Section — Konings, Theologia Moralis
§ III. On One Consenting
- Principles. - I. One consenting is bound to restitution whenever knowingly and freely he either gives consent or carries a vote, by which he efficaciously influences the damage of another. I say: influences; because one who, seeing damage done or hearing that it has been done, only approves it, without moving another to harming, sins only internally against justice. I say: efficaciously; because if he did not efficaciously influence the injury, he would not be bound to restitution. Resolve the same if, fraud or special agreement being set aside, by his vote he impeded another from the obtaining of a good to which he had no right.
II. He is not bound concerning the damage who authentically revokes a sentence or vote previously given before the wickedness is consummated; nor one voting in good faith, although, as was said above n. 749. q. 3°, when the error is detected he is bound from justice to revoke his vote, if time permits him this and he can do it without grave inconvenience.
- Questions. - Query 1° Is one consenting bound to restitution who gives an unjust vote if other votes already sufficient for the damage are not lacking?
Resp. 1° It is certain that all consenting are equally bound to restitution if they gave votes by agreement, since, after conspiracy has been entered into, there is one moral action of all. Likewise if they are carried secretly.
Resp. 2° It is also certain that all consenting contract the obligation of restoring when they carried the vote at the same time; because, since none was then earlier or later, the sentence resulting from the sum of the votes is deservedly attributed to the individual voters.
Resp. 3° It is likewise certain that those are not excused from restitution who first give a vote before the number has been completed, even if they foresee that others who consent will not be lacking, because they truly influence the damage. For although without them it was to be inflicted, nevertheless through them it is in fact partially inflicted. - Thus commonly. - Lugo.1
Resp. 4° But whether, conspiracy and simultaneous collection of votes being set aside, the last voters can be excused from the obligation of restoring when the number of votes required for the definition of the business has already been fulfilled, is controverted. S. Alph.,2 Lugo,3 and several others affirm, because voters of this kind are in no way the cause of the damage, since it had already been sufficiently prepared and determined by others. - I say: "for the definition of the business." For it would be otherwise if the vote were consultative, or (because by it the number of votes is increased) if it were foreseen to influence the sanctioning of an unjust thing which otherwise would be prohibited. (p) p. 475.
Notes to n. 768. (1) D. 19. n. 17. (2) L. IV. 566. (3) D. 19. n. 17. Appendix annotation (ρ), to n. 768. R. 4°. p. 315. col. 2. Likewise otherwise, if by his vote he could recall the previous voters from an unjust sentence. But in doubt it ought by no means be presumed that the previous voters will be recalled from an unjust sentence if they culpably carried it; otherwise, if by inculpable error. L. IV. 566. § fin.
- Query 2° In doubt whether your vote was among the earlier and necessary ones for inflicting the damage, are you bound to restitution?
Resp. The true opinion, according to S. Alph.,1 teaches that anyone is bound according to proportion; and when the others do not restore, that you are bound to the whole. The reason of the former is clear of itself. The reason of the latter is that by your vote at least you made worse the right which the injured party had of recovering from the other voters the damage inflicted. The case would be if the votes had been cast secretly.
Query 3° Do you contract the obligation of restoring if you do not cast a vote when you can cast it?
Resp. 1° Negatively, if the right of giving the vote was conceded to you for your mere favor or grace; because then you inflict no injury upon another.
Resp. 2° Affirmatively, if it would have to be given from office, and its omission was the efficacious cause of grave and unjust damage. - Lugo and others commonly. (l) p. 482.
Appendix annotation (l), to n. 769. q. 3°. p. 315. col. 2. Hence, supposing theological fault and efficacious influence, he is liable to restitution who abstains from giving a vote when he ought to give it from office, by which he is to protect the public or private good, for example a judge in a tribunal, members of a college which must provide for the good of the Republic, State, County, Municipality (members of Congress, of Legislatures, County commissioners, Members of city councils), or also members of a college to which the private affairs of others are to be managed, as trustees of a moral body, society, etc.; because by taking up that office they have obligated themselves by a tacit contract, and therefore from strict justice, to manage the affairs of others and forestall the harm of others. The right of electing magistrates, where it has been granted, as among us, is an Office and not only a privilege; for society has the right that only worthy magistrates be set over it, and the office of appointing these has been entrusted to citizens by legitimate authority. Therefore those who abstain from giving a vote can sin, yet not against commutative justice, but against legal justice, and accidentally against religion, in the case in which by not excluding an unworthy man they harm it. But that they sin in fact, it is required 1° that a worthy man whom they may elect can be found; 2° that they foresee that by abstaining they effectively promote the election of an unworthy man; 3° that they are not excused from giving a vote by a sufficient reason, for example by notable harm threatening them from it. Marres, p. 295. n. 117. 118; 4° that, as more often happens, they do not invincibly ignore this obligation of theirs, for example holding their right only as a privilege.