The Vice Against Distributive Justice

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 63-78.)

The Vice Opposed to Distributive Justice.—Favoritism (i.e., acceptance of persons, partiality) is defined as “a species of injustice which moves one to distribute the common goods or burdens of society, not according to merit or fitness, but according to some other and impertinent standard.”

(a) The common goods include offices, honors, functions, while the common burdens include taxes, contributions, and penalties.

(b) The common goods of which we now speak are those that belong to society and that must be portioned out to its members justly. Hence, there is no question of goods that belong to private persons, which the owners are not obliged to give to others unless it be in virtue of charity or liberality. A rich man is not guilty of acceptance of persons, if he bestows his largesses on those who are less in need or less deserving, but more acceptable to himself; and God is not unjust when he gives unequal graces to those who are equally sinners (Matt., xx. 14, 15).

(c) The right standard of just distribution is merit or fitness, as when an applicant is appointed to the post of teacher or superior on account of good character and knowledge. Any other standard which leaves merit and fitness out of consideration is unjust, as when a public official selects for offices or honors, not those who have worked the hardest or who give the most promise, but those who have more money or who are related to himself.

The Sinfulness of Favoritism from Revelation.—In Holy Scripture favoritism is reproved (“How long will you judge unjustly and accept the persons of the wicked?” Psalm lxxi. 2), and impartiality is praised (“Thou art a true speaker and teachest the way of God in truth, neither carest Thou for any man, for Thou dost not regard the person of man,” Matt., xxii. 16; “Masters, know that the Lord both of servants and you is in heaven, and there is no respect of persons with Him,” Eph., vi. 9). Distributive justice is commanded in many passages of Holy Writ (“Consider not the person of the poor, nor honor the countenance of the mighty; but judge thy neighbor according to justice,” Levit. xix. 15; “There shall be no difference of persons, you shall hear the little as well as the great, neither shall you respect any man’s person,” Deut., i. 17; “Thou shalt not accept persons nor gifts,” Deut., xvi. 19; cfr. James, ii. 1 sqq.).

The Sinfulness of Favoritism from Reason.—Favoritism transgresses a divine command and substitutes personal will for right in the treatment of subjects by superiors. Hence, it is morally evil, for disobedience is sinful in the high as well as in the low, and violation of rights is unjust whether the rights be of the community or of the individual.

The Gravity of the Sin of Favoritism.—(a) From its nature, favoritism is a mortal sin; for it is a form of injustice (see 1746), and indeed it is no less damaging than commutative injustice (e.g., theft) and is often accompanied by the latter. (b) From its matter and from the lack of deliberation or consent it may be venial. Thus, if favoritism is shown in a trifling matter (e.g., in conferring a post that is unremunerative and unimportant) or in a small degree (e.g., in preferring an applicant who is only slightly less worthy), there is only venial injustice.

Distributive injustice is also frequently accompanied by commutative injustice.

(a) Thus, a first class of common goods that are distributed are those intended primarily for the common good, and only indirectly and secondarily for the good of individuals, such as public offices, dignities, and benefices. He who distributes these offices unfairly, by appointing unworthy persons, or by appointing the less worthy when he is under contract to appoint the more worthy, violates commutative justice and is held to restitution to the community; but the worthy or more worthy persons slighted had no strict right, and hence no restitution is due them, unless there was a compact with them or unjust means were used to exclude them (see 1755).

(b) A second class of common goods are those that are intended primarily for the benefit of individuals, such as a fund created for the relief of the destitute or afflicted or pensions set aside for those who have deserved well of society. He who distributes these goods unfairly is guilty of commutative injustice against private persons, since the goods were destined for them, and they had a right ad rem to the goods, and hence to these persons restitution is owed.

Favoritism in Spiritual Matters.—(a) Partiality in granting favors is sinful, and gravely so when the matter is serious. Examples are the grant to the unworthy of the power of Orders or of jurisdiction, the concession of permissions and dispensations to one’s friends that are denied to others. (b) Partiality in imposing burdens is also sinful, as when a prelate issues an onerous command, and grants exemption to his friends. But if the thing commanded is obligatory already by reason of law, it should be observed in spite of the favoritism of the prelate.

Who is to be considered as more worthy for appointments in spiritual matters?

(a) The more worthy person is the one who will better serve the common good in the office. Hence, the more pious or the more learned man is not necessarily the more worthy, for another may have greater industry, influence, executive ability, initiative, prudence, experience, etc., and so be better suited to fill the position. But no person should be considered as worthy of spiritual offices unless his moral character is good, and excellence in temporal things does not compensate for negligence in spiritual matters.

(b) The more worthy person is the one who is more available when the appointment has to be made. Hence, the one who is better gifted for the office is not necessarily the more worthy, for another may be better known and it may be impossible to make investigations and comparisons at the moment.

Opinion of the Applicant or Appointee about His Own Fitness.—(a) The applicant need not think that he is worthy or the most worthy; indeed, according to St. Thomas, it would be presumptuous for him to think so highly of himself, and he would thus become unworthy. It suffices, then, that the applicant have in mind only to try for the office, leaving the decision about fitness to the examiner or appointer.

(b) The acceptor who feels that he is unworthy or less worthy is not guilty of injustice; for he is not the judge of his own abilities and may rely on the judgment of those who appoint him. Moreover, he can trust to divine grace and his own efforts to make up for any deficiency or inferiority of which he is conscious. But it seems that, if the appointee were absolutely certain that his appointment was unjust, he would be bound to surrender his office, if this were possible.

Favoritism in Secular Matters.—Do the conclusions in reference to ecclesiastical offices apply also to secular offices?

(a) In both cases distributive justice is violated by favoritism, for the standard followed is not merit or fitness, and thus the more worthy persons are injured. The opinion that civil society has dominion of public offices and therefore the right to distribute them at will, without regard to the merits or fitness of persons selected, is not probable; for civil rulers, like spiritual rulers, should consider themselves as ministers and dispensers only (I Cor., iv. 1), and even if they had dominion over offices, they would be bound to use that power for the benefit of the public for whom they rule.

(b) In both cases also commutative justice is violated in some instances, the offense being either against society or against individuals (see 1755, 1808). Thus, an official who appoints a subordinate knowing that he will oppress and rob, is responsible and bound to restitution to the victims as being a cooperator in injustice.

Favoritism in Marks of Esteem or Honor Shown to Others.—(a) There is no favoritism if honor and esteem are shown to those who deserve it on account of their virtue or position. Hence, it is not unjust but just to show special marks of veneration to holy persons, and even to those who are not holy, but whose authority or age deserves respect (such as rulers and prelates, parents and aged men).

(b) There is favoritism if honor and esteem are shown to those who have no genuine claim to it on account of goodness or rank. Thus, wealthy men are worthy of special respect on account of goodness when they employ their riches in useful ways, or on account of preeminence in the community in rank, ability, influence, etc., and he who shows special courtesy or attention to the wealthy for reasons such as these is not a respector of persons. But if mere wealth is worshipped, sinful favoritism is shown, as when a villainous rich man is honored and a worthy poor man is despised, or well-dressed persons are conducted honorably to comfortable seats in church and good persons whose attire is poor are treated with contempt (James, ii).

Favoritism in Judges (Umpires, Arbitrators) and the Like.—(a) In the course of a trial there may be favoritism in matters left to the judge’s discretion. This does not happen, however, when the discretionary power is intended for the judge’s own benefit (e.g., when on a free day he decides to hear one side rather than the other), but when it is meant for the benefit of the litigants (e.g., when he grants to one side a longer time for preparation of its case than to the other side and for no reason pertinent to the matter at issue).

(b) In the sentence pronounced there is favoritism, if the decision is not based on the merits of the litigants, but on extraneous considerations, such as the fact that one of the parties is a friend or relative of the judge or arbitrator, or belongs to the same political party or business, etc.: “It is not good to accept the person of the wicked, to decline from the truth of judgment” (Prov., xviii. 5). If the arguments are about evenly balanced on both sides, it would be favoritism to decide in favor of one against the other. Alexander VII condemned the proposition that a judge may take money in such a case of doubt to decide for one party (Denzinger, n. 1126).

S. Th. II-II, q. 63, a. 1, 2, 3.

618. Distributive justice directly and per se regards the distribution of goods. It belongs to distributive justice to bestow upon another, not to demand for oneself. But only in the distribution of goods is something bestowed upon another. Hence distributive justice first and directly regards the distribution not of burdens but of the goods of the community.

A. Generally and principally: the goods of the community are good social conditions. Distributive justice does not always principally treat the quality of goods to be subjected to distribution, for example, money, things, services to be divided; but especially the distribution of the goods themselves of the community, or of the social conditions required for perfect human life, by conceding security of order, rights, economic conditions, etc. It must bestow good conditions upon all, but diverse ones according to their principality in society, so that they may be able to attain development, but each one in his own diverse sphere.

To this end let there be a more equitable division of goods (n. 269, 5).

B. Specifically: the goods of the community are also particular goods, and indeed of diverse kinds:

1. Various duties or public offices, which, at least primarily, are instituted for the common good of the republic, and only secondarily can be for the private good of the members;

2. Other goods can also be primarily prizes for members, such as rewards for merit, helps and subsidies for need;

3. Honors which, according to the custom of the republic, are given to those obtaining such or such a state or grade: for thus morally there is a certain common good which is also exhibited by private persons as members of one republic, so that in this they act in the place of the republic;

4. Finally, efficacious protection or guardianship of liberty, rights, and goods; but concerning this something special will be said in q. 4, where public judgments are treated.

619. Distribution of duties or offices. In choosing for public offices, per se he must be chosen who is positively known to be worthy and to have the qualities required for the office both by the nature of the thing and by civil law, namely, knowledge, probity, industry; unless by accident no worthy person is present and nevertheless it is necessary to have someone, in which case it suffices to choose the less unworthy. And indeed:

1. Toward the republic, there is also an obligation of commutative justice to choose one truly worthy, if someone chooses; moreover, the superior choosing for offices by office is obligated to choose from commutative justice, but others choosing from privilege only from legal justice;

2. Toward the candidates themselves, there is also from commutative justice an obligation of choosing the more worthy, if they have been called by a competition properly so called, namely, one announced not only for knowing the worthy but with the obligation precisely to confer the benefice on the more worthy from among the competitors: for then he acquires a strict right, to be observed in every case. Otherwise, from distributive justice alone the more worthy must be chosen, not absolutely, but among those who can be had.

For offices carry with them several goods, gains, advantages, and utilities which can be taken by officials without detriment to the common good; and since they are goods of the community, in some way they belong to the parts, and therefore they are goods to be distributed equally among citizens. And therefore they have the nature of rewards which can be given only to a few, and are to be given to the more worthy; otherwise there is acceptance of persons. Except:

a) If the more worthy is reserved for a more excellent office soon to be vacant;

b) If the more worthy is occupied elsewhere with greater good of the community;

c) If the vote certainly will not profit the more worthy: for then the less worthy can be chosen in order to avoid the election of one more unworthy.

620. Distribution of other goods. Other goods of the community, which primarily regard the utility of members, are both rewards properly so called for merits, and subsidies for need or necessity, such as monies by which institutions are erected, for example, public schools, arts and sciences are fostered, or various needs of citizens are relieved. In distributing these, a threefold rule must be observed:

1. Goods are primarily and before all things to be distributed according to the demand of the common good: for distributive justice divides common goods among the various parts and members of the community; but the good of the parts as such yields to the common good of the whole. Therefore.

2. Rewards by which citizens, or institutions, are incited to virtue, sobriety, thrift, piety toward the fatherland, are to be distributed proportionately to merits properly so called.

3. Subsidies strictly so called for the relief of the needy are to be paid proportionately to their necessity.

But if distribution is made for another reason, besides the sin which is committed toward the republic, distributive justice also is injured by acceptance of persons.

It should be noted, moreover, that in distributing these goods, besides distributive justice, commutative justice can also be injured; not indeed by superiors if they themselves distribute, but if in their name lower officials, as mere ministers and stewards, do nothing except execute the distribution. For they are held to execute the will of the superiors, who intend to confer goods according to the merits of citizens; and therefore each citizen has a strict right that they not act against this mandate.

621. Distribution of honors. In distributing honors, let the words of St. Thomas be as a rule (a. 3): "If someone is honored on account of other causes which do not make him worthy of honor... it pertains to acceptance of persons... Now honor is a certain testimony concerning the virtue of him who is honored; and therefore virtue alone is the due cause of honor. Yet it must be known:

1. That someone can be honored not only on account of his own virtue, but also on account of the virtue of another; just as princes and prelates are honored even if they are evil, insofar as they bear the person of God and of the community over which they are placed...; thus also the foolish man is honored, who is placed in the place of God and in the place of the whole community.

2. And by the same reason parents and masters are to be honored, on account of their participation in the divine dignity, who is the Father and Lord of all....

3. But the aged are to be honored on account of the sign of virtue, which is old age, although this sign sometimes fails....

4. But the rich are to be honored on account of this, that they obtain a greater place in communities. But if they are honored solely with regard to riches, it will be the sin of acceptance of persons" (cf. Jas. II, 1-3).

622. Observations. A. What we have said concerning the distribution of offices and goods of the republic is per se valid concerning spiritual goods and ecclesiastical benefices; indeed, in these the sin is greater because it is committed in greater things: thus there is grave sin in election to an episcopal benefice or to others having care of souls, and to simple ones of greater moment. Nevertheless:

1. St. Thomas, a. 2, places a certain restriction: "For it sometimes happens that he who is less holy and less knowing can contribute more to the common good, on account of power or secular industry, or on account of something of this kind. And because distributions of spiritual things are principally ordered to the common utility... therefore sometimes, without acceptance of persons in the distribution of spiritual things, those who are simply less good are preferred to those who are better; just as God also sometimes grants graces gratuitously given to the less good."

2. Indeed, some, progressing further, say that ecclesiastical benefices were instituted solely on account of the common good, and therefore that there is no obligation toward candidates, nor from distributive justice of naming the more worthy, except in the case of competition strictly so called. Yet this is not conformable to the mind of St. Thomas, who says, ad 3: "As regards the conscience of the one choosing, it is necessary to choose the better, either simply or in comparison with the common good. But if someone more suitable can be had for some dignity and another is preferred, this must be on account of some cause. And if this indeed pertains to the business, as regards this he who is chosen will be more suitable. But if what is considered as cause does not pertain to the business, there will manifestly be acceptance of person." These words should be subjected to meditation by all those who must distribute ecclesiastical benefices, since in these distributive justice is often in no way attended to.

3. Consequently, concerning nepotism St. Thomas says, ad 1: "Concerning relatives of the prelate, a distinction must be made. For sometimes they are less worthy, both simply and with respect to the common good. And thus, if they are preferred to the more worthy, it is the sin of acceptance of persons in the distribution of spiritual things; of which the ecclesiastical prelate is not master so that he can give them at will, but dispenser.... But sometimes the relatives of an ecclesiastical prelate are as worthy as others. And thus he can lawfully prefer his relatives without acceptance of persons, because at least they are more eminent in this, that he can have more confidence in them, so that they may treat the affairs of the Church unanimously with him. Yet this would have to be omitted on account of scandal, if from this some would take an example of giving the goods of the Church to relatives even apart from dignity."

B. Insofar as some knowingly and willingly sin against commutative justice in distributing goods, to that extent they are held to restore to those whose strict right they injured; but he who was unjustly elected is not held to restitution unless: 1. he is incapable, in which case let him restore to the community on account of the various damages which it suffered from his election, and renounce the office, or, if possible, render himself suitable as soon as possible; 2. or unless by unjust means he impeded the election of the more worthy.

C. The distribution of particular goods, for example, of an inheritance, is not distribution properly so called or formal, but only material division; nor does it properly pertain to distributive justice, because a strict right is had to these things, and there is not question of the goods of the community itself.

(D. Thomas, q. 63.)

1°: Acceptance of persons is the injustice by which, in common matters to be distributed by justice, no regard is had to the proportion of merits or the suitability of those who are candidates, but to some cause irrelevant to the matter. ^{463 463} Merc., Instit. moral. Alphons., n. 1027-1030.

I said, « in common matters », whether goods, such as public offices, benefices, honors, judgments, etc.; or evils, that is burdensome things, such as taxes, tolls, public works, contributions, penalties, etc.

It must be observed, however, that common goods are of two kinds. Some are ordered primarily and immediately to the public good, and through it only mediately and secondarily to the benefit of the particular persons who occupy them, such as benefices, public offices, dignities, etc. Others are ordered primarily to the benefit of particular persons, such as the public treasury, common revenues, a legacy to be distributed to the poor, a sum of money handed over by the king to be distributed, stipends for well-deserving soldiers, etc.

In both kinds of goods, bad distribution is an acceptance of persons opposed to distributive justice, insofar as no regard is had to the proportion of merits; but moreover in both is found a violation of commutative justice, though in different ways. In the bad distribution of goods of the first kind, commutative justice is violated toward the state or the Church; because this or that has strict right that provision be made for it from the best ministers, and this devolves upon the providers by their office. Hence, strictly speaking, restitution must be made to it, not indeed to the particular persons, for whose benefit these goods are not primarily ordered, and who therefore have not strict right to them, but only a right of aptitude. But in the bad distribution of goods of the second kind there is found a violation of commutative justice even toward private persons; because from the fact that these goods are destined primarily to them, they have strict right to them, that is, a right to the thing itself, and the bad distributor is held to restitute to them.

I say 2°: Acceptance of persons is, by its genus, mortal sin. ⁴⁶⁴ Because every injustice is, by its genus, mortal sin. Now acceptance of persons is an injustice opposed to distributive justice, which is a virtue more excellent than commutative justice, and from which follow damages no less than from commutative justice. Therefore. ⁴⁶⁴ Hic q. 63, a. 1, c.

By spiritualities we here understand ecclesiastical power, whether of order or of jurisdiction, and its exercise, especially ecclesiastical benefices and offices.

I suppose as certain that the conferral of spiritualities on an unworthy person, if worthy ones are found, is mortal sin, because it is an acceptance of persons in a matter of grave moment. ^{465 465} Ibid., ad 2 et 3.

The difficulty, therefore, is whether it is lawful to confer a benefice on a less worthy person, passing over one more worthy. Hence:

I say: The conferral of any benefice or ecclesiastical office made on a less worthy person, one more worthy being passed over, regularly speaking, is illicit, but valid. Say the same of presentation and election. It is the common opinion of the authors. ^{466 466} Ibid., a. 2, c.

Furthermore, understand the conclusion thus: not that the collator or patron must inquire through the whole kingdom or province who is the most worthy; for that would be a burden too heavy, and liable to deception; but that from those who are at hand, or whose merits he knows or can come to know, using moral diligence, he choose him whom he judges the more worthy.

The first part of the conclusion is proved 1° from canon law, cap. unico: « Ut ecclesiastica beneficia », Decretal. lib. III, tit. XII. Innocent III says: « Not out of carnal affection, but with judgment weighed, ought you to have dispensed the ecclesiastical office and benefice to the more suitable person. » The Council of Trent, sess. XXIII, cap. 1, on the promotion of bishops, declares that those promoted and those lending their efforts sin mortally, « unless they have most diligently taken care that they judge them the worthier and more useful to the Church. » And cap. 18, on the presentation of pastors, says: « From these the bishop shall choose him whom he judges the more suitable than the others. »

It is proved 2° by reason. ⁴⁶⁷ As long as, in promotion to a benefice or ecclesiastical office, a less worthy person is preferred to a more worthy one, there is manifestly an acceptance of person injurious to the Church, for whose benefit ecclesiastical benefices and offices were instituted. Therefore. ⁴⁶⁷ Ibid., ad 3.

But note that the worthiness of someone can be regarded in two ways. ⁴⁶⁸ In one way, simply and in itself; and thus he is of greater worthiness who more abounds in the gifts of grace in spiritual things. In another way, by comparison with the common good; for it sometimes happens that he who is less holy or less learned can contribute more to the common good because of power, or industry, or something of this kind. But greater worthiness must be regarded not simply, but comparatively, with respect to the common good. ⁴⁶⁸ Ibid., a. 2, c.; Quodlib. cit.

The second part of the conclusion is clear from various places in the law which require only a worthy person. ⁴⁶⁹ This the interpreters understand with St. Thomas to mean that the conferral or election be valid and cannot be challenged in a judicial forum; because otherwise every election could give rise to calumny, and there would be no end of lawsuits. ⁴⁶⁹ Ibid., ad 3.

From what has been said it follows that he sins mortally who promotes, or takes care to have promoted, presents, or elects to a benefice or ecclesiastical office having annexed the care of souls or ecclesiastical governance a less worthy person, one more worthy being passed over — or even to simple benefices, but otherwise of grave moment, for instance one having a vote in elections to dignities or to offices having the care of souls; because it is an acceptance of persons in a matter of grave moment, with great detriment to the Church, or at least from which such detriment can follow. See proposition 47 condemned by Innocent XI.

[Such is this proposition: « When the Council of Trent said that those communicating in the sins of others sin mortally who promote to churches none other than those whom they judge worthier and more useful to the Church itself: first the council seems by this to have meant by worthier nothing else than the worthiness of those to be chosen, taking the comparative for the positive; or, secondly, in less proper language it understood the worthier so as to exclude the unworthy, not indeed the worthy; finally, thirdly, it follows when the concursus takes place. »]

But it will be venial only, more probably, if simple benefices of lesser moment are in question, such as chaplaincies, modest canonries, provided they are not conferred by concursus; because, since such benefices are ordered to humble and very limited offices, such as reciting the office, celebrating Mass, singing the Epistle or Gospel, etc., it does not seem that grave damage is inflicted on the Church if sometimes a less unworthy man is placed over a worthier one.

I said in the conclusion, « regularly speaking, » because there are certain cases in which it is lawful to promote worthy men to benefices even with the cure of souls, worthier men being passed over.

1° If from the institution of the benefice it has been settled by the Church that the one to be promoted must be from the bosom of the Church, e.g., from a certain family. 2° If the founder of the benefice himself fixed beforehand who is worthy; for this privilege is granted to him by law, cap. Monasterium, causa 16, q. 7. 3° If in the election [...] it would not benefit the more worthy one.

You will ask 1° whether he who promotes an unworthy or less worthy person to benefices or ecclesiastical offices, one more worthy being passed over, is held to any restitution.

I answer. 1° He who promotes an unworthy person — both the promoter and the one promoted are held to restitute to the Church all the damages that come to it from this: the promoter, because he sins against commutative justice toward the Church, to which he is bound by his office to set over it worthy ministers; the one promoted, because he cooperated in the unjust action of the promoter, and from him immediately flow the evils of the Church.

I answer. 2° He who promotes a less worthy one, the more worthy being passed over, is also held, speaking of itself, by force of such promotion, to restitute to the Church; because toward it he violates commutative justice, since he is bound by his office, as was said, to set over it the best ministers. But it seems that the Church neither demands this restitution nor binds to it, in order to avoid perplexities: and thus the common sense [of theologians] apprehends it.

[The other opinion, no less probable, holds that the promoter is held to no restitution in this case. The reason is that ecclesiastical offices to which benefices are annexed were instituted primarily, indeed even solely, that the Church may be served by good ministers. Now, as is supposed, if the worthier are passed over, those chosen are worthy or good. Hence, if the good of the Church is not provided for in a better way, it is at least done sufficiently, and the intended end is essentially attained. Therefore ⁴⁷⁰ Moreover this question becomes purely speculative from what was said above, namely that the Church in the aforesaid case does not demand restitution.] ⁴⁷⁰ S. Lig., lib. V, n. 107.

I answer. 3° He who promotes an unworthy or less worthy person, one more worthy being passed over, outside the concursus, is held to restitute nothing to the more worthy one who was passed over; because with respect to him he does not violate commutative justice, but only distributive justice. For the more worthy one has not strict right to the benefice, but only a right of aptitude and proportion.

I said, « outside the concursus; » because, by force of the announcement of the concursus, anyone capable acquires the right to compete, and he who is judged the worthier has, from an implicit pact, strict right to the benefice. Hence, if it is conferred on a less worthy one, injury is manifestly done to the worthier one; just as, when many fight in a public contest, injury would be done to the victor if the proposed prize were denied to him.

[You will ask 2° whether a worthy man, clearly knowing another to be worthier, sins by accepting the benefice, and is held to repair the loss to him.

I answer. The first opinion affirms it, because he himself, by accepting the benefice, cooperates in the unjust election to the damage of the other. The other opinion, which seems truer, says that he neither sins nor consequently is held to restitution.

The reason why he does not sin is given by D. Thomas, IIae IIae, q. 185, a. 3, c, namely that, on the part of the one choosing, « he who must choose someone as bishop... is not held to take the better one simply,... but the better one for the governance of the Church... On the part of him who is taken up, it is not required that he consider himself better than others; for that would be proud and presumptuous: but it suffices that he find nothing in himself by which it becomes illicit for him to take up the office of prelacy. » Furthermore, what is said of the episcopate must be said a fortiori of inferior benefices ⁴⁷¹] ⁴⁷¹ Id., ibid., n. 110, dub. 2.

You will ask 3° whether what has been said thus far in the present article is to be extended to secular offices.

I answer, more commonly and more probably affirmatively; because these offices are likewise ordered primarily and principally to the common good of the state. Hence he who distributes them to the unworthy, or to the less worthy, sins against commutative justice toward the state, and against distributive justice, by acceptance of persons, toward the worthier.

You will say: He who holds dominion over some thing, and can sell it, is not an acceptor of persons if he hands it over or sells it to whom he wills. Now the prince or the state holds dominion over secular offices, and can sell them. Therefore.

I answer: I distinguish the major. If that thing is so much its own property that it is not to be appropriated to the common utility of the state, I concede; if it is to be appropriated to the common utility of the state, as public offices are, I deny. — To the minor ⁴⁷² Indeed, speaking absolutely and from the nature of the thing, secular offices can be sold; because the dignity, the ample stipend, the occasion of gain, and similar things annexed to these offices are assessable in price. But they must be sold to the worthier and for a moderate price, lest poor but more suitable men be shut out from them, and lest those who buy at an immoderate price practice rapine and extortion to keep themselves whole. And because they are accustomed to be sold indiscriminately to the higher bidders and at an immoderate price, without regard to greater or lesser unworthiness or worthiness, therefore it is not expedient that they be sold. ⁴⁷² D. Thom., Opusc. XXI, 1, 5°.

You will ask 4° what qualities are necessary for duly obtaining benefices.

I answer. The first is probity of life. The second is learning, which must be such as the office annexed to the benefice requires. The third is legitimate age, namely for the episcopate, the completed thirtieth year; for benefices having the care of souls, the completed twenty-fourth year; for a canonry of a cathedral church that age is required that the one receiving the benefice may be able within a year to receive the order annexed to that benefice; for other canonries and any simple benefices, the begun fourteenth year. The fourth, legitimate title, without which, or without a dispensation, the conferral is void. The fifth, clerical tonsure. The sixth, celibacy, so that a conferral made to a married man is null. The seventh is immunity from major excommunication, suspension, interdict, and irregularity. The eighth is immunity from heresy in oneself and in one's parents up to the second generation according to the paternal line, and up to the first according to the maternal line. The ninth is a determined intention of taking up the office annexed to the benefice, or, if none be annexed, of persevering in the clerical state. Hence he sins mortally who accepts a benefice with the mind of enjoying its fruits until, for example, he has finished his studies, or found a suitable wife, intending afterwards to resign it; and if it be a parochial benefice, he is held to restitute the fruits received. The last condition is that another benefice not be conferred on one who already has one without cause. Hence

You will ask 5° whether it is lawful to possess several benefices at once.

I answer: that it is illicit by natural and positive law ⁴⁷³, except in certain cases to be assigned below. ⁴⁷³ Quodlib. IX, a. 15, c.

By natural law; because for one man to hold several benefices at once contains in itself several disorders. First, the Church is deprived of a number of ministers and their service, since it is not possible for one man to serve several churches, and then prebends were established as it were stipends for those ministering there. Secondly, there follows a diminution of divine worship, while one man is instituted in place of many; for he who holds several prebends does not recite the hours, sing, or celebrate Mass more often, etc. Thirdly, there follows the frustration of the will of the founders, who contributed something to this church precisely so that, according to the number of benefices, there would be a number of beneficiaries ministering to God there. Fourthly, there follows inequality, while one man abounds in several benefices, and others equally or perhaps more suitable cannot obtain even one. Add that plurality of benefices is a foment of ambition, avarice, gluttony, lust, and many other vices.

By positive law. Cap. Sanctorum, dist. 70; cap. Clericis and cap. Clericum, causa 21, q. 1. Which ancient law the Tridentine confirms and renews, sess. xxiv, cap. 17 de Reform., in these words: « The holy synod... commands by the present decree that hereafter only one ecclesiastical benefice be conferred on each man, which indeed should suffice for his honorable support for life; nevertheless another simple one sufficient may be conferred on the same man, provided neither requires personal residence. »

I said, « except in certain cases. » The first is the one assigned by the Tridentine: if one benefice does not suffice for the honorable support of the beneficiary and his dependents in need.

Commutative Justice regards things, Distributive persons; wherefore as the former is injured by exchanging things without due proportion; so the latter is offended while one person is unjustly preferred to another; which happens especially in benefices, elections, honors, and Judgments, as S. Bonaventura notes, in speculo animae, cap. 3. And he says the whole disordination of this Justice proceeds from inordinate love; For in conferring benefices flesh and blood choose the best part; but by reason of riches the Rich of this age are often honored before the Poor rather than the Saints, although honor, according to Aristotle lib. 1. Rhetor. cap. 5. is nothing other than a testimony of virtue; but in rendering Judgments, among other things, a Largess of gifts makes a corrupt judgment pronounce for one to the prejudice of another. Concerning this acceptance of persons it must be asked what and what sort of sin it is, with D. Thom. quaestione 63. art. 1.

ACCEPTANCE of persons consists and is placed in this: that in the distribution of the goods of the community some person is preferred to others, without consideration of the proportion of merits. So teach D. Thom. here, and there the Thomists, and many Sententiarii in 4. dist. 15. et Summistae V. Acceptio personarum, et V. dignitas, with D. Bonavent. in speculo, cap. 3. And the Saintly Doctor defines it in Confessionali, cap. 1. particula 6. Acceptance of persons is an injustice, whereby person is preferred to person for an undue cause in distributions of what is owed. This definition the Saintly Doctor drew from many holy Fathers, whom he lists in Lib. 3. Pharetrae, cap. 38. But he explains the acts of Distributive Justice opposed to acceptance of persons most excellently, part. 2. de Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, cap. 2. et 3.

Therefore, to distribute the goods of a community, not according to the proportion of merits, but to give them to someone from some undue condition, as Prefecture, or a Chair, because he is rich, not because he is learned and holy; is acceptance of persons, and that mortally.

It is proved by D. Bonavent. in the places cited, first from Scripture, Levit. 19. You shall not consider the person of the poor. Deuter. 1. There shall be no distinction of persons; you shall hear the small as well as the great: neither shall you accept the person of anyone, Ecclesiasticus 42. Do not accept a person, so as to offend. James 2. If you accept persons, you commit sin.

It is proved next by the Saintly Doctor, and D. Thom. because it gravely injures Justice in the public good.

But two conditions are required by the Theologians with D. Bonavent. in speculo, loco citato, for there to be an Acceptance of persons. The one, that there be a distribution of goods which are of a community; not of the dispenser's own; for then he could say what the Lord says: Is it not lawful for me to do what I will? Matth. 20. The other is that the dispenser be bound by justice to distribute those common goods in that proportion, in compensation of merits.

Dignities and Offices, as the Holy Doctor observes in the Speculum, cap. 3, are of two kinds: some are Ecclesiastical, others Secular. Again, of the Ecclesiastical, some have annexed care of souls, such as Bishoprics and Prelacies (praepositurae); and others are simple benefices.

Distributive justice intervenes in the distribution of Ecclesiastical benefices, and consequently the opposite vice in a bad distribution: so judge D. Bonaventure, loco citato, art. 2, Valencia, disput. 5, quaest. 7, puncto 2, and others; for these benefices are not proper debts owed to anyone by his merits, but are compared with all the men of the community, so that a worthy man may be taken from among them, and among the worthy the worthier may be chosen, if need be. Yet I would not deny that Commutative justice also intervenes, which gives stipends of tithes even to the ministering benefice-holder, etc., as is intimated in Num. 18, Luke 10, 1 Cor. 9, 1 Tim. 5. Add that in the cap. finalia, extra de rescriptis, it is laid down: a benefice is not given except on account of an office, and even before the distribution one looks at whether he has merits proportionate adequately; but here it does not stop, but proceeds to compare his merits with the merits of others; and thus, among many compared, one is chosen. Hence it is called Election, as it were the selection of one from among many, as the Holy Doctor proves in book 1, dist. 40, art. 2, quaest. 2, from that text of Cant. 5: My Beloved is chosen out of thousands.

It is certain, moreover, that in elections to benefices it is necessary that a worthy man be chosen. So testifies Innocent III with the General Lateran Council, in cap. Grave nimis, which the Holy Doctor often urges in his treatises on Poverty. Hence the Council of Trent, cap. 1 de Reformatione, declares that there is no election to benefices — those which in Cathedral Churches have annexed the office of reading Sacred Scripture — in an unworthy person, or one less suitable, and who cannot himself fulfill that office.

The question is a grave one: whether they are bound to choose not only worthy men, but even the worthier.

The first opinion is that it is enough to choose a worthy man. So Hugo and the Apparatus seem to think, on cap. Licet ergo, § quaest. 1, and on cap. Monasterium 16, quaest. 7, and others, as cited by Covarruvias, Relectio on the rule Peccatum non dimittitur, nisi restituatur ablatum, part. 2, § 7 — who nevertheless says they spoke in the external forum.

Very many have followed this view, if any of the following conditions is present. First, when the excess is not notable; second, when the worthier man is of another house, or of another Church, or a stranger; third, when the greater part wishes to elect the less worthy man, then the lesser part may give him their suffrage, even if they had sworn to elect the worthier; fourth, when another unworthy man is elected, if he does not give his suffrage to this less worthy one, and the worthier would have to be excluded on account of the fewness of votes; fifth, when the worthier man presides over another Church and would have to be postulated; sixth, when the worthier man is entangled in external affairs, or does not reside as much as the less worthy; seventh, if the less worthy is already experienced and eloquent in the Prelacy, and the worthier inexperienced; eighth, when it is not free for the collator or the institutor to confer upon another, or to institute another, than the one presented to him by the Patron; ninth, if a benefice, by an institution confirmed by the Church, is to be given to someone from a certain Family or township; tenth, if the founder of a parochial benefice presents a worthy man, and not the worthier; for this is permitted him. Eleventh, when someone resigns a benefice to a worthy man, passing over a worthier one. Finally, a lay patron may elect and present a less worthy man, leaving aside a worthier. You will find all this in Valetus, de differentia utriusque fori, v. electio, diffic. 1; Ioan. de Cruz, in direct., part. 1, punct. 7, quaest. 7, art. 2, dub. 9, concl. 2; Riccius, part. 3, decis. 214, num. 3; Sylvius, 2. 2, quaest. 63, art. 2, quaeritur 4, concl. 3; Tanner, 2. 2, diffic. 4, quaest. 8, dub. 2, num. 17; Lessius, lib. 2, cap. 34, disp. 13, num. 58; Villalobos, in summa, Tom. 2, tract. 8, diffic. 4, num. 6. See also Malderus, 2. 2, tract. 9, c. 2, dub. 7; Diana, part. 2, tract. 5, resol. 110; Bassaeus, V. electio, num. 10; Lezana, tract. 1, cap. 15, num. 14; Bonagratia, V. electio, num. 161.

Far more do they assert that it is licit for a Patron to present a less worthy man, excluding the worthier — with regard to a lay Patron: Lambertus, de iure patron., part. 1, lib. 2, quaest. 10, art. 3, num. 17; Riccius, in decis., part. 3, decis. 306; Belletus, in disquis. clerical., part. 1, § 4, num. 50; Ioan. Valetus, in differ. utriusque fori, v. Electio, num. 1 — and Ledesma calls this opinion probable, summa, part. 2, tract. 7, cap. 2, conclus. 7, diffic. 9; Bannes, 2. 2, quaest. 63, art. 2, dub. 4; and most recently Garzias follows it in its terms, de benef., tract. 2, part. 7, cap. 16, num. 19; Petrus Navarrus, de restit., lib. 2, cap. 2, num. 150. Diana does not reject it, part. 1, tract. 15, resol. 37.

SENTENTIA, however — the view holding that one is bound in conscience to choose the worthier man for any Ecclesiastical benefice whatever — is expressed by D. Bonaventure in the Speculum animae, part. 3, where he says: Around the conferring of Ecclesiastical benefices I then understand acception of persons to have the character of mortal sin, when an Ecclesiastical benefice is conferred upon someone unworthy, knowingly with the worthy passed over, whether out of regard for kinship, or even for a temporal benefice, or for spiritual affection; Likewise, too, to elect a rich man to a dignity of the Church, contemptuously passing over a poorer but better-instructed man. Hence Augustine, on that text: "Do not in acception of persons," etc., James 2: Who (he says) would endure it, if someone should elect a rich man to a seat of honor in the Church, contemptuously passing over a poorer man, better instructed and holier? But if the benefices are temporal, in them acception of persons can be mortal sin in the article of necessity, when someone is bound to confer a benefice by precept, and the benefice is given to him who does not need it, by reason of a particular love; and he who is in straitened necessity is despised. Such is the word of St. Bonaventure.

D. Thomas followed him, here, 2. 2, quaest. 63, art. 2, and in quodlibet, quaest. 7 and 8; Alexander of Hales, 2. part., quaest. 136, memb. 2; Lyranus, on cap. 21 of John; Richard and Maior, in 4 Sent., dist. 15; Adrian, quaest. de restitut.; Covarruvias, relect. on the Rule Peccatum, part. 2, § 7, num. 4; Soto, lib. 3 de Iustitia, quaest. ultim., art. 2; Valencia, disput. 5, quaest. 7, puncto 2; Caspensis, Tract. 18, disput. 2, sect. 2; Fagundez, lib. 8 on the eighth precept, cap. 22, alleging very many who constantly affirm that even the Supreme Pontiff, electing less worthy men with the worthier left aside, sins lethally. These are Decius, in cap. constitutus, 2, § 7, num. 4; Cajetan, 2. 2, quaest. 63, art. 2; D. Thomas de Salonis, ibidem; Navarrus, de orat., Miscell. 38; Azorius, part. 2, lib. 6, cap. 15, quaestio 1; Reginaldus, tract. 3, num. 19; Sayrus, decis. 22 de poenitent.; Riccius, in collectan., part. 4, coroll. 93; Stephanus Gratianus, decis. 97; Raudensis, decis. 25; Barbosa, in remiss. ad Trident., sess. 24, cap. 8, numero 27; Goncales, regul. 8, glossa 4, numero 128; Rodriquez, in summa, part. 1, cap. 106; Cardinal Zapata, de provis. benefic., part. 2, num. 5, fol. 53; Lessius, lib. 2 de Iust., cap. 34, num. 64 — and Tanner says it is the common view, disp. 4, quaest. 8, num. 14; Bassaeus, V. electio, num. 11.

Indeed, not only in Pastoral benefices but even in the other simple Prebends they expressly deny that it is licit to elect a less worthy man: Vasquez, opusc. de benef., cap. 2, dub. 8, num. 78, and, as regards the more distinguished benefices, Rebellius subscribes, de obligatione Iustitiae, part. 1, l. 3, quaest. 9, num. 22; Salon, quaest. 3, art. 2; and the others cited above by Fagundez.

THOUGH on this point Reginaldus holds the opposite, Tom. 2, tract. 3, cap. 15, n. 179; Aragon, loco cit.; Lessius, l. 2, cap. 34, dub. 14, num. 66; and others cited by Fagundez, saying it is not deadly if done only once or twice; and universally the opposite is held by Navarrus, de restit., l. 2, cap. 2, num. 172; Ledesma, in summa, part. 2, tract. 7, cap. 2, concl. 7, diffic. 15; Gutierrez, can. quaest., lib. 2, cap. 11, num. 12; Gazia, de Benefic., Tom. 2, part. 7, cap. 16, num. 16; Diana, part. 1, tract. 15, resol. 38.

I ASSERT, with the sentiment of D. Bonaventure, that the worthier man is always owed election in conscience for any Ecclesiastical benefice whatever.

It is PROVED by D. Bonaventure, first, on cap. 21 of John, where Christ the Lord, about to elect the Supreme Pontiff, examines Peter three times: Simon, son of John, lovest thou me more than these? The Holy Doctor discusses this passage, collat. 99 on 21 John, finding Anthony of the Prelates in those words. For the first part: Simon, is interpreted as Hearing, or Obedient; for he who wishes to preside over others and to command must first have learned to be subject and to obey. The other part is Ioannis, or Ione; for he is called in Matth. 16 Simon Bar-iona, that is, son of the Dove, on account of the simple innocence of his life. But this name was changed into Cephas, which signifies head, κεφαλή, as the Holy Doctor says, so that he might have the eminence of perfection and holiness such as is owed to a Head, in whose figure Saul was good, and better than he was not in all Israel, and from his shoulder and upward he overtopped with his whole head, as is said in 1 Reg. 10. Yet let him keep humility together with loftiness. Hence he calls him Simon, by which name he was called while as a poor man he toiled at fishing, so that he might always remember his former state; for so too it was said to Saul, 1 Reg. 15: When thou wast a little one in thine own eyes, wast thou not made the head of the tribes of Israel? Now in the head science flourishes; for thus he must be most learned. Hence God threatens him, Osee 4: Because thou hast rejected knowledge, I will reject thee, that thou shalt not exercise the priesthood for me, etc. Straightway Christ says: Lovest thou me more than these? to show that he ought to be more eminent and outstanding than the rest in Charity, so as to fulfill the office of Pastor most perfectly, even to offer his throat and expose himself to the slaughter of six hundred beasts for the safety of the flock. Hence D. Augustine says, Tract. 123 on John: If thou lovest me: feed my sheep, not thine own; seek my glory, not thine own; my gains, not thine own.

Of this also Isidore, Etymologiae, lib. 7, cap. 9. Hence Augustine says that to love is: To love God gratuitously, and not to expect other goods besides him. But in what manner he ought to be loved, he had said above, cap. 14: If any man loves me, he will keep my word. For, as Dionysius says, de divinis nominibus, cap. 4: the divine love is ecstatic, not allowing its lovers to remain in themselves; and because to love God in this way is to feed the sheep of the Lord, which he redeemed with his own blood, therefore there follows here: Feed my lambs, or sheep; that is, if thou lovest me, feed them, as D. Augustine, cited above, says: Feed with the word, feed with example, feed also with the fruits of the holy prayers, as St. Bernard says, epist. 101. More particularly, in what way the sheep ought to be fed spiritually, the same Bernard says, serm. 76 in Cant.: The Pastor of sheep ought to be in the pastures of the Scriptures, as in the inheritance of the Lord. And this, so that precepts may be imposed upon hard and carnal souls; the burdens of dispensations upon the weak; sound counsels and strong exhortations upon the healthy. Such is his word. Such Pastores the Lord promised, Jer. 3: I will give you Pastors who shall feed you with knowledge and doctrine.

THEREFORE in figure the ancient Fathers fed sheep before they were called to Scepters, as Moses, Exod. 2; David, 1 Reg. 16; and others; wherefore Christ, Jo. 10: I am the good Shepherd. Hence he wished first to be revealed to shepherds, as D. Ambrose notes in the Homily on the Nativity of the Lord. Hence Peter himself, 1 cap. 5: Feed the flock which is among you. Hence the reproach: Woe to the Pastors of Israel, who fed themselves, Ezech. 34. And Thren. 1 he laments: Her Princes are become like rams that find no pasture; and Joel 1: The herds have groaned, because they have no pasture, etc. Such is the word of the Seraphic Doctor, collat. 50 on cap. 21 of John, cited above.

HENCE in a grave commentary he closes with an Epiphonema, and here there stands open what is necessary for the successors of Peter, namely a fervid and true love of God, so that they love God, not themselves, and the Divine honor, not their own, and Divine gains, not their own. And perhaps first he says: Feed my lambs, twice; and once: Feed my sheep. For by lambs are signified the simple, the weak, and the poor, who ought to be fed with a twofold pasture, namely bodily and spiritual. By sheep are signified the stronger and richer, who ought to be fed with spiritual pasture. Hence the Gloss: To feed sheep is to provide, if need be, earthly succor to subjects, to furnish examples of virtues: as the Pastor feeds his flock: he shall gather the lambs with his arm, and shall take up the young in his bosom, Isa. 40. Therefore he who succeeds to Peter in the pastoral office, and does not love God, nor feed the sheep, is an Idol, not a Pastor — O Pastor, and idol, leaving the flock, Zach. 11. But I resume the name Cephas, Xefali, head, and send it back to that discourse on election, in which I have adapted the Anatomy of the human head in every way to a Rector, or to the Head of some Church.

It is PROVED secondly by the Holy Doctor, from the Fathers, lib. 3 of the Pharetra, cap. 38, all with one mouth approving it.

D. GREGORY, lib. 25 Moral., cap. 11, writes thus: Because we close our eyes to things internal and invisible, and are fed by things visible, we often venerate a man not for what he himself is, but for what surrounds him; and since we do not look at what he is, but what he can be, in acception of persons we are led not by persons, but by things adhering to them. Read what he pursues there.

D. JEROME, on cap. 2 of Malachi: Among all the sins of Priests, this is noted as if the greatest, that they consider not causes but persons, and despising the just poor man, honor the unjust rich. The authority of D. Jerome is also cited, 8, quaest. 1, cap. Licet ergo.

He also, lib. 2 on Isa., cap. 3, in the Gloss, on the words: "Why do ye crush," sharply rebukes thus: Our Princes, while they publicly accuse and confound poor delinquents, make not even a gesture at the rich sinning worse, in whose houses is the rapine of the poor, while they treasure up to themselves the goods of the Church and abuse for their pleasures what is given for the sustenance of the poor, and reserve to themselves, or distribute to their kinsmen, and make of others' want their own riches, or those of their own; and lib. 3, on cap. 6 of Amos: Whoever in judging is led by kinship, or friendship, or on the contrary by hostile hatred or enmities, perverts the judgment of Christ, which is justice.

D. AMBROSE, lib. 2 de officiis, cap. 24: Far be grace the cause; let merits be discerned: let there be nothing of opinion; nay, it weighs upon Faith, if in judging thou favorest the more powerful, accusest the cause of the inferior, or the innocent poor man, and excusest the rich man guilty of fault.

ST. BERNARD, lib. 2 de consideratione: Think it no small guilt of sin, if thou takest the faces of sinners, and judgest not rather the causes of merits. Here he addresses the Supreme Pontiff Eugenius III.

The same St. Leo asserts, epist. 84, cited in cap. Metropolitano, dist. 63, where he commands that, the Metropolitan being deceased, the best man be substituted and ordained.

AND Innocent III, cap. unica extra, prescribes that Ecclesiastical benefices ought not to be dispensed out of carnal affection, but by discreet judgment to the more suitable person. The same is clear from the letter of Pope Siricius to all the Orthodox, Tomo 1 of the Concil., and from the Council of Basel, where in the form of the oath exacted from electors it is prescribed (he says): I will elect the worthier.

FINALLY in the Council of Trent, sess. 24, in the Decree de Reform., cap. 1, it is asserted that the Electors of Bishops, communicating in the sins of others, sin mortally, unless they take care to prefer those whom they themselves judge worthier and more useful to the Church, etc., by reason of their demanding merits. Regarding this, Clem. VIII, decreto Reform. Regular., and Urban VIII, demand before elections the oath of electing the worthier.

It is PROVED by reason by both Holy Doctors. Whenever a less worthy man is preferred to a worthier one for a benefice, he must be preferred on account of irrelevant conditions, whether of friendship, of kinship, or of other similar things; but this is to accept persons: Therefore. This argument St. Bonaventure brings, in the Speculum, loco citato, and in the Pharetra, from the Fathers alleged above.

It is PROVED fourthly by the Holy Doctor, on Luke 12, in those words: Who, thinkest thou, is the faithful and wise dispenser, where he says: He calls prelates dispensers: So let a man account us, as the ministers of Christ, and dispensers of the mysteries of God. Such faithful men it is difficult to find. Hence there: Now it is sought among the dispensers, that some faithful one be found; namely faithful and prudent in election. Hence Prov. 27: Be diligent to know the countenance of thy cattle, and consider thy flocks. Few are intent upon the utility of the flock; hence Ezech. 34: Woe to the Pastors of Israel.

Consider the Holy Doctor, who infers that these are dispensers, not lords; and consequently cannot dispense goods except to the intention of the Lord; and he brings the example of Joseph, who was the best Dispenser in the land of Egypt, Genes. 41. Hence he pronounces Woe upon them, who in elections do not conduct themselves faithfully and prudently, providing most excellently, as far as can be done, for the ministers of the Church.

Fagundez uses this argument, num. 2, where he also observes, with Cotta de memorabilibus, V. Papa, pag. 655, and D. Ambrose de dignitate Sacerdotali, and D. Gregory, homil. 9 in Evangelia, that the Supreme Pontiff is not excluded from this obligation; nay, he is bound the more, the greater and more universal the administration with which he is endowed. This the Holy Doctor also shows in the place cited, and Pinellus, lib. de rescindendis vend. p. p., cap. 2, num. 30. Nay, D. Bernard de considerando uses this very medium.

By these arguments it is shown that the same must be observed even in simple benefices; for these too are goods falling under dispensation, not under free jurisdiction. Wherefore the reason is not taken from the side of the benefice as it is relative to the spiritual good of the people, but as in itself it is a good for the recipient, and a good of the Republic, or of the Church, which the faithful dispenser is bound to confer to the mind of the Lord, without acception of persons; and thus St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and others spoke universally, as Diana saw, p. p., tract. 15, resol. 38, with Bannes, 2. 2, quaest. 63, art. 2, dub. 5.

NOR do they adequately extricate themselves, with others there cited by Diana, by inferring that all future Prelates will be in an evil state: For they often elect less worthy men.

I SAY, indeed: Let them look to themselves; yet not all are of that kind.

He urges secondly: For the Council of Trent commands that only Pastoral benefices be conferred upon the worthier, and consequently does not seem to include Canonicates, which in sess. 24, cap. 12 it admonishes should be conferred, if it can be conveniently done, at least in part, upon Doctors or even Licentiates in Theology: Therefore it does not compel that they be conferred upon the worthier.

It is CONFIRMED from practice: For Pastoral benefices are conferred by concursus; not so the rest. Nor do the Laws speak of these so clearly.