29. Universities, studies, colleges, graduations, and masterships in them were introduced by vain paganism; they profit the Church as much as the devil.” Proposition of John Wycliffe condemned at the Council of Constance.

“…Moreover, the very manner of instructing youth proper and peculiar to schools of this kind—non-Catholic schools—had first to come under deliberation. This appeared to the Sacred Congregation to be full of danger even of itself and exceedingly adverse to the Catholic cause. For pupils of such schools, since their proper manner excludes every doctrine of religion, will neither learn the rudiments of the faith nor be instructed in the precepts of the Church, and thus they will lack the knowledge most necessary to man, without which one does not live as a Christian…. In the aforesaid schools … teachers from every sect without distinction are employed, so that they are free to infuse errors and seeds of vice into tender minds. A certain corruption also threatens from this additional fact: that in the same schools, or at least in many of them, young people of both sexes are brought together in the same room to hear lessons, and males are ordered to sit upon the same bench beside females. All these things bring it about that youth is wretchedly exposed to harm concerning the faith and that morals are endangered. — But unless this danger of perversion is rendered remote from proximity, such schools cannot be attended with a safe conscience. The natural and divine law itself proclaims this…. And these things, as founded upon natural and divine law, state a certain general principle, possess universal force, and pertain to all those regions where this most pernicious manner of instructing youth has unhappily been introduced….

“Nevertheless, the Sacred Congregation is not ignorant that the circumstances of affairs are sometimes such that Catholic parents can in conscience commit their children to public schools. But they cannot do this unless they have a sufficient cause for acting thus; and whether such a sufficient cause is present or absent in some particular case will have to be left to the conscience and judgment of the Bishops. According to the things reported, it will then generally be present when either no Catholic school is available or the one available is poorly suited to instructing young people in a manner fitting and congruent with their condition. But then, so that public schools can be approached in conscience, the danger of perversion, which by their proper nature is always more or less connected with them, must by opportune remedies and precautions be rendered remote from proximity. Therefore it must first be seen whether, in the school concerning the attendance of which there is question, the danger of perversion is of such a kind that it plainly cannot be rendered remote, as often as certain things opposed to Catholic doctrine or good morals are either taught or done there, things which can neither be heard nor performed without harm to the soul. Indeed, as is evident of itself, such a danger is to be avoided at the cost of any temporal harm whatsoever, even of life.

“Moreover, in order that youth can in conscience be committed to public schools, it must duly and diligently receive the necessary Christian instruction and education, at least outside school time. Therefore, let pastors and missionaries … diligently devote themselves to catecheses…. Let the parents themselves, or those who are in their place, keep solicitous watch over their children…. From Catholic moral doctrine it is manifest that however many parents neglect to impart this necessary Christian instruction and education to their children; or allow them to attend such schools in which ruin to souls cannot be avoided; or, finally, although a suitable Catholic school, properly instructed and prepared, is present in the same place, or although they have the faculty of educating their children as Catholics in another region, nevertheless commit them to public schools without sufficient cause and without the necessary precautions by which the danger of perversion is rendered remote from proximity—such persons, if they have been contumacious, cannot be absolved in the sacrament of Penance.” Instruction of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, On Public Schools, to the Most Reverend Bishops in the United States of North America, 30 June 1875; C. 481.

“By letters given on 3 Feb. 1865 to the Most Reverend Fathers and Lords, the sacred Prelates of England, the Sacred Council commonly called the Propagation of the Faith signified that it had most willingly confirmed the opinion unanimously proposed by the praised Bishops at the recent London meeting: that colleges were not to be erected in connection with the English Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and that Catholic parents were opportunely to be persuaded not to send their sons to those Universities, because, namely, the same Sacred Council had seen that the opinion of the Bishops was wholly consonant with the principles handed down by it according to the mind of the Supreme Pontiff whenever it had been consulted concerning the dangers of mixed schools…. “But since not all passed the same judgment concerning the avoidance of non-Catholic Universities, and there were even some who judged that it could be tolerated that Catholic youth attend the aforesaid Institutions, whether on account of the temporal emoluments acquired in them or because, in their opinion, no certain law appears by which access to them is absolutely prohibited, I judge it worthwhile that Your Amplitude clearly explain in a pastoral letter the doctrine concerning the avoidance of proximate occasions of sinning gravely, to which no one can expose himself without mortal sin unless a grave and proportionate necessity urges, and unless such precautions are employed by which the proximate danger of sinning is rendered remote. Now, in the matter concerning which there is question, in which, according to the declaration of the Supreme Pontiff, there inheres an intrinsic and most grave danger not only for uprightness of morals but especially for the faith, which is altogether necessary for salvation, who does not see that there can scarcely, or not even scarcely, be circumstances in which non-Catholic Universities can be attended without sin? The lightness of mind and instability of young people, the errors which are drawn in as if with the air in the said Institutions without the antidote of more solid doctrine, and the very great force which human respect and the mockeries of companions exercise upon the young introduce so present and so proximate a danger of falling for young people that generally no sufficient reason can be conceived on account of which they may be committed to non-Catholic Universities….” Instruction of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, 6 Aug. 1867; C. 478.

“1. Is it lawful for parents to commit their children to schools of this kind—mixed schools—to be instructed? — Resp. Generally speaking, it is not lawful; but in particular cases it is to be left to the judgment and conscience of the Ordinary. It will, however, be his duty to take diligent care that opportune remedies be employed not only by himself and by the pastors, but also by each parent, by which the danger of perversion may be removed from the pupils; and at the same time to press upon the magistrates and governors that violence not be inflicted upon the conscience of Catholics by employing books hostile to the Catholic religion; and finally, constantly and insistently to admonish and exhort all, and especially those who have the ability, to send their children into other regions where they may be educated as Catholics.

“2. Is it lawful for a priest to teach the doctrines of the Christian faith in the aforesaid schools or to discharge the office of chaplain? — Resp. In the affirmative, and according to the intention. The intention is that care is to be taken that, insofar as possible, priests or upright laymen of proven religion be placed over as many schools as possible, not only for teaching the Christian faith but also the other disciplines. But in order that every fear of scandal may cease, the people are to be admonished that this is done so that the evils which flow from schools of this kind may, insofar as possible, be averted; and that it therefore ought to be an excuse for no one not to send his children to purely Catholic schools, in which their faith and morals are in no manner endangered.

“3. Even if those mixed schools can in some manner be tolerated, is it lawful for the Catholics of the Jura to renounce their right, resting upon public treaties, by force of which it is unlawful for anyone who does not profess the Catholic religion to discharge the office of teaching in their public schools?” Resp. In the negative, whether there is question of an express cession or even of a tacit cession arising from silence and culpable toleration. Therefore, although care must be taken lest anything be done imprudently by which the ferocity of adversaries is aroused to inflict graver evils, nevertheless nothing is to be relaxed of diligence and constancy, so that the legitimate means which are in the power of Catholics may be employed for recovering the aforesaid right, together with the sanctity of the treaty and the immunity of the Catholic religion.” Instruction of the Holy Office to the Bishops of Switzerland, 26 March 1866; A. S. S., vol. 25, p. 132 ff.; vol. 33, p. 222 ff.; C. 477.

“By a most recent decree the Catholic catechism is expelled from the schools of the Municipality. The decree, worthy of reproach, removes an obstacle from raging heresy and unbelief…. But while, in the name of religion, we raise our voice to defend its sacred rights, we also wish it to become known to everyone how much a senseless design of this kind is opposed to the good of society…. For it is not lawful to renew Solomon’s judgment upon a child, and irrationally and inhumanly to divide him in half with respect to his intelligence and his will: because, while the former is cultivated, the latter must be directed toward acquiring virtuous habits and pursuing the last end…. And the matter shines with such splendor that it was held to be true, even at the price of contradiction, by those very persons who desire that religious instruction be cast out of the schools; for they do not direct their efforts to the intellect alone, but also to the will, endeavoring that the ethics which they call civil and natural be taught in the schools, and taking care that youth be directed toward the acquisition of civil and social virtues. But a moral philosophy of this kind is not only unable to lead man to the higher end established by the divine goodness in the beatific vision of God, but also proves unequal to this: that the soul of the child be instructed in true virtue and be able to remain constant upon the right path…. And rightly have we used the word expel: since the method devised of offering religious instruction only to those children whose parents have expressly requested it is altogether a mockery. For it is not easy to comprehend how the authors of this impious design failed to consider with what evil feeling a child would be affected who perceived that he was receiving religious instruction in a manner altogether different from others…. But if, driven either by depravity of mind, or ignorance, or sloth, there are parents—as is not difficult—who do not request for their children the benefit of religious instruction, a great part of the young would be deprived of the most salutary teachings, with the greatest danger not only to the souls of those innocent children, but also to civil society itself…. When benefits even of less importance were expected, elementary instruction was rendered obligatory by law, compelling parents by fines to send their children to school; who now will dare to take religious instruction away from Catholic youth, when it presents itself as the more prudent protection for leading life uprightly? Is it not cruel to demand that children of this kind grow up without any knowledge of religion…?” Letter of Leo XIII to the Most Eminent Cardinal Vicar, Tot inter, 26 June 1878.

“The Church, guardian and vindicator of the integrity of the faith, which, by the authority committed to her by God her Founder, ought to call all nations to Christian wisdom and likewise carefully to see by what precepts and institutions the youth placed under her power is cultivated, has always openly condemned schools which are called mixed or neutral, repeatedly admonishing fathers of families to turn their attention, in a matter of such importance, to taking precautions.” Encyclical Letter of Leo XIII, Nobilissima Galliarum, to the Bishops of France, 8 February 1884.

Cf. no. 367.

“10. No one without revelation would reasonably assert of himself or of another that he was the head of a particular Church, nor is the Roman Pontiff the head of the particular Roman Church. — 11. It is not necessary to believe that this man, whoever is the Roman Pontiff, is the head of any particular holy Church, unless God has predestined him.” Propositions of John Hus condemned by the Council of Constance.

“15. No one is a civil lord, no one is a Prelate, no one is a Bishop, while he is in mortal sin.” Proposition of John Wycliffe and John Hus condemned by the Council of Constance.

“63. It is lawful to refuse obedience to legitimate Princes, and even to rebel.” Proposition condemned by Pius IX in the Syllabus. Cf. no. 870.

“1. Is it lawful for a priest to open a vein or to practice certain other things of the medical art? — 2. What is to be called the best manner of providing for the support of ministers here in these new regions? — 3. What obligation rests upon the laity to pay this due? — 4. Is it lawful to deny spiritual ministry to those persons, or to persons belonging to their family—for example, the Sacrament of Baptism to infants—if they refuse to submit to this due? — Resp. To 1. In the negative, unless a dispensation has been obtained and in a case of true necessity. — To 2. Provision is to be made from the revenues of the churches and the voluntary offerings of the faithful. — To 3. The faithful are bound in conscience to the sufficient support of the Ministers of the Church. — To 4. The question of denying sacred things, and Baptism itself, to those who refuse to submit to the due of offerings is unworthy of an ecclesiastical man and deserving of censure.” Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, 13 May 1816.

“…But if we descend from abstractions to the consideration of facts, care must diligently be taken lest the principles established thus far be denied. These indeed remain immovable; nevertheless, when facts arise, they bear the character of something contingent and variable in use, which is determined by those very facts, whence the application made of those principles follows. Or, in other words: although each form of civil government is good in itself and can be adapted to the supreme government of peoples, nevertheless in reality among every people civil power is found only in its one unique form; each people certainly possesses its own proper form. This form arose from a complex of historical or national circumstances, which nevertheless always pertain to men; these circumstances in each nation gave origin to its laws, which were to be transmitted to posterity and held as a foundation; and through these circumstances this or that particular form of civil government is found to be defined, namely, this foundation for transmitting every supreme power to posterity.

“We deem it useless to admonish here that individual citizens are bound to submit to governments thus constituted, and that nothing is to be attempted in order to overthrow them or to change their form. Hence it came about that the Church, which alone upon earth guards as a deposit, most of all, the true and sublime notion of civil power, because she teaches that all power is derived from God, has continually condemned rebellious men who refuse obedience to legitimate authority. And this even at the very time when Kings and Princes were abusing the power entrusted to them, thereby depriving themselves of the strongest of all safeguards granted them for sustaining their authority, and of the most efficacious of all aids for obtaining from peoples observance of the laws of government…. Nevertheless, it must here be diligently noted that, whatever may be the form of civil government in any nation, it is by no means to be regarded as so definitive that it ought to remain immutable forever, even if perhaps this was the intention and will of those who determined it at the beginning. The Church of Jesus Christ alone has been able to preserve until now the form of her government…. But as regards merely human societies, it is a fact confirmed by six hundred historical documents that time, that remarkable transformer of earthly things, repeatedly effects most grave changes in their civil institutions. Sometimes indeed it changes the form of government only to some extent; but at other times it advances so far that, after the former forms have been abolished, it substitutes new and altogether different ones; indeed, sometimes it even changes the very manner of transmitting supreme power to successors.

“But how do these changes of which we speak happen to the commonwealth? They sometimes follow violent crises of a nation, all too frequently bloody; in the heat of these the preceding governments vanish; then behold anarchy, which now holds sway there; immediately the public order of the state is overturned from its lowest foundations. Then a certain social necessity is imposed upon the nation; it is compelled to provide for itself without delay.

“Why, I ask, will it not have the right, or rather the duty, to withdraw itself from such a state of affairs, which disturbs it so gravely, and to restore public peace to its former tranquility of order? Now this social necessity proves the constitution and existence of a new government to be just, whatever form at length it assumes; because, in the hypothesis in which we are situated, these new governments are meanwhile necessarily required for restoring public order, since no public order can subsist without some civil government.

“Hence it follows that the whole novelty of the matter, in events of this kind, is confined to the political form of civil government to be established, or to the changed manner of transmitting that government to successors, but in no way touches the government itself considered in itself. This indeed continues immovable and worthy of observance; for, if it is inspected more intimately in its very nature, it is established and imposed for the sake of providing for the common good, which is the supreme reason from which human society takes its origin. In other words: in every hypothesis civil power, considered as such, is from God, and always and everywhere from God alone. For there is no power, writes the Apostle, but from God (Rom. 13:1).

“Therefore, when new governments which represent this immutable power have in fact been constituted, citizens are not only not forbidden voluntarily to submit to them; they are, rather, altogether commanded to do so because of the necessity of the common good, for the sake of which those governments arose and continue to exist. This is especially so since the rebellion of peoples can sharpen hatred among citizens, excite civil wars, and cast the nation itself down into the chaos of anarchy. But this great duty of observance and submission will continue so long as the necessity of the common good shall demand it; for this public good is the first and last law before God and in human society.” Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter Inter gravissimas, 16 February 1892, to the Bishops of France; A. S. S., vol. 24, p. 534 ff.

“An unbelieving king lays snares for the Christians subject to him, or wishes here and now to destroy them and to abolish the Christian name in his kingdom. While he is contemplating and preparing these things, other wicked men, by conspiring against him and defeating him, attempt to cast him out of his kingdom. It is asked: — 1. Whether the Christians are bound positively to defend him, namely, the tyrant who wishes here and now to slaughter them; or whether they can rather conduct themselves negatively, neither fighting against him nor assisting him. — 2. Insofar as the response to the first part is affirmative: after he has been cast out of his kingdom, whether the Christians are bound to recall him to his kingdom, if they can; or whether they can rather admit and defend his successor, even, in the given case, against the former king, especially if the successor tolerates or favors religion. — Resp. To 1. As the matter is stated, in the negative to the first part; in the affirmative to the second part. — To 2. Provided for in 1.” Holy Office, 27 January 1892.

1099. 1. This precept agrees with the first three: for if we do not venerate and honor parents, whom we ought to love next after God, since they are almost always before our eyes, what honor, what worship shall we give to God, the supreme and best parent, who falls under no sight?³

³ 1 John 4:20.

(A) Besides those who begot us, there are many whom we ought to honor in the place of parents, either by reason of power, or dignity, or utility, or some excellent function and office. Thus there are to be honored: (a) prelates of the Church and priests, who have begotten us in Christ Jesus through the Gospel,⁴ and as it were travail again with their little children until Christ be formed in us;⁵ (b) magistrates who govern the republic; (c) guardians and teachers, to whose care, fidelity, probity, and wisdom we are entrusted; (d) the aged and those worn out by age.

⁴ 1 Cor. 4:14.

⁵ Gal. 4:19.

(B) But especially are father and mother to be honored by us, who are certain images, as it were, of the immortal God, from whom life has been given to us, whom God used in order to impart to us an immortal soul, by whom we were led to the sacraments, instructed in religion and in human and civil culture, and educated to integrity of morals and holiness.

2. The honor of parents includes: (a) love, since they are so disposed toward us that they flee no labor, no striving, no dangers for our sake; (b) prayer, that they may be most commended to God and to the saints; (c) obedience, by which we conform our manner of acting to their judgment and will; (d) imitation, since we seem to attribute very much to those to whom we wish to be as similar as possible; (e) help as to the necessities of body and soul, especially in sickness, taking care lest they omit anything that pertains either to confession of sins or to the other sacraments; (f) care for burial and funeral rites, and also suffrages for hastening the repose of the soul.

In this same manner Bishops and Pastors are to be honored, assisted, and heard; Princes are to be observed and helped by prayers. The same is true of others who rightly and deservedly are called fathers, such as magistrates and the aged: for they are worthy to receive honor and benefit from our charity, obedience, and help.

3. Parents also have their own proper duties and functions: (a) that they imbue their children with most holy disciplines and morals; (b) that by their examples they inculcate equity, continence, modesty, and religion; (c) moreover that they especially avoid three things: 1) lest they speak or determine anything too harsh against their children, so that they do not become fainthearted;⁶ 2) lest by dissolute indulgence they corrupt their children; 3) lest in the education and instruction of their children they enter into preposterous counsels, being occupied in this one thought and care, that they may leave a rich and ample patrimony, while not solicitous about eternal salvation.

⁶ Col. 3:21.

Concerning these things it has been said in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States, n. 969-1002 (30-63).

Honor thy father and thy mother. - Exod. xx, 12.

This precept primarily and directly imposes upon children certain obligations toward parents; but secondarily and indirectly it regards parents. It also regards, although implicitly, the mutual obligations of other superiors and inferiors.

Titius, a Catholic father of a family, sent his children to a Catholic elementary school, but when, as he thought, they were unjustly and cruelly beaten by the schoolmistress, and the greater part of the boys who attended the school were from the lowest class, he afterward transferred them to a school provided by public authority. In it, indeed, no religious education was given besides the reading of the Bible; but on Sundays Titius sent the boys to the Catholic church, where they were instructed in Christian doctrine. Paul, the parish priest of Titius, tries in vain to bring him to a better course, and remains doubtful whether he ought to deny him the sacraments, or what should be done in the case. Hence it is asked:

1. What right belongs respectively to the Church and to parents concerning the education of children?

2. Is there an obligation, and what kind, for parents to send their children to a Catholic school if one exists in the place?

3. When is a penitent to be judged incapable of receiving absolution?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What rights have the Church and parents, respectively, over the education of children ?

The Church has received the right and the duty from

God to teach, train, and educate especially, all those who belong to her by Baptism. This right of the Church directly extends to religion, faith, and morals, but as these can not, in practice, be separated from education in other branches, and no attempt should be made to separate them, therefore the Church claims authority over all the education of her children. The parents by natural law have the right and the duty to bring up and educate their children, and in fulfilling this duty, as all others, Catholic parents should follow the guidance of the Church. If parents commit part of their office to others, they are bound to select those who can and will give a Catholic education to their children.

2. What sort of obligation are parents under of sending their children to a Catholic school, if there is one in the place?

The bishops of the Province of Westminster declared, in a circular read Sept. 17, 1905: “We desire to call the earnest attention of all Catholics to the grave departure from Catholic teaching and tradition, and to the very serious dangers to Catholic faith and spirit, which are involved in the placing of Catholic children, of whatever class in life, in non-Catholic schools. Owing to the usually proximate nature of these dangers, it is under ordinary circumstances a grievous sin on the part of parents to expose their children to such risks, and this has been expressly declared in the instructions of the Holy See, and of the bishops of this province. There is not infrequently also a grave sin of scandal. . . . The social advantages to be gained at certain schools manifestly do not constitute such a necessity. No individual priest or confessor is entitled to decide where necessity of this nature exists, but the matter is one to be referred to the Ordinary of the diocese for his counsel and judgment.”

3. When is a penitent to be judged unfit to receive absolution ?

A penitent is unfit to receive absolution for his sins if he is not sorry for them, if he has not made, at least, a formally integral confession, and if he is not prepared to fulfil all his duties which impose on him a grave obligation.

4. The case. Titius, a Catholic parent, transferred his children from the Catholic elementary school to the provided school, because, as he thought, they had been unjustly and cruelly beaten by the mistress, and because the greater portion of the children were from the lowest classes. No religious instruction besides Bible reading was given in the provided school. Titius sent his children to the Catholic Church on Sundays where they were taught their catechism. Paul, the parish priest of Titius, having tried in vain to get him to send the children to the Catholic school again, is now in doubt as to whether he should refuse him the sacraments, or what he should do.

Such questions, as to whether and how far Titius was justified in his action or not, have been reserved to the bishops in the Province of Westminster. Paul, therefore, should not take upon himself to refuse the sacraments to Titius, but he should refer the case to the bishop. Objectively it will seldom be advisable to proceed to extremes with people like Titius, unless their example is likely to be imitated by many others if some drastic remedy is not found.

Caius, a young Catholic twenty years of age at the University of Oxford, wishes, as a volunteer soldier, to wage war for his country in South Africa. His parents oppose him, however, because they do not wish to undergo the danger of losing their first-born son, since he is of the best character and likely to bring greater glory to their honored name. Since he cannot obtain their consent, but nevertheless burns with zeal to serve his country, he approaches Julius, his confessor, and asks whether he can enlist without mortal sin. Hence it is asked:

1. What are the obligations of children toward their parents?

2. What are the rights of parents over their children?

3. When do the obligations of children toward their parents cease?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What are the obligations of children toward their parents?

Children are bound to love, honor, and obey their parents, and support them when they are in need.

2. What are the rights of parents over their children?

As parents have the duty of bringing up and educating their children they have the right, which corresponds to that duty, to keep their children with them, and to receive their obedience, honor, and love. They may correct a child when he requires it. A parent, as such, has no rights over a child’s property, but if no guardian of the property has been lawfully appointed, the father will be considered its guardian, and he will be obliged to administer it for the benefit of his child.

3. When do the obligations of children toward their parents cease?

The obligations of children to love and honor their parents never cease. The obligation to live under their direction and control terminates with minority. In general, minority terminates when the child is twenty-one, but before that age a child who has reached the age of discretion may enter into religion, marry, and enlist in the army.

4. The case. Caius, a young Catholic at Oxford, twenty years of age, wanted to enlist in the army and serve in the South African war. He was the eldest son in a family of position, and the parents would not give their consent. He asked Julius, his confessor, whether he would sin grievously if he enlisted without his parents’ consent.

In such cases, the confessor will, as a rule, act prudently by taking the side of the parents, and trying to induce the son to do as they desire. Still, if Caius insists on a theological answer to his question, Julius should tell him that he will not sin if he enlists against his parents’ wish. They do not stand in need of his assistance, and English law allows him to enlist without the consent of his parents: * Although parental authority continues until the child is twenty-one, yet public policy requires that a minor should be at liberty to contract an engagement with the State; and the parental authority is suspended, though not destroyed, by enlistment in the army.”¹ Thus positive law determines and defines the indefinite and vague law of nature concerning the time of emancipation from parental control.

1 Encyclopedia of Laws, vol. v, p. 28.

Robert, a young man seventeen years of age, seeks the counsel of Titius, his confessor, concerning his obligations. For recently, as he says, he left his father’s house because of frequent quarrels between his drunken father and the rest of the family; but now his father commands him to return, and Robert is in no way prepared to obey unless he is bound under grave sin. For he says that, if he returned, his father would squander in indulging his vice the greater part of the money which Robert acquires by his labor, and that, furthermore, it would be necessary for him to endure quarrels and other inconveniences between his father and himself or another member of the family, which indeed he affirms he would bear most unwillingly and only under compulsion. Titius knows Robert to be well-behaved and prepared to do everything that the Catholic religion requires in the case. Hence it is asked:

1. How long do children remain under the authority of their parents?

2. The ownership of what goods belongs to children of a family?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. How long do children remain under the authority of their parents?

The natural law requires that children should, in general, remain under the authority of their parents until they are able to take care of themselves. The age at which they are able to do this is not determined by the natural law, but is left to be determined by positive law, ecclesiastical and civil. A child is sui juris for the purpose of receiving baptism at seven years of age by himself, for the purpose of taking vows, or marrying at the age of puberty. By English law, children in general become sui juris at twenty-one, but when they have attained years of discretion (regularly fourteen for males, sixteen for females), and separation from their parents appears to be for their advantage, English law will not compel them to remain with their parents.

2. Of what property have children the ownership?

Children, by English law, are capable of owning property just like adults who have attained their majority, but they are limited in the administration of it. The administration is regularly in the hands of a guardian, appointed for the purpose, but a minor can make contracts for necessaries, and necessaries are understood in a wide sense to comprehend whatever is suitable to the minor’s position in life.

3. The case. Robert, a youth of seventeen, asked the advice of Titius, his confessor. He left home because of the frequent broils between his drunken father and members of the family, and he is determined not to return unless he is bound under pain of mortal sin to do so. He knows that if he does return, his father will take the largest part of his wages, and spend it in drink, and that he will have to put up with the constant family broils, and this he is not prepared to do. Titius knows that Robert is steady and will do what a good Catholic is bound to do. The confessor, as a rule in such cases, will try his best to keep youths at home till they marry or attain their majority. Still he can not tell Robert that he is bound to return home under pain of committing mortal sin. He is steady, we must presume that he is in respectable lodgings, he can support himself, and he is not bound to give his wages to his father, to be spent in drink. Under such circumstances Titius should give Robert some good advice about keeping steady and attending to his religious duties, but he should also tell him frankly that he is not bound to return home in the circumstances.

Martha accuses herself in confession of stealing her husband’s money, and, when the confessor asks about the circumstances, she answered that her husband earns by his labor the sum of twenty shillings every week, but gives her only ten to pay the expenses of the family, which scarcely suffice, if indeed they suffice at all, for that, while he dissipates the other ten in drinking with bad companions; furthermore, that she has been accustomed secretly to take three or four shillings from her husband’s clothes, and that on this account her conscience is tormented all the more because she possesses nearly one hundred pounds sterling of her own money, which, however, she says she wishes to preserve for providing dowries for her daughters. Hence it is asked:

1. By our law does a husband acquire any right in the goods of his wife?

2. Is support owed by a husband to his wife and children from strict justice?

3. What is to be said of the case?