The Sin of Doubt

WHEN we have some knowledge of a matter which does not amount to a certainty, various states of mind may be distinguished with respect to the mind’s inclination to form a judgement about the matter in question. If no reasons are known for either affirming or denying a proposition, or if there are as weighty reasons for one as for the other, the mind suspends judgement, and is said to be in doubt. Doubt, then, is the suspending of judgement about a matter apprehended by the mind. A doubtful conscience, therefore, will be a suspension of judgement about the lawfulness of some action.

If some slight reason draws the mind in one direction, we have then a suspicion about the matter. If there be a good solid reason or reasons for forming a judgement in a particular sense though there is not sufficient ground for certainty, and it is felt that the opposite may be true, the mind then forms an opinion on the matter.¹

Theologians distinguish a negative from a positive doubt. There is negative doubt when the mind suspends judgement for want of reasons on one side or on the other; if there is an apparent equality of reasons on either side, the doubt is positive. In this chapter we confine our attention to negative doubt, the sense in which the term doubt is usually understood in theology. A speculative doubt has reference to some question in the abstract apart from present action, as when I doubt whether it is allowed to fish on Sundays, though I have no intention of actually fishing: a practical doubt has reference to the lawfulness of an action which there is question of performing here and now.

A doubt about law has reference to the law’s existence or its interpretation; a doubt about fact has reference to fact.

¹ St Thomas, 2-2, q. 2, a. 1.

It is not lawful to perform an action with a practically doubtful conscience as to whether the action is right or wrong. The reason is obvious; for, as we saw in the last chapter, we must have a certain conscience that the action is right before performing it, otherwise sin is committed, and one who has a doubtful conscience has not a certain conscience.

The sin which is committed by one who acts with a practically doubtful conscience as to whether the action is right takes its species and gravity from the doubtful conscience. If I eat meat with a practical doubt as to whether it is not forbidden on that day by the Church, I commit a sin of the same kind and malice as if I ate meat knowingly on a day of abstinence. The reason is obvious from what was said about a certain conscience. The species of a sin and its malice depend upon the mind and will of the agent, and when one acts with a doubtful conscience the will is prepared to commit a sin of the kind apprehended, and by that very act it commits the sin.

II. When is jurisdiction supplied? Canon 209 establishes: In common error or in positive and probable doubt, whether of law or of fact, the Church supplies jurisdiction for both the external and internal forum. Therefore jurisdiction is supplied:

1. In common error, namely when a sufficiently large part of the community thinks that the required power belongs to someone, although in fact it does not belong to him. It is said:

a) A sufficiently large part. Moreover, it suffices that morally all members of the community err. Likewise, it is enough that the greater part be in error, both because then the error can in some way be called common, and because the common good, which the Church intends to provide for, seems entirely to require this. It probably suffices that many err, many, I say, whether absolutely, as 200, or relatively to the community; likewise it is probably enough that the foundation of common error has been posited, as if the name of a priest lacking jurisdiction has been affixed to a confessional. The reason is sought from this: otherwise it would often be difficult to determine whether or not common error was present. I have said "probably suffices," because with respect to the later cases there are reasons for doubting,¹ both because formerly the notion of common error was not applied sufficiently commonly to the said cases, and because such error is in reality not yet common.

b) Of the community, namely "of a people, neighborhood, parish, college, community, etc., provided that in such a community there are not fewer than ten people.... The reason is that ten constitute a people."²

c) They think. Doubt properly so called does not suffice, but at least that state of mind is required which is called opinion.³

When common error stands, supplied jurisdiction extends itself also to those members of the community who are not occupied by the error.

2. In positive and probable doubt, whether of law or of fact. It is said:

a) In positive and probable doubt, that is, as these words seem to be taken here, when for the existence of jurisdiction there are relatively grave reasons, or a relatively grave reason.

b) Whether of law or of fact. Doubt of law is had if, after considering law or custom, it is positively probable that jurisdiction is present. Doubt of fact is had if it is positively probable either that the private fact of concession of jurisdiction has taken place, or that jurisdiction privately conceded has not yet expired.

Corollary. In the case in which the required common error is only probably present, the Church also supplies only probably.⁴ Nor should you say that in the case jurisdiction is probable, and therefore by force of can. 209 is certainly supplied. For the words "the Church supplies jurisdiction in positive and probable doubt whether of law or of fact" signify, in their obvious sense, that the Church supplies jurisdiction if it probably exists independently of the Church supplying; but they do not involve this: that the Church supplies jurisdiction in positive and probable doubt concerning jurisdiction supplied by it, that is, by the Church.

¹ Others do not doubt: Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis Principia, III, 459; Jombart and Guns in Nouvelle Revue Theologique, 1923, pp. 173, 539 sq.; Aertnys-Damen, II, 359; Schaepman, Nederlandsche Katholieke Stemmen, 1928, p. 44.

² Reiffenstuel, Ius Canonicum Universum, V, I, 249.

³ Doubt properly so called is the state of a mind fluctuating between two parts of a contradiction. It is distinguished into positive and negative, according as someone doubts on account of equal or nearly equal motives, or on account of no motives or slight motives on each side. Where one side is held as more probable than the other, there is not doubt properly so called, but opinion, which is the state of a mind adhering to something knowable with prudent fear of erring.

⁴ Otherwise Jombart, Nouvelle Revue Theologique, 1923, p. 176.

The notions which recur most, and the prior exposition of which is of the greatest importance, are those of certainty, opinion, and doubt. For the sake of completeness we shall add some points concerning the notion of probability, the immoderate use of which has so greatly entangled the treatise on conscience.

I. Certainty is the state of a mind adhering to some knowable thing without a prudent fear of erring. It is said "without a prudent fear"; for an imprudent fear is not always absent even from the certainty of faith. "But sometimes," says Aquinas, "the possible intellect is determined to this, that it totally adhere to one part" (De Verit., q. 14, a. 1). And elsewhere: "Certainty is nothing other than the determination of the intellect to one" (In III Sent., dist. 23, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 3).

Certainty is distinguished into metaphysical, physical, and moral, according as it is founded in the essences of things, in physical laws, or in moral laws, that is, those which govern the inclinations and morals of human beings.

Moral certainty is usually divided into strict and broad. Strict certainty is that of which we have just spoken. Broad certainty is that which includes some prudent fear, or "which does not exclude every prudent fear" (St. Alphonsus, I, 81); hence it cannot be called certainty properly so called, but must be referred to opinion, as will be more evident from what is to be said.

II. Opinion is the state of a mind adhering to some knowable thing with a prudent fear of erring. "But sometimes the intellect is inclined more to one thing than to another; yet that which inclines it does not sufficiently move the intellect to this, that it determine it totally to one of the parts; hence it indeed accepts one part, yet it always doubts about the opposite: and this is the disposition of one opining, who accepts one part of a contradiction with fear of the other" (St. Thomas, De Verit., q. 14, a. 1). And elsewhere: "One opining has thought without perfect assent; but he has something of assent, insofar as he adheres to one more than to another" (In III Sent., dist. 23, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1). Moreover, one opining gives the fearful assent of which there has been speech to a proposition, or to one part of a contradiction, as true. "One opining," says St. Thomas, "says (certainly with fear) that what he opines is true" (In VI Eth., lect. 8).

Corollary I. One who opines that a law exists does not wholly ignore the existence of the law, but knows it in some measure, or truly has a positive cognition of it, although a weak one.

Corollary II. One who opines that a law exists holds the opinion favoring the law as certainly more probable, but the opinion which supports liberty as certainly less probable. But since a small excess of probability is commonly not clearly, and therefore not certainly, perceived, an opinion that is certainly more probable will commonly be notably more probable, or certain in a broad sense, imperfectly and improperly (cf. St. Alphonsus, Lettere, III, n. 219).

III. Doubt is the state of a mind fluctuating between two parts of a contradiction because of no motives, or because of equal motives on both sides. "Our intellect," says the Angelic Doctor, "stands in different ways with respect to the parts of a contradiction. For sometimes it is not inclined more to one than to the other, either because of a defect of things moving it, as in those problems concerning which we do not have reasons, or because of the apparent equality of those things which move toward each part: and this is the disposition of one doubting, who fluctuates between two parts of a contradiction" (De Verit., q. 14, a. 1). Again: "When a man does not have a reason for one part more than for the other, either because he has one for neither, which belongs to one who does not know, or because he has one for each, but an equal one, which belongs to one doubting, then he in no way assents, since his judgment is in no way determined, but is equally disposed toward different things" (III Sent., dist. 23, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1). Nor does St. Alphonsus speak otherwise: "A doubtful conscience is that which suspends assent for each part of the doubt, and remains uncertain and hesitating" (I, 20). "A doubtful conscience is that which, remaining undeliberated, suspends assent for each part" (Homo Apostolicus, tr. I, n. 12). Therefore the Doctors whom we have cited teach that one doubting gives assent, not even a weak assent, to neither part of a contradiction as true. St. Alphonsus gives the ultimate reason for this matter in these words: "For although, when reasons of equal weight support each opinion, each would have force to move the intellect to assent if they were not mutually opposed; nevertheless, since here they are directly opposed to each other, each is now deprived of the force of drawing assent to itself, and by reason of the equality of the weights one destroys the other, and both therefore bring forth nothing except mere doubt" (Dichiarazione del Sistema, appendix, n. 21).

Suspicion is reduced to doubt, that is, the state of mind in which either opinion seems to someone doubtfully more probable. "As all," says St. Alphonsus, "both Probabilists and Antiprobabilists, agree, when there is a slight preponderance between two opinions, so that the excess is very slight and doubtful, then both opinions are regarded as equally probable according to that common axiom: A little is reckoned as nothing" (I, 55, 7th ed.). Likewise St. Thomas: "Certain acts of the intellect have unformed thought without firm assent, whether they incline to neither part, as happens to one doubting, or incline more to one part, but are supported by some slight sign, as happens to one suspecting, or adhere to one part, yet with fear of the other, which happens to one opining" (II-II, q. 2, a. 1). Again: "Reason takes what is little as though it were nothing" (I-II, q. 14, a. 4).

Doubt, or a doubt, is distinguished:

1. Into strict and broad doubt. Strict doubt, or doubt properly so called, is that which we have just described. Broad doubt is some such doubting or hesitation which remains in the state of opinion; hence it is only doubt taken improperly.

Strict doubt is divided into positive and negative, according as someone doubts because of equal or nearly equal motives, or because of no motives, or slight motives, on either side.¹

2. Into speculative and practical doubt, according as the doubt concerns the morality of an action considered in the abstract, for example whether it is licit to paint on a feast day, or concerns the morality of an action viewed in particular, for example whether it is licit for me to paint on this feast day (St. Alphonsus, I, 21).

3. Into doubt of law and doubt of fact. Doubt of law is had when there is doubt about the existence, sense, extension, or cessation from within of a law or disposition; for example, if there is doubt whether it is licit to paint on a feast day. Doubt of fact obtains when there is doubt about a particular fact or thing on which the application of a law or disposition to a particular case depends; for example, if there is doubt whether someone has fulfilled the law or is excused from the law. Yet authors do not agree in delineating doubts of law and of fact.

IV. Probability, or a probable sententia (opinion),² is taken by different persons in a different sense. Some call that opinion probable which rests on a grave foundation, even though perhaps on a foundation certainly less grave than the foundation of the opposite opinion; so the Probabilists. Others require that it rest on a foundation equally or almost equally grave as the opposite; so St. Alphonsus (Dell' uso moderato, c. 5, n. 25). Others require a foundation so grave that it merits the assent of a prudent man; this belongs only to the more probable opinion; so commonly the philosophers.³ An opinion thinly or doubtfully probable is not called probable except improperly.

A probable opinion is distinguished:

1. Into probable absolutely, or in itself, and probable comparatively, or relatively, according as it is probable viewed in itself alone or compared with the opposite. What is comparatively probable is either far more probable, or most probable; or certainly, or much, more probable; or equally, or almost equally, probable; or, as others add, certainly, or much, less probable.⁴

2. Into probable in the logical sense and probable in the ethical or practical sense. Probable in the logical sense is what has grave reasons, or reasons fit for proving. Probable in the ethical sense is what has reasons so grave that, at least by force of a reflex principle, it can direct actions, or be approved for practice.

3. Into probable intrinsically and probable extrinsically. An opinion is called probable intrinsically if it is probable because of intrinsic reasons; probable extrinsically if such great extrinsic authority supports it that, because of that authority, it is prudently held as intrinsically probable. From these things it is clear that extrinsic probability is resolved into intrinsic probability. Besides, concerning extrinsic probability, first note proposition 27, condemned by Alexander VII: "If a book belongs to some junior and modern author, the opinion ought to be judged probable so long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the Holy Apostolic See as improbable."⁵ Then observe these things:

a) "The authority of writers must be estimated not from their multitude, but from their weight; so that the authority of few, or even of one doctor endowed with special knowledge and piety, is sometimes to be preferred to many others" (St. Alphonsus, Diss. de usu mod. op. prob., n. 88, year 1757).⁶

b) The authority of St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus is very great. That St. Thomas is to be preferred to all others, no one today will deny. Moreover, from the various ecclesiastical documents by which the doctrine of St. Thomas is celebrated and inculcated in an entirely singular way, it is enough to recall to mind the encyclical Aeterni Patris (4 Aug. 1879), the Motu Proprio of Pius X, De Studio doctrinae S. Thomae in scholis catholicis promovendo (29 Jun. 1914), and canons 589, § 1 and 1366, § 2.

The very great authority of St. Alphonsus is clear both from the fact that he was raised to the dignity of Doctor of the Church,⁷ and from the many, and singular, praises by which the Church has not ceased to adorn and commend his doctrine.⁸ Hence in controversial matters those authors should be consulted cautiously who easily withdraw from the doctrine of St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus, and who are struck by these words which Mercurelli, at the command of Pius IX, wrote back to Vitozza, who had defended the doctrine of St. Alphonsus against Ant. Ballerini: "His Holiness judged it commendable that you undertook to defend the praises bestowed by the Church upon the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, and that you took pains to meet the malice of those who, abusing the dispositions instituted concerning that same doctrine, tried to depress it."⁹

c) Concerning the manner in which St. Alphonsus gives his judgment about the value of opinions, it is useful to note these things:

(alpha) Generally, for him that opinion is practically probable which he calls probable.

(beta) If he calls one opinion more probable and another probable, he understands them as doubtfully more probable and doubtfully less probable, so that the latter too is held by him as practically probable.¹⁰ If concerning some opinion he says, "It is said not improbably," or "It does not seem improbable," or "Authors say probably," or, for example, "Lugo probably says," then regularly he holds the opinion in question as practically probable. If, once the doctrine set forth has been proved, he adds, for example, "Lugo observes," commonly he approves such an observation.

(gamma) If he writes, "The Doctors say that it is probably licit," from this it is not certainly clear what he himself thinks. If he calls certain opinions neither probable nor improbable, he keeps silent about his judgment concerning them. If he calls one opinion more probable, but gives no judgment about the opposite, or says of it, "I do not dare to condemn it"; "I do not dare to call it improbable," he does not therefore pronounce it practically probable, but leaves the matter to the judgment of others (Preface of St. Alphonsus, bk. V, n. 76).

(delta) If he calls some opinion truer, far, much, notably, certainly more probable, or more common and more probable, he does not hold the opposite as sufficiently founded.

(epsilon) If he calls an opinion common or more common, and gives no judgment about the opposite, the former commonly must be called his own.

Finally, if there is doubt about the doctrine of the holy Doctor, sometimes the doubt can be resolved from a comparison of different works and places.

¹ But if St. Alphonsus (I, 20) states that positive doubt is had "when for each part, or at least for one, there is a grave motive," he takes the word "doubt" in the broader sense, insofar as it includes both strict and broad doubt.

² It is better called an opinion (sententia) than an opinion (opinio), because opinio designates a state of mind.

³ Cf. De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 14-17.

⁴ An opinion which by some is called the only probable one falls into an opinion certain in the broad sense.

⁵ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1127.

⁶ Among grave authors St. Alphonsus counts: Suarez, Soto, Azor, Canus, Sylvius, Cajetan, Banez, Navarrus, Paludanus, Toletus, Sylvester, Lessius, Molina, Sanchez, Angelus, Vasquez, Armilla, Valentia, Layman, de Lugo, Castropalaus, Bonacina, Emmanuel Sa, Pontius, Cabassutius, Collet, Roncaglia, the Salmanticenses, Petrocorensis, Abelly, Cardenas, Coninck, Gamachaeus, Isambert, etc., besides St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, St. Antoninus, and Scotus, whose authority indeed must be preferred to others (cited dissertation, loc. cit.).

⁷ This dignity, according to the doctrine of Benedict XIV, "does not pertain to doctors who have been in the Church, but to doctors of the Church itself" (De Serv. Dei beatif., etc., bk. 4, p. 2, c. 11, n. 11). For it, as the cited author teaches, there are required "eminent doctrine, notable sanctity of life... and besides this, the declaration of the Supreme Pontiff or of a General Council legitimately gathered" (loc. cit., n. 13).

⁸ It is pleasing to report some excerpts from certain ecclesiastical documents: 1. The Sacred Penitentiary on 5 July 1831 responded that a confessor is not to be disquieted who in the practice of the Sacred Penitentiary follows all the opinions of St. Alphonsus, although he does not read the works of the blessed Doctor except to know his doctrine accurately, without weighing the arguments or reasons on which the various opinions rest. Yet you should not apply these things to opinions which are sufficiently established to be opposed to declarations of the Church, or which someone, after perhaps making inquiry and taking all things into account, judges to be certainly less probable. 2. The Sacred Penitentiary on 19 Dec. 1855 responded to a certain professor that, notwithstanding his oath of following Probabiliorism and the opinions of the Probabiliorists, he could "follow and publicly hand on in all things the doctrine of St. Alphonsus de Ligorio." 3. The decree Urbis et Orbis, dated 23 March 1871, concerning the concession of the title of Doctor: "He (St. Alphonsus) dispelled and drove away the darkness of errors widely diffused by unbelievers and Jansenists, by learned works, and especially by treatments of Moral Theology. Besides this he clarified obscure things and explained doubtful ones, since among the tangled opinions of theologians, whether laxer or stricter, he paved a safe way by which the directors of the souls of the Christian faithful could walk with unoffending foot." 4. The Apostolic Letter in the form of a Brief, dated July 1871, concerning confirmation of the title of Doctor: "Intending his mind solely toward the glory of God and the spiritual salvation of men, he wrote very many books, filled with sacred learning and piety, whether amid the tangled opinions of theologians, both laxer and stricter, for fortifying a safe way by which the directors of the souls of Christ's faithful could walk with unoffending foot, or for informing and instructing the clergy." 5. Finally, the Congregations in their responses, repeatedly and expressly, referred questioners especially to the doctrine of St. Alphonsus (De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 46-48).

⁹ Nouv. Rev. theol. VII, p. 98.

¹⁰ Cf. De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 64-65.

Proposition. For acting licitly, certainty strictly so called concerning the honesty of the action to be placed here and now is required. This is clear, first, from Sacred Scripture. "But he who discerns, if he eats, is condemned, because it is not from faith. But everything that is not from faith is sin" (Rom. 14:23). Here St. Paul treats the controversy about the eating of foods which the Mosaic law prohibited. Moreover, the Apostle teaches that he sins who eats the aforesaid foods while discerning, Greek diakrinomenos, which in the context means: struggling with himself, doubting, hesitating,¹ whether the eating is licit. But according to the Apostle the reason is that every action placed without a firm persuasion concerning the honesty of the action is sinful. "It is said," says St. Alphonsus, "from faith, namely, from a certain dictate of conscience, so that a man is persuaded in his conscience that by acting he acts rightly" (I, 55). This interpretation is deduced from the context of the discourse (vv. 2, 14, 22), and even today is commonly admitted.² There is added, second, an argument taken from reason. Beyond doubt, he sins who wills and chooses an action, whether it is good or evil, whether it offends God or does not offend God. But one acts thus who wills and chooses an action about which he doubts whether here and now it is licit. Hence St. Augustine: "To do that which is uncertain whether it is a sin is a certain sin."³ St. Alphonsus asserts the same repeatedly (I, 22, 24; likewise I, 81 and Homo Apostolicus I, 65, where he teaches that not even a most probable opinion of itself and ultimately suffices).

Corollary I. Authors commonly teach that broad certainty suffices for acting licitly. But this is said less accurately; for broad certainty still admits prudent fear, or broad doubt. But it is not licit to place an action as long as one still prudently fears that it is formal sin, or a true offense against God. Moreover, this fear or broad doubt is easily excluded through some general reflex principle, for example: It is licit to follow an opinion certain in the broad sense; which principle others also call concomitant.

Corollary II. It suffices that someone in good faith be certain of the liceity of an action, even if the foundation on which the certainty rests is less solid. Nor is it required that someone reflexively judge that he is certain.

Corollary III. One who acts with a practical doubt concerning the honesty of an action commits as much and such a sin as that about which he doubts; for he perpetrates as much and such a sin as the danger to which he exposes himself (St. Alphonsus, I, 22). If only the notion of sin is apprehended, there is had a sin of unnamed species; concerning this, however, observe these words of St. Thomas: "When reason apprehends something as evil, it always apprehends it under some notion of evil; for instance because it is contrary to a divine precept, or because it is scandal, or on account of something of this kind; and then such an evil will is reduced to such a species of malice" (I-II, q. 19, a. 5, ad 3). "Yet it must be noted for practice, what many are ignorant of, that it is gravely illicit to act with a practical doubt about grave sin."⁴

¹ The source's Greek form is badly OCR'd; the intended term is diakrinomenos.

² That by "faith" supernatural faith is not understood, but a dictate of conscience, is clear from Lateran IV (c. 41); and that a certain dictate is understood is taught by Estius, Beelen, Cornely, Reithmayer, Bisping, and other interpreters commonly.

³ Bk. I, De Baptismo, c. 5.

⁴ Cf. Marc, n. 37; Vindiciae Alphonsianae, I, p. 504; Aertnys-Damen, I, n. 64.

The sayings to be explained either represent, in a brief formula, the moral system itself or its demonstration, or they exhibit rules by which doubts of fact are solved.

I. A doubtful law does not oblige. The sense is: A law whose existence or enactment is strictly doubtful does not oblige. But a law whose cessation or fulfillment is strictly doubtful does oblige; likewise a law whose existence or enactment is certainly more probable.

II. In doubt the condition of the possessor is better. Wherefore observe:

1. The principle has force both in the matter of justice and in the matter of other virtues, whenever the dispute is between liberty and law (St. Alphonsus, I, 26). Nevertheless the sense of the principle is different according as it regards justice or another virtue, as will be clear from what must be said under 2 and 3.

2. In the matter of justice he is said to possess who holds the thing about which there is dispute with the mind of an owner or as his own. In this matter the principle has force insofar as one who has begun in good faith to possess a thing can retain it until it is demonstrated that it belongs to another (St. Alphonsus, I, 36; VI, 904, 905).

3. But if the dispute is between liberty and law, that is said by us to possess which is at least prior by nature. Hence liberty possesses in doubt: 1. whether a positive law has been established or promulgated; 2. whether a law comprehends some person or case; 3. whether the fact founding the law has taken place. The law possesses in doubt whether it has ceased or has been fulfilled. But the principle has force only, or the condition of the possessor is better only, in strict doubt, and not if that which supervenes is more probable.

III. In doubt a fact is not presumed but must be proved. The principal fact is understood; such are, for example, the establishment of a law, the fact founding a law, the cessation and fulfillment of a law. These, therefore, are considered as if they had not taken place until, according to the things explained above, they have been sufficiently proved.

IV. In doubt that which has been done is presumed to have been done rightly; or: In doubt one must stand for the validity of the act. These have force if the principal fact is established, but there is doubt about an accessory fact or about the circumstance or manner in which the fact took place. In that case the fact is presumed to have been done duly. Hence one who doubts, for example, whether he confessed duly or obtained a dispensation validly, can stand for the validity of the act (St. Alphonsus, I, 182; VI, 461). The principle does not have force if the manner in which the act was placed is established, but there is doubt whether the act so placed is valid.

From what was said above concerning the certitude requisite for conscience (see 641 sqq.), it follows that: (a) when the state of mind is positive or negative doubt, one is not allowed to act; for a person who is ignorant of what he should do, or who is fluctuating between opposites, runs the risk of sin and its consequences, if he acts blindly; (b) when the state of mind is suspicion, one is not allowed to act, for conscience must be more than conjecture or inclination; (e) when the state of mind is opinion, one is or is not allowed to act, according as the opinion has or has not the qualities required for certitude that is moral and practical (as explained above in 643 sqq.).

Doubt and Suspicion.—The following are the duties of a person whose state of mind about his obligation is one of doubt or suspicion:

(a) If he has no time to resolve his hesitation but must decide at once, he should follow the rules given for a perplexed conscience (see above, 611 sqq.). Example; Sempronius is ordered by his father to go on an errand; by his mother, to remain at home. He does not know whom he should obey, but argues that there can be no harm in performing the errand, since he feels that he is forced anyway. Sempronius’ impromptu decision proceeds from a sense of moral responsibility; it is good, and as certain as he is able to make it.

(b) If a person has time to resolve his hesitation, he should not trust to common sense, but should consult moral theology, if he is competent to understand and apply it, or should have recourse to his confessor, if he is not a theologian. The attention given to his problem should be proportionate to the gravity of the duty in question, its importance for third parties, etc. (see below, 667 Sqq.). Example: If a layman is uncertain whether a practice he follows in his business is dishonest, he should consult a priest; if the priest is uncertain, he should refer to his theology and study the matter until he is able to give a well-founded, morally certain judgment.

Reflex principles by the aid of which a negative doubt may be solved, when the question is about the existence or non-existence of some fact connected with obligation, are the following:

(a) If the fact at issue is one about which presumption may be had from general or personal experience, the doubt may be settled by the principle: “In uncertainty decide according to what usually happens.” Examples: Titus is uncertain whether his boy of seven years has the use of reason and is bound to go to Mass. As a rule, children attain discretion at the age of seven; and hence Titus should take his boy to Mass. Fr. Caius is uncertain whether he has said Terce. His experience is that such uncertainties on his part have always been baseless in the past; hence, he may consider that he has said Terce as usual.

(b) If the fact at issue is one about which no presumption is afforded, either from general or personal experience, recourse may be had to the principle: “A fact should not be taken for granted, but must be proved.” Examples: Sempronia doubts whether her practice of saying the Rosary daily was the result of a vow; but, as there is no proof or circumstantial evidence of a vow, it may be held that her practice originated in a resolution. Caius, a stranger, claims that Titus owes him for an unpaid debt of his father. Titus knows nothing of the alleged debt, and the only substantiation for its existence is the word of the stranger. Titus is not obliged to pay.

In the above cases negative doubt was solved generally in favor of non-obligation as against obligation. But there are two cases in which negative doubt must be settled in favor of obligation, according to the rule: “In doubt follow that which is safer.” The two cases are:

(a) Negative doubt must be settled in favor of obligation, when the doubt is about a matter of such importance that it does not permit the taking of risks in its performance, as when there is question of laws that safeguard the supreme rights of man, or of laws that prescribe the essentials to be used in the administration of the Sacraments. Example: Sempronius adopts a newly-born infant abandoned at his door. As there is nothing to indicate whether the baby has been baptized or not, Sempronius takes the safer course and has it baptized.

(b) Negative doubt must be settled in favor of obligation when it persists because no reflex principle is found, or none that seems to be suitable for the case. Example: Titus wavers between uncertainties about the existence of a law; he can discover no reasons pro or con, and he knows no principle or presumption to guide himself by in his difficulty. He does not know or even think that he may act as if the law were non-existent, and hence he must inquire further, or else act as if the law did exist.

For the above-mentioned cases, to which their principle does not apply, Probabilists refer to the rules for a doubtful conscience (see 656 sqq.). The following special rules are given for cases of negative doubt:

(a) If the doubt is one of law and insoluble, one is free to act; for it is a general principle that an act may be considered lawful, as long as there is no serious reason to the contrary. Example: Sempronius goes out into the country on Sunday afternoon. An opportunity to fish presents itself, but Sempronius begins to doubt whether there is or is not a church law against fishing on Sundays. As no argument for either side is known to him, he may act on the general principle that what is not forbidden is lawful.

(b) If the doubt is one of fact and insoluble, and a prohibitory law is involved, one is free to act; for it is commonly admitted that legislators do not intend their prohibitions, which are restrictions of liberty, to be interpreted with the utmost rigor. Example: Titus is eating a chicken dinner late on Thursday night when his watch stops. As he has no way of discovering the time, he does not know whether Friday or the end of the dinner will arrive first. He may continue the meal, making no undue delays.

(c) If the doubt is one of fact, and a preceptive law is in question, one must take reasonable precautions to settle the doubt; for the lawgiver wills that those who are subject to the law should make use of the ordinary means to learn the facts on which obligation depends (see above, 384). If the doubt remains insoluble, one may decide in favor of liberty; for it may reasonably be presumed that the legislator does not intend to obligate those whose obligation remains uncertain. Example: Caius doubts whether he has reached the age of sixty, when the obligation of fasting ends. He should try to discover his real age; but, if he can find no real proofs either for or against the age of sixty, he may decide in favor of sixty, if there are some indications that he is of that age.

The Sin of Doubt.—Faith as explained above must be firm assent, excluding doubt (see 752, 799), and hence the saying: “He who doubts is an unbeliever.” The word “doubt,” however, has many meanings, and in some of those meanings it is not opposed to firm assent, or has not the voluntariness or acceptance of error that the unbelief of heresy or infidelity includes. To begin with, doubt is either methodical or real.

(a) Methodical doubt in matters of faith is an inquiry into the motives of credibility of religion and the reasons that support dogma, made by one who has not the slightest fear that reason or science can ever contradict faith, but who consults them for the purpose of clarifying his knowledge and of strengthening his own faith or that of others. This kind of doubt is employed by St. Thomas Aquinas, who questions about each dogma in turn (e.g., “Whether God is good”), and examines the objections of unbelievers against it; but unlike his namesake, the doubting Apostle, he does not withhold assent until reason has answered the objectors, but answers his own questions by an act of faith: “In spite of all difficulties, God is good, for His Word says: ‘The Lord is good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him’ (Lament, iii. 25).”

(b) Real doubt, on the contrary, entertains fears that the teachings of revelation or of the Church may be untrue, or that the opposite teachings may be true.

Real doubt in matters of faith is always unjustifiable in itself, for there is never any just reason for doubting God’s word; but it is not always a sin of heresy or of infidelity. There are two kinds of real doubt, viz., the involuntary and the voluntary. (a) Doubt is involuntary, when it is without or contrary to the inclination of the will, or when it proceeds from lack of knowledge (see 40-55 on the Impediments to Voluntariness). Example: Indeliberate doubts, and doubts that persist in spite of one, lack the inclination of the will, while doubts that proceed from invincible ignorance lack knowledge. (b) Doubt is voluntary, when it is according to inclination and with sufficient knowledge.

Involuntary doubt in matters of faith is neither heretical nor sinful, for an act is not sinful, unless it is willed (see 99).

(a) Indeliberate doubts arise in the mind before they are adverted to and without any responsibility of one’s own for their appearance. From what was said above on first motions of the soul (see 129), it is clear that such doubts are not sinful.

(b) Unwelcome doubts persist in the mind after they have been adverted to, and, since faith is obscure (see 752, 799), it is not possible to exclude all conscious doubts, or even to prevent them from occurring often or lasting a considerable time. From what was said above on temptation (see 253 sqq.), it is clear that, if the person troubled with unwished doubts makes prompt and sufficient resistance, he not only does not sin, but gains merit. But, if his resistance is not all it should be, and there is no danger of consent to the temptation, he sins venially.

(c) Ignorant doubts occur in persons who have not received sufficient religious instruction, through no fault of their own, and who therefore regard the doctrines of faith as matters of opinion, or at least look upon doubts as not sinful. From what was said above on invincible ignorance (see 30), it is clear that such persons do not sin by their doubts.

Voluntary doubt is entertained either in ignorance for which one is responsible, or in full knowledge; in the former case it is indirectly voluntary, in the latter, directly voluntary.

(a) The doubts of one who is responsible for them because he did not use the means to instruct himself in the faith, are a sin of willful ignorance proportionate to the negligence of which he was guilty; but, if he is willing on better knowledge to put aside his doubts and accept the teaching of the Church, he is not pertinacious, and hence not guilty of heresy or infidelity.

(b) The doubts of one who is responsible for them, and not uninstructed or ignorant in faith, are sometimes positive, sometimes negative. Neither of these kinds of doubt is equivalent to heresy or infidelity in every case.

Negative doubt is the state of mind in which one remains suspended between the truth contained in an article of faith and its opposite, without forming any positive judgment either of assent to or dissent from the article, or its certainty or uncertainty.

(a) If this suspension of decision results from a wrong motive of the will, which directs one not to give assent on the plea that the intellect, while not judging, offers such formidable difficulties that deception is possible, then it seems that the doubter is guilty of implicit heresy, or at least puts himself in the immediate danger of heresy.

(b) If this suspension of judgment results from some other motive of the will (e.g., from the wish to give attention here and now to other matters), the guilt of heresy is not incurred, for no positive judgment is formed. Neither does it seem, apart from the danger of consent to positive doubt or from the obligation of an affirmative precept of faith then and there (see 925), that any serious sin in matters of faith is committed by such a suspension of judgment. Examples: Titus, being scandalized by the sinful conduct of certain Catholics, is tempted to doubt the divinity of the Church. He does not yield to the temptation by deciding that the divinity of the Church is really doubtful, but the difficulty has so impressed him that he decides to hold his judgment in abeyance. It seems that there is here an implicit judgment (i.e., one contained in the motive of the doubt) in favor of the uncertainty of the divinity of the Church. Balbus has the same difficulty as Titus, and it prevents him from eliciting an act of faith on various occasions. But the reason for this is that an urgent business matter comes up and he turns his attention to it, or that he does not wish at the time to weary his brain by considering such an important question as that of faith, or that he thinks he can conquer a temptation more easily by diverting his thoughts to other subjects (see 257), or that he puts off till a more favorable moment the rejection of the difficulty. In these cases there is not heretical doubt, since Balbus forms no positive judgment, even implicitly, but there may be a sin against faith. Thus, Balbus would sin seriously if his suspension of assent should place him in immediate danger of positive doubt; he would sin venially, if that suspension be due to some slight carelessness.

Positive doubt is the state of mind in which one decides, on account of some difficulty against faith, that the latter is really doubtful and uncertain, and that assent cannot be given to either side. With regard to such a state of mind note: (a) If this judgment is formed by a Catholic, it is heretical; for his faith, as he knows and admits, is the true faith, revealed and proposed as absolutely certain. Hence, although he does not deny the faith, he does positively judge that what is revealed by God and proposed infallibly by the Church as certain, is not certain, and thus in his intellect there is pertinacious error.

(b) If this judgment is formed by a non-Catholic, it is likewise heretical, if the truth doubted belongs to divine or Catholic faith, for we are now considering the formal heretic who belongs to a non-Catholic sect against conviction; but it is not heretical, if the doctrine doubted belongs only to what is wrongly considered in his sect as divine faith, or to what may be called Protestant faith (i.e., the official confession of his religion), for he does not profess to accept his church as an infallible interpreter.

The doubts We have been just discussing are the passing doubts that come to those who are believers, or who consider themselves believers. There are also doubts that are permanent, and that are held by those who class themselves, not as believers, but as doubters or agnostics. Some of these sceptics doubt all religious creeds, holding that it is works and not beliefs that matter. This doctrine amounts to infidelity, since it rejects Christian faith entirely. Others profess Fundamentalism, which accepts a few Christian beliefs and considers the others as optional, pretending that the true faith cannot be recognized amid so much diversity of opinions. This doctrine is heretical, since it accepts some and rejects others of the articles of faith.

Rash Doubts.—Doubt about the probity of others is sinful, when there are no sufficient reason for it; for example, it would be unreasonable to suspend judgment about a man of excellent reputation because a well-known calumniator had spoken against him. But a doubt may be reasonable, as when a person has had a good reputation for honesty but a reliable witness declares that he is dishonest. In such a case should one decide for the innocence or for the guilt of the party called into doubt, or should one suspend judgment on the matter?

(a) It is not lawful to interpret reasonable doubts in a sense unfavorable to another person, for this would amount to rash judgment, since the reasons are sufficient for doubt but not for decision. Hence, it would be wrong to believe that a person of good repute was a thief, because another person of good repute said so.

(b) It is lawful to suspend judgment in case of reasonable doubts, if there is no obligation of deciding one way or the other, for in so doing one does no injury either to one’s own intelligence (since the doubt is reasonable) or to the honor of another person (since, as supposed, there is no obligation of judging positively in his favor). Just as there is no duty of making acts of love of our neighbor on every occasion, neither is there a duty of deciding doubts to his advantage on every occasion, or of having any opinion about him whatever. Some authors do not admit this, but the common teaching is against them.

(c) It is not lawful to suspend judgment, but the reasonable doubt must be resolved in a favorable sense, if there is an obligation or a wish to decide one way or the other; otherwise one would decide in an unfavorable sense and be guilty of rash judgment. This is what is meant by the well-known maxim that doubts about the character of a neighbor should be settled in favor of the neighbor. Hence, if one were in serious danger of forming a rash judgment and could not otherwise overcome the temptation, a suspension of judgment should give place to favorable judgment. It is true that one may be frequently in error by thus judging well of mankind, since man is inclined to evil from his youth (Gen., viii. 21) and the number of fools is infinite (Eccles., i. 15). But it is a less evil to fall into the speculative error of taking a bad man for good than by adopting another course to fall into the practical error of becoming bad oneself by violating a law of prudence, justice and charity; and it is less harmful that many sinners should receive more credit than they deserve, than that one just man should be deprived of the good opinion that belongs to him. Pseudo-Ambrose (Apol. ii, David, c. 2, n. 5) says that those who judge others rashly often become worse by this act than the persons they judge; and St. Thomas remarks that favorable opinions of others harm no one, whereas unfavorable opinions are a wrong to innocent persons.

Obligations of the Possessor in Doubtful Faith Who Began Possession in Good Faith (Supervening Doubt).—(a) If he does not culpably neglect attempts to settle his doubt, he becomes a possessor in good faith. If the doubt is settled against him, he must restore (1771); if the doubt continues, he may retain possession and prescribe (i.e., acquire ownership through long exercise of ownership rights), for presumption favors the possessor, but he must he willing to restore, should another appear as the rightful owner.

(b) If he culpably neglects attempts to settle the doubt, he becomes a possessor in bad faith. If the doubt is settled against him, he must restore (1800), at least for the time during which his culpability was grave; if the doubt continues and its settlement is impossible through his fault, it seems that he should share ratably with another claimant according to the strength of the respective claims; if the doubt continues and there is no other claimant, it seems that he may act on the principle that presumption favors the possessor.

Obligations of the Possessor in Doubtful Faith Who Began in Bad Faith (Antecedent Doubt).—(a) If the property came to the possessor in doubtful faith without legal title (e.g., by violence), he has the obligations of one in bad faith, for presumption favors the former possessor.

(b) If the property came to him by legal title (e.g., by gift or sale), but from a former possessor of doubtful or suspected faith (e.g., one who seemed to have the property through theft), he must attempt to settle the doubt. Should the doubt nevertheless continue, some think he should divide it with another probable claimant, but others believe he may retain all.

(e) If the property came to him by legal title and from a former possessor in good faith, he must attempt to settle the doubt; but if the doubt remains in spite of his inquiries, he may retain the property in good faith, as long as matters continue in the same state.

It is licit to follow a truly probable opinion, the safer being left aside, whether equally probable or even truly more probable, where the question concerns only the honorableness of the action, by forming for oneself a conscience not directly, but from reflex principles.

The proposition is against probabiliorists and equiprobabilists. The first part is proved. Probabiliorism and equiprobabilism are refuted.

Proof 1. The system of the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists is not practical. For it is very difficult even for the doctors themselves to establish which opinion is more probable, which notably more probable. What appears to one more probable or notably more probable appears to another less probable and notably less probable. Indeed, what to one and the same person previously appeared more probable, far more probable, afterwards, the matter having been weighed better, seems less probable and much less probable.

Proof 2. For either the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists say that it is licit to act from the immediate judgment of the more probable or notably more probable opinion; or they say that it is licit to act from a mediate judgment, namely by force of the principle: a doubtful law does not oblige; an uncertain law does not produce a certain obligation; the will without knowledge of the law cannot be bound by its obligation. The first cannot be said, for although the opinion is more probable or notably more probable, nevertheless it is not certain; and without a certain conscience it is not licit to act. But the other, as is clear, leads not into probabiliorism or into equiprobabilism, but into simple probabilism. For where there is true probability against the law, the law is already doubtful and uncertain, and knowledge of the law cannot be had.

Proof 3. For we would be bound to follow the more probable or notably more probable opinion insofar as these approach more closely to truth. But this is false; for an opinion simply probable can approach more closely to truth, and a sentence can be false which bore before itself a certain greater appearance of truth. Moreover, here the question does not concern speculative truth but practical truth; the question does not concern adhesion of the intellect simply to truth, but the obligation of the will, which is not bound by the obligation of the law unless the law is certain and knowledge of the law is had.

The second part is proved. Simple probabilism is proved.

Proof 1. The proposition established is clear from the authority of very many and very grave theologians, who not only hand it down, but also affirm it as common doctrine, such as Suarez, Lugo, Struggl, La-Croix, Pignatelli, Vasquez, Elbel, Castropalaus, Sporer, etc. Cf. these Instit. Mor. ed. 4. Hence S. Alph. in Dissert. de usu moderato opinionis probabilis in concursu probabilioris, 2nd ed., Naples 1755: "We undertake to prove the last, more benign, and most common opinion, namely that it is licit to use a probable opinion even in concurrence with a more probable one in favor of the law, whenever that opinion has a certain and grave foundation." And certainly, although many after the Jansenists defended probabiliorism, nevertheless by far the greater part of theologians embraced probabilism. But he who in practice follows a doctrine which very many and very grave theologians teach, and which the doctors commonly hand down, acts prudently; but he who acts prudently acts honorably. For this reason, in the Dissertation just cited, S. D. immediately adds: "Add to these especially the argument, namely that if the benign opinion had been false, it certainly would by no means have been commonly received everywhere by doctors as it truly was received; or at least the Church would not have tolerated it, permitting souls commonly to walk by this way of perdition, as the adversaries cry out, deceived by such blind guides." And, as the same S. Alph. has it l. 6. n. 460, par. Haec autem, "nor is it an obstacle that several opinions which are circulated are not condemned by the Church, and yet by others more commonly are reputed lax; for the Church does not condemn all opinions which regard particular cases, although it does not approve them; but opinions which regard the universality of consciences, the Church does not approve nor keep silent about, as S. Aug. said, Epist. 119: The Church of God tolerates many things, and yet those things which concern faith or good life, it neither approves nor keeps silent about." Cf. L. 1. 3. n. 669 toward the end, Hoc unum, etc.; Bouquillon Theol. Fund. de Consc. c. 2. a. 1. § 2.

Proof 2. He who in practice follows an opinion which stands within the bounds of right reason and prudence acts prudently, and consequently honorably. But he who in practice follows a truly probable opinion, the more probable and safer being left aside, follows an opinion which stands within the bounds of right reason and prudence. Therefore. - The major is clear of itself. For what is more honorable than to follow right reason and prudence, which is right reason concerning things to be done? And Benedict XIV, C. Apostolica Constitutio § 21, indeed hands down this rule of acting, namely that we should follow the opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms. Moreover, it is by no means consonant with right reason, and especially with divine goodness, to wish to oblige man to perform somehow that which remains prudently uncertain to man himself after diligent inquiry, whether it is required by the order or not; especially since doubts of this kind are very frequent because of the weakness of the human intellect itself. This would be to impose unbearable burdens. L. 58. 86; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 10 ad 1. But the minor is clear from the very nature and definition of a truly probable opinion, which is not changed by the concurrence of another opinion, although more probable and safer. And this S. Alph. himself openly affirms in the definition of the more probable opinion; for he says that its contrary is judged probable. Cf. 112. Muzzarelli Dissert. de Regul. mor. opin., Rome 1807, p. 30 seq.; L. 1. 1. n. 79.

Proof 3. S. Alph. says this in his Op. Mor. Theol., 6th ed., Rome 1767: "There are two principles on which, relying, I defend the licit use of a probable opinion. The first, that a doubtful law, in the conflict of two equally probable opinions, does not oblige, because a doubtful law is not sufficiently promulgated. The other, that an uncertain law cannot introduce a certain obligation, because the obligation of law is posterior to liberty, with which man has been endowed by God." Each of these principles is explained and proved at length by S. D. l. 1. n. 66 seq., H. A. tr. 1. n. 37 seq. But when a truly probable opinion is present, although it is in concurrence with another more probable and safer one, each principle is still verified, namely that the law is uncertain if the question concerns its existence, or that it is doubtful if the question concerns its interpretation, because it is obscure; and therefore neither does the law have the power of actually obliging, since it has not been sufficiently or certainly promulgated; "for then the doubt whether the law exists is sufficiently promulgated, but the law is not promulgated," L. 1. 1. n. 70, Turin ed. 1846; nor is man, having certain possession of his liberty, bound to reckon himself despoiled of it because of an uncertain law: for antecedently to every law, each possesses his own liberty, since man must first be conceived as free, and then the law which is imposed on man. Therefore. L. 54 seq.

Now, that the law in that hypothesis is really doubtful or uncertain, so that it may prudently be regarded as such, whence that twofold axiom flows, is clear from the very nature of probability. For where true probability is present, greater probability does not of itself destroy the lesser; and this philosophers and theologians commonly affirm, and S. Alph. expressly hands down, H. A. tr. 1. n. 29 and l. 1. n. 40, where he says that the contrary of the more probable is also judged probable. The same S. D. explains this in this way in the Dissertation ed. 1755, n. 13: Greater probability does not destroy the lesser, "unless that lesser probability is drawn from the same principle, or unless the more probable opinion has in its favor so convincing an argument that the contrary seems truly improbable, or no longer gravely and certainly probable. But otherwise it must be said if the excess is not notable, and the opposed probability receives force from diverse principles, as almost always happens in the concurrence of opinions; for then the less probable opinion is by no means deprived of its grave probability." Indeed the probability or improbability of some opinion is not the same as its truth or falsity, so that one excludes the other; but it is a worthiness of meriting prudent assent, arising from grave motives, which, although greater or lesser, do not contradict one another if they are taken from diverse principles. But if they exhibit an argument so convincing that the opposite is judged improbable, we are already outside the case of greater or lesser probability, since then one opinion will be certain or probable, the other false or improbable.

Hence S. D. l. 6. n. 604, raising the question: "Whether a penitent can be absolved who wishes to follow an opinion contrary to that which the confessor holds," responds: "The common and to-be-followed opinion teaches that the confessor not only can, but is also bound under grave sin (where the question concerns grave matter, H. A. tr. 16. n. 118), to absolve a penitent who wishes to follow a probable opinion, although the opposite seems more probable to the confessor.... This common opinion standing, strengthened by so many authorities and reasons, I do not see how a confessor can with a safe conscience deny absolution to one wishing to follow an opinion which appears probable to the penitent himself, indeed perhaps more probable, if not directly at least reflexively, as probabilist authors commonly think, who by following a probable opinion in concurrence with a more probable one judge that they embrace an opinion reflexively more probable, as being confirmed by graver foundations and by the most common authority of doctors." S. D. has the same doctrine in his last work, H. A. tr. 16. n. 118; and to this opinion he adds no limits except the following: namely that "the opinion of the penitent have some probability, so that the confessor, although he does not hold it as solidly probable, nevertheless does not repute it altogether false... evidently erroneous." Cf. also l. 1. n. 87, where S. D. after Gerson says: "Theological doctors ought not to be quick to assert that some things are mortal sins where they are not most certain about the matter: Note, WHERE THEY ARE NOT MOST CERTAIN." Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 1. d. 26. n. 3; Pignatelli Cons. Can. tom. 8. cons. 15.

Proof 4. In order that law certainly oblige, it must be sufficiently promulgated, S. Th. 1. 2. q. 90. a. 4. But sufficient promulgation of law is not had if the law is not certain and manifest. Hence in canon law it is generally established: "In these things, concerning which the law is not found expressed, proceed, equity being preserved, always inclining toward the more humane part, according as you will see persons and causes, places and times, to require." C. Ex parte tua 11 de Transact. And in civil law it is decreed: "Whenever the interpretation of liberty is doubtful, response must be made according to liberty." L. 20 de R. I. "In a doubtful matter, to follow the more benign interpretation is no less just than safe." L. 192 de R. I. But the reason is that law imposes moral necessity, and therefore must necessarily bind the will. But it cannot necessarily bind the will except through knowledge. Therefore, knowledge of the law being excluded, the will remains morally free. S. Th. De Verit. q. 17. a. 3. Now if a most probable opinion is present against the law, it is evidently clear that knowledge of the law is lacking. For certainty and evidence cannot be had with the greatest opposite probability; indeed not even with simple probability. Hence S. Alph. says: "To constitute a doubtful law, true probability to the contrary suffices." L. 1. n. 57, ed. 1762. 1763.

Confirmation 5. By the authority of S. Thomas. Law is a certain rule and measure. In order that a rule direct and a measure measure, it must be applied to the thing which must be directed and measured. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 30. a. 4. Therefore law must reach the subjects whom it directs; but it reaches them through knowledge. S. Th. De Verit. q. 17. a. 3. Accordingly law must be certain and evident. Therefore, if the law is uncertain, namely if its existence is not established, if the law is doubtful, namely if the meaning of the law is obscure, the obligation of the law ceases; a precept does not bind except through knowledge. S. Th. l. c. Hence those axioms: An uncertain law cannot introduce a certain obligation; A doubtful law does not oblige. For the effect cannot surpass the cause. These things S. Thomas says altogether generally, nor does he distinguish between a law having against it a less probable, or equally probable, or more probable opinion. Therefore the whole question from the Angelic Doctor is this: whether a law having against it a more probable, equally probable, or less probable opinion can be said to reach man through knowledge, to bind him by means of knowledge, through knowledge, through the power of knowledge. But knowledge is not given if true probability is against it. Hence every question about mortal sin is determined dangerously unless the truth is had expressly. S. Th. Quodl. 9. a. 15. And S. Alph. l. 3 after n. 139, Epist. Resp.: "But in order that some action be affirmed absolutely to be a mortal sin, a probable opinion is not enough, nor even a more probable one; for the more probable does not exclude rational fear of erring; whence it does not bring about that the law does not remain doubtful, and that the opposite cannot be true, if it is truly probable."

Confirmation 6. Innocent III allowed a spouse suffering from impotence a three-year trial, C. Laudabilem 5 de Frig., and did not prescribe that it must first be seen whether potency was more probable, or at least equally probable. In the eighteenth century, when certain Indians in the Kingdom of Paraguay who had been converted to the faith had several wives, and questions arose concerning the validity of their marriages, Urban VIII responded to John de Lugo, afterwards Cardinal: "Where the opinions of doctors concur as probable on each side, those opinions are to be followed which, for the condition of places and barbarian men, are more favorable." Urban did not say that the more probable opinions were to be followed, nor did he say where equally probable opinions concur, but absolutely where probable opinions concur. Carden. Cris. Theol. Diss. 2. § 553. E. M. 119.

Nor indeed is it of any force, in order to overturn all the aforesaid things in almost one word, to object against them that probabilism has already been condemned by Innocent XI. For Innocent XI only commanded that liberty be given to the Fathers of the Society to defend probabiliorism and to refute probabilism, if they wished. Cf. E. M.; Wirceburg. De Actib. hum. c. 4.

Note: An exception, and a true and illogical exception of probabilism, is the limitation which some probabilists and equiprobabilists add to probabilism from the principle of possession: In doubt the condition of the possessor is better. Therefore, they say, a doubtful law, in doubt about the existence of the law, does not indeed oblige, because liberty possesses. But a doubtful law in doubt about its cessation obliges, because the law possesses. Hence if it is probable that you did not emit a vow, you are not bound by the vow. If you certainly emitted a vow, and it is probable that you satisfied it, you are still bound to satisfaction.

But thus to admit probabilism halfway concerning the existence of the law, and not concerning the cessation of the law, is to admit the principles and deny the conclusions. If a doubtful law does not oblige, precisely because it is doubtful, whenever it is doubtful it will not oblige. Now the law is as doubtful in doubt about its existence, namely about its first existence, as it is doubtful in doubt about its cessation; for if its cessation is probable, by that very fact the existence itself of the law becomes doubtful. But the law obliging is not a law which existed, but one which exists; nor is it the law which exists in the abstract, but one which binds us in the present by its certain obligation.

But if a probable opinion is had concerning the cessation of the law, however that may be understood, its obligation becomes doubtful, and its existence likewise becomes doubtful; namely again, not the very existence itself of the law in the abstract, but its force of obliging in the concrete, in the particular case, here and now. L. 1. 1. n. 63. 78. And thus, although it is certain that a vow was emitted and at some time existed, if you probably satisfied it, that certain vow, insofar as it once existed, becomes doubtful insofar as it binds you here and now; and that saying has force: A doubtful law does not oblige.

Possession indeed constitutes a prevailing right insofar as he who possesses is shown by possession itself, or at least is presumed, to be the owner of the thing which he possesses. But how can that be either demonstrated or reasonably presumed when the opposite is established by true or grave probability? For then it is established by true and grave probability that the possession is not legitimate, which alone can constitute a prevailing right. For if the fact alone of possession, without legitimate title, at least reasonably presumed, constituted that prevailing right, then all thieves and robbers could retain another's property by the prevailing right of possession. Cf. 157. 4; Troplong, Della Prescrizione c. 2 del Possesso a. 2228; D'Annib. ed. 4. p. 1. n. 260. 268.

The material fact itself of possession by no means constitutes a prevailing right in the internal forum, as regards the very right of dominion and ownership of the thing, but only as regards proof in the external forum, which must be instituted by the plaintiff against the possessor, because of the aforesaid presumption of dominion. But presumption yields to truth. Hence if someone has possessed in bad faith, even for a very long time, he must restore the thing even spontaneously and without proof or petition by the plaintiff. D'Annibale himself, who ed. 4. p. 1. n. 264 seq. follows the rule of possession, asserts n. 256 note 5: "Justice forbids giving damage to him who is in certain possession of his right....

I said, who is in certain possession of his right; for if the right of another is uncertain, either the condition of the possessor will be better, or at least because no certain right of another is violated, there will be no obligation of restitution." Behold how D'Annib. himself requires certain and legitimate possession, so that it really constitutes a prevailing right. And the same D'Annib. l. c. n. 259 note 18 also asserts: "Namely, certainty against true probability is not given." How therefore will the obligation of the law be certain, if it is probable that that obligation already ceased long ago?

See also ibid. n. 169. 181. 203. - Cf. 143. S. Alph. l. 3. n. 112 par. Secundo says: "When it is probable that the obligation of the law never began, or that it has been abolished, then the presumption in favor of the law ceases, and liberty possesses." Behold, the limitation of probabilism through the principle of possession is finished; and from S. D. also, it has no value except from presumption. S. D. joins indifferently the two cases, that the law never began, or that it has been abolished, and when each is probable, from S. D. the obligation of the law is not present. - Likewise n. 290 he says that probable custom suffices for excusing from the law. Behold again, no account is taken by S. D. of possession of the law.

And then, distinguishing well altogether between doubt and probability, he says: "that in doubt about custom the precept possesses, whence a dispensation must be sought; otherwise, if it is probable that custom is present." Cf. L. 1. 3. n. 325, par. Infirmi, n. 483, l. 4. n. 47. Besides, D'Annibale asserts the law of possession in a threefold case, namely in doubt 1. whether it receives a restrictive interpretation, 2. whether it is just, 3. whether it has ceased. P. 1. n. 262. And in the preceding n. 261 note 30 and n. 263 note 1, he affirms that S. Alphonsus perpetually used this rule of possession. - Now D'Annibale himself, cited n. 262 note 35, says: "except the 2nd case, in which all agree, Cf. here 157, in the others even those who seem to profess it depart from our rule."

And among these he expressly cites and reports only S. Alphonsus! And while the praised author notes this against Probabilism, that it must use exceptions which his rule of possession does not need, l. c. n. 266, he then candidly admits that his rule is not perpetual, and that it fails in several cases which he enumerates, l. c. n. 269 note 30. - But the alleged exceptions of Probabilism, namely when the question concerns not only the honorableness of an action, but an end to be obtained absolutely and the objective truth of the thing, l. c. n. 266, 256 note 5, are not really exceptions.

Cf. here 120. What he likewise says, l. c. n. 267, that the probabilist is forced to give contradictory responses, is in no way true. Cf. here 128. And it is certainly surprising that the learned theologian found a contradiction, cited n. 267, as regards that same case in which he himself had expressly affirmed a little before, namely n. 263, that it is licit to follow each of two contrary probable opinions. - Finally he asserts n. 264 that that rule of possession enjoys a better right, and n. 269 that it is better than the others not only as to the truth of the thing, but also as to practice; but in the following n. 270, immediately afterward, he affirms that it is licit to follow opinions truly and gravely probable; and n. 263, after he has set forth the various systems and also established his own rule n. 262, he says, let it be licit for each one to choose what pleases him more.

Perhaps to avert contradiction it can be said that the illustrious D'Annibale regarded that rule of possession not for the case of true probability, but for the case of doubt, which he seems sufficiently to suggest n. 269; and thus it is altogether true that theologians most commonly teach that rule, n. 268, and in this sense we also admit it and diligently explain it. Cf. here 143 seq. And certainly that rule is stated in doubt.

Since the authority of S. Alphonsus is very great in moral matters, and several more recent authors deny that S. D. stands for probabilism simply so called, but affirm that he teaches equiprobabilism, and rejects probabilism as lax doctrine; hence here especially we raise the question about the mind of the holy Doctor, although in the preceding article we have almost constantly used his opinions and even his words to establish the doctrine of probabilism.

E. M. Lest there be doubt in this matter, and that we may faithfully set forth the mind of S. D., we take his doctrine from the tract on Conscience in his work H. A., which he himself there, n. 79, declares that he wrote when near death. Now these things are had in n. 33. 77: "The third opinion, which is ours, says that when the opinion which favors liberty is equally probable as the opinion which favors the law, without doubt it can be followed licitly.... Here it is necessary that I warn something concerning my system, which must altogether be warned, and it is this: that when it is doubted whether the opinion favoring the law is equally probable or a little more probable, then the same principle has place, that a doubtful law does not oblige; for in such a case, the law itself does not cease to be strictly doubtful. For then, although some greater probability for the law might be present, since it is doubted whether this greater probability is present or not, the preponderance will be so slight and minimal that it must be counted for nothing before that saying commonly admitted by the adversaries themselves, that a little is reputed as nothing. But it would be otherwise when the excess were evident and certain, because then the opinion favoring the law will be certainly and much more probable; and therefore then, as was said from the beginning, the law is already morally promulgated, and therefore obliges, and is without doubt to be observed."

As regards the first, the holy Doctor refers himself back to those things which were said at the beginning. At the beginning, n. 31, these things are had: "But whether it is licit to operate with a probable opinion, there are three opinions, the first of which is that someone can licitly follow an opinion even less probable in favor of liberty, although the opinion in favor of the law is certainly more probable. Authors of the past century held this opinion almost commonly, but we say that it is lax and cannot licitly be embraced. The reason is that when the opinion in favor of the law is certainly more probable, then the law is no longer doubtful by a strict doubt, as happens, as we shall explain later, when the opinions both in favor of the law and in favor of liberty are equally probable; but it is morally certain, since it has in its favor a certain foundation that it is true, whereas on the contrary the less probable opinion, which favors liberty, has such a foundation that it is not true, so that it remains tenuously, or at least doubtfully, probable before the safer opinion; and therefore it is not prudence, but imprudence, to wish to follow it. For when it certainly appears to the intellect that the truth stands more for the law than for liberty, then the will cannot prudently and without fault follow the less safe part: for then it would not operate from its own judgment, or its own belief, but from a certain effort which by its will it will make upon the intellect, removing it from that part which seems truer to it, and bending it toward that part which not only seems to it not true, but does not even show that it has a certain foundation by which it could be true."

Now from these things it is openly clear that S. D. by an opinion certainly more probable really understands an opinion morally certain. For he says that then the law 1. is not doubtful by a strict doubt, but is morally certain; 2. that the same law then has in its favor a certain foundation that it is true; 3. again, that the said law has against itself only an opinion which has such a foundation that it is not true; 4. that the less probable opinion opposed to the law is tenuously or doubtfully probable; so that it is imprudence to wish to follow it, and that it not only seems not true, but does not even show that it has a certain foundation by which it could be true.

Now a tenuously probable opinion is not a truly probable opinion; and the same S. Alph. teaches this, n. 65: "tenuous probability is not true probability, but is only a certain false or vain appearance of probability." Likewise a doubtfully probable opinion is not truly and properly probable, which we contend it is licit to follow even in concurrence with the more probable. For if it is doubtfully probable, it participates in the nature of doubtful probability, and therefore properly speaking is not probable. And certainly a truly and properly probable opinion is defined by the same S. Alph., l. c. n. 21, as "that which rests on some grave foundation apt to incline the assent of a prudent man." Therefore a doubtfully probable opinion will be an opinion which has a doubtfully grave foundation, and therefore does not merit the assent of a prudent man, who would be exposed to the danger of acting imprudently. "Doubtfully probable," says S. Alph. l. c. n. 65, "which no one can follow, but if it is not probable, it has only some prudent reason that it is true... the doubtfully probable has some prudent reason, although not altogether stable, that it is probable."

And hence it is clear that that opinion which it is imprudence to wish to follow, and which not only seems not true, but does not even show that it has a certain foundation by which it could be true, is not a truly and properly probable opinion. Therefore if the less probable opinion opposed to the certainly more probable is not truly and properly probable, the certainly more probable opinion by no means remains within the limits of probability, but already reaches certainty. The same is confirmed from the Dissertation inserted in Op. Mor. l. 1. n. 55 of the sixth and seventh editions, and related in the edition of P. Gaude p. 25 as a commentary on the doctrine of S. Alphonsus in the text, and in the Turin edition of 1846, where he thus explains that phrase "certainly more probable." "I said," he says, "certainly more probable, because when the opinion in favor of the law is certainly and without any hesitation more probable, then that opinion cannot be anything except notably more probable. And in that case the safer opinion will no longer be doubtful (understand concerning doubt strictly taken... Cf. here 138), but is morally or quasi morally certain; at least it can no longer be called strictly doubtful, since it has in its favor a certain foundation that it is true. Hence then it happens that the less safe opinion, which lacks a certain foundation, remains either tenuously or at least doubtfully probable with respect to the safer; and therefore it is not prudence, but imprudence, to wish to embrace it," etc.

Note first that from S. D., if an opinion is certainly more probable, it is notably more probable, because a small excess either is not perceived by the intellect, or is not perceived without fear of erring. Hence, if an opinion is certainly more probable, it is also notably more probable. - Then note as regards that phrase, quasi morally certain, that to the holy Doctor in this matter, where the question concerns a certain moral estimation, a little is reputed as nothing. Moreover S. D. is not speaking of any probability whatever, but of that which appears certainly to the intellect, and he is speaking of one who, if he departed from this probability, would depart from his own judgment through a certain effort of the will, and would act against his conscience; to whom he therefore applies that saying of the Apostle, Rom. 14:23: What is not from faith is sin. Ibid. and H. A. tr. 1. n. 31. Finally S. D. calls that opinion lax which defends even a less probable opinion in favor of liberty without any distinction, namely one which has only some foundation of reason and authority; and therefore he distinguished by saying that someone cannot follow this less safe opinion when there is a great and certain preponderance in favor of the safer. Apolog. cont. il P. Patuzzi anno 1765. But the true doctrine of probabilism, which we follow, does not defend any probable opinion indiscriminately, but one certainly and gravely probable, which alone is truly probable. Likewise S. D. calls that doctrine lax which authors of the past century almost commonly handed down, namely in the latter part of that century, in which several lax opinions of probabilists were condemned by the Holy See; but certainly not Sanchez, Suarez, Lessius, Palaus, Laymann, Lugo, Pallavicini and very many others, whom S. Alph. himself, not only in his Moral Works, but in that very Dissertation on his moral system, approves and praises for his opinion. He himself defends this and repeatedly champions it, not against probabilists, but against rigid tutiorists, and affirms that for a series of many years it had without doubt been common among all. Breve Dissertaz. dell'uso moderato dell'Opin. Probab., Naples 1762, p. 48; Op. Mor. l. 1. n. 59. 68-73. 84.

As regards the other point, it is an evident thing that if S. D. by an opinion much more probable understands an opinion morally certain, or quasi morally certain against a tenuous or doubtful probability, by an opinion a little more probable he understands simply an excess of mere probability. For otherwise the holy Doctor himself could certainly not admit that a probable opinion can sometimes retain its probability and that someone can follow it, although the opposite is notably more probable, as he himself really admits several times. Cf. Comment. de Consc. et de Probabilismo n. 104 seq. But if it is asked why S. D. then designates that excess by saying "a little more probable," and not simply by saying "more probable," the reason is that S. D. considers the matter practically rather than speculatively, given the nature of the thing and the principles, and also the rigor of words, and thus distinguishes between a small and a notable excess of probability. A notable excess, truly such, of probability is had when it is evident and certain; and then, from S. D., probability reaches certainty. And this is indeed so, at least practically and regularly speaking; for such probability, at least practically, is confused with moral certainty, which in a certain broader sense is certainty. And in fact S. D. is speaking of a much greater probability that is certainly and evidently such. Certainly and evidently to whom? Not only certainly to the one opining, since all know well that one and the same opinion appears less probable to one and more probable to another, indeed even to the same person in diverse circumstances; but to all, or by the common judgment of the wise. And in fact if a proposition is much more probable certainly and evidently to all, or by the common judgment of the wise, it already really is, practically speaking, morally certain. For in things to be done we often use most probable and more probable opinions as though true, and as though morally certain, when greater certainty cannot be had. Every other excess, although perhaps notable, nevertheless if it is not so evident and certain, really cannot properly be called notable, since then there is doubt concerning such a notable excess, and the proposition which to one seems much more probable to another perhaps, indeed perhaps even to the same person, the matter having been weighed better, as S. Alph. himself confesses of himself, l. 1. n. 86, H. A. tr. 1. n. 78, appears much less probable. Therefore, if that notable excess of probability is so evident and certain, then it already reaches certainty, and by right and deservedly the opposite can only be tenuously or doubtfully probable. But if, although notable, it nevertheless is not so evident and certain, that excess really cannot as regards us be held as notable, but remains within the limits of equal probability or of a little greater probability. Certainly, if to the one opining alone a sentence seems notably more probable, or if doctors fall into various opinions concerning it, can it prudently be held as certainly and evidently more probable? Certainly not. Hence again it is clear that by that "a little greater" excess S. D. really understands simply an excess of probability.

Not only to the one opining. "Such an appearance (of greater probability)," says S. D., "cannot constitute a certain rule of operating, since it can deceive in many ways. For not rarely some opinion which will appear more probable to someone will appear less probable to another; indeed to the same person an opinion which yesterday was less probable will today appear more probable." Therefore that opinion which appears more probable to someone cannot be a true rule of acting, because "the law would be particular only for him to whom that opinion appears more probable. But this would certainly be against the nature of law, which for the common good must necessarily be universal and universally proposed, lest the people, who are bound to observe it, be frequently divided and perplexed concerning the truth to be embraced, while each preacher or confessor, from the diversity of opinions and according to his own sense, would often instruct the faithful." Nor is it of force to say that by following the benign sentence (namely the probable even in concurrence with the more probable in favor of the law), disparity can also intervene, since the same opinion can seem probable to one, improbable to another. It is not denied that this can happen; but it will always be true that, when some opinion is strong with solid probability and rests on a certainly grave foundation, it will be regarded as probable among the greatest part of the wise. And this will already be enough to preserve the universal uniformity of observance of the law, notwithstanding that among some particular person that opinion is not probable; for that which happens rarely does not take away universal conformity. Yet this does not happen concerning the estimation of more probable opinions, because since greater or lesser probability depends on moral motives, namely on the judgment and weighing of reasons, which some draw from one principle, others from another, it happens not rarely but commonly that what appears stronger to one appears weaker to another.... But that we become certain that some opinion... is truly more probable or has the required preponderance, this is morally impossible. For either that preponderance is small, and who will be secure that the opinion is truly more probable? For since the excess is moderate, it can with difficulty be perceived certainly. Or the preponderance is great, and who will be able to judge that it reaches a sufficient measure, so that the opposite is judged false or tenuously probable? And thus we would always have to act with practical doubt. Either I am bound to follow opinions more probable in themselves, and then when shall I know which opinion is truly more probable in so many cases, where grave reasons and authorities occur opposed on each side? Or opinions more probable to me, and the straits would be increased; for often I would have to judge my opinion to be probable against another opinion of several wise men. And then who will render me safe that my opinion is certainly more probable and more notable, with that notable preponderance which some of the adversaries require? How shall I become certain that I have understood the opposed reasons well and solved them well? that the dictate of conscience which I have formed for myself is sufficiently certain and safe? that I have not been deceived by my own sense, so that if I err, my error is truly invincible and inculpable?" S. Alph. Dissertation anno 1755, n. 3. 17. 42. 43. 48. 50.

And if it is asked why S. D. made this distinction between a little more probable and notably, much, evidently, certainly more probable, the reason is that S. D., as is clear from l. c. H. A. n. 31 and from the Apologia contra Patuzzi 1762, wished to oppose himself to those probabilists who extended probabilism even to tenuous and doubtful probability, and therefore contended that it is licit to act when any apparent reason is present, but not firm reason, or authority. Hence from the opposite S. D. established that someone must then follow the opinion certainly, evidently, notably, much more probable, which, as is clear, in comparison with the tenuously or doubtfully probable is by right and deservedly called morally certain by S. D. Therefore, since S. Alph. designated such an opinion in comparison with the doubtfully and tenuously probable by "notably more probable," what remained was that he designate any other more probable opinion in comparison with the truly probable by "a little more probable." Cf. Breve Dissertaz. etc. cited above at the end of n. 133, p. 51, Op. Mor. ed. Rome 1757, l. 1. n. 33. Behold the words of S. D. in the Apology of the year 1765: "I did not contend nor do I contend to found new systems, and I know well that no probabilist of solid doctrine hands down as licit the use of a tenuously or doubtfully probable opinion. But because many probabilists without distinction say that it is licit to follow a less probable opinion when it has some foundation from reason or from authority, therefore I wished to distinguish, establishing that it is not licit to follow the less safe opinion when the excess of probability in favor of the safer is notable and certain, because then the less safe opinion cannot be called certainly probable."

What is doubtful conscience? - Doubt is a suspension of assent concerning an apprehended object; not only as regards the specification of the act, but also as regards the very exercise of the act, namely because a sufficient reason is not had for either part. Therefore doubtful conscience is that which remains suspended concerning the honorableness of an action, inclining to neither part. This conscience, since it does not involve judgment, is not conscience properly, but rather a defect of conscience; for conscience is judgment, not suspension of judgment. Nevertheless this suspension of judgment is called conscience, insofar as with this suspension of judgment we often in fact act. Doubt of this kind can be joined with a reflex judgment about the insufficiency of the motive or reason for assenting, and then a judgment of this kind is more properly called doubtful conscience. - L. 1. 1. n. 20; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 5.

How manyfold is doubtful conscience? - "Doubt is divided into negative and positive. Negative doubt is when probable reasons occur on neither side. Positive is when for each side, or at least for one, there is present a grave motive sufficient for forming a probable conscience, although with fear concerning the opposite; therefore positive doubt almost always coincides with probable opinion." L. 1. 1. n. 20. Likewise one doubt is strict, another broad. Strict doubt is had when the mind does not determinately embrace one part by its assent, but adheres waveringly to each; broad is when the mind adheres to one part, yet does not furnish it an altogether firm assent.

In the former sense is to be understood what S. Alph. has apud Aertnys n. 70 at the end: "Where two equally probable opinions concur, neither remains probable, but only doubtful." Certainly the mind can remain doubtful, that is, suspend assent; but it can also well adhere determinately to one before the other, and even to each, if the motives are not contradictory but disparate, with an assent indeed not certain and firm, but probable, not without fear of the opposite. Therefore strict doubt can arise from the fact that on each side the reasons are equal or almost equal; or also from the fact that for neither side are there reasons, or only slight reasons are present for each. And just as when reasons are present on each side, although equal, reason can be moved by them to assent, so when no reasons or only slight reasons are present, then the doubt is to be scorned, and consequently does not impede opposite probability or certainty. In the present we are not treating of conscience positively and broadly doubtful, or probable, about which we have already spoken; but our discussion will be only about conscience negatively and strictly doubtful.

Moreover, doubt is divided into speculative and practical. Speculative doubt is that by which someone doubts about the truth of a thing or about the liceity of a thing in general, or universally, for example, whether baptism with distilled water is valid, whether painting on a feast day is servile work. Practical doubt is that by which someone doubts about the liceity or honorableness of an action in particular, to be exercised here and now, for example, whether on this feast day in these circumstances it is licit for me to paint, whether it is licit to baptize this child with distilled water. To be exercised here and now: for otherwise, although the action is considered as circumscribed by several circumstances, speculative doubt can still be had concerning it, if the question does not concern an action to be exercised and directed by conscience in the present. Practical doubt always arises from another speculative doubt, either of law concerning the law, or of fact concerning some particular thing. Hence conscience speculatively doubtful, and practically doubtful. L. 1. 1. n. 21; S. Th. 1. p. q. 79. a. 13.

The means by which from a speculatively doubtful conscience someone may make the step to a practically certain conscience are: 1. To weigh the doubt itself with a certain moral diligence. For if, as S. Alph. says l. 1. n. 24, "all things having been weighed, he notices that the doubt is empty, here he can well put aside his doubt without another reflection, and thus execute the action." 2. To inquire into the practice of good men operating without scruple. 3. The counsel of a learned and prudent man. 4. Some probable reason, a fortiori a demonstrative reason of the matter, which perhaps can be found by inquiring into the truth. - 5. Some general reason, or some general reflex principle, so called because it leads and bends us by means of reasoning to defining rightly the question, not concerning the intrinsic and objective truth of the thing, which cannot be resolved through itself and in its immediate principle, but concerning the subjective liceity of our action from some general extrinsic principle. Thus a judge is doubtful whether Titius is guilty, from intrinsic and direct reasons of law or fact. But from the general and reflex principle, In doubt favor is to be given to the accused, he unhesitatingly absolves Titius. - L. ib.

In doubt the condition of the possessor is better. C. 6 de Praescript. This axiom in the external forum, both ecclesiastical and civil, has been received as a certain rule of judgments. For it is to be presumed that he who possesses a thing possesses it by right, unless the contrary is clear. The same certainly has force in the internal forum of conscience. For certain and legitimate possession produces moral certainty concerning the dominion of the thing, L. 1. 1. n. 35, l. 4. 210, l. 6. n. 905. 927; and the reason is that, given human customs, no one is, morally speaking, negligent; indeed on the contrary all are diligent and very diligent in guarding their own things. Moreover, where one does not proceed from a false supposition, the right of the external and internal forum is the same; for each forum is founded on the principles of natural justice and equity. Hence theologians commonly admit the aforesaid rule for the forum of conscience. L. 1. 1. n. 26. Now some say that this axiom has force only in the matter of justice. "Yet I," says S. Alph. l. c., "do not know how it can be denied in all matters." And this certainly is by far the more common and truer opinion. The reason for this extension also to other matters, with due proportion, is the same as in the matter of justice. For no one can justly be despoiled without sufficient reason of a good which is his own. But man naturally, and therefore certainly and altogether legitimately, possesses his liberty, which certainly is some good and right of his own. Therefore this good also pertains to justice, and he who unjustly either takes it away or weakens it violates justice. Without injustice a free man cannot be subjected to servitude. But there can be no doubt that in doubtful laws liberty is always in prior possession of itself. For upon whom is law imposed except a free man? Whence it is that what is licit is not whatever the law permits, but what the law does not prohibit, L. 28. § 2 Ex quib. caus. maior., and therefore this prohibition must be manifestly proved, C. 23 de Verb. signif. - Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 5. n. 8; Lugo De Iust. et Iur. d. 17. n. 87, d. 23. n. 110. In doubt: that is, in negative doubt, and the reason of the axiom is then clear, because possession stands for the possessor, and therefore moral certainty; for the petitioner no prudent reason is had. Cf. Lugo De Iust. et Iur. 23. n. 110. But in positive doubt, or probability, if probability is present on each side, so that on one side possession and probability of right stand, and on the other only equal or almost equal contrary probability of right, the condition of the possessor is again better, as is clear of itself. But if on one side indeed possession stands, but on the other contrary probability of right; or on one side possession and at the same time probability of right, and on the other far greater contrary probability of right, then certainly the condition of the possessor is not better, but doubtful. Indeed the first opinion holds that the judge is bound to adjudge the thing to the plaintiff, because the right of possession prevails in an equal cause, but not in a less probable cause. For Rule 65 of the Law in the Sixth has it thus: "In equal fault, or cause, the condition of the possessor is stronger"; and in L. 128 ff. de div. Reg. Iuris it is said: "In an equal cause the possessor ought to be held stronger." But the second opinion holds that the condition of the possessor is still better, and that the judge cannot despoil him of possession. The reason is that "it is certain that legitimate possession gives to each a certain right of retaining the thing, until the right of another is not established, as they say most commonly... a certain right, which cannot be overcome except by the certain right of another through certain convincing reasons." For possession is defined: the right of insisting in a thing not prohibited to be possessed. L. 1. 1. n. 36; Ithur. Cas. 1. n. 2. Cf. L. 1. 3. n. 547. 562. 711, etc.

Therefore the possession about which the present saying speaks is certain and legitimate possession. It is called certain, that is, that the fact of possession is certain; legitimate, that is, begun and continued in good faith, and likewise begun and continued by a just title, at least apparent, or at least thought to exist, or presumed, such as, for example, donation, purchase, inheritance, and similar things, through which ownership of some thing is usually acquired. Therefore if possession is doubtful, or begun with doubtful faith, or by a doubtful title, it by itself does not exhibit to the possessor a special prerogative and presumption against which no contrary probability has force. L. 1. 1. n. 36. 47, l. 4. n. 210.

Probability of right, which can be only on one side or on each side, is the probability of a real just title, or of one actually existing, from which true and real dominion and ownership of the thing arise. For for legitimate possession, about which the axiom speaks, it suffices that the just title at least appears, because, for example, a donation or purchase intervened from him who was thought to be owner, although he was not; or at least was thought to exist, because the action signified by the title is thought to have intervened, although it did not intervene, as happens when someone thinks that the thing was given to him or bought by him, and nevertheless this was not done; or at least presumed, because, for example, because of length of time in peaceful possession or other circumstances, it is prudently thought that some title intervened, although the possessor cannot allege any determinate one. Therefore this probability of right, as is clear, is altogether outside possession itself, which only gives the right of insisting in the thing, or of holding it, although perhaps its dominion and ownership does not belong to you, since a just title was not really present. Now the probability of a real just title, or of one actually existing, can be in two ways: 1. Probability of the justice of the title for beginning or continuing possession and ownership of the thing, for example, a testament lacking legal formalities. 2. Probability of the reality or existence of a just title for the same effect, for example, of donation, when it is also probable that the thing was taken by theft. The former probability is called of right; the latter is called of fact. Where this latter is treated, "when the fact is not plainly proved, it is not probable that the accused can be condemned, since laws never permit the accused to be condemned unless the crime or debt is fully proved; but it is not proved fully and sufficiently for a sentence when, although two or three witnesses testify, nevertheless other witnesses testify the contrary; for through these the testimony of the former is destroyed or diminished, and therefore the sufficient proof required for full proof and condemnation does not remain." Lugo De Iust. et Iure d. 16. n. 100. Cf. also d. 23. n. 100, d. 16. n. 34. 96. 99.

You will resolve: From the aforesaid axiom several practical cases of negative doubt can be resolved, in which every true probability is lacking, namely whether the time of the obligation of a law has arrived or passed. "In doubt of beginning, for example, whether you have completed 21 years, you are not bound to fasting, because then possession is for liberty. Otherwise in doubt of passing, for example, whether on Saturday the hour of midnight has passed, you cannot eat meat, for then the law possesses. Thus also, if you doubt whether you have 16 years for profession, or 25 years for priesthood, you cannot profess or be ordained. Thus commonly." L. 1. 1. n. 99. 32.

In doubt one must stand for that for which presumption stands. For presumption, taken from things ordinarily happening, or from other circumstances of the person and the thing, produces moral certainty, or at least probability. "In obscure matters one is accustomed to look at what is more likely, or what usually happens." L. 114 de R. I.; R. I. 14 in 6. It is a certain anticipated proof of a thing from indications, before direct proofs. Therefore presumption exhibits a thing as true and stands for that side which is not bound by itself to prove the contrary fact, but transfers that burden of proving to the other side. For whenever something is known to preexist which by its nature perseveres until it is taken away by some contrary fact, that thing is thought to persevere as long as that contrary fact is not established, which consequently must be proved by the adverse side.

Hence, if you are accustomed at such a time diligently to recite the breviary, and you doubt whether you have recited some part, presumption favors you and exempts you from the obligation of reciting or repeating. If an insane person, but one who has lucid intervals, makes a vow and afterward doubts whether he made the vow while master of himself, he is not obligated so long as it does not appear that he was master of himself. L. 1. n. 26. Nevertheless in the forum of penance, in which, as S. Thomas says 4.

D. 17. a. 3. q. 3, one must stand by the word of the penitent for himself and against himself, presumption yields to the truth affirmed by the penitent. - Cf. 204; Lugo De Poenit. d. 20. n. 17. 19; L. 1. 3. n. 270, l. 6. n. 600 par. Limitant. Likewise in the case of doubt, the baptism of spouses is not presumed in relation to a marriage, if the non-Catholic party or parties had parents belonging to a sect which rejects baptism; on the contrary it is presumed if they had parents belonging to a sect which admits baptism, and they were zealous in that sect. S. O. Aug. 1, 1883; Collect. S. C. de P. F. n. 662; E. M. n. 1016.

Note: Where the question concerns obedience to be furnished to a superior in doubt, presumption stands, speaking per se, always for the superior. L. 1. 1. n. 93. 98. 99. Speaking per se always: for accidentally it can sometimes happen that presumption is not present for the superior, for example, in doubt about the liceity of the thing, even with the precept of the superior acceding, for example, when the superior "is accustomed rashly and imprudently to command at pleasure things which are not licit... also when, with the precept of the prelate acceding, the thing remains in doubt (as regards its intrinsic liceity); nor does the authority, doctrine, probity, or prudence of the prelate suffice for putting aside the doubt, which case is possible." Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 3. d. 19. n. 11; L. 1. 3. n. 617. Cf. here 157.

In doubt a fact is not presumed, but must be demonstrated. L. 10 C. de Non numer. pec. - For no reason must be given for non-being, but for being; because non-being does not have its cause, but being does. But understand this of the principal fact, if it is doubtful: because, if the principal fact is certainly established and there is doubt about an accessory fact, then other principles have force: In doubt every fact is presumed rightly done; In doubt the fact which by law had to be done is presumed; In doubt one must stand for the value of the act; always excluding unjust damage to oneself or another or the community. For every being naturally tends toward its perfection and good. Therefore if nothing is established as obstructing, nature continues to pursue its course. The fact of a completed Confession is established; you doubt concerning the right, whether you confessed rightly with sorrow, with purpose; you can acquiesce. These three latter principles have force both for liberty and against liberty.

For liberty, if a contrary and certain presumption or the common good does not obstruct; for no obligation is to be imposed unless it is certainly established. Against liberty, namely if a contrary and certain presumption or the public good obstructs; for the common good prevails over private good. L. 1. 1. n. 26. 27. 137. 182. 251, l. 3. n. 201, l. 6. n. 505; L. Quoties 12 de Reb. dub. ff.

You will resolve: In doubt whether you took some food or drink, and likewise in doubt whether you took food or drink after midnight, you can receive the Eucharist. For unless the fact is proved in each case, liberty possesses. L. 1. 1. n. 38. 39; Elbel 166. 167; Amort. Theol. t. 2. d. 5. 9. 4, who observes these things at the end: "Yet I say that he would sin at least venially who, for the pleasure of mere drinking, should thus traffic around the laws of the Church, exposing himself to the danger of at least material transgression; and if he does this from custom or from a resolve always to operate in this way, no other reasonable cause concurring, for example, thirst, infirmity, he will sin mortally, because such a resolve argues interpretative contempt and a defect of charity toward God and the Church, whose honor he stains."

Busemb. apud La Croix, l. 1. n. 470. VI. Indeed, although it is licit to use a probable opinion against a law, it is nevertheless not licit to act in fraud of the law, voluntarily procuring a state of doubt against the law, lest someone be bound to observe the law. Doubtful baptism, in order to a marriage already entered or to be entered, is held as valid; and therefore a marriage is pronounced valid or invalid according to various circumstances.

The marriage of one doubtfully baptized with one not baptized must be held invalid. On the contrary, the marriage of two doubtfully baptized persons, and of one doubtfully baptized with one baptized, must be held valid. S. O. Nov. 17, 1830; Sept. 9, 1868; Sept. 18, 1872; July 7, 1880; Sept. 18, 1890; Apr. 12, 1899; Collect. S. C. P. F. n. 1872; E. M. n. 1016. But a doubtful marriage, because of the common good, is commonly held as valid. But because of the most excellent good of religion, the doubtful marriage of polygamous infidels who are converted to the faith is declared invalid. Collect. S. C. de P. F. n. 1301. 1304. 1332. 2184.

In doubt no one is presumed evil, unless it is proved. - This axiom is a corollary of the preceding. For since facts and consequently crimes are not presumed, but must be demonstrated, neither ought anyone to be presumed evil, but he must be proved. Indeed no one is evil for nothing.

Hatreds should be restricted and favors should be broadened. R. I. 15 in 6 - For no one desires to be hated, but all desire to be pleasing. Therefore favors are to be preferred to hatreds. Favor is understood as whatever indulges liberty or grants grace. R. 122 de R. I. Hatred is whatever restricts liberty, establishes a punishment, or injures some right. But since it sometimes happens that what is a favor to one is hatred to another, the particular case must be considered, so that it may be determined whether favor is to be preferred to hatred, or hatred to favor. Hence there arises the general principle: In obscure matters the minimum is to be followed, R. I. 30 in 6, L. 9 de Reg. Iur., and therefore the interpretation of law is to be made less burdensome and more benign to liberty. Whence there is another general principle: Always in doubts the more benign things are to be preferred. L. 56 de R. I. And likewise another: Unless you have been certain of the mandate, you will not be compelled to execute what is commanded. C. Cum iure 31 de Off. et pot. iud. del. L. 1. 1. n. 97.

You will resolve: Therefore it is false that where generally the discussion concerns speculative doubt about the liceity or illicitness of an action, in doubts the safer part must be chosen. And certainly in this Rule of Canon Law the question does not concern speculative doubt, in which by means of a reflex principle someone can form for himself a certain conscience, and thus choose a part altogether safe; but the question concerns either practical doubt, namely a practically doubtful conscience, with which it is not licit to act, or else the question concerns those cases in which the end must necessarily be obtained. But the question is above all about the external forum, in which often there is a special reason for following the safer course, in order to remove scandals, abuses, and offenses of the faithful; or about honorableness and the greater degree of merit, not about the necessity of salvation. L. 1. 1. n. 68. 79, H. A. tr. 1. n. 39; Struggl tr. 1. q. 5. n. 17.

What must someone do if, placed between two precepts, he remains doubtful which one he ought to choose, for example, if the precept of hearing Mass urges, and he ought to assist someone gravely sick? - This conscience is usually called perplexed. Someone, when such a case occurs, must sufficiently, as much as is in him, inquire into the truth so that he may put aside the doubt. When the truth has been sufficiently inquired into, and the doubt remains, he can and must choose that which seems to him the lesser evil; and, if each seems equally grave, he can choose either. This is true even if someone culpably cast himself into that perplexity, provided that he is sorry for the past fault. The reason is that there is no obligation to impossibilities, and therefore then the lesser obligation ceases; or, if they are or seem equal, or because of ignorance someone does not know how to discern which is lesser, either ceases; and even if someone thinks that by acting so he sins, he does not really sin from defect of liberty. - Suarez d. 12. s. 5; Lessius on q. 19. d. 19. a. 6. d. 9; L. 1. 1. n. 10; Elbel 141.

If you doubt whether you have already satisfied some obligation, are you still bound to satisfy? - R. Affirmatively, if the doubt is merely negative. For in such a doubt no prudent reason of satisfaction is present, and therefore it is impossible by some reflex principle to form for oneself a conscience concerning non-satisfaction, since the law altogether certainly perseveres. Cf. Ithur. Cas. 44. n. 15.

But if the doubt is positive, it is controverted. The first opinion, which S. Alph. 1. 1. n. 26-29, 1. 3. n. 700 par. ult., 1. 6. n. 477, quaest. reform., recent retract. q. 1 and 18, etc., altogether holds and thinks must be held, and several others hold, affirms. The reason is 1. because a certain obligation is not satisfied by a doubtful fulfillment; 2. because since in doubt the condition of the possessor is better, and the law certainly existing possesses against liberty, it prevails over liberty, and will always have it obligated to itself until the law has certainly been fulfilled. Cf. besides L. 1. 1. n. 20. 39. 99, 1. 3. n. 112. 290.

The second opinion, which we judge most probable both intrinsically and extrinsically, denies that such an obligation is present. The reason is the very fundamental reason of probabilism, which the holy Doctor cited above explains most learnedly and most expertly, namely: a doubtful law does not oblige. For law does not oblige in the abstract and universal, but in the concrete and particular case, L. 1. 1. n. 78. But although the existence of the law according to itself is certain, nevertheless the same law as obliging in such a concrete and particular case is uncertain, and is altogether prudently pronounced uncertain, if it is truly probable that satisfaction has already been made to it. Therefore either it must be said that the obligation of satisfying the law again in the aforesaid case is null, or it must be said that the aforesaid principle, a doubtful law does not oblige, is not universally true but suffers an exception; which would not be fittingly said. For what is true is always true, and for every particular contained in the universal. But from this reason it appears that the obligation really is not certain, which is assumed in the first reason of the opposite opinion, if it is probable that the law has already been satisfied. For against certainty there cannot be probability. As regards the second reason, as is clear from what has already been said, possession prevails in merely negative doubt; but for it certainly to prevail even in positive doubt, it must be certain and certainly legitimate possession. Now when in a particular case it is truly probably established that the law has been fulfilled, the possession of the law for that concrete and particular case becomes prudently doubtful; for if you really satisfied it, liberty in fact possesses. Besides, it is certainly not legitimate, since probably the just title of obligation is lacking; for you can probably believe that you have already satisfied, and therefore the just title, at least presumed, probably is not present. Moreover, several and very grave theologians hold this opinion. Indeed the same S. Alph. 1. 1. n. 99 has these things: "What in doubt whether you have fulfilled the law? In negative doubt you are bound to fulfill; otherwise in positive." Cf. also 1. 4. n. 150. And thus indeed S. Alph. himself thought, 1. 1. n. 76, edition of the year 1757; and S. D. called this opinion common, and himself deduced it from the very principles of probabilism. Finally S. D. 1. 6. n. 505 says, "it must be carefully noted that penitents are not to be compelled to repeat confessions unless it is morally certain that they were invalid, as La-Croix, etc., rightly say." - D'Annib. ed. 4. p. 1. n. 169.

You will resolve: Therefore that axiom, a doubtful law does not oblige, is to be understood of a law doubtful by positive doubt, or truly probably doubtful. Now law can be positively doubtful in many ways concerning its existence and concerning its cessation; concerning existence, whether it has been enacted, whether promulgated, whether the time of obligation has arrived, whether it extends to such a case; concerning cessation, whether it has been abrogated, whether its excuse or dispensation is present, whether it has already been fulfilled. And in all these cases we say that the aforesaid axiom has place, unless we wish to admit the truth of the general proposition and at the same time deny the truth of the proposition contained in the general.

Therefore law can be doubtful: 1. As regards its very existence and promulgation, concerning which S. Alph. says: "In order that law oblige, it must not only be promulgated, but also promulgated as certain. And this point must firmly be established here," 1. 1. n. 63 seq. and 97. And, to pass over others, these things are from the distinguished Doctor apud S. Alph. 1. 1. 66: "As long as there is a probable judgment that there is no law prohibiting the action, such a law is not sufficiently proposed to man; whence since the obligation of law is of itself burdensome, it does not urge until it is more certainly established." C. 31 de Off. iud. deleg.

2. As regards its understanding and obvious interpretation, and whether it is obscure or ambiguous. For since law must be sufficiently proposed in order to oblige, the legislator is not judged to wish to oblige beyond that which is clearly and determinately expressed in the law. R. I. 30. 57 in 6; L. 9 C. de Leg. et Const.; Suarez in 1. 2. tr. d. 12. s. 5. n. 7. Obscure: for example, whether regular prelates, since they too have their own sheep, ought to apply Mass for them on feast days. This question, twice proposed before the Holy See, has not yet been solved. Giraldi Expos. I. P. p. 2. s. 85. t. 3. Ambiguous: it is provided that a beneficed cleric not reciting the canonical hours after six months from obtaining the benefice does not make the fruits his own; nevertheless the fruits are to be understood not of the earlier and later time, but only of the later.

3. Whether it has an extensive or restrictive interpretation, concerning which S. Alph. 1. 3. n. 1036 says: "When it is doubted whether a law comprehends some case or subject, it is the same as if it is doubted whether a law exists for that case or subject, and therefore liberty possesses." Cf. also 1. 1. n. 27. 97; Lugo De Poenit. d. 16. n. 59, De Iust. et Iur. d. 23. n. 110.

4. Whether it has ceased, either immediately when it was enacted, because it was never received, or with the progress of time through desuetude; concerning which S. D. 1. 3. n. 112 says: "Nor is the first opinion an obstacle, which we followed 1. 1. n. 97, namely that in doubt whether a law has been received, the law rightly obliges; for here we are not involved in doubt, but in probable opinion.... For in doubt the presumption stands for the law, since a crime in not receiving a just law is not presumed. But when it is probable that the obligation of the law never began, or has been abolished, then the presumption for the law ceases and liberty possesses." The same S. D. has this, 1. 1. n. 107 par. An vero, 1. 4. n. 47. The same must consequently be said when it is probable that the end of the law has ceased adequately, L. 1. 1. n. 199, or that the law has been abrogated by custom, L. 1. 3. n. 290, or that in a particular case there is no need of dispensation, L. 1. 1. n. 192, 1. 3. n. 304. Certainly as soon as the obligation of the law is doubtful, its possession consequently becomes doubtful; and therefore in the case the argument taken from the Rule of possession has no force.

5. Whether the law is just or unjust; and here a threefold case can occur. The first is that the justice of the law is doubted because the legislator himself is doubted, whether he is a legitimate superior. Now in this case, if the doubt about the legitimacy of the superior is positive, about which we are treating, namely it is truly probable that he is not a legitimate superior, by that very fact the non-existence of the law becomes truly probable, and therefore it does not oblige. Cf. L. 1. 1. n. 98. 121. - But if the doubt is merely negative, the law must be obeyed, "whenever the superior is in peaceful possession of his power; for then his condition, as already possessing the right of commanding, is better." L. 1. 1. n. 98, 1. 4. n. 47. The other case is that the justice of the law is doubted because it is doubted whether the superior exceeds his power. In positive doubt, or true probability concerning excess of power, the same must be said as in the preceding case. For by the very fact that it is truly and manifestly probable that the superior exceeds his power, the non-existence of the law becomes truly probable, and therefore it does not oblige. Cf. L. 1. 3. n. 617. - But if the doubt is merely negative, presumption, speaking per se, always stands for the superior.

The third case is because the liceity of the thing commanded itself is doubted. In positive doubt or true probability, the law is not doubtful, and therefore obliges. For the superior then commands a thing probably licit, indeed certainly licit; for he commands that the subject embrace some probable opinion in practice, which is certainly licit. Therefore he commands licitly and by right. Therefore the subject is bound to obey. Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 3. d. 19; L. 90, l. 1. n. 93. 99. 124, l. 4. n. 47; Wirceburg. De Legib. c. 1. a. 1. "But the doctors commonly limit the aforesaid opinion, and say that the subject is not bound to obey, 1. if the thing is very difficult and troublesome.... They limit it 2. when by obeying the subject would expose himself or another to the danger of undergoing grave inconvenience in life, reputation, honor, or goods." L. 1. 4. n. 47, l. 3. n. 617, l. 1. n. 31. "The reason is that the subjection and obedience due to the superior does not take away your right and possession, or that of another, concerning the good of honor, reputation, body, or fortune. Therefore you are not bound to deprive yourself of this certain possession in a matter of such great moment; rather it seems consonant with equity that greater account be taken of your certain possession, and that this be preferred to the right or possession, in some way doubtful, of the superior." Elbel 173; Laymann c. 5. n. 12; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 5. Moreover, because then in the case of a very difficult or harmful thing it can deservedly be doubted whether the superior exceeds the limits of his power, and therefore the existence of the law becomes doubtful; or legitimate epikeia can then also have place, according to the various circumstances of the particular case. But if the doubt is merely negative, presumption, as has already been said, Cf. 146, always stands for the superior. Cf. Suarez De Relig. t. 4. l. 4. c. 12 seq.; Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 3. d. 19. Besides, as regards practice more, "the opinion of all theologians, both recent and ancient, is common: they teach that in obscure matters the superior must be obeyed where sin is not certain; and thus all have taught who have treated this matter. Thus also all the masters of mystical theology with S. Ignatius of Loyola in the Letter on the Virtue of Obedience." L. 1. 1. n. 100. 194; Lugo l. c. n. 3; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 5.

What is justice, and what are its parts? - R. To the first. Justice is the virtue which renders what is owed according to equality. Hence other moral virtues hold the mean of reason, according namely to prudent estimation. For since they are concerned with ruling passions, that which is right for one person is little or too much for another. But justice attains the mean of the thing, according namely to the equality of thing to thing, so that as much is rendered as is owed. For the equal is really the mean between greater and lesser. And thus the mean of justice cannot vary according to persons, places, and time; but whoever it may be, wherever and whenever, who owes one hundred, and whoever the creditor may be, he ought to render one hundred to him. If he renders fifty he injures justice; if one hundred and fifty he exercises liberality. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 58, 59, 61, 80.

R. To the second. The parts as it were integral of justice are: to decline from evil and to do good, namely to do owed good and to decline from the opposite evil. Owed; for if the speech is about good and evil in common, then to do good and to avoid evil pertains to every virtue. But if it is considered under the account of what is owed, then it pertains to justice. For justice is one kind general, namely legal, another special, namely distributive and commutative; these are the three subjective parts, or its species. To general or legal justice it pertains to do owed good in order to the Community and to God, in order to divine or human law; and accordingly as to the proper account of legal justice it pertains to attend to the debt of the precept, to do good, so to the proper account of transgression it pertains to attend to contempt of the precept, to decline from evil. - But to special justice, distributive and commutative, it pertains to do good owed to the neighbor and to avoid the opposite evil, namely that which is harmful to the neighbor. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79.

But as to do good is a certain special part of justice distinct from the declining of evil, so omission, which is opposed to the former, is altogether distinguished from transgression, which is opposed to the latter. For omission is properly of owed good, e.g., if someone does not show owed reverence to parents; and transgression is properly in doing evil, e.g., if someone inflicts contumely or any injury upon parents. The former is opposed to the affirmative precept, to do good; the latter to the negative precept, to decline from evil. Properly omission; for this imports the passing over of good not just any whatsoever, but of owed good. But good under the account of what is owed properly pertains to justice; to legal justice indeed, if the debt is taken in order to divine or human law; but to special justice if in order to neighbor. Properly transgression; for transgression materially taken is common to all species of sins, because by any species of sin man transgresses some divine precept. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79. "But these two parts of justice, general or special, are called as it were integral, because each of them is required for the perfect act of justice. For it pertains to justice to constitute equality in those things which are toward another. But it belongs to the same thing both to constitute something and to conserve what has been constituted in those things which are toward another. But someone constitutes the equality of justice by doing good, i.e., by rendering to another what is owed to him; and he conserves the equality of justice already constituted by declining from evil, i.e., by inflicting no harm upon the neighbor." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 72, a. 1.

The potential parts of justice, or the virtues annexed to it, are: religion, piety, observance, truth, gratitude, vindication, friendship, liberality. For these virtues are annexed to justice because they too in some way render what is owed according to equality. In some way; for since it belongs to justice to render what is owed according to equality, some of these fall short of the account of the equal, others of the account of what is owed. Religion, piety, and observance fall short of the account of rendering the equal, as is clear of itself. But truth, gratitude, vindication, liberality, and friendship fall short of the account of what is owed. For religion, piety, and observance cannot render worship and service to God, Parents, and Persons constituted in dignity according to equality. But the debt is deficient on the part of the one owing, in truth, so that namely man shows himself in words and deeds such as he is. Likewise the debt is deficient on the part of him to whom it is owed, in gratitude, by which someone recompenses another according to the things he has done in good things; and in vindication, by which another is recompensed according to the things he has done in evil things. Finally the debt is deficient in the account of the debt itself, in liberality and friendship, which are only toward a certain greater honorableness. For liberality renders us prompt to spend easily our things estimable by price, when right reason requires it; to this liberality avarice and prodigality are opposed. But friendship moderates our intercourse with neighbor, so that it may be pleasing to him, and such as according to right reason it ought to be. Likewise the debt is deficient in other things of this sort, which have little of the account of debt. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 80, a. 1.

Obedience is included in observance; for to preeminent persons there is owed both reverence of honor and obedience. In truth is included fidelity, through which the things said are done, as regards the observance of promises. But vengeance which is done by the authority of public power, according to the sentence of a judge, pertains to commutative justice; but vengeance which someone does by his own motion, not however against the law, or which someone requires from a judge, pertains to the virtue joined to justice. S. Th. 2. 2. l. c. ad 1, 3. Friendship or affability is a special virtue according to which "man is fittingly ordered to other men both in deeds and in words." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 114, a. 1. Flattery and quarrelsomeness are opposed to friendship. Flattery is a sin by which someone beyond the due mode of virtue wishes to delight others by words or deeds in common intercourse, with the intention of obtaining some advantage. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 115, a. 1. But quarrelsomeness, by which someone contradicts another because of defect of love toward the person speaking, is a species of discord contrary to charity; but that by which someone contradicts another rather in order to sadden him than to contradict him is especially opposed to the virtue of affability and friendship. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 116, a. 1.

Since justice renders what is owed according to equality, it of itself brings a precept, and injustice is opposed to justice, which falls short of rendering that debt and of preserving that equality. Justice and its various species are treated especially in the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, and tenth precepts of the Decalogue. But the other virtues annexed to justice are treated in the first, second, third, fourth, and eighth precepts of the Decalogue. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 122.

Whether he is bound to restitution who doubts whether he himself was the cause of damage? - It is common among doctors that in doubt whether the cause was placed, or whether damage was inflicted, he is held to no restitution. The reason is that the fact is not presumed but must be proved. If the doubt turns on the influence of the action into the damage which certainly occurred, there is controversy. The first opinion, very probable from St. Alphonsus, affirms, because, once the fact of the action is posited, the action is presumed to have been the cause of the evil, if it was truly apt to inflict the damage. The second opinion, from the same Holy Doctor, "also sufficiently probable, denies... and St. Thomas seems to hold this, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 7.... The reason is that general rule, that no one is obliged to restitution unless such an obligation is altogether established, namely that he himself was the true cause of the damage." L. 562. Likewise it seems to be denied if someone probably judges that he has already sufficiently repaired damage certainly inflicted by himself; for the condition of the possessor prevails, and no one is to be despoiled of his own thing unless there is a morally certain obligation. And this also holds in the case of a debtor who probably judges that he has already fully satisfied the debt. For although the obligation was certain beforehand, nevertheless now it is doubtful. - L. 547, 575, 579, 706. Cf. here 1469.

Whether you are held in solidum in doubt whether you influenced the whole damage? Resp. Negatively, because a certain burden cannot be imposed for an uncertain obligation. L. 577. Cf. C. A. 1303.

Whether you are held in solidum in doubt whether others restored their part pro rata? Resp. More probably negatively, if, after diligent inquiry has been made, the doubt perseveres, because a cooperator is held to nothing besides his own part, except in the defect of another; and if there is doubt about that defect, there is doubt about the obligation.

Whether a debtor is excused from restitution in doubt of payment? Resp. Negatively in a merely negative doubt, because then no prudent reason of payment made is present. - In a positive doubt or probability it is controverted. The first probable opinion affirms; because an obligation is not to be imposed unless it is certainly established concerning it. Moreover, because, as St. Alphonsus says, l. 4, n. 107, "no legitimate possessor of his own is held to restitution who has for himself a probable opinion." The second probable opinion denies it, because a certain obligation is not satisfied by a doubtful fulfillment. The third probable opinion says restitution must be made pro rata of the doubt; because it is not equitable that as much be paid from a doubtful right as would be paid if the right were certain. The fourth opinion affirms in gratuitous contracts, denies in onerous ones. "Nevertheless," adds D'Annib. p. 2, n. 327, ed. 3, "if it seems probable that you or your author satisfied an obligation, even an onerous one, I judge that one can cease from payment, so long as the creditor, not ignorant of the obligation, does not ask." L. 1. 1, n. 82.; l. 3, n. 700.; l. 6, n. 477. Cf. here 1369, 1378.

What is reputation? What is rash judgment? Reputation is: the common opinion about the life, morals, and other qualities of someone, which can increase or diminish his moral estimation. Good reputation therefore is the common opinion about the virtue, wisdom, or deeds excellently performed by another; if this goes out into external verbal testimony, it is called praise; but if into testimony, whether verbal or real, it is called honor. Hence the good reputation of someone can be unjustly injured not only through detraction and contumely, but also through an internal rash judgment about some crime or moral defect of another. One must distinguish rash doubt, suspicion, opinion, and firm judgment. Rash doubt is had when someone without sufficient reason remains suspended, yet without inclining rather into judgment of vice than of virtue. Rash suspicion is given when someone without sufficient motive inclines rather into a judgment of vice than of virtue of another; yet he suspends actual judgment. Rash opinion is given when someone without sufficient motive elicits assent concerning the vice of another, yet with fear concerning the opposite. Finally, rash judgment is given when someone without sufficient motive elicits a determined judgment concerning the vice of another without fear concerning the opposite. L. 962, 965.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 3.

What kind of sin is doubt, suspicion, rash opinion? Positive doubt, suspicion, or rash opinion about another's sin is of itself only venial. This is proved, because even an opinion, if it is fearful, concerning another's crime, speaking of itself, does not inflict grave injury on him, since, simply speaking, it does not take away by judgment another's reputation; for it is not a firm judgment. - Positive rash doubt is given when someone ought from graver motives to judge someone to be good and innocent; nevertheless from other lighter motives he positively doubts, or reflexively judges that it is doubtful whether he is good or evil, innocent or guilty.

Of itself, for per accidens it can sometimes become grave; if, e.g., these acts are concerned with very extraordinary sins, or graver ones by reason of the condition of the persons whom they regard, and the opinion or suspicion proceeds from slight indications, the doubt from very slight indications; because such opinion, suspicion, or doubt is a greater injury than even a firm judgment concerning less grave ordinary sins. Thus also such acts are a grave sin if they proceed from malevolence without cause; for then they proceed from contempt of another, and therefore are reckoned a grave injury. Moreover, because for the most part thoughts of this kind creep into the mind even without deliberation, whoever does not advert with full deliberation both to the gravity of the thing thought and to the lightness of the indications is excused from grave sin. 1 Cor. 13:5.; L. 963, 964.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 3.; Cajetan ib.; Quodl. 12, a. 34.; Lugo d. 64, n. 17.

Is one foreseeing an impediment for recitation of the office on the very day of obligation held to recite Matins and Lauds on the evening of the vigil? - Reply: Negatively. The reason is that although Matins and Lauds by force of privilege can be recited the preceding day, nevertheless they must not. The general rule is that no one is held to use any privilege. Therefore the strict obligation does not press before the following midnight. Wherefore, an impediment standing from midnight to midnight, the obligation is removed. Nevertheless it is very fitting that the recitation be anticipated. Wherefore, on the contrary, one foreseeing at evening time an impediment in the morning is held to recite Sext, None, Vespers, and Compline. For the substance of the obligation is from midnight to midnight, as custom itself, the best interpreter of laws, interprets this law. Kenrick tr. 8, n. 10, 19.

Is it lawful to absolve with doubtful jurisdiction, when there is doubt of fact whether it is present? - Doubtful: it is a question of negative doubt, by which the mind remains uncertain and suspended, without being determined to a judgment, namely to a positive judgment, although only probable. Whether it is present: e.g., whether the definite time of approbation continues; whether he is within the territory of the one delegating and approving; whether such a sin is not contained in the catalogue of reserved cases, etc. Wherefore it is a question of doubt of fact, namely of a particular or private fact. Resp. In the negative, unless some necessity urges. For the sacrament is cast into danger of nullity, and thus the penitent is exposed to grave harm. But in necessity one must aid the neighbor in the best way that can be done. Necessity is present: 1. if the precept of annual Confession urges; 2. if the penitent must celebrate Mass or communicate and otherwise would incur a mark of infamy; 3. if a priest is bound by obligation to celebrate; 4. if the penitent has already confessed his sins, for then he has an acquired right to obtain absolution. But because of reverence for the sacrament, absolution must be given under condition; and the penitent must be warned about the doubt of valid absolution, so that provision be made for his salvation. Consequently he is both to be excited by the confessor to contrition, and then must confess his sins to another having jurisdiction, because they certainly must be subjected to the keys.

But, the case of providing for one's own salvation being excluded, there are not lacking those who judge that there is no need of such admonition, because the obligation of confessing them has already probably been satisfied. Cf. the following number. But here it is a question of negative doubt. How, therefore, can it be affirmed that it has probably been satisfied? - Castro Palaus, tr. 23, p. 14, n. 25; L. 571, 432.

Is it lawful to absolve with jurisdiction speculatively probable, or with positive doubt of law? - Doubt properly so called is negative doubt. Positive doubt, improperly called doubt, is such only by reason of the fear with which a judgment is made, although a judgment is made determinately, yet an uncertain judgment, namely a probable one, in which there is breadth and variety; because it can be judged that each part is equally probable, or that one is probable and the other more probable, or that only one is probable, because its motive is neither evident nor certain, although the opposite has no foundation of probability. Jurisdiction speculatively probable, or positive doubt of law, is, e.g., that common error without a colored title gives jurisdiction; that one not approved absolves a dying person when an approved one is present; that even one not approved validly absolves from venials, etc. Wherefore doubt of law falls back into doubt of fact, not indeed of a particular fact, but of a universal fact; or the doubt is about a common question of law, not of private fact.

Moreover St. Alphonsus, 573, says: "The common opinion teaches that it is lawful to absolve with probable jurisdiction, provided the opinion is truly probable, supported by grave reason and authority. Thus Sanchez, Lugo, who thinks it most safe, etc.... and Sanchez, Tamburini, Cardenas, and Dicastillo, Illsung, Gormaz, Stoz, etc., apud Croix, l. 6, p. 1, n. 117, call it morally certain." But the same holy Doctor proposes the other opinion, which he says he follows, thus: "It is indeed lawful to administer this sacrament of penance with probable jurisdiction, but only when there is present a cause of grave necessity, or of great utility... or a reasonable cause.... The reason for this limitation is that, although in that case the Church can well be judged to supply jurisdiction because of the good of souls, nevertheless, with no just cause added, she is not presumed to wish to connive at the mere liberty of priests." - But the weakness of this opinion is shown by the very reason of the prior opinion, which St. Alphonsus himself thus explains and proves: "In the Church there is a universal custom of almost all confessors of absolving with probable jurisdiction, as Suarez, Lugo, etc., and all the other authors cited for this opinion commonly testify. But the common opinion of doctors founds moral certainty about the aforesaid custom. And although the contrary authors think it illicit to absolve with probable jurisdiction, nevertheless they pass over, nor can they deny, that this custom is present at least among the far greater part of confessors. Therefore, once this custom is placed as certain, it is certain that it is lawful to administer the sacrament with probable jurisdiction, since the custom itself supplies jurisdiction, as Suarez, Navarrus, etc., teach; and they prove this from C. Cum contingat 13, de Foro compet.... Jurisdiction can well be supplied by the Church, and it is morally certainly presumed to be supplied in this case because of the good of souls. Hence the confessor, in absolving, would not absolve with only a probable opinion, but with a morally certain one, not direct, but reflex." - These things concern positive doubt or probability of law. But what about positive doubt or probability of fact, namely of a private fact? Several affirm the same, among whom is D'Annibale, ed. 3, p. 1, n. 80, note 78; but others commonly deny it. - And those perhaps affirm it because a private fact can sometimes be joined with common error. Cf. 769. - La-Croix, l. 6, p. 1, nn. 118, 120; Lugo, d. 19, nn. 20, 23 ff.; L. 571, 573; D'Annibale, p. 3, n. 321.

Is it lawful to contract marriage with a doubtful impediment? A twofold doubt must be distinguished: doubt of fact and doubt of law. Doubt of fact is had when the doubt concerns a particular fact from which an impediment arises, e.g., if there is doubt concerning the very fact of adoption, the office of sponsor, carnal copulation, etc. Doubt of law is had when the impediment which arises from such or such a fact, otherwise certain, is doubtful; e.g., imperfect adoption is established, the office of sponsor exercised in private baptism is established, but whether an impediment arises from this is disputed among the doctors.

If the doubt is of law, it is lawful to contract marriage with an impediment doubtful by ecclesiastical law. The reason is that, in the case of doubt of law, if perhaps the impediment were actually present, the Church is judged to supply the defect of the contract invalid by canon law, just as she supplies the defect of jurisdiction whenever doctors commonly hold that she supplies jurisdiction in the sacrament of penance when doubt concerning it stands. Now the opinion teaching that the Church supplies the defect also in the present case of a doubtful impediment has generally been received as probable by innumerable doctors who favor it. But in a case of true doubt of fact, namely insoluble doubt, possession indeed stands for liberty. Nevertheless, in doubt of fact, it is more commonly not admitted that it is then lawful to contract without dispensation, namely lest the sacrament be exposed to the danger of nullity, and because of the danger of fornication, even if only material; and because the doctors more commonly hold this, the Church is not then judged to supply. La Croix, 534, 535; L. 901, 902.

But if, in doubt of law or fact, there is question of an impediment of natural and divine law, namely ligamen, kinship, impotence: in the first case, of doubt concerning ligamen, or a preexisting marriage, whether it had been validly contracted, whether the spouse had truly died, it is not lawful to enter another marriage unless it is morally certain concerning the invalidity of the prior marriage or concerning its dissolution. The reason is that, according to the various cases, either there is a certain acquired right of a third party, whom it is not lawful to despoil because of mere doubt, or certainly the matter of itself is liable to grave public scandal. C. Dominus 2, de Secund. nupt.; C. In praesentia, de Sponsal. In the other case, of kinship, it likewise is not lawful because of public scandal, since it publicly brings scandal perhaps to be mingled with a daughter or sister; and certainly the danger is present of greater public scandal if afterwards she is certainly discovered to be a daughter or sister. In the third case, of impotence, it is lawful to contract marriage, because it would be most grave to deprive someone of marriage because of doubt, and he possesses a certain right to it, unless impotence is proved; or certainly the presumption favors him, that he is naturally potent. "Nevertheless," says St. Alphonsus, 1102, "before marriage he ought to warn the spouse concerning such a doubt. Moreover, circumstances and experiences set aside, everyone is presumed capable, even if he has lived most chastely." L. 1102, 902.

These things are said speaking per se; "for when a most grave cause urges, marriage can be contracted, provided that the declaration of the Supreme Pontiff is added, as the sole interpreter of the divine law." L. 902. "Moreover they probably say... that in doubtful impediments the Bishop can well dispense. And the doctors very commonly say the same, speaking generally, concerning all cases or impediments reserved to the Pontiff, when it is doubted whether they need dispensation.... The reason is that, on the one hand, although dispensation from impediments of this kind is reserved to the Pope, nevertheless since reservation is odious, it must be interpreted strictly and restricted only to certain cases...; and also because, since in cases which frequently occur an inferior can dispense in the law of a superior, the Bishop will well be able to dispense in doubtful impediments, because in them it frequently happens that there is doubt concerning the need of dispensation." L. 902. But these things are to be understood concerning cases in which the Supreme Pontiff is accustomed to dispense; by no means concerning others. Zitelli, de Dispensationibus Matr., chap. 2, § 1, par. Secundam, Note.

Is one to be judged to have incurred censure who doubts whether he has incurred it? In a doubt of fact and in a doubt about the existence of the law, one is excused from incurring censure; not likewise in a doubt about the justice of the law, namely whether the censure is just. The first reason is that in doubt the condition of the possessor is better. But one who doubts whether by his act he has incurred censure possesses the right of using spiritual goods. Therefore he is not to be deprived of his right. Therefore. The second reason is that favors are to be enlarged and odious things restricted. Therefore a law inducing a doubtful penalty is to be taken in the more benign part; for penalty is odious. Therefore. The third reason is that in a doubt of justice, presumption favors the superior. When someone doubts whether he has been absolved from a censure which he incurred, in the external forum judgment must be made in favor of the censure, or bond, from C. Sicut 39, de Sent. exc., and therefore absolution must be sought. Likewise in the internal forum absolution must be sought, lest perhaps one become deprived of the goods of the Church. Lugo, De Poenit., disp. 20, n. 18; Sanchez, in Decal., book 1, chap. 10, nn. 55, 56; St. Thomas, Quodlibet 4, a. 14; L. 32, 39, 67, 68.

What is to be done in a case of doubt? "Where doubt occurs, the Ordinary should be consulted." Ritual, l.c.; Holy Office, May 16, 1866, etc. If recourse cannot be had to him, the principle holds: in doubt, odious things are to be restricted; nor indeed, because of the grave inconveniences which could arise from it, is burial to be denied to anyone unless it is certain that this obligation exists. La Croix, book 7, nn. 254-256. "Moreover," says St. Alphonsus, de Priv., n. 91, "no one is to be deprived of burial in any case without the sentence of the Bishop, or of the superior, if the body is that of a religious." Since there is question of positive law, which does not oblige with grave inconvenience, in such a case it is lawful to carry out the dead person with Catholic rite and to pay the solemn funeral rites to him, provided that these are not extorted in contempt of the Church, and provided that the deceased is not carried out with Masonic signs placed on the bier or on banners. The Holy Office, July 13, 1609, judged that the burial of heretics is to be tolerated if it cannot be resisted without scandal. And the Sacred Penitentiary, December 10, 1860, concerning those notoriously excommunicated says, "care must be taken that all things be done according to the norm of the sacred canons; but insofar as this cannot be obtained without danger of disturbances and scandal, the parish priest should in no way concur in the burial either by himself or through other priests," i.e., he should conduct himself passively. E.M.

Masonic or anti-Catholic banners can in no way be admitted in funerals and in churches. Indeed in churches only blessed banners are to be admitted, unless otherwise disturbances and dangers are feared. Sacred Congregation of Rites, July 14, 1887, ad 1, n. 3679; Sacred Penitentiary, April 3, 1887; Holy Office, April 4, 1887.

II. All and each persons knowingly reading without authority of the Apostolic See books of the same apostates and heretics defending heresy, and also books of any author prohibited by name through Apostolic letters; and those retaining, printing, and in any way defending the same books.

Knowingly: this clause placed at the beginning affects, in the obvious and natural sense, not only those reading, but also those retaining, printing, and defending. Therefore ignorance, whether of fact or of law, even crass, and not improbably also affected, excuses from this censure. L. 296. Reading: by the name of reading here is understood reading in the proper sense, and in a human way, so that one understands the things which he reads. Moreover, reading strictly such is understood; whence it is indeed prohibited to read, but it is not prohibited to hear one reading, who perhaps has faculty; nor to recite part of the book from memory, because these things are not comprehended strictly under the name of reading. Ithur., case 39; L. 292. Reading, in a notable quantity and sufficient for grave sin. Thus commonly the doctors, who nevertheless disagree in determining the quantity of this kind. But it seems more rightly to be distinguished, because if by reading a prohibited book you immediately fall into heresy, you can incur excommunication by reading even a few lines, because there is great danger of perversion, which the prohibition of the Church intends to remove. But if you fall into matter altogether indifferent and infected by no error, even by reading a whole page, you are excused from mortal sin and therefore from excommunication. Ithur., l.c., nn. 30, 31; L. 284, 294. Say the same concerning those retaining; for one who retains a book for a moderate time, e.g., one or another day, even if he has the intention of always retaining it, does not incur excommunication. For the reason is the same for time as for matter. Nor are theologians lacking who excuse one who retains a book for a longer time while awaiting a suitable time to hand it over to a superior, or to another having license. Without authority of the Apostolic See. Therefore the Pope alone, or those to whom he has committed or delegated this faculty, can dispense concerning the reading of books prohibited by the present censure.

Books: letters, sermons, public newspapers, Holy Office, April 27, 1880, pamphlets, are not books. Nor are manuscripts books. Sheets separated from a prohibited book, fragments of a book, are not a book. Cf. St. Alphonsus, 293; Suarez, De Cens., disp. 23, sec. 7, n. 3. For a book properly is a volume of several sheets collected together, not of an altogether slight bulk, treating of one and the same argument, or even of various arguments. Whence those knowingly reading periodic publications bound into fascicles, defending heresy and having a heretical author, incur excommunication. Holy Office, January 13, 1892. Of apostates and heretics: the same is added; therefore there is question of those of whom the discussion is in the preceding excommunication, namely by whatever name they are reckoned and of whatever sect they exist; but those believing them are omitted, wherefore it seems to be required for incurring this excommunication that the heretical author be known from elsewhere, and it does not suffice that he be first manifested as such through the book itself. For such a person would rather be a Catholic believing the errors of heretics than a heretic, as is distinguished in the preceding excommunication. Yet if the author evidently and certainly defends heresy, and evidently with a pertinacious mind against the authority of the Church, by that very fact he will be judged a heretic by right and deservedly. Hence if the book is anonymous, from the book itself it can be known whether its author is a heretic, L. 283, and then the censure is incurred. This is confirmed from the constitution Officiorum of Leo XIII, de Prohib. et cens. libr., sec. 47. Defending heresy: "even if only one error is contained in the whole book, the whole is prohibited; nor, even with that error deleted, will it be lawful to retain the book, because it is absolutely prohibited by force of this clause." Suarez, l.c. La Croix, n. 330, and others deny this last point, and indeed probably, because then the book no longer contains heresy, nor does it induce any danger. L. 283. But it must be carefully noted that to defend heresy is not simply to contain heresy, but to undertake patronage of heresy intentionally and, as it were, with one's powers. Therefore books of heretics which only incidentally contain heresy are not comprehended under this excommunication, since they do not treat professedly of faith. L. 287. Nor do the books of the primitive heretics seem to be comprehended, since their heresy no longer harms, and knowledge of them is very useful for ecclesiastical history. La Croix, book 7, n. 333.

Through Apostolic letters. Apostolic letters are those which proceed immediately in the name of the Roman Pontiff, whether in the form of a Brief, or in the form of a Bull, or in any other form, provided that in them is read, by Apostolic Authority, or something equivalent. Prohibited by name, i.e., with the title of the book expressed in particular. Therefore all books which are condemned only in a general way through Apostolic letters are not comprehended by this censure. Prohibited by name: the words indeed are general; nevertheless the doctors commonly understand them of prohibition under penalty of excommunication reserved to the Roman Pontiff. Otherwise the Supreme Pontiff seems to relax to others what he does not reserve to himself, and therefore then there will not be an excommunication reserved to himself in a special manner. But by this same argument it is shown that that excommunication, although reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, is nevertheless not reserved to him in a special manner. For if the Supreme Pontiff reserves it to himself only simply, he seems by that very fact to remove the special reservation. Therefore it would rather have to be said that there is question of prohibition under penalty of specially reserved excommunication. But then this second article of the Constitution would be entirely useless. Therefore it seems that it must be said that there is question of prohibition simply made under penalty of excommunication, although no reservation is added to it. It is said under penalty of excommunication, because if the prohibition is made either with no penalty added, or with another penalty, it surely does not pertain here. For here there is question of censures. Cf. 1178.

Retaining. "He is said to retain who has a book with himself, whether he has it borrowed, deposited, belonging to another, for binding, for selling, for adorning a library, whether in his own or another's house; so that in whatever way, and wherever he has the book, he incurs the censure imposed against those retaining. And so it is not lawful for you to sell or give them.... Yet I myself would think this must be limited, unless you sell or give to one having faculty to read them; for then I believe that the tacit or interpretative faculty of superiors is present, who are not reasonably judged unwilling.... You would not sin if, accommodating another who has faculty, you yourself were to carry with you some prohibited book bought at Rome, e.g., to Fano; just as the bookseller would not sin who kept the book longer in his shop for binding, because all these things are accessory to the faculty itself conceded and are understood as conceded through it." Ithur., case 39, n. 40. Printing: in the obvious sense, those printing are generally all who cooperate proximately in printing, such as those who compose the type, ink it, moisten the sheets, turn the press, etc. Those who arrange sheets and books already printed are not properly printers; those selling and carrying elsewhere are rather retainers. The owner of the typography and the publisher, in the obvious sense, are not printers, but those commanding printing. Regularly they are both readers and also retainers. Defending in any way, namely defending either by words or by deeds; either the depraved doctrine which they contain, or the material book itself, namely if they prevent the book from being burned or handed over to the Bishop or Inquisitor. L. 285. But one who approves and praises good and true doctrine contained in the book is not comprehended by this censure, provided nevertheless that he is not judged absolutely to approve the book itself; nor even one who praises the style, eloquence, phrase, or genius, provided that this does not argue praise and approval of the book. Bull In Coena Domini, sec. 1; Lugo, De Fide, disp. 25, n. 94; L. 281-299; Bouix, De Cur. Rom., part 3, sec. 3, chap. 11; Suarez, disp. 21, sec. 2, first excommunication; Bonacina, disp. 1, q. 2, part 4; E.M.

Can a priest doubting whether the penitent is his accomplice absolve him? R. Affirmatively. Gury, Case 619. The reason is that it is not to be presumed that the legislator prudently wished to proceed against the confessor with so great a doubt concerning the matter on the one hand, and with so great a detriment to reputation and perhaps a new scandal on the other. Therefore the present case seems to fall back into the question of probable or doubtful jurisdiction, in which, when a grave cause stands, it is more probably lawful to absolve. Cf. 770.

What is to be established concerning one who doubts about irregularity incurred? He is bound under grave obligation first to investigate the matter, unless perhaps grave harm could follow from the delay of inquiring. For there is question of a grave law of the Church on account of the honor and reverence owed to the sacrament of order.

Due diligence having been applied, if the doubt still perseveres, generally speaking, he is not to be held as irregular, whether the doubt is negative or positive, whether it is of fact or of law. Chap. Is qui 18, de Sent. exc. in 6. The reason is that odious things are to be restricted; and no one in doubt is to be despoiled of his own right. Generally speaking, because, as St. Alphonsus with the common opinion affirms must more truly be held, doubt concerning homicide is excepted, not concerning mutilation; for such a case is expressly declared in Law. Yet understand this if someone is certain of the homicide having followed, and only doubts whether by his own action he was the cause of it, namely whether he or another killed. Indeed they observe that this is valid only for clerics; and according to several, only for priests, and only as regards celebration of Mass, because the Law speaks only of this: lest if perhaps afterwards he is certainly known as a homicide, he be found to have celebrated, with scandal of the people. Chaps. Ad audientiam 12, Significasti 16, 18, Petitio tua 24, de Hom.; L. 346, 347, 371.

St. Th. I-II, q. 19, a. 3, ad 3; Q. D. de Ver. 17, a. 4, ad 9; II Sent. d. 39, q. 3, a. 3, ad 2 and 6.

109. Various modes of sinning against conscience. - He sins against conscience both who directly acts against a conscience prescribing or prohibiting, and who indirectly exposes himself to this danger by acting without a conscience adorned with the due qualities. Of itself and ordinarily it is not a special sin but is a condition of every sin; for the precept of acting according to conscience, or prudent reason, is general, just as the precept of observing the law, nor does it differ from it, because conscience, since it is not a new law, does not make the law but applies it and, as it were, promulgates it in second act; whence it need not be declared in confession. Nevertheless per accidens and rarely it can be a special sin, if someone expressly and directly through this intends to extinguish conscience; in which case it is formal and direct imprudence, which contemns and rejects the judgment of practical reason, and formal disobedience, which refuses to be subject to the rule of conscience and thus contemns the rule of every good operation, and exposes itself to the danger of every sin.

It is committed in three ways: 1) by acting directly against conscience, whether true or erroneous; 2) by acting according to a conscience erroneous vincibly; 3) by acting without a conscience sufficiently certain, but with a doubtful or merely opinative conscience.

110. Principles. The species and gravity of the sin of one acting against conscience.

I. To act directly against conscience, even erroneous conscience, prescribing or prohibiting:

1. Is a sin of the same species and gravity as conscience dictates; for species and gravity are taken from the object, not as it is in itself, but as it is proposed by the intellect and as the will tends toward it. For example, if someone kills another whom he erroneously thinks to be his own father or a priest, he will be guilty of parricide or sacrilege; on the contrary, if he kills his father or a priest whom he invincibly thinks to be a simple man.

2. If conscience in no way dictates the species of the sin, but only says that it is evil, it is a sin of simple disobedience toward the rule of reason; in the same way, to do a thing indifferent of itself, which is prohibited from the sole motive of obedience, is simple disobedience.

3. If conscience does not indicate the gravity of the sin, but only says that it is evil in general, and the one acting is actually so disposed that he would act even if he knew it to be mortally evil, or if he has in some way adverted or suspected this, or at least the obligation of examining it, it is a mortal sin, because he exposes himself to the danger of sinning mortally.

4. If conscience only says that it is evil and does not indicate the gravity, and he in no way, not even confusedly, adverts to it, it is only a venial sin. Yet authors disagree in assigning the reason. For some say that the sin is venial because evil in general, which alone conscience suspects, contains only minimal malice and consequently slight malice. Yet this seems false: for evil in general equally, or even rather, expresses grave malice, which alone is perfect and full malice, just as being in general rather expresses substance than accident. Whence it is better said that there is only venial sin because, since the one acting did not attend even confusedly to grave malice, sufficient advertence for mortal sin is lacking.

II. In a similar way one must speak of him who acts indirectly against conscience, i.e., with an uncertain conscience, or according to a conscience erroneous vincibly: it is a sin of the same genus or species, and gravity, as that concerning which the one acting doubts, or which he rashly from voluntary error judges licit, and to the danger of committing which he exposes himself. For he who doubts whether something is a sin of such a genus, species, or gravity - or rashly from voluntary error judges that it is not - and nevertheless does it, wills it even if it is of such a genus, species, and gravity, and consequently intends this genus, this species, and this gravity. Thus he who doubts whether an action is gravely harmful to his neighbor and nevertheless places it, wills to do it even if it is gravely unjust, and therefore he is guilty of grave injustice.

III. Observations. - 1. Ordinarily, other things being equal, it is graver to act against a conscience erroneous vincibly than to act according to it, because it is graver to sin from knowledge than from culpable ignorance, unless this latter was chosen or affected in order to sin more freely.

2. Ordinarily in confession it need not be declared whether one acted against a true or erroneous conscience, or with an uncertain conscience, because the object of the sin is the same - unless per accidens, if otherwise the declaration of the sin would be false, for example, "I did not hear Mass on Wednesday," if someone thought it had to be heard.

3. The aforesaid sins, although they can arise from diverse other sins, and by name from precipitation, formally pertain to inconsideration, which implies a defect of practical judgment.

[Section 111 is skipped in the original numbering.]