§ III. On the Conscience Required for Acting Licitly

Proposition. For acting licitly, certainty strictly so called concerning the honesty of the action to be placed here and now is required. This is clear, first, from Sacred Scripture. "But he who discerns, if he eats, is condemned, because it is not from faith. But everything that is not from faith is sin" (Rom. 14:23). Here St. Paul treats the controversy about the eating of foods which the Mosaic law prohibited. Moreover, the Apostle teaches that he sins who eats the aforesaid foods while discerning, Greek diakrinomenos, which in the context means: struggling with himself, doubting, hesitating,¹ whether the eating is licit. But according to the Apostle the reason is that every action placed without a firm persuasion concerning the honesty of the action is sinful. "It is said," says St. Alphonsus, "from faith, namely, from a certain dictate of conscience, so that a man is persuaded in his conscience that by acting he acts rightly" (I, 55). This interpretation is deduced from the context of the discourse (vv. 2, 14, 22), and even today is commonly admitted.² There is added, second, an argument taken from reason. Beyond doubt, he sins who wills and chooses an action, whether it is good or evil, whether it offends God or does not offend God. But one acts thus who wills and chooses an action about which he doubts whether here and now it is licit. Hence St. Augustine: "To do that which is uncertain whether it is a sin is a certain sin."³ St. Alphonsus asserts the same repeatedly (I, 22, 24; likewise I, 81 and Homo Apostolicus I, 65, where he teaches that not even a most probable opinion of itself and ultimately suffices).

Corollary I. Authors commonly teach that broad certainty suffices for acting licitly. But this is said less accurately; for broad certainty still admits prudent fear, or broad doubt. But it is not licit to place an action as long as one still prudently fears that it is formal sin, or a true offense against God. Moreover, this fear or broad doubt is easily excluded through some general reflex principle, for example: It is licit to follow an opinion certain in the broad sense; which principle others also call concomitant.

Corollary II. It suffices that someone in good faith be certain of the liceity of an action, even if the foundation on which the certainty rests is less solid. Nor is it required that someone reflexively judge that he is certain.

Corollary III. One who acts with a practical doubt concerning the honesty of an action commits as much and such a sin as that about which he doubts; for he perpetrates as much and such a sin as the danger to which he exposes himself (St. Alphonsus, I, 22). If only the notion of sin is apprehended, there is had a sin of unnamed species; concerning this, however, observe these words of St. Thomas: "When reason apprehends something as evil, it always apprehends it under some notion of evil; for instance because it is contrary to a divine precept, or because it is scandal, or on account of something of this kind; and then such an evil will is reduced to such a species of malice" (I-II, q. 19, a. 5, ad 3). "Yet it must be noted for practice, what many are ignorant of, that it is gravely illicit to act with a practical doubt about grave sin."⁴

¹ The source's Greek form is badly OCR'd; the intended term is diakrinomenos.

² That by "faith" supernatural faith is not understood, but a dictate of conscience, is clear from Lateran IV (c. 41); and that a certain dictate is understood is taught by Estius, Beelen, Cornely, Reithmayer, Bisping, and other interpreters commonly.

³ Bk. I, De Baptismo, c. 5.

⁴ Cf. Marc, n. 37; Vindiciae Alphonsianae, I, p. 504; Aertnys-Damen, I, n. 64.