Section — Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)
§ III. On the One Consenting
- Principles. - I. One consenting is held to restitution whenever knowingly and freely he emits a vote or sentence on which directly depends the violation of another's right, that is, whenever he gives efficacious consent to the damage or injury of the neighbor. I said, efficacious consent, because if the consent did not efficaciously influence the injury, he would not be held to restitution, since he consented affectively indeed, but not effectively, to the harm; and likewise if, fraud or a special pact being excluded, by his vote he impeded another from the attainment of a good to which he had no right.
II. He is not held concerning the damage who authentically revokes a sentence or vote previously given before the wickedness is consummated; nor one voting in good faith, although when the error has been detected he is held from charity, indeed from justice, to revoke his vote, if by time it is licit for him to do this.
- Questions. - Q. 1. Whether one consenting, who gives an unjust vote, is held to restitution if other votes already sufficient for the damage are not lacking?
Resp. 1. It is certain that all consenting are equally held to restitution if they gave votes by agreement, since, with a conspiracy entered into, there is one moral action of all.
Resp. 2. It is also certain that all consenting contract the obligation of restoring when they brought their vote at the same time, because since no one was then prior or posterior, the sentence resulting from the sum of the votes is deservedly attributed to each of those voting.
Resp. 3. It is also certain that those who first give a vote before the number is completed are not to be excused from restitution, even if they foresee that others who consent will not be lacking, because they truly influence the damage; for although it was to be inflicted without them, nevertheless through them, as far as is in them, it is in fact inflicted. - Thus commonly. - Vogler, n. 302. - Lugo, D. 19, n. 17.
Resp. 4. But whether, conspiracy and simultaneous casting of votes being excluded, the last voters can be excused from the obligation of restoring when now the number of votes required for defining the business has been fulfilled, is controverted. Several grave theologians affirm, because voters of this kind are in no way the cause of the damage, since it has already been sufficiently prepared and determined by others. - St. Lig., n. 566. - Lugo, ibid., n. 22, etc. - Others deny it, because since a sentence is never judged perfect unless it is concluded through the collation of all votes, the last influence the sentence no differently than the first 1.
1 Although perhaps this latter opinion may please the Confessor more, nevertheless he cannot impose the burden of restitution on the penitent, since it is uncertain on account of the reasons of the former opinion.
- Q. 2. Whether he contracts the obligation of restoring who does not bring a vote when he can bring one?
Resp. 1. Negatively, if the vote is to be given in mere favor or grace of someone 2, because no injury is inflicted on him.
2 The sentence of the Author is a little obscure. The sense is that in the case the obligation of restoring is not contracted when the right of bringing a vote has been granted to someone in mere grace or favor of himself. Wherefore at the end of the response you would more aptly say: because here he inflicts no injury on another.
Resp. 2. Affirmatively, if it had to be given from office, and its omission was the efficacious cause of grave and unjust damage. - Lugo and others commonly. - See Casus, n. 667, 670.