Section 1: Notion and Value of Honor

1. NOTION.—The term honor may be taken either subjectively or objectively.

Subjectively, honor is the dignity of a person (honor, dignitas) based on his worth, character, or distinguished service. Objectively, it is any consideration due or paid to a person by others, on account of worth, character or distinguished service; or, to express the same idea somewhat differently, recognition of a man's personal excellence, virtue, and ability by his fellowmen (aestimatio, existimatio).¹

¹ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, q. 2, art. 2: “Honor is shown to someone on account of some excellence of his, and thus it is a certain sign and testimony of that excellence which is in the person honored.”—IDEM, ibid., 2a 2ae, qu. 103, art. 2: “Honor is nothing other than a certain public acknowledgment of the excellence of someone’s goodness.”—Cfr. J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 459: “Reputation is the good estimation that others have of someone’s life and morals.”—Aug. Lehmkuhl, Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, 11th ed., p. 819: “Reputation is the good estimation which a man enjoys among others; honor is the indication or manifestation of this estimation according to virtue, dignity, and merit.”

There are several degrees of honor.

a) The first or lower degree is a good name or reputation (fama seu gloria humana).² This may justly be claimed by every man who conscientiously follows his chosen vocation and has not forfeited his claim to the recognition and esteem of his fellowmen by public crimes or blunders. b) The second or higher degree of honor is that which is due to a man on account of his state of life or social position, regardless of whether these are acquired by his own labor or inherited from his ancestors.

² Lehmkuhl, ibid.: “A good reputation is the foundation of honor, so that, if considered precisely, reputation is a greater good than honor; but honor, if taken together with its foundation, signifies something more than reputation. Hence it is that honor is valued more highly among men than reputation, and an injury to honor is borne even more grievously than an injury to reputation; for since estimation lies hidden within, whereas honor is also manifested outwardly and is the natural indication of inward estimation, he who shows honor is judged to give more than he who esteems someone inwardly.”

2. VALUE.—Although intrinsic honor, i. e., the consciousness of one's personal worth, is superior to exterior honor, which is merely the consideration or recognition received from others, the latter, too, is a valuable possession, whose loss may entail serious consequences.

The high value of exterior honor becomes evident from the following considerations: a) Honor is the medium through which the individual exercises his authority or influence upon society; b) Without honor no man can exercise a fruitful activity among and upon his fellows, and the loss of honor often entails moral death or absolute exclusion from the society of respectable men.³ "Take my honor, take my life," says an Irish proverb.

³ Cfr. Prov. XXII, 1; Ecclus. XLI, 15; John V, 44; Rom. XIII, 7; 1 Cor. IX, 15; 2 Cor. VIII, 21; Phil. IV, 9. —St. Augustine says, Serm., 355 (al. 49 de Diversis), c. 1, n. 1: “There are two things: conscience and reputation. Your conscience is for yourself; your reputation is for your neighbor. He who, trusting in his conscience, neglects his reputation is cruel, especially when placed in that position concerning which the Apostle says (Tit. II, 7), writing to his disciple: ‘Showing yourself an example of good works toward all.’” (Migne, P. L. XXXIX, 1569).—IDEM, De Bono Viduit., c. 22, n. 27: “Whoever guards his life from the crimes of shameful and wicked deeds does well for himself; but whoever also guards his reputation is merciful toward others. For our life is necessary to us and our reputation to others; and certainly that which we mercifully minister to others for their salvation also redounds to our benefit.” (P. L., XL, 448).—IDEM, Contra Faustum Manich., l. 22, c. 56: “Popular reputation, by which even greater and more illustrious renown is acquired, is not to be sought for its own sake, but is entirely necessary to the intention of good men by which they take counsel for the human race.” (P. L., XLII, 436).

c) A man's moral character not infrequently depends upon his good name, and many are deterred from doing evil by the fear of disgrace.

"Honor," says St. Thomas, summarizing the doctrine of the Fathers, "is the greatest among the exterior things that affect man, both because it ranks next to virtue, being as it were a testimony to man's virtue, and also for the reason that it is shown to God and those in authority, and men prefer the attainment of honor and the avoidance of disgrace to all other things."⁴

⁴ Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 129, art. 1: “The things which come into man’s use are external things, among which honor is absolutely the greatest, both because it is nearest to virtue, since it is a certain testimony concerning someone’s virtue, and because it is shown to God and to the best persons, and also because men set aside all other things in order to obtain honor and avoid reproach.” —Cfr. qu. 131, art. 1, ad 3.

READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 2, art. 2 sq.; 2a 2ae, qu. 103, art. 1 sq. —F. Kattenbusch, Ehren und Ehre, Giessen 1909. —H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, 11th ed., pp. 76 sq., 655 sqq., 678 sq.—J. E. Ross, C. S. P., Christian Ethics, pp. 258 sqq.