The Right to Honor and Reputation

642. Preliminary notions. 1. Honor taken broadly is the good estimation concerning someone's perfections.

a. In this sense honor is an internal judgment whose object is constituted by the perfections of one's neighbor, that is, the gifts and qualities by which a man is commended in human society. Therefore qualities both moral, namely virtues, and natural internal, as wisdom, learning, talent, eloquence, excellent disposition, strength, beauty by which women are commended, health, and also natural external, as riches, nobility, legitimate birth, etc.

b. The object of this judgment is the foundation of reputation and of honor strictly so called; and since this foundation can be true and false or putative, true and false honor, true and false reputation, are distinguished.

2. Honor taken strictly is external testimony concerning someone's perfections, namely where the good estimation which we have conceived concerning our neighbor manifests itself outwardly in the whole manner of acting.

3. Reputation is the common estimation concerning someone's perfections brought forth by speech.

a. Reputation taken generally is the common estimation concerning someone's qualities, which can be good or bad. It is clear that good reputation is considered here, which the proposed definition therefore exhibits.

b. Common estimation is said, because reputation consists in the judgment of many brought forth by speech: for reputation by its nature signifies something which is public. Wherefore the judgment of one or another concerning someone, brought forth by speech, cannot constitute his reputation. Yet it is not required that this judgment be true.

643. On the right to honor and reputation. 1. To each person belongs the right to the good estimation which is owed to the human person, and likewise that the honor which he merits be testified to him.

a. The right to good estimation is the negative and positive estimation by which nothing evil but rather that dignity which human personality contains of itself is attributed to another. Although no one of himself has the right to the estimation by which special virtues are attributed to another, nevertheless to each belongs the right of requiring that in human commerce he be treated as one to whom the virtues common among upright men belong: for each one must be held good until he is proved bad.

b. Whence it is clear that each one must be honored, because in each man, even of the lowest condition, there is present some perfection on account of which honor can be shown to him, which the Apostle indicates: anticipating one another in honor.¹

2. Each one has a right to his own reputation, not only true but also false.

a. For reputation is an external good produced by one's own industry; but over an external and proper good each one of himself exercises full right and ownership (n. 365). The right to false reputation is not taken directly from the very right of man, but from the inconveniences which would follow against the common good if it were everywhere permitted to publish the hidden defects of others.

The inconveniences which would follow against the good of peace and tranquility if hidden defects were everywhere manifested are these: one's neighbor could not usefully discharge his office, he would lose all authority, he would lack the good of conversation, those closely joined to him would be affected by disgrace, and he himself would be deprived of a great safeguard against greater vices.

b. Further, the right to true reputation is absolute and universal, which demands that each one be held by all as he truly is; wherefore this reputation can never licitly be taken away. But the right to false reputation is relative and limited, and since it is founded on the common good, it ceases when at some time the good of others rather demands that the hidden defects of one's neighbor be revealed.²

The reputation which each one needs is ordinary reputation or simply a good name, which is necessary to him for carrying out duties according to the condition of life, whether it has arisen from life and morals truly or only apparently honorable, from talents which truly belong to him or which by error are thought to belong to him. Therefore no one has a right to extraordinary reputation, which is founded on singular gifts and talents, for example, of an outstanding theologian, orator, jurist, physician, etc., if in reality he does not possess these. Wherefore the manifestation of an error on which an extraordinary reputation rests is not against justice nor against charity, provided there is a reasonable motive of manifesting it.

3. Even the dead have a right to reputation: for all things are present which are required that they be said to have a right to reputation, since the subject of the right still consists, namely their immortal soul, and they esteem greatly and desire to retain the reputation by which they live among men. Therefore it is a sin against justice to injure the reputation of some dead person, whether he has died long ago or recently. Yet since the dead need reputation less, of itself it is a lesser sin to injure the reputation of the dead than of the living, although it can be mortal.

a. It is also clear that moral persons, such as cities, religious orders, and monasteries, have their own reputation and right to reputation: for just as they are an apt subject of a right in goods of fortune, so also in the good of reputation and honor.

b. But those who are altogether unknown in some place have no reputation, and therefore no right to reputation.

¹ Rom. 12:10.

² Cf. Lugo, disp. 14, n. 97.

36. Principle: Man has direct and useful dominion over his own reputation, although limited. It is certain as to useful right; it is commonly held as to direct dominion.

The first part is proved, namely that he has direct and useful dominion, inasmuch as we can not only use a good name for our own advantage, but also renounce it for a higher good.

For we have not only useful but also direct dominion over those things which we acquire by our own labor, or legitimately obtain from those who have acquired the same things by their own labor; but so it is with good reputation: for we acquire or increase this by our own labor, namely by the upright exercise of our faculties; or we have received it from our parents by quasi-hereditary right; therefore we have true dominion over reputation. - Therefore we can protect it against unjust aggressions by our neighbor; and when taken away, reclaim it before judges as our own thing. - This indeed will appear even more manifestly if it is observed that reputation is truly estimable by price: for he who is engaged in commerce, or in an art or industry, conducts his affairs with a more prosperous outcome the more distinguished the reputation he has acquired for himself; therefore injury to reputation often also injures fortune, and therefore can oblige to pecuniary compensation.

Moreover, since reputation is truly ours, we can permit the loss of it in order to obtain a greater good, e.g., to cultivate humility, to seek counsel, to restore reputation to another, etc.; for, between two goods, it is permitted to choose the more excellent.

37. The second part is proved. Nevertheless that right is limited by a manifold obligation, namely (a) by duties toward oneself, inasmuch as it is no more permitted to defame oneself without cause than to dissipate goods of fortune, nor to sin or falsely impute sin to oneself for the sake of humility: for evils must not be done that goods may come. Hence rightly it is read in Scripture:¹ "Have care of a good name: for this shall continue with you more than a thousand precious and great treasures; the number of days of a good life is limited, but a good name shall continue forever." (b) By duties toward the neighbor: inasmuch as we cannot bring infamy upon ourselves if the infamy redounds upon the neighbor, e.g., upon one's family, convent, or community, or upon an accomplice; or also when reputation is necessary to someone for furnishing to the neighbor a duty which is owed to him by strict right, as it is necessary to a bishop or pastor for rightly fulfilling his duties; finally, when it is required for furnishing a duty which is prescribed not by justice, but by charity. In the first and second cases there is injustice, because of harm unjustly inflicted upon the neighbor; in the third, charity is injured.

¹ Ecclus. XLI, 15-16.

1. NOTION.—The term honor may be taken either subjectively or objectively.

Subjectively, honor is the dignity of a person (honor, dignitas) based on his worth, character, or distinguished service. Objectively, it is any consideration due or paid to a person by others, on account of worth, character or distinguished service; or, to express the same idea somewhat differently, recognition of a man's personal excellence, virtue, and ability by his fellowmen (aestimatio, existimatio).¹

¹ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, q. 2, art. 2: “Honor is shown to someone on account of some excellence of his, and thus it is a certain sign and testimony of that excellence which is in the person honored.”—IDEM, ibid., 2a 2ae, qu. 103, art. 2: “Honor is nothing other than a certain public acknowledgment of the excellence of someone’s goodness.”—Cfr. J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 459: “Reputation is the good estimation that others have of someone’s life and morals.”—Aug. Lehmkuhl, Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, 11th ed., p. 819: “Reputation is the good estimation which a man enjoys among others; honor is the indication or manifestation of this estimation according to virtue, dignity, and merit.”

There are several degrees of honor.

a) The first or lower degree is a good name or reputation (fama seu gloria humana).² This may justly be claimed by every man who conscientiously follows his chosen vocation and has not forfeited his claim to the recognition and esteem of his fellowmen by public crimes or blunders. b) The second or higher degree of honor is that which is due to a man on account of his state of life or social position, regardless of whether these are acquired by his own labor or inherited from his ancestors.

² Lehmkuhl, ibid.: “A good reputation is the foundation of honor, so that, if considered precisely, reputation is a greater good than honor; but honor, if taken together with its foundation, signifies something more than reputation. Hence it is that honor is valued more highly among men than reputation, and an injury to honor is borne even more grievously than an injury to reputation; for since estimation lies hidden within, whereas honor is also manifested outwardly and is the natural indication of inward estimation, he who shows honor is judged to give more than he who esteems someone inwardly.”

2. VALUE.—Although intrinsic honor, i. e., the consciousness of one's personal worth, is superior to exterior honor, which is merely the consideration or recognition received from others, the latter, too, is a valuable possession, whose loss may entail serious consequences.

The high value of exterior honor becomes evident from the following considerations: a) Honor is the medium through which the individual exercises his authority or influence upon society; b) Without honor no man can exercise a fruitful activity among and upon his fellows, and the loss of honor often entails moral death or absolute exclusion from the society of respectable men.³ "Take my honor, take my life," says an Irish proverb.

³ Cfr. Prov. XXII, 1; Ecclus. XLI, 15; John V, 44; Rom. XIII, 7; 1 Cor. IX, 15; 2 Cor. VIII, 21; Phil. IV, 9. —St. Augustine says, Serm., 355 (al. 49 de Diversis), c. 1, n. 1: “There are two things: conscience and reputation. Your conscience is for yourself; your reputation is for your neighbor. He who, trusting in his conscience, neglects his reputation is cruel, especially when placed in that position concerning which the Apostle says (Tit. II, 7), writing to his disciple: ‘Showing yourself an example of good works toward all.’” (Migne, P. L. XXXIX, 1569).—IDEM, De Bono Viduit., c. 22, n. 27: “Whoever guards his life from the crimes of shameful and wicked deeds does well for himself; but whoever also guards his reputation is merciful toward others. For our life is necessary to us and our reputation to others; and certainly that which we mercifully minister to others for their salvation also redounds to our benefit.” (P. L., XL, 448).—IDEM, Contra Faustum Manich., l. 22, c. 56: “Popular reputation, by which even greater and more illustrious renown is acquired, is not to be sought for its own sake, but is entirely necessary to the intention of good men by which they take counsel for the human race.” (P. L., XLII, 436).

c) A man's moral character not infrequently depends upon his good name, and many are deterred from doing evil by the fear of disgrace.

"Honor," says St. Thomas, summarizing the doctrine of the Fathers, "is the greatest among the exterior things that affect man, both because it ranks next to virtue, being as it were a testimony to man's virtue, and also for the reason that it is shown to God and those in authority, and men prefer the attainment of honor and the avoidance of disgrace to all other things."⁴

⁴ Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 129, art. 1: “The things which come into man’s use are external things, among which honor is absolutely the greatest, both because it is nearest to virtue, since it is a certain testimony concerning someone’s virtue, and because it is shown to God and to the best persons, and also because men set aside all other things in order to obtain honor and avoid reproach.” —Cfr. qu. 131, art. 1, ad 3.

READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 2, art. 2 sq.; 2a 2ae, qu. 103, art. 1 sq. —F. Kattenbusch, Ehren und Ehre, Giessen 1909. —H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, 11th ed., pp. 76 sq., 655 sqq., 678 sq.—J. E. Ross, C. S. P., Christian Ethics, pp. 258 sqq.

1. Every man is in duty bound to safeguard and preserve his honor or good name to the best of his ability.

a) This means, first and above all, that he must endeavor to acquire the basis of a good reputation by irreproachable conduct and to become ever more worthy of honor by faithfully performing his vocational duties and especially by conforming himself to Christ.¹

¹ Rom. VIII, 29.—Cfr. Virgil, Aeneis: "Famam ostendere factis, hoc virtutis opus."

b) We are exhorted to let our "light shine before men," that they may see our good works and glorify the Father who is in Heaven,² and to declare the virtues of Him who hath called us out of darkness into His marvellous light.³ We comply with this duty if we, each in his own particular sphere, faithfully and punctually do the things that are given us to do, or, as the Apostle puts it, "provide good things not only in the sight of God, but also in the sight of men,"⁴ and avoid even the semblance of evil. "Do ye all things without murmurings and hesitations, that you may be blameless and sincere children of God, without reproof, in the midst of a crooked and perverse generation, among whom you shine as lights in the world."⁵

² Matth. V, 16.

³ 1 Pet. II, 9; cfr. Acts XXIV, 16.

⁴ Rom. XII, 17; 2 Cor. VIII, 21.

⁵ Phil. II, 14-16. —Cfr. St. Jerome, Ep., 123 (al. 11), n. 15: “Avoid persons in whom there can be a suspicion of evil conduct, and do not have ready that commonplace saying: ‘My conscience is enough for me; I do not care what men say about me.’ And certainly the Apostle provided good things not only before God but also before men, lest through him the name of God should be blasphemed among the Gentiles (Rom. II, 24). He assuredly had the power to take about a woman as a sister, but he did not wish himself to be judged by an unbelieving conscience (1 Cor. X, 29).” (Migne, P. L., XXII, 1056). Cfr. Ep., 148 (al. 14), n. 33 (P. L., XXII, 1215).

He who does his share towards the well-being of society according to his insight and gifts,⁶ has no responsibility with regard to the recognition of his work by others. For, in the first place, the duty of providing for the proper recognition of his personal dignity and activity does not go beyond that of furnishing the object of recognition, which is dignity and activity itself; and, secondly, the judgments of society upon the moral worth of an individual and his work are uncertain and fallacious, because men do not always esteem one another according to their true value, but are often deceived by appearances and swayed hither and thither by error and prejudice. "Not he who commendeth himself is approved, but he whom God commendeth," says the Apostle,⁷ and our Divine Saviour admonishes us to "judge not according to the appearance, but judge just judgment."⁸

⁶ Rom. XII, 5.

⁷ 2 Cor. X, 18. —Cfr. 1 Cor. XI, 3.

⁸ John VII, 24; VIII, 15. —Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 2, art. 3: “Another thing also must be considered: human knowledge is often mistaken, especially concerning singular contingencies, of which kind human acts are; and therefore human glory is frequently deceptive. But because God cannot be deceived, His glory is always true; for which reason it is said: ‘He is approved whom God commends.’”

It is entirely legitimate for a man to try to make himself worthy of honor before God and his fellowmen by leading a virtuous life. The love of honor, in its true sense, is not opposed to humility, for humility does not enjoin self-contempt, but merely forbids conceit. Both Church and State acknowledge man's right to strive after positions or offices of honor, and reward with titles and privileges those who distinguish themselves by extraordinary courage, zeal, or fidelity. Monuments are sometimes erected in their honor, whereas those guilty of certain public crimes, e. g., perjury, are formally deprived of honor (capitis deminutio).

To seek honor for its own sake, or as an end rather than as a means to a higher end, to delight in it unduly (vanity), to covet it without regard to God,⁹ to demand recognition for qualities which one does not possess (hypocrisy) or to seek it through actions which are forbidden, e.g., by neglecting one's duty, or doing evil, or omitting good which one is bound to do, are sinful acts.¹⁰ It is also sinful to be careless of honor or reputation, to hold them lightly or to despise them cynically. The last-mentioned attitude is generally a result of disguised pride.

⁹ Ps. CXIII, 9; 2 Cor. XI, 30.— Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 131, art. 1.

¹⁰ Cfr. Luke IX, 26. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 132, art. 1-4.

"There are honors which dishonor him who seeks them," truly says a modern novelist.¹¹ Every honor or dignity, according to an ancient proverb, entails its own peculiar responsibilities and burdens.¹²

¹¹ "Il y a des honneurs qui déshonorent" (G. Flaubert).

¹² "Honos habet onus."

An ancient saw declares that honors and dignities often change a man's character.¹³ Unfortunately, the change is not always for the better, and consequently those who receive honors or dignities should strive to employ them as a means of moral improvement. "It is sure proof of nobility of character," says Jean Paul, "if a man uses honors and dignities as means of acquiring virtue."

¹³ "Honores mutant mores."

The foundation of true happiness is neither honor nor wealth, but honesty, sincerity, and trust in God. Human glory frequently evaporates like smoke, but nobility of character is a stable possession. "The Lord rewards his servants, not according to the dignity of their office," says St. Francis de Sales, "but in proportion to the humility and love with which they discharge the same."¹⁴

¹⁴ De la Vie Dévote, III, 2.

c) Every man is bound to preserve his honor and good name by faithfully complying with the duties of his vocation, leading a pure and upright life, and avoiding whatever might justly cause offense to others. If, despite all reasonable care, he has the misfortune to give scandal, either by making mistakes or letting his zeal run to ex- cess, let him candidly admit his fault and humbly seek forgiveness. One whose honor is unjustly attacked has the right to defend it, nay, he is in duty bound to do so if his office, or the interest of his family, or the good name of those associated with him, or the danger of scandal render it necessary. Sometimes, however, it is an act of heroic virtue to suffer persecution silently, like Christ and His Apostles, or to sacrifice one's good name for the honor and glory of God. Our Lord says: " Blessed are ye when they shall revile you, and persecute you, and speak all that is evil against you, untruly, for my sake."¹⁵ And St. Paul: "We labor, working with our own hands, we are reviled, and we bless; we are persecuted, and we suffer it."¹⁶ A good conscience and the conviction that an omniscient God governs the universe and draws good out of evil, will give us the consoling assurance that we have nothing to fear, especially since we know from Revelation that the names of Christ's faithful servants, even though they be traduced by men, are held in high honor by God and indelibly graven in the Book of Life.¹⁷

¹⁵ Matth. V, 11; Luke XVII, 3.

¹⁶ 1 Cor. IV, 12; Col. III, 12; 1 Thess. V, 15; 1 Pet. II, 23.

¹⁷ Luke X, 20; XII, 7; Phil. IV, 3. —Cfr. St. Augustine, De Bono Viduitatis, c. 22: “Since no amount of human caution can in every respect avoid the suspicions of the very malicious, when we have done whatever we rightly can for our reputation, if some try to discolor our reputation either by inventing evil things about us or by wrongly believing them, let there be the consolation of conscience and indeed even joy, because our reward is great in heaven, even when men say many evil things about us who nevertheless live piously and justly (Mt. V, 11-12). For that reward is like the pay of those who fight with the weapons of justice (2 Cor. VI, 7-8), not only on the right hand but also on the left—that is, through glory and dishonor, through ill repute and good repute.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 449).

When a man has lost his good name through his own fault, silence and patience may be recommended as suitable means of atonement. A person who has been innocently robbed of his good name and sees his career endangered or ruined, may find that the simple continuance of his accustomed mode of life is the most effective weapon of self-defence. Where deeds fail to convince, words generally prove of little or no avail.

It is never allowed to employ immoral means, such as lies or duelling, for the restoration of one's honor.

To hide secret sins and defects from others, in order to preserve one's honor and good name, is not forbidden. No human authority can pass judgment upon the secret deeds and motives of men. ("De internis non iudicat praetor.")

d) If a man has lost his good name through his own fault, he must try to regain it as soon and as fully as possible. The means by which it may be regained depend as a rule on the manner in which it was lost. A reputation that is completely shattered may be difficult to rebuild; but the obligation of trying to do so remains and binds especially in those cases where the welfare of a family or the good name of a community depend upon the honor of the individual member.

If honor has been lost through neglect or the commission of some minor fault, it may be restored by increased zeal, fidelity, diligence, and prudence. If the fault was grievous, sincere penance and a genuine purpose of amendment are not only a strict duty, but the only suitable means of making amends for the sin committed and repairing the scandal given. However, as Christ has expressly declared that there will be more joy in Heaven over one sinner who does penance than over ninety-nine just who need it not, every penitent sinner who atones his fault, regains the right to his good name, and it must not be denied him. Nor should it be forgotten that even in the impenitent sinner, no matter how deeply he may have fallen, there is always the human dignity to be respected.¹⁸

¹⁸ Cfr. Luke XV, 7, 10; Gal. VI, 1; Eph. VI, 8 sq.; Jas. II, 1-9.

α) The teaching of Catholic Moral Theology on the subject of honor has been denounced as a hindrance to progress and as subversive of that self-respect which no man can afford to surrender. This is a grievous mistake. Seeking honor and fleeing from it seem indeed contradictory acts, but the apparent contradiction is solved by a higher unity. In preaching contempt of the world and of oneself¹⁹ the Church does not mean to imply that, to be truly humble, a man must be indifferent to mundane things, but merely that he who is truly humble will patiently suffer contempt for Christ's sake, though he will never stoop to anything that would degrade his dignity as a man. Inordinate self-humiliation is not a virtue, but a sin (per excessum) against humility, which consists essentially in submission to God, and to men for God's sake,²⁰ in the service of truth and charity.²¹ Humility, therefore, keeps the pursuit of honor within the bounds of reason and, together with charity, is the foundation of the Christian life. This noble virtue was practiced in a preeminent and exemplary degree by Jesus Christ, "the truth, the way, and the life," who was able to say of Himself: "Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart."²²

¹⁹ "Spernere mundum, spernere sese, spernere nullum, spernere se sperni."

²⁰ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 161, art. 1, ad 5. —St. Bernard, De Gradibus Humilitatis, c. 1, n. 2: “Humility is the virtue by which a man, through the truest recognition of himself, becomes lowly in his own estimation.” (Migne, P. L., CLXXXII, 942).

²¹ Matth. XX, 28; XXIII, 11; Gal. V, 13. —St. Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia, c. 34, n. 38) “It is rightly held that humility should be placed rather on the side of truth, not on the side of falsehood,... lest humility, placed on the side of falsehood, lose the reward of truth.” (Migne, P. L., XLIV, 265).

²² Matth. XI, 29; John XIV, 6.— Cfr. St. Augustine, Ep., 118 (al. 56), c. 3, n. 22: “I should wish you, my Dioscorus, to submit yourself to Him [Christ] with complete piety, and to prepare for yourself no other way for pursuing and obtaining truth than that which was prepared by Him who, as God, saw the weakness of our steps. The first thing on that way is humility; the second, humility; the third, humility; and however many times you were to ask, I should say this.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIII, 442).

Catholic ascetics neither condemns the striving after honor nor justifies carelessness in this regard, but merely forbids vainglory (gloria vana), which has for its end and purpose not God, but self.

Contempt of worldly distinctions and honors does not imply want of self-respect if it is inspired by a desire for eternal glory. This desire lives only in noble souls. St. Paul, who did not hesitate to say of himself that he had labored more than all the rest and was "made a spectacle to the world, and to angels, and to men,"²³ nevertheless declared: "I am the least of the apostles, who am not worthy to be called an apostle."²⁴

²³ 1 Cor. IV, 9.

²⁴ 1 Cor. XV, 9 sq.

β) The question has been raised whether a man may deprive himself of his good name (seipsum infamare). In answering this question the casuists draw a distinction. If one can defame himself without detriment to his vocational duties and without injury to others, they say the sacrifice is permissible because it violates neither justice, as man has full ownership of his good name (dominium famae suae), nor charity, because charity requires regard for external goods only in so far as they are necessary for one's own salvation or the salvation of others. According to Gury and others of this school, however, it would be grievously sinful to deprive oneself of one's good name if the latter were an indispensable requisite of one's official position or if the defamation would result in danger to one's own life or injury to the good name of others.²⁵

²⁵ J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 469: “It is asked whether it is lawful to defame oneself. The answer is affirmative in itself, if it is done with a right intention, scandal and harm to others being excluded. The reason is that it is not contrary to justice, since each person is the owner of his own reputation, nor contrary to charity, because charity does not bind one to preserve external goods except insofar as one’s own salvation or that of one’s neighbor requires it. But accidentally you will sin, and indeed gravely, if your reputation is necessary for your office, or if harm to your life or infamy to others ought to follow from this.”

We cannot quite agree with this view, but maintain that defamation of one's own character is forbidden for reasons which may be briefly stated as follows: a) To preserve one's honor and good name is a precept of the moral law of nature as well as of divine law, and the duty arising from both, while it differs in pro- portion to the concrete conditions or circumstances of each, can never cease entirely. b) Self-defamation no matter by what motives it is inspired or how useful it may appear to be, by its very definition presupposes the telling of a lie. Now, no one is allowed to attribute to himself sins or vices of which he is not guilty because to lie is forbidden absolutely and in all circumstances.

To reveal one's real but secret faults (e. g., to a superior) is not self-defamation but an act of humiliation or the expression of a strong purpose of amending one's life and correcting the fault in question. Such an act of humility, far from injuring one's good name, is apt rather to enhance it.

For the rest, there is hardly a vocation in which men do not feel the need of occasional recognition and encouragement from their fellowmen.

READINGS.—H. Noldin, S. J., Summa Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, 11th ed., pp. 76 sq., 656 sq. —Thos. Slater, S. J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, New York 1919, p. 346.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, 11th ed., pp. 818 sqq.—F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. II, 6th ed., Paderborn 1909, pp. 326 sqq.—J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, pp. 258 sqq.

The good name of a man, that is to say, the high opinion which others have of him (fama bona), and the external honor which they pay him (honor, aestimatio), are important possessions both from the individual and the social point of view. On the one hand, they afford internal satisfaction and, on the other, they exercise a considerable influence upon the position and activity of a man by giving him authority and influence among his fellows. Thus the good name and honor of men constitute an ethical possession of great social importance, which must be duly respected for the same reasons which oblige the Christian to protect his personal reputation and honor. The duties towards one’s fellowmen with regard to good name and honor are twofold, positive and negative.¹

¹ St. Bernard, Epist., 122, n. 1: “In this life a certain reward of virtue is conspicuous and immortal testimony. She obtains this for herself; this she herself preserves. Its splendor is not diminished by envy, nor assisted by external efforts. Indeed, just as the esteem of the good cannot be taken away by false accusations, so neither can it be acquired by flattering favors.” (Migne, P. L., CLXXXII, 267).—See this Handbook, Vol. III, pp. 164 sqq.

1. Positive Duties. a) Above all, man must give to his fellowman the honor that is his due, readily acknowledge his excellencies or merits, promote their acknowledgement by others, and defend him against unjust attacks. In doing so the human heart conquers the radical vice of envy, for “charity envieth not, . . . seeketh not her own, . . . rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth.”²

² 1 Cor. XIII, 4–6; cfr. Rom. XII, 10; XIII, 7; 1 Pet. II, 17; 1 Tim. VI, 1.—On envy, see this Handbook, Vol. II, pp. 55, 65, 77 sqq., 94.

b) The duty of defending the honor of others against unjust attacks binds particularly towards those who have a special claim on a person, e. g., parents, teachers, superiors, friends. Towards others than these it binds only when there is danger of serious injury, which might be wholly or in part prevented by a proper defence, but not when it is probable that any attempt at defence will prove ineffective or cause serious damage to the defender.

As regards the manner in which a man is bound to defend the honor of others, we may say that in most cases an expression of disapproval or dissatisfaction with the conduct of the offender, e. g., by breaking off conversation with him, or leaving his company, or rendering exceptional honors to the person attacked, is apt to prove more effective than any attempt to defend him in a formal way.

The duty of honoring a fellowman ceases when he has forfeited his claim to respect by his own conduct.

c) Opposed to this duty are: undue praise, flattery, and toadyism. These vices are mean and destructive because they are designed to create false notions of dignity, authority, and power, and in matter of fact but too often succeed in this nefarious attempt.³ True politeness (urbanitas), which, without trenching upon modesty, gives honor to whom honor is due and, above all, never violates the truth, is a moral virtue, whereas intentional rudeness may be called a moral defect, because Sacred Scripture exhorts us: “Let every one of you please his neighbor unto good, to edification.”⁴

³ Cfr. Horace, Sat., I, 6, 15 sqq.: “[The people], who foolishly often give honors to the unworthy and, inept, are slaves to reputation, who stand amazed at titles and images.”—Tacitus, Annal., l. I, c. 7: “At Rome the consuls, senators, and knights rushed into servitude.”—Seneca, De Benefic., l. VI, c. 30: “Do you not see how extinguished liberty and fidelity submitted to servile compliance drive them headlong, while no one advises or dissuades from the judgment of his own mind, but there is a contest in flattering, and the one duty of all friends, the one rivalry, is who may deceive most flatteringly?”—Cfr. Cicero, Laelius sive de Amicitia, c. 25.

⁴ Rom. XV, 2; cfr. Phil. IV, 5.—On politeness, see this Handbook, Vol. III, p. 70.—St. Augus- tine, De Civ. Dei, l. XXII, c. 30, n. 1: “There true glory will be, where no one will be praised through the error or flattery of the one praising. True honor, which will be denied to no one worthy and bestowed on no one unworthy; nor will any unworthy person seek it, where no one will be permitted to be except the worthy.” (Migne, P. L., XLI, 801).—IDEM, Epist. CCXXXI (al. CCLXIV), n. 4: “When the good are praised, it benefits not those praised, but those praising. For the former, so far as concerns themselves, it is enough that they are good; but those for whom it is expedient to imitate the good are to be congratulated when the good are praised by them, since they thus indicate that those whom they praise truthfully are pleasing to them.” (P. L., XXXIII, 1024).

In everyday life politeness is often made to serve as a cloak for flattery and hypocrisy, and conventional courtesy is largely unreal. The consequence is that many unspoiled natures rebel against the hollowness of civilization. This rebellion is justified when it is directed against really immoral excrescences and so long as it does not go to the extreme of opposing boorishness to conventionality. It is always a gain if nature, which is selfish in its crudeness, is subdued to the yoke of good manners, even though they be but conventional. “Suaviter in modo” is a necessary complement to “fortiter in re.”⁵

⁵ Linsenmann, Moraltheologie, p. 456.

We can easily understand, says a recent writer, why biassed men, who see nothing but the abuse involved, protest against every form of superior culture and wish to substitute for politeness the frank, unveiled expression of personal opinion. These contemners of the finer forms of social intercourse forget that true charity and veneration must not be displaced by hypocrisy and that, on the other hand, even those who have no claim to respect, may and should be treated with charity. True charity, like the sun, shines upon good and bad alike and sheds its blessings upon the wicked as well as the just. It is patient and kind, not easily provoked to anger, thinketh no evil, but beareth all things and endureth all things.⁶ Charity does not inquire after merit and value, but lends value to that which it loves. It eschews hypocrisy and flattery and treats all men with benevolence and good will.

⁶ Cfr. 1 Cor. XIII, 4 sqq.

Preliminary note. Rightly and deservedly St. James called the tongue "a world of iniquity,"²⁸⁷ because very many iniquities and injustices are caused by the tongue. But we shall treat, as was already said above, art. 4: 1. of truthfulness; then of the vices opposed to it, namely, 2. of lying, where also there will be discussion of simulation, boasting, and irony, 3. of mental restriction, 4. of violation of a secret, 5. of wounding of honor, 6. of wounding of reputation, 7. of rash judgment. Thus we comprise all those things which other authors are accustomed to treat under the eighth precept of the Decalogue.

²⁸⁷ Jas. 3, 6.

417. Notions. - Good reputation properly is the common estimation concerning someone's excellence; nevertheless the estimation of individuals concurs toward it as part of the common opinion by which reputation of another's excellence is constituted; - but honor is the external testimony of this excellence. These two can be injured by words, whether internal and mental, namely, by rash judgment and suspicion, or external and vocal or by equivalent signs: reputation, namely, by detraction, honor by contumely; to which several other sins can be reduced. We are about to explain these in three articles, to which a fourth is to be added: concerning the restitution of reputation and honor.

The FIRST opinion is, that it is deadly to defame oneself without cause. Thus Cajetan 2. 2. quaest. 73. art. II., and in the summa, v. Detractio. St. Antoninus, 3. part. tit. 8. cap. IV. §. 1.; Angelus, V. detractio, §. ult.; Sylvester, num. 4., who excuse two cases, when it is done out of fear of death; but Valencia, disp. cit. quaest. 17. puncto 2., says it is against CHARITY, which Malderus too thinks probable, tract. VII. cap. I. dub. 10.; but Turrianus, 2. 2. Tom. II. disput. 54. num. 11., says it is mortal against magnanimity. Tannerus also, disp. IV. quaest. VIII. num. 148., and others at his place.

The SECOND opinion is, that to defame precisely oneself is not mortal. Thus St. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 57. art. IV., and quaest. 58. art. II.; Couar. lib. I. var. cap. II.; Toletan. lib II. de restit. cap. IV. part. 2. lib. I. num. 123., and part. 3. disp. I. num. 366.; Molina tract. IV. disp. 37.; Lessius lib. II. cap. XI. disp. 6.; Maldet. tract. VII. cap. I. disp. 10.; Sayrus lib. XI. cap. III. num. 33.; Filliucius tom. II. tract. 40. cap. IV. n. 123.; Tolet. lib. V. cap. 66.; Sotus lib. V. quaest. X. art. II.; Navar. sum. cap. XVIII.; Adrian. in IV. de restit. famae, q. 35.; Fagundez in VIII. praeceptum, lib. VIII. cap. VIII.

The SERAPHIC Doctor seems to me constant for the first opinion, lib. IV Pharetrae, cap. 47., where he shows the necessity of good fame from the Fathers.

St. GREGORY in the Register, lib. VII. Ind. II. cap. II., says: Whatever can weigh down either your opinion or your soul, refuse it altogether, and consent to commit yourself to it by no one's persuasion. The same, lib. XXVI. moral. cap. 23.: He tortures the just when his [honor] is wounded, exalts the wicked: but while he tortures the just, he purifies them.

St. AUGUSTINE, de moribus, et vita clerici serm 53.: With the help of the Lord our God we ought to guard both our life and our reputation, so that those who praise us do not blush before detractors. And de bono viduitatis, cap. XXII.: In all the spiritual delights which the unmarried enjoy, their holy conversation must also be cautious, lest perhaps, although their life is not evil through wantonness, their reputation be evil through negligence.

And a little later: Our life is necessary to us; our fame to others, and whatever we mercifully minister to others for salvation, redounds also to our own utility.

See also what is related in C. Noli, 12. quaest. 1.: He who, trusting in his conscience, neglects his reputation, is cruel. And l. 1. de civit. cap. 10.: No less guilty is he who admits a false crime about himself than if about his neighbor.

St. Jerome, epist. 2. ad Nepotianum: Beware of all suspicions, and whatever can probably be feigned, avoid beforehand that it not be feigned. And epist. 11. ad Agetuch.: Flee persons in whom there can be suspicion of evil conversation: nor have ready that saying of the street-corner. My conscience suffices me: I care not what men say of me. And certainly the Apostle provided good things not only before God, but also before men, lest through him the name of God be blasphemed among the nations.

And epist. 9. ad Salvian.: The fame of chastity in women is a tender thing, like a most beautiful flower, which quickly withers in a light breeze and is corrupted by a light gust.

St. Bernard, serm. 46. in Cant.: They who are placed over others must be strong and constant, who, spreading everywhere the good odor of their faith and conversation, can say with the Apostle: We are the good odor of Christ to God in every place.

And in sermon 71.: Virtue indeed will be joined with the whiteness of conscience, where the odor of fame cannot follow it; nor will it suffice to excuse the blemish of a discolored conscience; yet a man of good virtue will always provide, as far as in him lies, not only before God, but also before men.

And de considet. l. 3.: It concerns your perfection to avoid both evil things and equally evil appearances: in the one you consult your conscience; in the other, your fame. Be strong in faith, comely in glory, and you have proved yourself an imitator of God. Your strength is the faith of your conscience: and your comeliness is the splendor of good opinion. Such is St. Bernard.

Nor indeed are these simple admonitions, as Fagundez thinks, num. 4., but precepts for guarding against grave evils. Indeed, from this an occasion of scandal is given, a way is opened to sins, when a man of good reputation is heard to fall most disgracefully; but the rules must be taken from what usually follows. Usually also fame is necessary, as in a Father of a family, a Lord, a Pastor, etc.; usually it redounds to others, as to a family. Therefore the adversaries are forced to give many exceptions.

They object. Everyone is the Lord of his own reputation, as of his own goods.

It is answered with St. Bonaventure in the Speculum animae, cap. 1., by denying the parity; for, as is said in Proverbs 28., reputation is of a higher order.

They object secondly that of Matth. 23., where we are commanded not to seek the first places.

I answer; It is one thing not to seek the first places, and another to defame oneself, as the holy Doctor deduces from the authorities cited.

They ask here: Whether, in order to avoid tortures, someone can confess a grave crime that is false and imposed upon us, which they wish to extort by torments.

Many say many things at Fagundez l. 8. cap. 9., and Tanner num. 149.

First I say, that one cannot impose a false crime upon oneself. Cajet., 2. 2. quaest. 73. art. 2.; Armill. and Sylvester, v. detract. num. 4.; St. Antonin., 3. p. tit. 8. cap. 4. §. 1.; Valencia, disp. 5. quaest. 17. punct. 2. The same judge those who teach that he who has imposed a false crime upon himself is bound to retract it in the place of execution. Thus the Abbot, in cap. ex parte 2. num. 2. de sepulturis.; Felin., C. causam, num 7.; Archid., 2. p. tit. 11. cap. 21. §. 3.; Socin., in repetit. C. Ad audientiam; Sanches, Tom. 1. Decal. l. 3. cap. 7. num. 12.

It is proved, because no one is the Lord of his own life.

Wherefore the opinion of Fagundez does not seem proven to me, num 2., who cites other Doctors, num. 9.; nor that of Tanner, who cites Valencia, Soto, Navarrus, and Lessius for the opposite opinion, which he subscribes to, holding that one can impose upon oneself a false defaming crime.

He asks also in cap. 10.: Whether a man, in dispensations that are sought from the Supreme Pontiff, is bound to defame himself by manifesting an occult coupling with an affine or blood-relative.

He answers that nowhere in the law is there a precept of explaining such a coupling and defaming oneself; but it is more probable that one is bound by the decree of the Congregation of the most Eminent Cardinals upon the Council of Trent, sess. 24. cap. 5., and this is the style of the Roman curia; for the style of the curia makes law, C. in causis, C. ex litteris de constitut., and C. quam gravi de crimine falsi. And for this he reports many Doctors. Mascard. vol. 3. de probat. consil. 1312. num. 21.

165. Honor is the esteem in which a man is held by his fellow-men. Considered radically, or in its cause, it is a man's real excellence. Since all men have naturally, as beings endowed with rational faculties and destined for an exalted end, a certain high excellence, all men are naturally entitled to a certain honor. Still, as all men are not gifted with equal excellence, they are not all entitled to equal honor. A person may lose some of his claims to be honored or respected by others. It may be necessary for the common good, or even for some considerable private good, that the vices of an individual be exposed and his honor thus lessened.

Honor is unjustly impaired by: 1. Insult, or contumely, consisting in open, deliberate expressions of contempt; 2. Calumny, or false accusation; 3. Detraction, or the disclosure of another's secret faults to any one who has not a right to know them. The last two faults are still further specified as offenses against another's good name.

166. Thesis XII. It is unlawful to impair another's honor, and necessary to make amends for its violation.

Proof. We are obliged to love others as we love ourselves; but to lessen another's honor is not to love him as we love ourselves, for we would not have others do this unto us. We wish our honor to be respected, (a) as something valuable for its own sake and prized as such by noble minds; (b) as a protection of our rights, for a man in bad repute is more apt to suffer wrong and has little if any influence towards conciliating favor.

A man is obliged to make good the damage or loss which he has caused to another's honor or good name. Since justice demands that every one shall have his due, the honor unjustly taken away is due to him from whom it has been taken and must, as far as is possible, be restored.

167. Duelling, a practice handed down from the paganism of northern Europe, was once extensively used as a means for protecting or recovering personal honor. Happily, it has fallen into contempt and consequent disuse.

168. Thesis XIV. Duelling is opposed to the natural law.

Proof. A duel is a fight between two parties with murderous weapons, undertaken by private authority and according to previous appointment. Now, such an act is intrinsically wrong, and therefore opposed to the natural law. The act is intrinsically wrong, because it has the malice both of suicide and of murder. 1. A principal in a duel exposes his life without a just and reasonable cause, and he does this deliberately and by pre-arrangement. 2. He deliberately seeks the life of a fellow-man on his own private authority and without being forced by necessary self-defense.

169. Objections.

1. David is praised for his duel with Goliath. Answer. A single combat, authorized by the civil power as a means of warfare, is not a duel in the sense here attached to the word.

2. A duel may be necessary to avoid the imputation of cowardice. Answer. It would be moral cowardice to do a wrong action through human respect.

3. It is lawful to slay the unjust assailant of a man's honor, since many value honor more highly than life. Answer. Life can sometimes be defended only by striking down the unjust aggressor; but this is not true of a man's honor or good name. Moreover, the esteem in which one man is held by others is not more precious than life, though this is true of honor considered radically or in its cause, i. e., personal excellence and virtue.

4. According to the general opinion, a woman may kill the assailant of her honor, or virtue, if there be no other means of escape. Answer. Honor in this case means more than a good name; it means bodily chastity, which its owner has a right to defend as a priceless possession (No. 163, i).