Question Two: On Justice and Injustice in Distributing Goods

S. Th. II-II, q. 63, a. 1, 2, 3.

618. Distributive justice directly and per se regards the distribution of goods. It belongs to distributive justice to bestow upon another, not to demand for oneself. But only in the distribution of goods is something bestowed upon another. Hence distributive justice first and directly regards the distribution not of burdens but of the goods of the community.

A. Generally and principally: the goods of the community are good social conditions. Distributive justice does not always principally treat the quality of goods to be subjected to distribution, for example, money, things, services to be divided; but especially the distribution of the goods themselves of the community, or of the social conditions required for perfect human life, by conceding security of order, rights, economic conditions, etc. It must bestow good conditions upon all, but diverse ones according to their principality in society, so that they may be able to attain development, but each one in his own diverse sphere.

To this end let there be a more equitable division of goods (n. 269, 5).

B. Specifically: the goods of the community are also particular goods, and indeed of diverse kinds:

1. Various duties or public offices, which, at least primarily, are instituted for the common good of the republic, and only secondarily can be for the private good of the members;

2. Other goods can also be primarily prizes for members, such as rewards for merit, helps and subsidies for need;

3. Honors which, according to the custom of the republic, are given to those obtaining such or such a state or grade: for thus morally there is a certain common good which is also exhibited by private persons as members of one republic, so that in this they act in the place of the republic;

4. Finally, efficacious protection or guardianship of liberty, rights, and goods; but concerning this something special will be said in q. 4, where public judgments are treated.

619. Distribution of duties or offices. In choosing for public offices, per se he must be chosen who is positively known to be worthy and to have the qualities required for the office both by the nature of the thing and by civil law, namely, knowledge, probity, industry; unless by accident no worthy person is present and nevertheless it is necessary to have someone, in which case it suffices to choose the less unworthy. And indeed:

1. Toward the republic, there is also an obligation of commutative justice to choose one truly worthy, if someone chooses; moreover, the superior choosing for offices by office is obligated to choose from commutative justice, but others choosing from privilege only from legal justice;

2. Toward the candidates themselves, there is also from commutative justice an obligation of choosing the more worthy, if they have been called by a competition properly so called, namely, one announced not only for knowing the worthy but with the obligation precisely to confer the benefice on the more worthy from among the competitors: for then he acquires a strict right, to be observed in every case. Otherwise, from distributive justice alone the more worthy must be chosen, not absolutely, but among those who can be had.

For offices carry with them several goods, gains, advantages, and utilities which can be taken by officials without detriment to the common good; and since they are goods of the community, in some way they belong to the parts, and therefore they are goods to be distributed equally among citizens. And therefore they have the nature of rewards which can be given only to a few, and are to be given to the more worthy; otherwise there is acceptance of persons. Except:

a) If the more worthy is reserved for a more excellent office soon to be vacant;

b) If the more worthy is occupied elsewhere with greater good of the community;

c) If the vote certainly will not profit the more worthy: for then the less worthy can be chosen in order to avoid the election of one more unworthy.

620. Distribution of other goods. Other goods of the community, which primarily regard the utility of members, are both rewards properly so called for merits, and subsidies for need or necessity, such as monies by which institutions are erected, for example, public schools, arts and sciences are fostered, or various needs of citizens are relieved. In distributing these, a threefold rule must be observed:

1. Goods are primarily and before all things to be distributed according to the demand of the common good: for distributive justice divides common goods among the various parts and members of the community; but the good of the parts as such yields to the common good of the whole. Therefore.

2. Rewards by which citizens, or institutions, are incited to virtue, sobriety, thrift, piety toward the fatherland, are to be distributed proportionately to merits properly so called.

3. Subsidies strictly so called for the relief of the needy are to be paid proportionately to their necessity.

But if distribution is made for another reason, besides the sin which is committed toward the republic, distributive justice also is injured by acceptance of persons.

It should be noted, moreover, that in distributing these goods, besides distributive justice, commutative justice can also be injured; not indeed by superiors if they themselves distribute, but if in their name lower officials, as mere ministers and stewards, do nothing except execute the distribution. For they are held to execute the will of the superiors, who intend to confer goods according to the merits of citizens; and therefore each citizen has a strict right that they not act against this mandate.

621. Distribution of honors. In distributing honors, let the words of St. Thomas be as a rule (a. 3): "If someone is honored on account of other causes which do not make him worthy of honor... it pertains to acceptance of persons... Now honor is a certain testimony concerning the virtue of him who is honored; and therefore virtue alone is the due cause of honor. Yet it must be known:

1. That someone can be honored not only on account of his own virtue, but also on account of the virtue of another; just as princes and prelates are honored even if they are evil, insofar as they bear the person of God and of the community over which they are placed...; thus also the foolish man is honored, who is placed in the place of God and in the place of the whole community.

2. And by the same reason parents and masters are to be honored, on account of their participation in the divine dignity, who is the Father and Lord of all....

3. But the aged are to be honored on account of the sign of virtue, which is old age, although this sign sometimes fails....

4. But the rich are to be honored on account of this, that they obtain a greater place in communities. But if they are honored solely with regard to riches, it will be the sin of acceptance of persons" (cf. Jas. II, 1-3).

622. Observations. A. What we have said concerning the distribution of offices and goods of the republic is per se valid concerning spiritual goods and ecclesiastical benefices; indeed, in these the sin is greater because it is committed in greater things: thus there is grave sin in election to an episcopal benefice or to others having care of souls, and to simple ones of greater moment. Nevertheless:

1. St. Thomas, a. 2, places a certain restriction: "For it sometimes happens that he who is less holy and less knowing can contribute more to the common good, on account of power or secular industry, or on account of something of this kind. And because distributions of spiritual things are principally ordered to the common utility... therefore sometimes, without acceptance of persons in the distribution of spiritual things, those who are simply less good are preferred to those who are better; just as God also sometimes grants graces gratuitously given to the less good."

2. Indeed, some, progressing further, say that ecclesiastical benefices were instituted solely on account of the common good, and therefore that there is no obligation toward candidates, nor from distributive justice of naming the more worthy, except in the case of competition strictly so called. Yet this is not conformable to the mind of St. Thomas, who says, ad 3: "As regards the conscience of the one choosing, it is necessary to choose the better, either simply or in comparison with the common good. But if someone more suitable can be had for some dignity and another is preferred, this must be on account of some cause. And if this indeed pertains to the business, as regards this he who is chosen will be more suitable. But if what is considered as cause does not pertain to the business, there will manifestly be acceptance of person." These words should be subjected to meditation by all those who must distribute ecclesiastical benefices, since in these distributive justice is often in no way attended to.

3. Consequently, concerning nepotism St. Thomas says, ad 1: "Concerning relatives of the prelate, a distinction must be made. For sometimes they are less worthy, both simply and with respect to the common good. And thus, if they are preferred to the more worthy, it is the sin of acceptance of persons in the distribution of spiritual things; of which the ecclesiastical prelate is not master so that he can give them at will, but dispenser.... But sometimes the relatives of an ecclesiastical prelate are as worthy as others. And thus he can lawfully prefer his relatives without acceptance of persons, because at least they are more eminent in this, that he can have more confidence in them, so that they may treat the affairs of the Church unanimously with him. Yet this would have to be omitted on account of scandal, if from this some would take an example of giving the goods of the Church to relatives even apart from dignity."

B. Insofar as some knowingly and willingly sin against commutative justice in distributing goods, to that extent they are held to restore to those whose strict right they injured; but he who was unjustly elected is not held to restitution unless: 1. he is incapable, in which case let him restore to the community on account of the various damages which it suffered from his election, and renounce the office, or, if possible, render himself suitable as soon as possible; 2. or unless by unjust means he impeded the election of the more worthy.

C. The distribution of particular goods, for example, of an inheritance, is not distribution properly so called or formal, but only material division; nor does it properly pertain to distributive justice, because a strict right is had to these things, and there is not question of the goods of the community itself.