Question Four: On the Sin of One Acting Against Conscience

St. Th. I-II, q. 19, a. 3, ad 3; Q. D. de Ver. 17, a. 4, ad 9; II Sent. d. 39, q. 3, a. 3, ad 2 and 6.

109. Various modes of sinning against conscience. - He sins against conscience both who directly acts against a conscience prescribing or prohibiting, and who indirectly exposes himself to this danger by acting without a conscience adorned with the due qualities. Of itself and ordinarily it is not a special sin but is a condition of every sin; for the precept of acting according to conscience, or prudent reason, is general, just as the precept of observing the law, nor does it differ from it, because conscience, since it is not a new law, does not make the law but applies it and, as it were, promulgates it in second act; whence it need not be declared in confession. Nevertheless per accidens and rarely it can be a special sin, if someone expressly and directly through this intends to extinguish conscience; in which case it is formal and direct imprudence, which contemns and rejects the judgment of practical reason, and formal disobedience, which refuses to be subject to the rule of conscience and thus contemns the rule of every good operation, and exposes itself to the danger of every sin.

It is committed in three ways: 1) by acting directly against conscience, whether true or erroneous; 2) by acting according to a conscience erroneous vincibly; 3) by acting without a conscience sufficiently certain, but with a doubtful or merely opinative conscience.

110. Principles. The species and gravity of the sin of one acting against conscience.

I. To act directly against conscience, even erroneous conscience, prescribing or prohibiting:

1. Is a sin of the same species and gravity as conscience dictates; for species and gravity are taken from the object, not as it is in itself, but as it is proposed by the intellect and as the will tends toward it. For example, if someone kills another whom he erroneously thinks to be his own father or a priest, he will be guilty of parricide or sacrilege; on the contrary, if he kills his father or a priest whom he invincibly thinks to be a simple man.

2. If conscience in no way dictates the species of the sin, but only says that it is evil, it is a sin of simple disobedience toward the rule of reason; in the same way, to do a thing indifferent of itself, which is prohibited from the sole motive of obedience, is simple disobedience.

3. If conscience does not indicate the gravity of the sin, but only says that it is evil in general, and the one acting is actually so disposed that he would act even if he knew it to be mortally evil, or if he has in some way adverted or suspected this, or at least the obligation of examining it, it is a mortal sin, because he exposes himself to the danger of sinning mortally.

4. If conscience only says that it is evil and does not indicate the gravity, and he in no way, not even confusedly, adverts to it, it is only a venial sin. Yet authors disagree in assigning the reason. For some say that the sin is venial because evil in general, which alone conscience suspects, contains only minimal malice and consequently slight malice. Yet this seems false: for evil in general equally, or even rather, expresses grave malice, which alone is perfect and full malice, just as being in general rather expresses substance than accident. Whence it is better said that there is only venial sin because, since the one acting did not attend even confusedly to grave malice, sufficient advertence for mortal sin is lacking.

II. In a similar way one must speak of him who acts indirectly against conscience, i.e., with an uncertain conscience, or according to a conscience erroneous vincibly: it is a sin of the same genus or species, and gravity, as that concerning which the one acting doubts, or which he rashly from voluntary error judges licit, and to the danger of committing which he exposes himself. For he who doubts whether something is a sin of such a genus, species, or gravity - or rashly from voluntary error judges that it is not - and nevertheless does it, wills it even if it is of such a genus, species, and gravity, and consequently intends this genus, this species, and this gravity. Thus he who doubts whether an action is gravely harmful to his neighbor and nevertheless places it, wills to do it even if it is gravely unjust, and therefore he is guilty of grave injustice.

III. Observations. - 1. Ordinarily, other things being equal, it is graver to act against a conscience erroneous vincibly than to act according to it, because it is graver to sin from knowledge than from culpable ignorance, unless this latter was chosen or affected in order to sin more freely.

2. Ordinarily in confession it need not be declared whether one acted against a true or erroneous conscience, or with an uncertain conscience, because the object of the sin is the same - unless per accidens, if otherwise the declaration of the sin would be false, for example, "I did not hear Mass on Wednesday," if someone thought it had to be heard.

3. The aforesaid sins, although they can arise from diverse other sins, and by name from precipitation, formally pertain to inconsideration, which implies a defect of practical judgment.

[Section 111 is skipped in the original numbering.]