3. On The One Consenting

104. Consent is sometimes taken for the approval of some deed. Thus, e.g., an irreligious man, hearing that iniquitous laws have been passed against the Church, exclaims: This has been done well. I plainly consent. Such consent of itself in no way flows into the damage inflicted; nevertheless per accidens it can cause unjust damaging, because iniquitous legislators, seeing the consent of the people, are made more courageous in establishing wicked laws and do not revoke iniquitous laws already passed. In the present place we speak of consent which of itself damages; and then the one consenting is said to be he who by his external approval, vote, or sentence truly and efficaciously cooperates in damage to the neighbor, e.g., a juror,⁴⁹ who with others issues an unjust sentence; a deputy who by his vote with others establishes an iniquitous law (e.g., concerning ecclesiastical goods to be seized); an elector who with others chooses someone unworthy for an office or benefice.

Here again the general principle announced above must be applied, namely, the one consenting is bound to reparation of the damage if he has truly, efficaciously, and formally cooperated by his consent in the damage. From this principle the following corollaries flow:

⁴⁹ Commonly, der Geschworene, le juré.

105. a) He who was negligent in choosing deputies for "Parliament" is not obligated to reparation of the damage which arose from iniquitous laws which were established by the deputies, both because the vote of one elector has very little influence upon the election of a deputy and because electors cannot answer for all the laws which the elected deputies will establish. But nevertheless the faithful are to be diligently and prudently instructed that they uprightly exercise the right of suffrage, lest wicked deputies be elected. With merit someone called the carelessness and vain fear of those citizens who do not give their vote for good deputies an electoral sin. And this sin does not seem to be of lighter weight. Certainly if in our times Catholic men with united strength exercised the right of suffrage for electing good deputies, there would not be so many very wicked laws. For this reason it is especially displeasing to men devoted to Indifferentism and unhealthy Liberalism if priests diligently warn the faithful to exercise the right of suffrage duly; and therefore the enemies of religion continually stir up complaints against such priests, as if they were inserting themselves into political matters. And therefore in this matter there is need of great prudence, lest priests be accused either in public newspapers or in a lay tribunal.

b) Deputies in public assemblies who either α) from agreement (i.e., who belong to the same parties, or are of the same "faction") or β) by secret votes⁵⁰ or γ) by other modes have efficaciously established an iniquitous law, are held under grave sin to reparation of the material damage caused. In practice a twofold difficulty can arise, namely, whether the vote of one or another deputy truly flowed efficaciously into the establishing of the iniquitous law, and then how much damage has arisen from the law established. Often each difficulty, and especially the second, cannot be solved with certainty. But if it is not certainly established concerning the efficacious influence of the vote, the obligation of repairing the damage cannot be imposed. Since almost always it is a question of laws injuring ecclesiastical goods, upon a deputy who has so sinned and now desires to do penance, after absolution from censures perhaps incurred, there is suitably imposed a fitting alms to be given to the Church, unless the confessor wishes, for greater security, to consult the Sacred Penitentiary.

c) He who either culpably or in good faith gave consent for inflicting damage is bound to revoke it. But if he did this before the damage was inflicted, he is obligated to nothing beyond; but if he did not do this, he is held concerning the repairing of the damage.

⁵⁰ The same seems to hold also in public votes; and not only when public votes are given simultaneously, e.g., if deputies rise together or raise the hand as a sign of voting, but also in successive votes. For a sufficient reason is not brought forward why the earlier voters ought to be in a worse condition than the later ones. Cf. Billuart, De iure et iust. diss. 8, a. 13, § 4.