IV. On the Doctrine of S. Alphonsus Concerning Probabilism

Since the authority of S. Alphonsus is very great in moral matters, and several more recent authors deny that S. D. stands for probabilism simply so called, but affirm that he teaches equiprobabilism, and rejects probabilism as lax doctrine; hence here especially we raise the question about the mind of the holy Doctor, although in the preceding article we have almost constantly used his opinions and even his words to establish the doctrine of probabilism.

E. M. Lest there be doubt in this matter, and that we may faithfully set forth the mind of S. D., we take his doctrine from the tract on Conscience in his work H. A., which he himself there, n. 79, declares that he wrote when near death. Now these things are had in n. 33. 77: "The third opinion, which is ours, says that when the opinion which favors liberty is equally probable as the opinion which favors the law, without doubt it can be followed licitly.... Here it is necessary that I warn something concerning my system, which must altogether be warned, and it is this: that when it is doubted whether the opinion favoring the law is equally probable or a little more probable, then the same principle has place, that a doubtful law does not oblige; for in such a case, the law itself does not cease to be strictly doubtful. For then, although some greater probability for the law might be present, since it is doubted whether this greater probability is present or not, the preponderance will be so slight and minimal that it must be counted for nothing before that saying commonly admitted by the adversaries themselves, that a little is reputed as nothing. But it would be otherwise when the excess were evident and certain, because then the opinion favoring the law will be certainly and much more probable; and therefore then, as was said from the beginning, the law is already morally promulgated, and therefore obliges, and is without doubt to be observed."

Two things must be investigated here. The first is what S. Alph. understands by an opinion evidently and certainly much more probable. For if he understands an opinion truly and properly probable, he is against us; but if he understands an opinion which passes beyond the limits of probability and reaches certainty, he will be for us. The other is what S. D. again understands by an opinion equally probable or a little more probable. For if that "a little more probable" denotes a slight excess of probability, as distinguished from a greater excess of true probability, again S. D. is against us; but if it denotes simply an excess of probability, S. D. will be for us.

As regards the first, the holy Doctor refers himself back to those things which were said at the beginning. At the beginning, n. 31, these things are had: "But whether it is licit to operate with a probable opinion, there are three opinions, the first of which is that someone can licitly follow an opinion even less probable in favor of liberty, although the opinion in favor of the law is certainly more probable. Authors of the past century held this opinion almost commonly, but we say that it is lax and cannot licitly be embraced. The reason is that when the opinion in favor of the law is certainly more probable, then the law is no longer doubtful by a strict doubt, as happens, as we shall explain later, when the opinions both in favor of the law and in favor of liberty are equally probable; but it is morally certain, since it has in its favor a certain foundation that it is true, whereas on the contrary the less probable opinion, which favors liberty, has such a foundation that it is not true, so that it remains tenuously, or at least doubtfully, probable before the safer opinion; and therefore it is not prudence, but imprudence, to wish to follow it. For when it certainly appears to the intellect that the truth stands more for the law than for liberty, then the will cannot prudently and without fault follow the less safe part: for then it would not operate from its own judgment, or its own belief, but from a certain effort which by its will it will make upon the intellect, removing it from that part which seems truer to it, and bending it toward that part which not only seems to it not true, but does not even show that it has a certain foundation by which it could be true."

Now from these things it is openly clear that S. D. by an opinion certainly more probable really understands an opinion morally certain. For he says that then the law 1. is not doubtful by a strict doubt, but is morally certain; 2. that the same law then has in its favor a certain foundation that it is true; 3. again, that the said law has against itself only an opinion which has such a foundation that it is not true; 4. that the less probable opinion opposed to the law is tenuously or doubtfully probable; so that it is imprudence to wish to follow it, and that it not only seems not true, but does not even show that it has a certain foundation by which it could be true.

Now a tenuously probable opinion is not a truly probable opinion; and the same S. Alph. teaches this, n. 65: "tenuous probability is not true probability, but is only a certain false or vain appearance of probability." Likewise a doubtfully probable opinion is not truly and properly probable, which we contend it is licit to follow even in concurrence with the more probable. For if it is doubtfully probable, it participates in the nature of doubtful probability, and therefore properly speaking is not probable. And certainly a truly and properly probable opinion is defined by the same S. Alph., l. c. n. 21, as "that which rests on some grave foundation apt to incline the assent of a prudent man." Therefore a doubtfully probable opinion will be an opinion which has a doubtfully grave foundation, and therefore does not merit the assent of a prudent man, who would be exposed to the danger of acting imprudently. "Doubtfully probable," says S. Alph. l. c. n. 65, "which no one can follow, but if it is not probable, it has only some prudent reason that it is true... the doubtfully probable has some prudent reason, although not altogether stable, that it is probable."

And hence it is clear that that opinion which it is imprudence to wish to follow, and which not only seems not true, but does not even show that it has a certain foundation by which it could be true, is not a truly and properly probable opinion. Therefore if the less probable opinion opposed to the certainly more probable is not truly and properly probable, the certainly more probable opinion by no means remains within the limits of probability, but already reaches certainty. The same is confirmed from the Dissertation inserted in Op. Mor. l. 1. n. 55 of the sixth and seventh editions, and related in the edition of P. Gaude p. 25 as a commentary on the doctrine of S. Alphonsus in the text, and in the Turin edition of 1846, where he thus explains that phrase "certainly more probable." "I said," he says, "certainly more probable, because when the opinion in favor of the law is certainly and without any hesitation more probable, then that opinion cannot be anything except notably more probable. And in that case the safer opinion will no longer be doubtful (understand concerning doubt strictly taken... Cf. here 138), but is morally or quasi morally certain; at least it can no longer be called strictly doubtful, since it has in its favor a certain foundation that it is true. Hence then it happens that the less safe opinion, which lacks a certain foundation, remains either tenuously or at least doubtfully probable with respect to the safer; and therefore it is not prudence, but imprudence, to wish to embrace it," etc.

Note first that from S. D., if an opinion is certainly more probable, it is notably more probable, because a small excess either is not perceived by the intellect, or is not perceived without fear of erring. Hence, if an opinion is certainly more probable, it is also notably more probable. - Then note as regards that phrase, quasi morally certain, that to the holy Doctor in this matter, where the question concerns a certain moral estimation, a little is reputed as nothing. Moreover S. D. is not speaking of any probability whatever, but of that which appears certainly to the intellect, and he is speaking of one who, if he departed from this probability, would depart from his own judgment through a certain effort of the will, and would act against his conscience; to whom he therefore applies that saying of the Apostle, Rom. 14:23: What is not from faith is sin. Ibid. and H. A. tr. 1. n. 31. Finally S. D. calls that opinion lax which defends even a less probable opinion in favor of liberty without any distinction, namely one which has only some foundation of reason and authority; and therefore he distinguished by saying that someone cannot follow this less safe opinion when there is a great and certain preponderance in favor of the safer. Apolog. cont. il P. Patuzzi anno 1765. But the true doctrine of probabilism, which we follow, does not defend any probable opinion indiscriminately, but one certainly and gravely probable, which alone is truly probable. Likewise S. D. calls that doctrine lax which authors of the past century almost commonly handed down, namely in the latter part of that century, in which several lax opinions of probabilists were condemned by the Holy See; but certainly not Sanchez, Suarez, Lessius, Palaus, Laymann, Lugo, Pallavicini and very many others, whom S. Alph. himself, not only in his Moral Works, but in that very Dissertation on his moral system, approves and praises for his opinion. He himself defends this and repeatedly champions it, not against probabilists, but against rigid tutiorists, and affirms that for a series of many years it had without doubt been common among all. Breve Dissertaz. dell'uso moderato dell'Opin. Probab., Naples 1762, p. 48; Op. Mor. l. 1. n. 59. 68-73. 84.

As regards the other point, it is an evident thing that if S. D. by an opinion much more probable understands an opinion morally certain, or quasi morally certain against a tenuous or doubtful probability, by an opinion a little more probable he understands simply an excess of mere probability. For otherwise the holy Doctor himself could certainly not admit that a probable opinion can sometimes retain its probability and that someone can follow it, although the opposite is notably more probable, as he himself really admits several times. Cf. Comment. de Consc. et de Probabilismo n. 104 seq. But if it is asked why S. D. then designates that excess by saying "a little more probable," and not simply by saying "more probable," the reason is that S. D. considers the matter practically rather than speculatively, given the nature of the thing and the principles, and also the rigor of words, and thus distinguishes between a small and a notable excess of probability. A notable excess, truly such, of probability is had when it is evident and certain; and then, from S. D., probability reaches certainty. And this is indeed so, at least practically and regularly speaking; for such probability, at least practically, is confused with moral certainty, which in a certain broader sense is certainty. And in fact S. D. is speaking of a much greater probability that is certainly and evidently such. Certainly and evidently to whom? Not only certainly to the one opining, since all know well that one and the same opinion appears less probable to one and more probable to another, indeed even to the same person in diverse circumstances; but to all, or by the common judgment of the wise. And in fact if a proposition is much more probable certainly and evidently to all, or by the common judgment of the wise, it already really is, practically speaking, morally certain. For in things to be done we often use most probable and more probable opinions as though true, and as though morally certain, when greater certainty cannot be had. Every other excess, although perhaps notable, nevertheless if it is not so evident and certain, really cannot properly be called notable, since then there is doubt concerning such a notable excess, and the proposition which to one seems much more probable to another perhaps, indeed perhaps even to the same person, the matter having been weighed better, as S. Alph. himself confesses of himself, l. 1. n. 86, H. A. tr. 1. n. 78, appears much less probable. Therefore, if that notable excess of probability is so evident and certain, then it already reaches certainty, and by right and deservedly the opposite can only be tenuously or doubtfully probable. But if, although notable, it nevertheless is not so evident and certain, that excess really cannot as regards us be held as notable, but remains within the limits of equal probability or of a little greater probability. Certainly, if to the one opining alone a sentence seems notably more probable, or if doctors fall into various opinions concerning it, can it prudently be held as certainly and evidently more probable? Certainly not. Hence again it is clear that by that "a little greater" excess S. D. really understands simply an excess of probability.

Not only to the one opining. "Such an appearance (of greater probability)," says S. D., "cannot constitute a certain rule of operating, since it can deceive in many ways. For not rarely some opinion which will appear more probable to someone will appear less probable to another; indeed to the same person an opinion which yesterday was less probable will today appear more probable." Therefore that opinion which appears more probable to someone cannot be a true rule of acting, because "the law would be particular only for him to whom that opinion appears more probable. But this would certainly be against the nature of law, which for the common good must necessarily be universal and universally proposed, lest the people, who are bound to observe it, be frequently divided and perplexed concerning the truth to be embraced, while each preacher or confessor, from the diversity of opinions and according to his own sense, would often instruct the faithful." Nor is it of force to say that by following the benign sentence (namely the probable even in concurrence with the more probable in favor of the law), disparity can also intervene, since the same opinion can seem probable to one, improbable to another. It is not denied that this can happen; but it will always be true that, when some opinion is strong with solid probability and rests on a certainly grave foundation, it will be regarded as probable among the greatest part of the wise. And this will already be enough to preserve the universal uniformity of observance of the law, notwithstanding that among some particular person that opinion is not probable; for that which happens rarely does not take away universal conformity. Yet this does not happen concerning the estimation of more probable opinions, because since greater or lesser probability depends on moral motives, namely on the judgment and weighing of reasons, which some draw from one principle, others from another, it happens not rarely but commonly that what appears stronger to one appears weaker to another.... But that we become certain that some opinion... is truly more probable or has the required preponderance, this is morally impossible. For either that preponderance is small, and who will be secure that the opinion is truly more probable? For since the excess is moderate, it can with difficulty be perceived certainly. Or the preponderance is great, and who will be able to judge that it reaches a sufficient measure, so that the opposite is judged false or tenuously probable? And thus we would always have to act with practical doubt. Either I am bound to follow opinions more probable in themselves, and then when shall I know which opinion is truly more probable in so many cases, where grave reasons and authorities occur opposed on each side? Or opinions more probable to me, and the straits would be increased; for often I would have to judge my opinion to be probable against another opinion of several wise men. And then who will render me safe that my opinion is certainly more probable and more notable, with that notable preponderance which some of the adversaries require? How shall I become certain that I have understood the opposed reasons well and solved them well? that the dictate of conscience which I have formed for myself is sufficiently certain and safe? that I have not been deceived by my own sense, so that if I err, my error is truly invincible and inculpable?" S. Alph. Dissertation anno 1755, n. 3. 17. 42. 43. 48. 50.

And if it is asked why S. D. made this distinction between a little more probable and notably, much, evidently, certainly more probable, the reason is that S. D., as is clear from l. c. H. A. n. 31 and from the Apologia contra Patuzzi 1762, wished to oppose himself to those probabilists who extended probabilism even to tenuous and doubtful probability, and therefore contended that it is licit to act when any apparent reason is present, but not firm reason, or authority. Hence from the opposite S. D. established that someone must then follow the opinion certainly, evidently, notably, much more probable, which, as is clear, in comparison with the tenuously or doubtfully probable is by right and deservedly called morally certain by S. D. Therefore, since S. Alph. designated such an opinion in comparison with the doubtfully and tenuously probable by "notably more probable," what remained was that he designate any other more probable opinion in comparison with the truly probable by "a little more probable." Cf. Breve Dissertaz. etc. cited above at the end of n. 133, p. 51, Op. Mor. ed. Rome 1757, l. 1. n. 33. Behold the words of S. D. in the Apology of the year 1765: "I did not contend nor do I contend to found new systems, and I know well that no probabilist of solid doctrine hands down as licit the use of a tenuously or doubtfully probable opinion. But because many probabilists without distinction say that it is licit to follow a less probable opinion when it has some foundation from reason or from authority, therefore I wished to distinguish, establishing that it is not licit to follow the less safe opinion when the excess of probability in favor of the safer is notable and certain, because then the less safe opinion cannot be called certainly probable."

Omitting the treatise on Conscience in the work entitled H. A., and the moral Dissertation on this matter inserted in the Theologia Moralis, if we consult these very works of the holy Doctor, we shall certainly see that S. D. pursues with the greatest diligence not only the more common and more probable opinions, but also the less and much less probable and common opinions. Cf., for example, l. 3. n. 404, where after S. D. says that the negative is far more probable to him, he says that the affirmative is sufficiently probable. And ibid. n. 649 he says: "This second opinion seems to me certainly and far more probable. But whether the first is probable... I dare to call it neither probable nor improbable." Therefore S. D. thinks that there can be a probable opinion whose opposite is to someone certainly and far more probable. Cf. l. 6. n. 868 dub. 3, l. 3. n. 293, n. 520 q. 4, n. 547 par. Ceterum, n. 529, n. 700 q. II, where S. D., after in a certain question of justice he has called the first opinion more common and indeed very probable, but concerning the second opinion has very modestly said that it does not lack its probability, undertakes to demonstrate that probability broadly and diligently; finally resolving the objection, he openly affirms that this serves for practice; for he says: "For this is probability of right... which the debtor can well use." Cf. also here n. 136. Therefore if someone still wishes to contend that S. Alph. speculatively champions another system, diverse from true probabilism, he must certainly confess that practically S. Alphonsus is a true probabilist. And certainly, if, so that we may be bound to follow the more probable opinion from the system of S. Alph., that excess of greater probability must be commonly evident and certain, H. A. tr. 1. n. 77, you will hardly find perhaps one or another such opinion in moral matters, since, as we have already observed, where the question concerns probability, the judgments of the gravest theologians are very diverse, and therefore the excess then cannot prudently be held as evident and certain. Indeed, as Ithur. observes, Cas. 44. n. 5, "hardly any question is treated among doctors in which there are not both probabilists who against other probabilists embrace the stricter opinion, and probabiliorists who against other probabiliorists embrace the more benign opinion." - L. 1. 3. n. 293, n. 930. d. 1.

Therefore the doctrine which S. Alph. holds as lax is not true probabilism, which stands within the limits of true and proper probability; but it is that probabilism which passes beyond these limits and extends itself even to tenuous and doubtful probability. Hence S. D. does not say absolutely that that doctrine is commonly held, but almost commonly by authors of the past century; for in fact it was then held by several; but it would altogether wrongly be confused with the doctrine of true probabilism, truly commonly, indeed most commonly, handed down. Hence the same S. Alph. called this most common and most probable, Dissert. de Usu moder. opin. probab. 1755, which for almost two centuries exhausted the labors of so many wise men, which, if it had been false, the Church would not have tolerated.

And, if the matter were not so, where is that moral system which, in the Catholic Church, Clement XIII in the year 1791 answered to S. Alphonsus himself could be defended catholically? l. 1. n. 84. 85, p. 66, ed. P. Gaude. For before S. Alphonsus there was nothing middle between true probabilism and tutiorism or probabiliorism; nor then was equiprobabilism even counted among moral systems. But S. D. perpetually refuted tutiorism or probabiliorism. But S. D. asserts that he hands down only the common doctrine, l. 1. n. 59. 84. But S. D. perpetually taught: In order that there not be grave sin, it suffices that true probability be had; I understand that which rests on a foundation not tenuous, etc., l. 3 after n. 139, Epist. Resp. Therefore one must immediately note that S. D. very rarely employs this note, certainly, notably more probable, etc., which the Vindic. Alph., Appendix 1, Clavis Operum, etc., themselves noted; which indeed would be very strange if his system had been so little practical. On the contrary, nothing would have had to be expressed more frequently and more clearly in individual questions. The holy Doctor does not reject true and proper Probabilism, but broad Probabilism, namely extended even to tenuous probability, which the Church certainly did not tolerate. Cf. 136.

Are all opinions which S. Alphonsus reports and does not expressly reject, although he does not expressly approve them, held as probable by S. Alphonsus? - On this matter S. Alph. himself thus declares his mind: "I judged that the Medulla of Hermann Busembaum should be set before, not now that I might approve all the opinions of that author, but only that I might follow his method, which among the methods of other doctors seemed to me very suitable for setting forth moral matters.... Besides, kindly reader, I wish you to be warned not to think that I approve those opinions from the fact that I do not reprove them; for sometimes I shall faithfully set them forth with their reasons and patrons, so that others according to their prudence may judge of what weight they are. Then note that when I call some opinion truer, then I do not hold the contrary as probable, even if I do not expressly condemn it as improbable. Moreover, when I call one of the opinions more probable, no judgment having been given about the probability of the other, or I use this phrase, I do not dare to condemn, I do not therefore understand that I am calling it probable, but remitting the matter to the judgment of the more prudent." Monit. auct. ad lect. at the beginning of the work. And again l. 5. n. 76: "And here again I repeat what I protested at the beginning, namely that when I call some opinion uniquely more probable, I do not therefore understand that I call the contrary probable. Likewise, when I say of some opinion that I do not dare to condemn it, or to call it improbable, I do not therefore admit it as probable, but doubt concerning its probability. Likewise, when I call some opinion truer, I understand that the opposite does not seem to me to be strong with solid probability, although I do not altogether reprove it." Nevertheless it can in no way be denied that certain opinions are really held by S. D., at least implicitly, as sufficiently probable, which he not only reports, but also weighs their reasons, and even seems himself to add strength to them, if, after enumerating grave theologians, he says, for example, the Salmanticenses judge it probable, etc., or adds at the end, indeed Palaus says, Lugo adds, notes, etc. S. D. also holds as sufficiently probable opinions which he says are not improbable, l. 3. n. 1012. - E. M.; A. S. S. v. 1. p. 467 seq.

136 bis. Note: The oath of following the doctrine of S. Thomas does not obstruct the doctrine of S. Alphonsus M. de Ligorio being followed and handed down. S. Poenit. Dec. 13, 1855. E. M. 131.