Article — Billuart, Summa Summae · from Schola Thomistica
What is respect of persons?
1°: Acceptance of persons is the injustice by which, in common matters to be distributed by justice, no regard is had to the proportion of merits or the suitability of those who are candidates, but to some cause irrelevant to the matter. 463 463 Merc., Instit. moral. Alphons., n. 1027-1030.
1°: Acceptio personarum est iniustitia qua, in rebus communibus ex iustitia distribuendis, non attenditur proportio meritorum vel idoneitas eorum qui candidant, sed aliqua causa huic rei impertinens.463 463 Merc., Instit. moral. Alphons., n. 1027-1030.
I said, « in common matters », whether goods, such as public offices, benefices, honors, judgments, etc.; or evils, that is burdensome things, such as taxes, tolls, public works, contributions, penalties, etc.
Dixi, « in rebus communibus », sive bona, ut sunt officia publica, beneficia, honores, iudicia, etc.; sive mala, hoc est onerosa, ut sunt tributa, vectigalia, opera publica, contributiones, poenae, etc.
It must be observed, however, that common goods are of two kinds. Some are ordered primarily and immediately to the public good, and through it only mediately and secondarily to the benefit of the particular persons who occupy them, such as benefices, public offices, dignities, etc. Others are ordered primarily to the benefit of particular persons, such as the public treasury, common revenues, a legacy to be distributed to the poor, a sum of money handed over by the king to be distributed, stipends for well-deserving soldiers, etc.
Observandum est autem, bona communia esse duplicis generis. Quedam sunt primario et immediate ordinata ad bonum publicum, et eo mediante tantum ac secundario in utilitatem particularium qui ea occupant, ut sunt beneficia, officia publica, dignitates, etc. Alia sunt primario ordinata ad utilitatem particularium, ut sunt thesaurus publicus, proventus communes, legatum pauperibus distribuendum, summa pecuniae a rege tradita distribuenda, stipendia militibus bene meritis, etc.
In both kinds of goods, bad distribution is an acceptance of persons opposed to distributive justice, insofar as no regard is had to the proportion of merits; but moreover in both is found a violation of commutative justice, though in different ways. In the bad distribution of goods of the first kind, commutative justice is violated toward the state or the Church; because this or that has strict right that provision be made for it from the best ministers, and this devolves upon the providers by their office. Hence, strictly speaking, restitution must be made to it, not indeed to the particular persons, for whose benefit these goods are not primarily ordered, and who therefore have not strict right to them, but only a right of aptitude. But in the bad distribution of goods of the second kind there is found a violation of commutative justice even toward private persons; because from the fact that these goods are destined primarily to them, they have strict right to them, that is, a right to the thing itself, and the bad distributor is held to restitute to them.
In utroque genere bonorum mala distributio est acceptio personarum opposita iustitiae distributivae, in quantum non attenditur proportio meritorum; sed insuper utrobique reperitur violatio iustitiae commutativa, diversimode tamen. In mala distributione bonorum primi generis violatur iustitia commutativa erga rempublicam vel Ecclesiam; quia haec vel illa habet strictum ius ut de optimis ministris ipsi provideatur, et provisoribus id incumbit ex officio. Unde, stricte loquendo, illi restitutio facienda est, non vero particularibus, in quorum utilitatem haec bona non sunt primario ordinata, qui ideo non habent ius strictum ad illa, sed tantum ius aptitudinis. At vero in mala distributione bonorum secundi generis reperitur violatio iustitiae commutativa etiam erga particulares; quia ex hoc quod haec bona sint ipsis primario destinata, habent ad illa ius strictum, hoc est ius ad rem, et illis restituere tenetur malus distributor.
I say 2°: Acceptance of persons is, by its genus, mortal sin. 464 Because every injustice is, by its genus, mortal sin. Now acceptance of persons is an injustice opposed to distributive justice, which is a virtue more excellent than commutative justice, and from which follow damages no less than from commutative justice. Therefore. 464 Hic q. 63, a. 1, c.
Dico 2°: Acceptio personarum est ex genere suo peccatum mortale.464 Quia omnis iniustitia est ex genere suo peccatum mortale. Atqui acceptio personarum est iniustitia opposita iustitiae distributivae, quae est virtus praestantior commutativa, et ex qua non minora damna sequuntur quam ex commutativa. Ergo. 464 Hic q. 63, a. 1, c.