Section 1: The Duty of Respecting the Honor and Good Name of Others

The good name of a man, that is to say, the high opinion which others have of him (fama bona), and the external honor which they pay him (honor, aestimatio), are important possessions both from the individual and the social point of view. On the one hand, they afford internal satisfaction and, on the other, they exercise a considerable influence upon the position and activity of a man by giving him authority and influence among his fellows. Thus the good name and honor of men constitute an ethical possession of great social importance, which must be duly respected for the same reasons which oblige the Christian to protect his personal reputation and honor. The duties towards one’s fellowmen with regard to good name and honor are twofold, positive and negative.¹

¹ St. Bernard, Epist., 122, n. 1: “In this life a certain reward of virtue is conspicuous and immortal testimony. She obtains this for herself; this she herself preserves. Its splendor is not diminished by envy, nor assisted by external efforts. Indeed, just as the esteem of the good cannot be taken away by false accusations, so neither can it be acquired by flattering favors.” (Migne, P. L., CLXXXII, 267).—See this Handbook, Vol. III, pp. 164 sqq.

1. Positive Duties. a) Above all, man must give to his fellowman the honor that is his due, readily acknowledge his excellencies or merits, promote their acknowledgement by others, and defend him against unjust attacks. In doing so the human heart conquers the radical vice of envy, for “charity envieth not, . . . seeketh not her own, . . . rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth.”²

² 1 Cor. XIII, 4–6; cfr. Rom. XII, 10; XIII, 7; 1 Pet. II, 17; 1 Tim. VI, 1.—On envy, see this Handbook, Vol. II, pp. 55, 65, 77 sqq., 94.

b) The duty of defending the honor of others against unjust attacks binds particularly towards those who have a special claim on a person, e. g., parents, teachers, superiors, friends. Towards others than these it binds only when there is danger of serious injury, which might be wholly or in part prevented by a proper defence, but not when it is probable that any attempt at defence will prove ineffective or cause serious damage to the defender.

As regards the manner in which a man is bound to defend the honor of others, we may say that in most cases an expression of disapproval or dissatisfaction with the conduct of the offender, e. g., by breaking off conversation with him, or leaving his company, or rendering exceptional honors to the person attacked, is apt to prove more effective than any attempt to defend him in a formal way.

The duty of honoring a fellowman ceases when he has forfeited his claim to respect by his own conduct.

c) Opposed to this duty are: undue praise, flattery, and toadyism. These vices are mean and destructive because they are designed to create false notions of dignity, authority, and power, and in matter of fact but too often succeed in this nefarious attempt.³ True politeness (urbanitas), which, without trenching upon modesty, gives honor to whom honor is due and, above all, never violates the truth, is a moral virtue, whereas intentional rudeness may be called a moral defect, because Sacred Scripture exhorts us: “Let every one of you please his neighbor unto good, to edification.”⁴

³ Cfr. Horace, Sat., I, 6, 15 sqq.: “[The people], who foolishly often give honors to the unworthy and, inept, are slaves to reputation, who stand amazed at titles and images.”—Tacitus, Annal., l. I, c. 7: “At Rome the consuls, senators, and knights rushed into servitude.”—Seneca, De Benefic., l. VI, c. 30: “Do you not see how extinguished liberty and fidelity submitted to servile compliance drive them headlong, while no one advises or dissuades from the judgment of his own mind, but there is a contest in flattering, and the one duty of all friends, the one rivalry, is who may deceive most flatteringly?”—Cfr. Cicero, Laelius sive de Amicitia, c. 25.

⁴ Rom. XV, 2; cfr. Phil. IV, 5.—On politeness, see this Handbook, Vol. III, p. 70.—St. Augus- tine, De Civ. Dei, l. XXII, c. 30, n. 1: “There true glory will be, where no one will be praised through the error or flattery of the one praising. True honor, which will be denied to no one worthy and bestowed on no one unworthy; nor will any unworthy person seek it, where no one will be permitted to be except the worthy.” (Migne, P. L., XLI, 801).—IDEM, Epist. CCXXXI (al. CCLXIV), n. 4: “When the good are praised, it benefits not those praised, but those praising. For the former, so far as concerns themselves, it is enough that they are good; but those for whom it is expedient to imitate the good are to be congratulated when the good are praised by them, since they thus indicate that those whom they praise truthfully are pleasing to them.” (P. L., XXXIII, 1024).

In everyday life politeness is often made to serve as a cloak for flattery and hypocrisy, and conventional courtesy is largely unreal. The consequence is that many unspoiled natures rebel against the hollowness of civilization. This rebellion is justified when it is directed against really immoral excrescences and so long as it does not go to the extreme of opposing boorishness to conventionality. It is always a gain if nature, which is selfish in its crudeness, is subdued to the yoke of good manners, even though they be but conventional. “Suaviter in modo” is a necessary complement to “fortiter in re.”⁵

⁵ Linsenmann, Moraltheologie, p. 456.

We can easily understand, says a recent writer, why biassed men, who see nothing but the abuse involved, protest against every form of superior culture and wish to substitute for politeness the frank, unveiled expression of personal opinion. These contemners of the finer forms of social intercourse forget that true charity and veneration must not be displaced by hypocrisy and that, on the other hand, even those who have no claim to respect, may and should be treated with charity. True charity, like the sun, shines upon good and bad alike and sheds its blessings upon the wicked as well as the just. It is patient and kind, not easily provoked to anger, thinketh no evil, but beareth all things and endureth all things.⁶ Charity does not inquire after merit and value, but lends value to that which it loves. It eschews hypocrisy and flattery and treats all men with benevolence and good will.

⁶ Cfr. 1 Cor. XIII, 4 sqq.

We do not, of course, mean to intimate that there are not cases in which regard for higher interests may compel us to express our innermost convictions openly and without reserve. Regard for the feelings of others must never be permitted to inspire a lie. Flattery is incompatible with truth and with charity. It dishonors him from whom it comes as well as him by whom it is accepted. We really show contempt for our neighbor when we flatter him.⁷

⁷ Rottmanner, O. S. B., Predigten und Ansprachen, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 178 sqq.—Cfr. St. Jerome, Epist., 148 (al. 14), n. 17: “Flee also the assent of flatterers and the harmful blandishments of deceit as certain plagues of the soul. Nothing corrupts the minds of men so easily; nothing strikes the soul with so sweet and gentle a wound. Among many, especially in this age, this vice reigns and—what is most grievous—is regarded in place of humility and benevolence. Hence it happens that one who does not know how to flatter is thought either envious or proud. It is indeed a great and sublime artifice to praise another to one’s own commendation and, by deceiving him, to bind the deceived person’s mind to oneself; and, what especially is commonly done through this vice, to sell feigned praises at a fixed price. What is this great lightness of mind, what great vanity, to abandon one’s own conscience and follow another’s opinion, and that a fictitious and feigned one? To be carried away by the wind of false praise (flattery), to rejoice in one’s own circumvention, and to accept mockery as a benefit? Therefore, if you truly desire to be praiseworthy, do not seek the praise of men.” (Migne, P. L., XXII, 1212).

2. Negative Duties. For the negative duties which we have in regard to the honor and good name of our fellowmen see the next section of this treatise.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 73.—F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 453 sqq.—H. Noldin, S. J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 658 sq.—A. Tanquerey, S. S., Synopsis Theol. Mor. et Pastor., Vol. III, pp. 17 sq.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 110 sqq.