The One Consenting

489. Notion. The one consenting is said to be he who by external approval, vote, or sentence influences the damage of the neighbor; of this kind can be a sworn judge who with others gives sentence, a deputy who with others by his vote establishes a law, an elector who with others elects someone to an office or benefice.

The one consenting who by his consent does not influence the damage can sin against charity or even against justice affectively, but not effectively.

490. Obligations as to the consent itself. a. He who culpably gave consent for inflicting damage is bound to revoke it; if he does this before the damage has been inflicted, he is bound to nothing; but if he either has not done this or could not do it, he is held for the damage.

b. If in good faith he gave consent for inflicting damage, once the error has been detected he is bound to revoke it; if he has done this or could not do it, he is bound to nothing.

491. Obligations toward the damaged person. 1. The one consenting is bound to repair the damages into which the consent efficaciously influences; but it certainly efficaciously influences those damages for the infliction of which the consent is necessary.

Whether he who gives an unjust vote which is not necessary is bound to restitution.

a. Those who by agreement (for example, among the members of some faction), or at the same time (for example, by rising), or secretly (for example, by secret ballots) give a vote, all are equally bound to restitution. The reason for the first is that, once a conspiracy has been entered, each influences the vote of the others and therefore the damage; the reason for the second is that no one gave his vote earlier and no one later, and therefore all and each place one morally unified action for producing the effect, which therefore is attributed equally to each; the reason for the third is that it is unknown who was earlier or later, and therefore the effect is attributed equally to each, since each placed an action efficacious of itself of the effect.

Yet if even in secret voting it could be established that the vote of someone certainly did not influence the damage, he would be excused from restitution just as in voting which is made openly.¹

b. If they give a vote openly and successively, certainly the first, whose vote is necessary, are bound to repair the damage, even if they foresee that others will not be lacking who would vote in the same way: for these truly and in fact influence the damage.

c. Those who vote when the number necessary for deciding the matter has certainly already been completed are (at least probably) bound to nothing, because they no longer influence the damage already inflicted by others.

This opinion is called probable because there are some who think that in fact all votes influence the effect, because the matter is not decided, that is, the sentence is not fully given, unless when all votes have been given.

2. He who gives an unjust vote which is the sole means for impeding a greater damage is not bound to repair the damage; indeed he acts licitly if the thing to which he consents by his vote is not intrinsically evil, and if it is publicly known that this is done only to forestall a greater evil.

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri III, n. 366, 5.

I. Notion. One consenting is said to be he who, whether by consenting or by casting a vote, influences the damaging act of another. Here can come: 1° Superiors and others who by external consent, laughter, etc., approve the evil will of the evil-doer; 2° legislative assemblies; 3° administrative assemblies of a province, municipality, etc.; 4° judges of diverse instances.

II. Damages to be repaired. The one consenting is bound to restore: 1° the damage in which he cooperated positively; 2° the damage which he did not prevent, and which he both could and, by justice, ought to have prevented.

Question. Which of those who have cast an unjust vote are bound to restore?

Response 1. If the votes were cast either at the same time, for example by standing or sitting, or by agreement,¹ all voting unjustly are bound to restitution, because all are equally the cause of the damage.

Response 2. If the votes were cast neither at the same time nor by agreement, those certainly must restore who certainly voted before the necessary number of votes was completed. But there is dispute about those who afterward cast a vote. Sufficiently probably they are immune from restitution. For although the law is not enacted until all votes have been collected or counted, nevertheless, strictly speaking, votes afterward cast effect nothing, or do not influence the law, since it already cannot be avoided (St. Alphonsus, III, 566).

Response 3. He who doubts whether he voted before or after the necessary number was completed - which will easily occur if votes are cast secretly - is certainly bound to restitution, because by casting his vote he brought it about that the authors of the damage are uncertain; and thus he worsened the right which the one who suffered damage had of recovering restitution from certain damagers. Indeed also for this reason, because he is the cause of uncertainty, he seems to be bound in solidum (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tr. 9, n. 50).²

III. Cessation of the obligation. An obligation that would follow from approval ceases by timely revocation; one that would follow from a vote given ceases for the same reason, provided however that the vote can legally be revoked.

¹ "Before a vote is truly cast by individuals, such a conspiracy rather has the character of counsel; wherefore one who only consented in the meeting of the faction, but in the assemblies themselves is not among those effectively voting, is not held to restitution in the same order, but generally after them" (Lehmkuhl, I, 1201).

² St. Alphonsus says otherwise in Theologia moralis, III, 566; but the text of the second edition seems to have remained changed through forgetfulness.

681. Principles. - I. One consenting is held to restitution whenever knowingly and freely he emits a vote or sentence on which directly depends the violation of another's right, that is, whenever he gives efficacious consent to the damage or injury of the neighbor. I said, efficacious consent, because if the consent did not efficaciously influence the injury, he would not be held to restitution, since he consented affectively indeed, but not effectively, to the harm; and likewise if, fraud or a special pact being excluded, by his vote he impeded another from the attainment of a good to which he had no right.

II. He is not held concerning the damage who authentically revokes a sentence or vote previously given before the wickedness is consummated; nor one voting in good faith, although when the error has been detected he is held from charity, indeed from justice, to revoke his vote, if by time it is licit for him to do this.

682. Questions. - Q. 1. Whether one consenting, who gives an unjust vote, is held to restitution if other votes already sufficient for the damage are not lacking?

Resp. 1. It is certain that all consenting are equally held to restitution if they gave votes by agreement, since, with a conspiracy entered into, there is one moral action of all.

Resp. 2. It is also certain that all consenting contract the obligation of restoring when they brought their vote at the same time, because since no one was then prior or posterior, the sentence resulting from the sum of the votes is deservedly attributed to each of those voting.

Resp. 3. It is also certain that those who first give a vote before the number is completed are not to be excused from restitution, even if they foresee that others who consent will not be lacking, because they truly influence the damage; for although it was to be inflicted without them, nevertheless through them, as far as is in them, it is in fact inflicted. - Thus commonly. - Vogler, n. 302. - Lugo, D. 19, n. 17.

Resp. 4. But whether, conspiracy and simultaneous casting of votes being excluded, the last voters can be excused from the obligation of restoring when now the number of votes required for defining the business has been fulfilled, is controverted. Several grave theologians affirm, because voters of this kind are in no way the cause of the damage, since it has already been sufficiently prepared and determined by others. - St. Lig., n. 566. - Lugo, ibid., n. 22, etc. - Others deny it, because since a sentence is never judged perfect unless it is concluded through the collation of all votes, the last influence the sentence no differently than the first ¹.

¹ Although perhaps this latter opinion may please the Confessor more, nevertheless he cannot impose the burden of restitution on the penitent, since it is uncertain on account of the reasons of the former opinion.

683. • Q. 2. Whether he contracts the obligation of restoring who does not bring a vote when he can bring one?

Resp. 1. Negatively, if the vote is to be given in mere favor or grace of someone ², because no injury is inflicted on him.

² The sentence of the Author is a little obscure. The sense is that in the case the obligation of restoring is not contracted when the right of bringing a vote has been granted to someone in mere grace or favor of himself. Wherefore at the end of the response you would more aptly say: because here he inflicts no injury on another.

Resp. 2. Affirmatively, if it had to be given from office, and its omission was the efficacious cause of grave and unjust damage. - Lugo and others commonly. - See Casus, n. 667, 670.

527. He is called one consenting who by external approval, by vote, or by sentence truly cooperates in damage.¹ But a vote can be twofold: consultative and decretory; here the question concerns a decretory vote, which has the force of precept or law: the former is referred to counsel. - Thus, senators, deputies, and others who by their vote establish an unjust law; judges or jurors who pronounce an unjust sentence.

¹ Therefore here the question is not about any consent whatever furnished to an unjust thing, but about that which is the efficacious cause of the damage.

Now those consenting are bound to restitution as often as they have efficaciously and culpably violated the strict right of another. The reason is that, by making an unjust law or sentence, they concur in the damage inflicted in almost the same way as those mandating.

528. But the question is when those consenting can be judged the efficacious cause of the damage. Now:

(A) If all at the same time cast an unjust vote, whether by secret ballots, or by rising, etc., all equally concur in the damage, and all are bound to restitution.

(B) The same must be said of those who cast unjust votes from mutual conspiracy, because by a common vote they concur in the damage.

(C) If votes are given successively and by living voice: (a) certainly the first who emit votes are bound to restitution until the number necessary for establishing the law is completed, even if they foresee that others who will consent will not be lacking; for they truly have influence in the law and therefore in the damage; - (b) as regards those who, after the sufficient number has been completed, give votes, a distinction must be made: if the votes are revocable, they are bound to restitution, because the damage is not consummated, and therefore even the last truly cooperate in it; but if the votes are irrevocable, the damage is now complete, and therefore the last probably and speculatively are not bound to restitution, because they are not the efficacious cause of the damage. But in practice, at least for the most part, all the suffrages have influence upon the effect by way of one thing, insofar as they add strength to the executors of the law and render its revocation more difficult; wherefore generally they are bound to reparation.

(D) If before the law or sentence is made, the unjust vote is efficaciously revoked, no place is given to restitution, because now no efficacious cooperation is furnished.

(E) But those who give a vote for a thing less just, not intrinsically evil, when this is the only means of averting a greater evil, do not sin, nor therefore are they bound to restitution.¹

¹ Lehmk., n. 800; Genicot, n. 540; Noldin, n. 481.

529. Corollaries. (A) In modern societies, in which matters of the greatest moment are determined by the vote of senators and deputies, the duty is incumbent upon all these of emitting votes at the opportune time, so that they may promote the good of the commonwealth and avert the evils which wicked citizens are contriving: therefore not only do those sin gravely who cast a vote for an unjust law, but also those who, without just cause, from grave negligence or fear of displeasing the Government, abstain from giving votes, or are absent at the time of voting, when they can foresee that by silence of this kind grave damage is threatening the public good or some body of citizens; indeed they are bound to restitution, as often as by this way of acting they can be called the efficacious cause of some injustice.

530. (B) The same duty is likewise incumbent upon those electors who choose senators or deputies, as often as it is foreseen that unjust laws are going to be proposed and established; and this indeed today for the most part ought to be foreseen; for there are many who are attempting utterly to overthrow the religious and social order; and unless upright men perform their duty, form political associations, and at the opportune time elect honorable deputies, soon injustice will prevail everywhere. Therefore citizens who enjoy the right of suffrage, and do not use it because of negligence or vain fear, today of themselves sin gravely, because negatively indeed, but efficaciously, they concur in establishing unjust laws.¹ Not a few are subjectively excused from grave sin, because they do not think about the consequences of their negligence; but upon priests, and laymen who understand the matter better, the duty is incumbent of instructing them, prudently indeed, but unceasingly, so that good citizens, with forces united and federated, may be able to break the audacity and injustice of wicked men.

¹ Concerning this see Ami du Clerge, Le peche electoral, t. XXV, 1903, p. 979, and t. XXVI, 1904, p. 2.

104. Consent is sometimes taken for the approval of some deed. Thus, e.g., an irreligious man, hearing that iniquitous laws have been passed against the Church, exclaims: This has been done well. I plainly consent. Such consent of itself in no way flows into the damage inflicted; nevertheless per accidens it can cause unjust damaging, because iniquitous legislators, seeing the consent of the people, are made more courageous in establishing wicked laws and do not revoke iniquitous laws already passed. In the present place we speak of consent which of itself damages; and then the one consenting is said to be he who by his external approval, vote, or sentence truly and efficaciously cooperates in damage to the neighbor, e.g., a juror,⁴⁹ who with others issues an unjust sentence; a deputy who by his vote with others establishes an iniquitous law (e.g., concerning ecclesiastical goods to be seized); an elector who with others chooses someone unworthy for an office or benefice.

Here again the general principle announced above must be applied, namely, the one consenting is bound to reparation of the damage if he has truly, efficaciously, and formally cooperated by his consent in the damage. From this principle the following corollaries flow:

⁴⁹ Commonly, der Geschworene, le juré.

767. Principles. - I. One consenting is bound to restitution whenever knowingly and freely he either gives consent or carries a vote, by which he efficaciously influences the damage of another. I say: influences; because one who, seeing damage done or hearing that it has been done, only approves it, without moving another to harming, sins only internally against justice. I say: efficaciously; because if he did not efficaciously influence the injury, he would not be bound to restitution. Resolve the same if, fraud or special agreement being set aside, by his vote he impeded another from the obtaining of a good to which he had no right.

II. He is not bound concerning the damage who authentically revokes a sentence or vote previously given before the wickedness is consummated; nor one voting in good faith, although, as was said above n. 749. q. 3°, when the error is detected he is bound from justice to revoke his vote, if time permits him this and he can do it without grave inconvenience.

768. Questions. - Query 1° Is one consenting bound to restitution who gives an unjust vote if other votes already sufficient for the damage are not lacking?

Resp. 1° It is certain that all consenting are equally bound to restitution if they gave votes by agreement, since, after conspiracy has been entered into, there is one moral action of all. Likewise if they are carried secretly.

Resp. 2° It is also certain that all consenting contract the obligation of restoring when they carried the vote at the same time; because, since none was then earlier or later, the sentence resulting from the sum of the votes is deservedly attributed to the individual voters.

Resp. 3° It is likewise certain that those are not excused from restitution who first give a vote before the number has been completed, even if they foresee that others who consent will not be lacking, because they truly influence the damage. For although without them it was to be inflicted, nevertheless through them it is in fact partially inflicted. - Thus commonly. - Lugo.¹

Resp. 4° But whether, conspiracy and simultaneous collection of votes being set aside, the last voters can be excused from the obligation of restoring when the number of votes required for the definition of the business has already been fulfilled, is controverted. S. Alph.,² Lugo,³ and several others affirm, because voters of this kind are in no way the cause of the damage, since it had already been sufficiently prepared and determined by others. - I say: "for the definition of the business." For it would be otherwise if the vote were consultative, or (because by it the number of votes is increased) if it were foreseen to influence the sanctioning of an unjust thing which otherwise would be prohibited. (p) p. 475.

769. • Query 2° In doubt whether your vote was among the earlier and necessary ones for inflicting the damage, are you bound to restitution?

Resp. The true opinion, according to S. Alph.,¹ teaches that anyone is bound according to proportion; and when the others do not restore, that you are bound to the whole. The reason of the former is clear of itself. The reason of the latter is that by your vote at least you made worse the right which the injured party had of recovering from the other voters the damage inflicted. The case would be if the votes had been cast secretly.

Query 3° Do you contract the obligation of restoring if you do not cast a vote when you can cast it?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if the right of giving the vote was conceded to you for your mere favor or grace; because then you inflict no injury upon another.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, if it would have to be given from office, and its omission was the efficacious cause of grave and unjust damage. - Lugo and others commonly. (l) p. 482.

313. One consenting (consentir; toestemmen or behagen) in general is everyone who approves a deed, but then he does not influence the damage except per accidens; but in the present matter there is understood one who by his consent exteriorly manifested, namely by words or other signs, per se influences the damage to be inflicted.

Consent is also favor, approval, sentence, or vote, whether of election or of resolution; but vote is twofold: merely consultative, which belongs to cooperation by counsel; and decretory, which has the force of a precept or law, and constitutes a special mode of cooperation, as in senators or deputies who by vote establish an unjust law, in judges or jurors who pass an unjust sentence, in collators who make an unjust conferral of office, in electors who promote an unworthy person, all of whom act in almost the same way as mandators.

One consenting is bound to restitution when his consent was an efficacious and culpable cause of damage unjustly inflicted. Hence:

1. if there are several consenting, and all together give an unjust vote, whether by putting in a secret ballot or by rising, all equally concur in the damage and are bound to restitution;

2. if from mutual conspiracy they give wicked votes, all are likewise bound;

3. if they give a vote successively and by living voice, a) certainly those are bound to restitution who cast their vote earlier, until the number necessary for the wicked sentence is completed, even if they foresee that those who would furnish consent will not be lacking, because they truly influence the sentence and consequently the damage; b) but those who, after the sufficient number has been completed, give a vote, are also bound if the votes are revocable, because the damage is not yet consummated; probably they are not bound if the votes are irrevocable, because the damage has already been accomplished and consequently they are not its efficacious cause, unless sometimes per accidens, insofar as they could be a cause, after the manner of one counseling, that the decree be entrusted to execution more easily or revoked more difficultly;

4. if, before the sentence is passed, they efficaciously revoke the unjust vote, they are immune from restitution, because no efficacious cooperation is now present;

5. those who give a vote unjust of itself, but concerning a thing not intrinsically evil, when it is the only means of impeding a greater damage, can be freed from injustice and from repairing the damage; especially if it is publicly known that it is done in this way only to avert a greater evil.

In doubt whether someone gave his vote after the sufficient number of votes had been completed, he is bound to restore, at least pro rata and according to the measure of the doubt, because, although he has not certainly caused the damage, nevertheless he certainly caused uncertainty about the author of the damage, insofar as he brought it about that, on account of the exceeding number of votes, some are not certain who are bound to restore in solidum; and thus he has now made worse the condition of him who suffered the damage, in relation to reparation of the damage.

I say. The one consenting is held to restitution as often as knowingly and freely he issues a vote or sentence, upon which the violation of another's strict right directly depends, that is, as often as he gives efficacious consent to the damage or injury of the neighbor. The reason is that then he himself is the true, efficacious, and unjust cause of another's damage.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. He is not held to restitution who by his vote impedes another from obtaining a good to which he had no right, yet with fraud or special pact excluded; because in this case, but not in the other, a strict right would be violated.

2nd. He is not held for damage who authentically revokes a vote previously given, before the wickedness is consummated; nor the one voting in good faith, although this latter, when the error has been detected, is held from justice to revoke his vote. The reason is that the former does not exert influence efficaciously and the latter does not exert influence unjustly.

3rd. He is held for damage who abstains from casting a vote which from office would have to be given, and whose omission would be the efficacious cause of unjust damage; but not he who abstains from giving a vote from mere benevolence and concerning a thing not owed to another.

Question. Whether the one consenting, who gives an unjust vote, is held to restitution if there are not lacking other votes already sufficient for the damage?

Resp. It is certain, 1st, that all those consenting are equally held to restitution if by agreement they gave votes; since, when a conspiracy has been entered upon, there is one moral action of all. - It is certain, 2nd, that all those consenting contract the obligation of restoring when they have cast the vote at the same time; because, since no one then was prior or posterior, the sentence resulting from the sum of the votes is deservedly attributed to each of those voting. It is certain, 3rd, that those are not to be excused from restitution who first give a vote before the number is completed, even if they foresee that others who consent will not be lacking, because they truly exert influence on the damage; for although without them it would have been inflicted, nevertheless through them it is partially inflicted in fact.

But whether, conspiracy and simultaneous casting of votes being excluded, the last voters can be excused from the obligation of restoring when the number of votes required for the determination of the matter has already been completed, is controverted. Several grave theologians affirm, because voters of this sort are in no way the cause of the damage, since it was already sufficiently prepared and determined by others. Others deny, because since a sentence is never judged perfect unless it is concluded through the casting of all votes, the last no less than the first exert influence on the unjust sentence. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 566. - Lugo, disp. 19, n. 17. - Vogler, n. 302.

CONSENTING

[I. One consenting is here understood to be he who by unjust suffrage, vote or sentence is the cause of damage inflicted on another. Hither come all who by common counsel decree or do something; likewise counselors, deputies, senators, judges, etc., who concur to enacting or promulgating laws, to issuing sentences, to distributing offices, etc.

II. The suffrage of the consenter is either consultative or decretory, as it is given by way of counsel only, or by way of sentence by virtue of which execution must be done. There can be added a purely approbative suffrage.

One consenting by consultative vote is bound to reparation as the counselor, that is, insofar as he certainly and efficaciously induced the superior or another to inflict unjust damage. He can discern, moreover, from circumstances whether the superior was moved by his vote wholly or in part.

One consenting by decretory vote is bound to reparation as the commander, that is, whenever and insofar as knowingly and freely he gave efficacious consent to the unjust damage of his neighbor. The reason is that he concurs positively and efficaciously to the validity of the decree by virtue of which the damage was inflicted. Whence he is bound, like the rest, pro rata and in solidum³⁹⁷ . ³⁹⁷ Cfr. Marc. Instit. moral. Alphons., n. 983 et 984.

One consenting by purely approbative suffrage, since the resolution is already definitive, is not the positive nor efficacious cause of the damage, and therefore is bound to nothing by justice. Of him below.

III. Distinguish with Cajetan, in Summula, vo. Restitutione, § 8, between consent which is cause, and consent which is only consent, and not cause. V. g., an unjust war is in question; the counselors, or those to whom it belongs, are convened, they consent : their consent is not only consent but also cause of the unjust war, because the business hung upon their consent, and that they are held to restitution is beyond doubt. Say the same of senators voting for an unjust sentence, of voters casting votes in election of an unworthy man to prelacy or benefice. Many others hear that the unjust war has been decreed, the unjust sentence passed, the unworthy man promoted, they approve, consent, say : « Let it be done, so be it. » Their consent is only consent, and not cause of the unjust war, the iniquitous sentence, the promotion of the unworthy, since the will of the unjust voters does not hang upon them, is not changed by them, etc., and although they gravely sin by consenting to iniquity, they are nevertheless not bound to restitution of damages. So, with some things added, Card. Lugo praises it.

[In the former case the consenter is the positive, efficacious and formally unjust cause of the damage; in the latter he is cause under no title.

IV. Since now the number of suffrages sufficient for decreeing the damaging action is completed, is he bound to reparation pro rata and in solidum who adds his suffrage?

It must be said : 1° It is certain that all consenting are equally bound to reparation, if they gave their suffrages by agreement; because, a conspiracy entered, they acted as one agent, and theirs is one moral action.

2° It is also certain that all contract the obligation of repairing, if they gave their suffrages at the same time; because, since none was then prior or posterior, the sentence or decree is attributed to all by right.

3° It is certain likewise that those are not to be excused from reparation who cast their suffrage first, before the required number was completed, even if they were certain others would act similarly; because they flowed positively and efficaciously into the damage. So commonly.

4° Is the same to be decreed concerning those who voted, conspiracy and simultaneous emission of suffrages set aside, when the required number of votes had already been completed? It is contested. Several weighty theologians deny, because suffrages of this kind were in no way the cause of the damage, which had been sufficiently prepared and determined by others. Others affirm, because he who thus emitted his suffrage willed to concur positively in inflicting the damage, and indeed concurred efficaciously, seeing that the sentence or resolution was not definitive except, as is supposed, after all the suf frages had been collected; whence all acted as one agent, and the damage must be attributed to all in solidum³⁹⁸ . This latter opinion seems to us more probable and truer. ³⁹⁸ Cfr. Gury, n. 682.

But if anyone doubt whether his suffrage was among the prior ones and necessary to the damage, besides the reason brought forward to establish the obligation of reparation, another must be added, namely that he at least impaired the right which the damaged party had to exact reparation from another voter, namely by rendering the matter uncertain³⁹⁹ . Whence, like the rest, he is bound pro rata and in solidum. ³⁹⁹ S. Lig., lib. IV, n. 366.

Some exempt voters thus from the obligation of repairing damage when the sanction of king or president is required for the validity of the sentence or law, as happens in constitutional governments; because, so long as this sanction is lacking, nothing is definitive, and the harmful decision must be ascribed to the executive power. But that reason is not peremptory; for the sentence or law pertains conjointly to the voters and to the sanctioner, who act as one agent and are together the positive, efficacious and formally unjust cause of the damage. Whence, as all concurred to the damage, all are bound to concur to reparation.

V. But is he bound to repair the damage who does not cast his vote, when he could?

A distinction must be made. Either the vote was to be given from mere benevolence, but not from office, and concerning another's thing not owed, as concerning conferring some favor, and the omission generates no obligation of repairing damage, because no injustice was inflicted. Or the vote was to be given from office, and the omission was the efficacious cause of the damage, and this damage must be compensated.

VI. It can happen that a gravely harmful vote be cast in good faith and concur efficaciously to damage. V. g., the question of proclaiming a war just from elsewhere is agitated; the minister of arms falsely affirms that everything is ready and victory is most probably to be hoped for. War is proclaimed, everything goes to ruin and citizens suffer gravest detriments. If the affirmative vote can no longer be opportunely recalled, he who gave it is not bound to repair the damage pro rata sua ; because, if he was the positive and efficacious cause of the damage, he was not its formally unjust cause, that is, culpable theologically.]

XIV. Consent bringing in the debt of restitution is not a mere complacency in another's evil; but it is a cause efficaciously flowing into the evil to be made good. You subscribe to an unjust suit, you give your vote for an unjust war, for a theft, for a homicide to be perpetrated, for an unworthy master to be elected: you are subject to restitution of the loss that followed — when nevertheless your vote is necessary for the passing of the sentence, for the election of the unworthy man, and so forth. For if without your vote the sentence, the election, and the like was already concluded, then your vote does not flow into the effect: therefore you are free from restitution, but not from sin. If nevertheless you should give your vote first, although you foresaw that all the rest would give their votes, then you would be liable to restitution, because in truth your vote flowed into the evil. Wherefore in practice scarcely anyone is free who subscribes to an unjust sentence, or who gives his vote for an unworthy man, from restitution: because it can rarely be established whether the votes of the rest are antecedent or subsequent. Wherefore let each beware of this danger.