Article — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Article First. On the Right to Honor and Reputation
642. Preliminary notions. 1. Honor taken broadly is the good estimation concerning someone's perfections.
a. In this sense honor is an internal judgment whose object is constituted by the perfections of one's neighbor, that is, the gifts and qualities by which a man is commended in human society. Therefore qualities both moral, namely virtues, and natural internal, as wisdom, learning, talent, eloquence, excellent disposition, strength, beauty by which women are commended, health, and also natural external, as riches, nobility, legitimate birth, etc.
b. The object of this judgment is the foundation of reputation and of honor strictly so called; and since this foundation can be true and false or putative, true and false honor, true and false reputation, are distinguished.
Honor taken strictly is external testimony concerning someone's perfections, namely where the good estimation which we have conceived concerning our neighbor manifests itself outwardly in the whole manner of acting.
Reputation is the common estimation concerning someone's perfections brought forth by speech.
a. Reputation taken generally is the common estimation concerning someone's qualities, which can be good or bad. It is clear that good reputation is considered here, which the proposed definition therefore exhibits.
b. Common estimation is said, because reputation consists in the judgment of many brought forth by speech: for reputation by its nature signifies something which is public. Wherefore the judgment of one or another concerning someone, brought forth by speech, cannot constitute his reputation. Yet it is not required that this judgment be true.
643. On the right to honor and reputation. 1. To each person belongs the right to the good estimation which is owed to the human person, and likewise that the honor which he merits be testified to him.
a. The right to good estimation is the negative and positive estimation by which nothing evil but rather that dignity which human personality contains of itself is attributed to another. Although no one of himself has the right to the estimation by which special virtues are attributed to another, nevertheless to each belongs the right of requiring that in human commerce he be treated as one to whom the virtues common among upright men belong: for each one must be held good until he is proved bad.
b. Whence it is clear that each one must be honored, because in each man, even of the lowest condition, there is present some perfection on account of which honor can be shown to him, which the Apostle indicates: anticipating one another in honor.1
- Each one has a right to his own reputation, not only true but also false.
a. For reputation is an external good produced by one's own industry; but over an external and proper good each one of himself exercises full right and ownership (n. 365). The right to false reputation is not taken directly from the very right of man, but from the inconveniences which would follow against the common good if it were everywhere permitted to publish the hidden defects of others.
The inconveniences which would follow against the good of peace and tranquility if hidden defects were everywhere manifested are these: one's neighbor could not usefully discharge his office, he would lose all authority, he would lack the good of conversation, those closely joined to him would be affected by disgrace, and he himself would be deprived of a great safeguard against greater vices.
b. Further, the right to true reputation is absolute and universal, which demands that each one be held by all as he truly is; wherefore this reputation can never licitly be taken away. But the right to false reputation is relative and limited, and since it is founded on the common good, it ceases when at some time the good of others rather demands that the hidden defects of one's neighbor be revealed.2
The reputation which each one needs is ordinary reputation or simply a good name, which is necessary to him for carrying out duties according to the condition of life, whether it has arisen from life and morals truly or only apparently honorable, from talents which truly belong to him or which by error are thought to belong to him. Therefore no one has a right to extraordinary reputation, which is founded on singular gifts and talents, for example, of an outstanding theologian, orator, jurist, physician, etc., if in reality he does not possess these. Wherefore the manifestation of an error on which an extraordinary reputation rests is not against justice nor against charity, provided there is a reasonable motive of manifesting it.
- Even the dead have a right to reputation: for all things are present which are required that they be said to have a right to reputation, since the subject of the right still consists, namely their immortal soul, and they esteem greatly and desire to retain the reputation by which they live among men. Therefore it is a sin against justice to injure the reputation of some dead person, whether he has died long ago or recently. Yet since the dead need reputation less, of itself it is a lesser sin to injure the reputation of the dead than of the living, although it can be mortal.
a. It is also clear that moral persons, such as cities, religious orders, and monasteries, have their own reputation and right to reputation: for just as they are an apt subject of a right in goods of fortune, so also in the good of reputation and honor.
b. But those who are altogether unknown in some place have no reputation, and therefore no right to reputation.
1 Rom. 12:10.
2 Cf. Lugo, disp. 14, n. 97.