V. On Doubtful Conscience

What is doubtful conscience? - Doubt is a suspension of assent concerning an apprehended object; not only as regards the specification of the act, but also as regards the very exercise of the act, namely because a sufficient reason is not had for either part. Therefore doubtful conscience is that which remains suspended concerning the honorableness of an action, inclining to neither part. This conscience, since it does not involve judgment, is not conscience properly, but rather a defect of conscience; for conscience is judgment, not suspension of judgment. Nevertheless this suspension of judgment is called conscience, insofar as with this suspension of judgment we often in fact act. Doubt of this kind can be joined with a reflex judgment about the insufficiency of the motive or reason for assenting, and then a judgment of this kind is more properly called doubtful conscience. - L. 1. 1. n. 20; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 5.

How manyfold is doubtful conscience? - "Doubt is divided into negative and positive. Negative doubt is when probable reasons occur on neither side. Positive is when for each side, or at least for one, there is present a grave motive sufficient for forming a probable conscience, although with fear concerning the opposite; therefore positive doubt almost always coincides with probable opinion." L. 1. 1. n. 20. Likewise one doubt is strict, another broad. Strict doubt is had when the mind does not determinately embrace one part by its assent, but adheres waveringly to each; broad is when the mind adheres to one part, yet does not furnish it an altogether firm assent.

In the former sense is to be understood what S. Alph. has apud Aertnys n. 70 at the end: "Where two equally probable opinions concur, neither remains probable, but only doubtful." Certainly the mind can remain doubtful, that is, suspend assent; but it can also well adhere determinately to one before the other, and even to each, if the motives are not contradictory but disparate, with an assent indeed not certain and firm, but probable, not without fear of the opposite. Therefore strict doubt can arise from the fact that on each side the reasons are equal or almost equal; or also from the fact that for neither side are there reasons, or only slight reasons are present for each. And just as when reasons are present on each side, although equal, reason can be moved by them to assent, so when no reasons or only slight reasons are present, then the doubt is to be scorned, and consequently does not impede opposite probability or certainty. In the present we are not treating of conscience positively and broadly doubtful, or probable, about which we have already spoken; but our discussion will be only about conscience negatively and strictly doubtful.

Moreover, doubt is divided into speculative and practical. Speculative doubt is that by which someone doubts about the truth of a thing or about the liceity of a thing in general, or universally, for example, whether baptism with distilled water is valid, whether painting on a feast day is servile work. Practical doubt is that by which someone doubts about the liceity or honorableness of an action in particular, to be exercised here and now, for example, whether on this feast day in these circumstances it is licit for me to paint, whether it is licit to baptize this child with distilled water. To be exercised here and now: for otherwise, although the action is considered as circumscribed by several circumstances, speculative doubt can still be had concerning it, if the question does not concern an action to be exercised and directed by conscience in the present. Practical doubt always arises from another speculative doubt, either of law concerning the law, or of fact concerning some particular thing. Hence conscience speculatively doubtful, and practically doubtful. L. 1. 1. n. 21; S. Th. 1. p. q. 79. a. 13.

What is the directive force of doubtful conscience? - The response is clear from the following propositions. - With a practically doubtful conscience, whether the action is licit or illicit, it is illicit to act. For only a certain conscience is the rule of morals. Cf. 102. Hence that saying: In doubts the safer part is to be chosen. The safer, namely that which stands for the observance of the law. C. Inquisitioni 44 de Sent. exc.; L. 1. 1. n. 22. 79, l. 7. n. 347; S. Th. Quodl. 8. a. 13; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 5; De Censur. d. 40. s. 6. n. 3. 9; E. M.

With a speculatively doubtful conscience it is licit to operate, provided a practically certain conscience can be formed. For as is clear from what has been said n. 102, certain conscience, however finally it has been formed, if it at least rests on moral certainty, is a sufficient rule of morals, indeed the sole rule of morals. It is licit to operate: namely where the question concerns only the licit or illicit. For where the question concerns the truth of the thing and an effect necessarily to be obtained, if it is illicit to act with probability, it is consequently illicit to act with doubt. Cf. 116; L. 1. 1. n. 25; Suarez d. 12. s. 5.

The means by which from a speculatively doubtful conscience someone may make the step to a practically certain conscience are: 1. To weigh the doubt itself with a certain moral diligence. For if, as S. Alph. says l. 1. n. 24, "all things having been weighed, he notices that the doubt is empty, here he can well put aside his doubt without another reflection, and thus execute the action." 2. To inquire into the practice of good men operating without scruple. 3. The counsel of a learned and prudent man. 4. Some probable reason, a fortiori a demonstrative reason of the matter, which perhaps can be found by inquiring into the truth. - 5. Some general reason, or some general reflex principle, so called because it leads and bends us by means of reasoning to defining rightly the question, not concerning the intrinsic and objective truth of the thing, which cannot be resolved through itself and in its immediate principle, but concerning the subjective liceity of our action from some general extrinsic principle. Thus a judge is doubtful whether Titius is guilty, from intrinsic and direct reasons of law or fact. But from the general and reflex principle, In doubt favor is to be given to the accused, he unhesitatingly absolves Titius. - L. ib.

There are indeed certain general reasons, or certain general sayings and principles, which can always be at hand, so that someone may make the step from negative doubt to moral certainty immediately, or at least to probability, from which then by means of the principles of probabilism he can form for himself a certain conscience. Now rules and principles of this kind are the following. Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 5. n. 7; Lugo De Iust. et Iur. d. 23. n. 110.

In doubt the condition of the possessor is better. C. 6 de Praescript. This axiom in the external forum, both ecclesiastical and civil, has been received as a certain rule of judgments. For it is to be presumed that he who possesses a thing possesses it by right, unless the contrary is clear. The same certainly has force in the internal forum of conscience. For certain and legitimate possession produces moral certainty concerning the dominion of the thing, L. 1. 1. n. 35, l. 4. 210, l. 6. n. 905. 927; and the reason is that, given human customs, no one is, morally speaking, negligent; indeed on the contrary all are diligent and very diligent in guarding their own things. Moreover, where one does not proceed from a false supposition, the right of the external and internal forum is the same; for each forum is founded on the principles of natural justice and equity. Hence theologians commonly admit the aforesaid rule for the forum of conscience. L. 1. 1. n. 26. Now some say that this axiom has force only in the matter of justice. "Yet I," says S. Alph. l. c., "do not know how it can be denied in all matters." And this certainly is by far the more common and truer opinion. The reason for this extension also to other matters, with due proportion, is the same as in the matter of justice. For no one can justly be despoiled without sufficient reason of a good which is his own. But man naturally, and therefore certainly and altogether legitimately, possesses his liberty, which certainly is some good and right of his own. Therefore this good also pertains to justice, and he who unjustly either takes it away or weakens it violates justice. Without injustice a free man cannot be subjected to servitude. But there can be no doubt that in doubtful laws liberty is always in prior possession of itself. For upon whom is law imposed except a free man? Whence it is that what is licit is not whatever the law permits, but what the law does not prohibit, L. 28. § 2 Ex quib. caus. maior., and therefore this prohibition must be manifestly proved, C. 23 de Verb. signif. - Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 5. n. 8; Lugo De Iust. et Iur. d. 17. n. 87, d. 23. n. 110. In doubt: that is, in negative doubt, and the reason of the axiom is then clear, because possession stands for the possessor, and therefore moral certainty; for the petitioner no prudent reason is had. Cf. Lugo De Iust. et Iur. 23. n. 110. But in positive doubt, or probability, if probability is present on each side, so that on one side possession and probability of right stand, and on the other only equal or almost equal contrary probability of right, the condition of the possessor is again better, as is clear of itself. But if on one side indeed possession stands, but on the other contrary probability of right; or on one side possession and at the same time probability of right, and on the other far greater contrary probability of right, then certainly the condition of the possessor is not better, but doubtful. Indeed the first opinion holds that the judge is bound to adjudge the thing to the plaintiff, because the right of possession prevails in an equal cause, but not in a less probable cause. For Rule 65 of the Law in the Sixth has it thus: "In equal fault, or cause, the condition of the possessor is stronger"; and in L. 128 ff. de div. Reg. Iuris it is said: "In an equal cause the possessor ought to be held stronger." But the second opinion holds that the condition of the possessor is still better, and that the judge cannot despoil him of possession. The reason is that "it is certain that legitimate possession gives to each a certain right of retaining the thing, until the right of another is not established, as they say most commonly... a certain right, which cannot be overcome except by the certain right of another through certain convincing reasons." For possession is defined: the right of insisting in a thing not prohibited to be possessed. L. 1. 1. n. 36; Ithur. Cas. 1. n. 2. Cf. L. 1. 3. n. 547. 562. 711, etc.

Therefore the possession about which the present saying speaks is certain and legitimate possession. It is called certain, that is, that the fact of possession is certain; legitimate, that is, begun and continued in good faith, and likewise begun and continued by a just title, at least apparent, or at least thought to exist, or presumed, such as, for example, donation, purchase, inheritance, and similar things, through which ownership of some thing is usually acquired. Therefore if possession is doubtful, or begun with doubtful faith, or by a doubtful title, it by itself does not exhibit to the possessor a special prerogative and presumption against which no contrary probability has force. L. 1. 1. n. 36. 47, l. 4. n. 210.

Probability of right, which can be only on one side or on each side, is the probability of a real just title, or of one actually existing, from which true and real dominion and ownership of the thing arise. For for legitimate possession, about which the axiom speaks, it suffices that the just title at least appears, because, for example, a donation or purchase intervened from him who was thought to be owner, although he was not; or at least was thought to exist, because the action signified by the title is thought to have intervened, although it did not intervene, as happens when someone thinks that the thing was given to him or bought by him, and nevertheless this was not done; or at least presumed, because, for example, because of length of time in peaceful possession or other circumstances, it is prudently thought that some title intervened, although the possessor cannot allege any determinate one. Therefore this probability of right, as is clear, is altogether outside possession itself, which only gives the right of insisting in the thing, or of holding it, although perhaps its dominion and ownership does not belong to you, since a just title was not really present. Now the probability of a real just title, or of one actually existing, can be in two ways: 1. Probability of the justice of the title for beginning or continuing possession and ownership of the thing, for example, a testament lacking legal formalities. 2. Probability of the reality or existence of a just title for the same effect, for example, of donation, when it is also probable that the thing was taken by theft. The former probability is called of right; the latter is called of fact. Where this latter is treated, "when the fact is not plainly proved, it is not probable that the accused can be condemned, since laws never permit the accused to be condemned unless the crime or debt is fully proved; but it is not proved fully and sufficiently for a sentence when, although two or three witnesses testify, nevertheless other witnesses testify the contrary; for through these the testimony of the former is destroyed or diminished, and therefore the sufficient proof required for full proof and condemnation does not remain." Lugo De Iust. et Iure d. 16. n. 100. Cf. also d. 23. n. 100, d. 16. n. 34. 96. 99.

You will resolve: From the aforesaid axiom several practical cases of negative doubt can be resolved, in which every true probability is lacking, namely whether the time of the obligation of a law has arrived or passed. "In doubt of beginning, for example, whether you have completed 21 years, you are not bound to fasting, because then possession is for liberty. Otherwise in doubt of passing, for example, whether on Saturday the hour of midnight has passed, you cannot eat meat, for then the law possesses. Thus also, if you doubt whether you have 16 years for profession, or 25 years for priesthood, you cannot profess or be ordained. Thus commonly." L. 1. 1. n. 99. 32.

In doubt one must stand for that for which presumption stands. For presumption, taken from things ordinarily happening, or from other circumstances of the person and the thing, produces moral certainty, or at least probability. "In obscure matters one is accustomed to look at what is more likely, or what usually happens." L. 114 de R. I.; R. I. 14 in 6. It is a certain anticipated proof of a thing from indications, before direct proofs. Therefore presumption exhibits a thing as true and stands for that side which is not bound by itself to prove the contrary fact, but transfers that burden of proving to the other side. For whenever something is known to preexist which by its nature perseveres until it is taken away by some contrary fact, that thing is thought to persevere as long as that contrary fact is not established, which consequently must be proved by the adverse side.

Hence, if you are accustomed at such a time diligently to recite the breviary, and you doubt whether you have recited some part, presumption favors you and exempts you from the obligation of reciting or repeating. If an insane person, but one who has lucid intervals, makes a vow and afterward doubts whether he made the vow while master of himself, he is not obligated so long as it does not appear that he was master of himself. L. 1. n. 26. Nevertheless in the forum of penance, in which, as S. Thomas says 4.

D. 17. a. 3. q. 3, one must stand by the word of the penitent for himself and against himself, presumption yields to the truth affirmed by the penitent. - Cf. 204; Lugo De Poenit. d. 20. n. 17. 19; L. 1. 3. n. 270, l. 6. n. 600 par. Limitant. Likewise in the case of doubt, the baptism of spouses is not presumed in relation to a marriage, if the non-Catholic party or parties had parents belonging to a sect which rejects baptism; on the contrary it is presumed if they had parents belonging to a sect which admits baptism, and they were zealous in that sect. S. O. Aug. 1, 1883; Collect. S. C. de P. F. n. 662; E. M. n. 1016.

Note: Where the question concerns obedience to be furnished to a superior in doubt, presumption stands, speaking per se, always for the superior. L. 1. 1. n. 93. 98. 99. Speaking per se always: for accidentally it can sometimes happen that presumption is not present for the superior, for example, in doubt about the liceity of the thing, even with the precept of the superior acceding, for example, when the superior "is accustomed rashly and imprudently to command at pleasure things which are not licit... also when, with the precept of the prelate acceding, the thing remains in doubt (as regards its intrinsic liceity); nor does the authority, doctrine, probity, or prudence of the prelate suffice for putting aside the doubt, which case is possible." Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 3. d. 19. n. 11; L. 1. 3. n. 617. Cf. here 157.

In doubt a fact is not presumed, but must be demonstrated. L. 10 C. de Non numer. pec. - For no reason must be given for non-being, but for being; because non-being does not have its cause, but being does. But understand this of the principal fact, if it is doubtful: because, if the principal fact is certainly established and there is doubt about an accessory fact, then other principles have force: In doubt every fact is presumed rightly done; In doubt the fact which by law had to be done is presumed; In doubt one must stand for the value of the act; always excluding unjust damage to oneself or another or the community. For every being naturally tends toward its perfection and good. Therefore if nothing is established as obstructing, nature continues to pursue its course. The fact of a completed Confession is established; you doubt concerning the right, whether you confessed rightly with sorrow, with purpose; you can acquiesce. These three latter principles have force both for liberty and against liberty.

For liberty, if a contrary and certain presumption or the common good does not obstruct; for no obligation is to be imposed unless it is certainly established. Against liberty, namely if a contrary and certain presumption or the public good obstructs; for the common good prevails over private good. L. 1. 1. n. 26. 27. 137. 182. 251, l. 3. n. 201, l. 6. n. 505; L. Quoties 12 de Reb. dub. ff.

You will resolve: In doubt whether you took some food or drink, and likewise in doubt whether you took food or drink after midnight, you can receive the Eucharist. For unless the fact is proved in each case, liberty possesses. L. 1. 1. n. 38. 39; Elbel 166. 167; Amort. Theol. t. 2. d. 5. 9. 4, who observes these things at the end: "Yet I say that he would sin at least venially who, for the pleasure of mere drinking, should thus traffic around the laws of the Church, exposing himself to the danger of at least material transgression; and if he does this from custom or from a resolve always to operate in this way, no other reasonable cause concurring, for example, thirst, infirmity, he will sin mortally, because such a resolve argues interpretative contempt and a defect of charity toward God and the Church, whose honor he stains."

Busemb. apud La Croix, l. 1. n. 470. VI. Indeed, although it is licit to use a probable opinion against a law, it is nevertheless not licit to act in fraud of the law, voluntarily procuring a state of doubt against the law, lest someone be bound to observe the law. Doubtful baptism, in order to a marriage already entered or to be entered, is held as valid; and therefore a marriage is pronounced valid or invalid according to various circumstances.

The marriage of one doubtfully baptized with one not baptized must be held invalid. On the contrary, the marriage of two doubtfully baptized persons, and of one doubtfully baptized with one baptized, must be held valid. S. O. Nov. 17, 1830; Sept. 9, 1868; Sept. 18, 1872; July 7, 1880; Sept. 18, 1890; Apr. 12, 1899; Collect. S. C. P. F. n. 1872; E. M. n. 1016. But a doubtful marriage, because of the common good, is commonly held as valid. But because of the most excellent good of religion, the doubtful marriage of polygamous infidels who are converted to the faith is declared invalid. Collect. S. C. de P. F. n. 1301. 1304. 1332. 2184.

In doubt no one is presumed evil, unless it is proved. - This axiom is a corollary of the preceding. For since facts and consequently crimes are not presumed, but must be demonstrated, neither ought anyone to be presumed evil, but he must be proved. Indeed no one is evil for nothing.

Hatreds should be restricted and favors should be broadened. R. I. 15 in 6 - For no one desires to be hated, but all desire to be pleasing. Therefore favors are to be preferred to hatreds. Favor is understood as whatever indulges liberty or grants grace. R. 122 de R. I. Hatred is whatever restricts liberty, establishes a punishment, or injures some right. But since it sometimes happens that what is a favor to one is hatred to another, the particular case must be considered, so that it may be determined whether favor is to be preferred to hatred, or hatred to favor. Hence there arises the general principle: In obscure matters the minimum is to be followed, R. I. 30 in 6, L. 9 de Reg. Iur., and therefore the interpretation of law is to be made less burdensome and more benign to liberty. Whence there is another general principle: Always in doubts the more benign things are to be preferred. L. 56 de R. I. And likewise another: Unless you have been certain of the mandate, you will not be compelled to execute what is commanded. C. Cum iure 31 de Off. et pot. iud. del. L. 1. 1. n. 97.

You will resolve: Therefore it is false that where generally the discussion concerns speculative doubt about the liceity or illicitness of an action, in doubts the safer part must be chosen. And certainly in this Rule of Canon Law the question does not concern speculative doubt, in which by means of a reflex principle someone can form for himself a certain conscience, and thus choose a part altogether safe; but the question concerns either practical doubt, namely a practically doubtful conscience, with which it is not licit to act, or else the question concerns those cases in which the end must necessarily be obtained. But the question is above all about the external forum, in which often there is a special reason for following the safer course, in order to remove scandals, abuses, and offenses of the faithful; or about honorableness and the greater degree of merit, not about the necessity of salvation. L. 1. 1. n. 68. 79, H. A. tr. 1. n. 39; Struggl tr. 1. q. 5. n. 17.

Of what species of sin is he guilty who acts with a practically doubtful conscience? - This person will be guilty of a sin of the same notion and species as the sin about which he doubts. The reason is that one doubting about that malice, and nevertheless acting, has an affection toward that malice. Hence if you doubt whether it is mortal, you sin mortally; if you doubt generally whether it is sin, not attending even confusedly to the grave malice which may be present, you sin venially. L. 1. 1. 22. 23; Elbel 140.

Note: He who sinned from an erroneous conscience is not bound in confession to explain that circumstance of erroneous conscience, because it does not change the species; since every sin is against conscience, and does not depend on the objective truth of the thing except insofar as that is judged through conscience and proposed to the will. Except the case of censure and reservation: since then the erroneous conscience must be explained so that the exemption from censure and reservation may be established. Except also the case in which otherwise the sin would not be understood, for example, if someone by omitting Mass on a weekday believes that he sins gravely.

What must someone do if, placed between two precepts, he remains doubtful which one he ought to choose, for example, if the precept of hearing Mass urges, and he ought to assist someone gravely sick? - This conscience is usually called perplexed. Someone, when such a case occurs, must sufficiently, as much as is in him, inquire into the truth so that he may put aside the doubt. When the truth has been sufficiently inquired into, and the doubt remains, he can and must choose that which seems to him the lesser evil; and, if each seems equally grave, he can choose either. This is true even if someone culpably cast himself into that perplexity, provided that he is sorry for the past fault. The reason is that there is no obligation to impossibilities, and therefore then the lesser obligation ceases; or, if they are or seem equal, or because of ignorance someone does not know how to discern which is lesser, either ceases; and even if someone thinks that by acting so he sins, he does not really sin from defect of liberty. - Suarez d. 12. s. 5; Lessius on q. 19. d. 19. a. 6. d. 9; L. 1. 1. n. 10; Elbel 141.

You will resolve: If the one acting chooses that which seems to him the greater evil, he sins according to the excess of the evil apprehended, since he freely chooses this excess.

If you doubt whether you have already satisfied some obligation, are you still bound to satisfy? - R. Affirmatively, if the doubt is merely negative. For in such a doubt no prudent reason of satisfaction is present, and therefore it is impossible by some reflex principle to form for oneself a conscience concerning non-satisfaction, since the law altogether certainly perseveres. Cf. Ithur. Cas. 44. n. 15.

But if the doubt is positive, it is controverted. The first opinion, which S. Alph. 1. 1. n. 26-29, 1. 3. n. 700 par. ult., 1. 6. n. 477, quaest. reform., recent retract. q. 1 and 18, etc., altogether holds and thinks must be held, and several others hold, affirms. The reason is 1. because a certain obligation is not satisfied by a doubtful fulfillment; 2. because since in doubt the condition of the possessor is better, and the law certainly existing possesses against liberty, it prevails over liberty, and will always have it obligated to itself until the law has certainly been fulfilled. Cf. besides L. 1. 1. n. 20. 39. 99, 1. 3. n. 112. 290.

The second opinion, which we judge most probable both intrinsically and extrinsically, denies that such an obligation is present. The reason is the very fundamental reason of probabilism, which the holy Doctor cited above explains most learnedly and most expertly, namely: a doubtful law does not oblige. For law does not oblige in the abstract and universal, but in the concrete and particular case, L. 1. 1. n. 78. But although the existence of the law according to itself is certain, nevertheless the same law as obliging in such a concrete and particular case is uncertain, and is altogether prudently pronounced uncertain, if it is truly probable that satisfaction has already been made to it. Therefore either it must be said that the obligation of satisfying the law again in the aforesaid case is null, or it must be said that the aforesaid principle, a doubtful law does not oblige, is not universally true but suffers an exception; which would not be fittingly said. For what is true is always true, and for every particular contained in the universal. But from this reason it appears that the obligation really is not certain, which is assumed in the first reason of the opposite opinion, if it is probable that the law has already been satisfied. For against certainty there cannot be probability. As regards the second reason, as is clear from what has already been said, possession prevails in merely negative doubt; but for it certainly to prevail even in positive doubt, it must be certain and certainly legitimate possession. Now when in a particular case it is truly probably established that the law has been fulfilled, the possession of the law for that concrete and particular case becomes prudently doubtful; for if you really satisfied it, liberty in fact possesses. Besides, it is certainly not legitimate, since probably the just title of obligation is lacking; for you can probably believe that you have already satisfied, and therefore the just title, at least presumed, probably is not present. Moreover, several and very grave theologians hold this opinion. Indeed the same S. Alph. 1. 1. n. 99 has these things: "What in doubt whether you have fulfilled the law? In negative doubt you are bound to fulfill; otherwise in positive." Cf. also 1. 4. n. 150. And thus indeed S. Alph. himself thought, 1. 1. n. 76, edition of the year 1757; and S. D. called this opinion common, and himself deduced it from the very principles of probabilism. Finally S. D. 1. 6. n. 505 says, "it must be carefully noted that penitents are not to be compelled to repeat confessions unless it is morally certain that they were invalid, as La-Croix, etc., rightly say." - D'Annib. ed. 4. p. 1. n. 169.

You will resolve: Therefore that axiom, a doubtful law does not oblige, is to be understood of a law doubtful by positive doubt, or truly probably doubtful. Now law can be positively doubtful in many ways concerning its existence and concerning its cessation; concerning existence, whether it has been enacted, whether promulgated, whether the time of obligation has arrived, whether it extends to such a case; concerning cessation, whether it has been abrogated, whether its excuse or dispensation is present, whether it has already been fulfilled. And in all these cases we say that the aforesaid axiom has place, unless we wish to admit the truth of the general proposition and at the same time deny the truth of the proposition contained in the general.

Therefore law can be doubtful: 1. As regards its very existence and promulgation, concerning which S. Alph. says: "In order that law oblige, it must not only be promulgated, but also promulgated as certain. And this point must firmly be established here," 1. 1. n. 63 seq. and 97. And, to pass over others, these things are from the distinguished Doctor apud S. Alph. 1. 1. 66: "As long as there is a probable judgment that there is no law prohibiting the action, such a law is not sufficiently proposed to man; whence since the obligation of law is of itself burdensome, it does not urge until it is more certainly established." C. 31 de Off. iud. deleg.

2. As regards its understanding and obvious interpretation, and whether it is obscure or ambiguous. For since law must be sufficiently proposed in order to oblige, the legislator is not judged to wish to oblige beyond that which is clearly and determinately expressed in the law. R. I. 30. 57 in 6; L. 9 C. de Leg. et Const.; Suarez in 1. 2. tr. d. 12. s. 5. n. 7. Obscure: for example, whether regular prelates, since they too have their own sheep, ought to apply Mass for them on feast days. This question, twice proposed before the Holy See, has not yet been solved. Giraldi Expos. I. P. p. 2. s. 85. t. 3. Ambiguous: it is provided that a beneficed cleric not reciting the canonical hours after six months from obtaining the benefice does not make the fruits his own; nevertheless the fruits are to be understood not of the earlier and later time, but only of the later.

3. Whether it has an extensive or restrictive interpretation, concerning which S. Alph. 1. 3. n. 1036 says: "When it is doubted whether a law comprehends some case or subject, it is the same as if it is doubted whether a law exists for that case or subject, and therefore liberty possesses." Cf. also 1. 1. n. 27. 97; Lugo De Poenit. d. 16. n. 59, De Iust. et Iur. d. 23. n. 110.

4. Whether it has ceased, either immediately when it was enacted, because it was never received, or with the progress of time through desuetude; concerning which S. D. 1. 3. n. 112 says: "Nor is the first opinion an obstacle, which we followed 1. 1. n. 97, namely that in doubt whether a law has been received, the law rightly obliges; for here we are not involved in doubt, but in probable opinion.... For in doubt the presumption stands for the law, since a crime in not receiving a just law is not presumed. But when it is probable that the obligation of the law never began, or has been abolished, then the presumption for the law ceases and liberty possesses." The same S. D. has this, 1. 1. n. 107 par. An vero, 1. 4. n. 47. The same must consequently be said when it is probable that the end of the law has ceased adequately, L. 1. 1. n. 199, or that the law has been abrogated by custom, L. 1. 3. n. 290, or that in a particular case there is no need of dispensation, L. 1. 1. n. 192, 1. 3. n. 304. Certainly as soon as the obligation of the law is doubtful, its possession consequently becomes doubtful; and therefore in the case the argument taken from the Rule of possession has no force.

5. Whether the law is just or unjust; and here a threefold case can occur. The first is that the justice of the law is doubted because the legislator himself is doubted, whether he is a legitimate superior. Now in this case, if the doubt about the legitimacy of the superior is positive, about which we are treating, namely it is truly probable that he is not a legitimate superior, by that very fact the non-existence of the law becomes truly probable, and therefore it does not oblige. Cf. L. 1. 1. n. 98. 121. - But if the doubt is merely negative, the law must be obeyed, "whenever the superior is in peaceful possession of his power; for then his condition, as already possessing the right of commanding, is better." L. 1. 1. n. 98, 1. 4. n. 47. The other case is that the justice of the law is doubted because it is doubted whether the superior exceeds his power. In positive doubt, or true probability concerning excess of power, the same must be said as in the preceding case. For by the very fact that it is truly and manifestly probable that the superior exceeds his power, the non-existence of the law becomes truly probable, and therefore it does not oblige. Cf. L. 1. 3. n. 617. - But if the doubt is merely negative, presumption, speaking per se, always stands for the superior.

The third case is because the liceity of the thing commanded itself is doubted. In positive doubt or true probability, the law is not doubtful, and therefore obliges. For the superior then commands a thing probably licit, indeed certainly licit; for he commands that the subject embrace some probable opinion in practice, which is certainly licit. Therefore he commands licitly and by right. Therefore the subject is bound to obey. Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 3. d. 19; L. 90, l. 1. n. 93. 99. 124, l. 4. n. 47; Wirceburg. De Legib. c. 1. a. 1. "But the doctors commonly limit the aforesaid opinion, and say that the subject is not bound to obey, 1. if the thing is very difficult and troublesome.... They limit it 2. when by obeying the subject would expose himself or another to the danger of undergoing grave inconvenience in life, reputation, honor, or goods." L. 1. 4. n. 47, l. 3. n. 617, l. 1. n. 31. "The reason is that the subjection and obedience due to the superior does not take away your right and possession, or that of another, concerning the good of honor, reputation, body, or fortune. Therefore you are not bound to deprive yourself of this certain possession in a matter of such great moment; rather it seems consonant with equity that greater account be taken of your certain possession, and that this be preferred to the right or possession, in some way doubtful, of the superior." Elbel 173; Laymann c. 5. n. 12; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 5. Moreover, because then in the case of a very difficult or harmful thing it can deservedly be doubted whether the superior exceeds the limits of his power, and therefore the existence of the law becomes doubtful; or legitimate epikeia can then also have place, according to the various circumstances of the particular case. But if the doubt is merely negative, presumption, as has already been said, Cf. 146, always stands for the superior. Cf. Suarez De Relig. t. 4. l. 4. c. 12 seq.; Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 3. d. 19. Besides, as regards practice more, "the opinion of all theologians, both recent and ancient, is common: they teach that in obscure matters the superior must be obeyed where sin is not certain; and thus all have taught who have treated this matter. Thus also all the masters of mystical theology with S. Ignatius of Loyola in the Letter on the Virtue of Obedience." L. 1. 1. n. 100. 194; Lugo l. c. n. 3; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 5.