On respect of persons in the distribution of spiritual things

By spiritualities we here understand ecclesiastical power, whether of order or of jurisdiction, and its exercise, especially ecclesiastical benefices and offices.

I suppose as certain that the conferral of spiritualities on an unworthy person, if worthy ones are found, is mortal sin, because it is an acceptance of persons in a matter of grave moment. ^{465 465} Ibid., ad 2 et 3.

The difficulty, therefore, is whether it is lawful to confer a benefice on a less worthy person, passing over one more worthy. Hence:

I say: The conferral of any benefice or ecclesiastical office made on a less worthy person, one more worthy being passed over, regularly speaking, is illicit, but valid. Say the same of presentation and election. It is the common opinion of the authors. ^{466 466} Ibid., a. 2, c.

Furthermore, understand the conclusion thus: not that the collator or patron must inquire through the whole kingdom or province who is the most worthy; for that would be a burden too heavy, and liable to deception; but that from those who are at hand, or whose merits he knows or can come to know, using moral diligence, he choose him whom he judges the more worthy.

The first part of the conclusion is proved 1° from canon law, cap. unico: « Ut ecclesiastica beneficia », Decretal. lib. III, tit. XII. Innocent III says: « Not out of carnal affection, but with judgment weighed, ought you to have dispensed the ecclesiastical office and benefice to the more suitable person. » The Council of Trent, sess. XXIII, cap. 1, on the promotion of bishops, declares that those promoted and those lending their efforts sin mortally, « unless they have most diligently taken care that they judge them the worthier and more useful to the Church. » And cap. 18, on the presentation of pastors, says: « From these the bishop shall choose him whom he judges the more suitable than the others. »

It is proved 2° by reason. ⁴⁶⁷ As long as, in promotion to a benefice or ecclesiastical office, a less worthy person is preferred to a more worthy one, there is manifestly an acceptance of person injurious to the Church, for whose benefit ecclesiastical benefices and offices were instituted. Therefore. ⁴⁶⁷ Ibid., ad 3.

But note that the worthiness of someone can be regarded in two ways. ⁴⁶⁸ In one way, simply and in itself; and thus he is of greater worthiness who more abounds in the gifts of grace in spiritual things. In another way, by comparison with the common good; for it sometimes happens that he who is less holy or less learned can contribute more to the common good because of power, or industry, or something of this kind. But greater worthiness must be regarded not simply, but comparatively, with respect to the common good. ⁴⁶⁸ Ibid., a. 2, c.; Quodlib. cit.

The second part of the conclusion is clear from various places in the law which require only a worthy person. ⁴⁶⁹ This the interpreters understand with St. Thomas to mean that the conferral or election be valid and cannot be challenged in a judicial forum; because otherwise every election could give rise to calumny, and there would be no end of lawsuits. ⁴⁶⁹ Ibid., ad 3.

From what has been said it follows that he sins mortally who promotes, or takes care to have promoted, presents, or elects to a benefice or ecclesiastical office having annexed the care of souls or ecclesiastical governance a less worthy person, one more worthy being passed over — or even to simple benefices, but otherwise of grave moment, for instance one having a vote in elections to dignities or to offices having the care of souls; because it is an acceptance of persons in a matter of grave moment, with great detriment to the Church, or at least from which such detriment can follow. See proposition 47 condemned by Innocent XI.

[Such is this proposition: « When the Council of Trent said that those communicating in the sins of others sin mortally who promote to churches none other than those whom they judge worthier and more useful to the Church itself: first the council seems by this to have meant by worthier nothing else than the worthiness of those to be chosen, taking the comparative for the positive; or, secondly, in less proper language it understood the worthier so as to exclude the unworthy, not indeed the worthy; finally, thirdly, it follows when the concursus takes place. »]

But it will be venial only, more probably, if simple benefices of lesser moment are in question, such as chaplaincies, modest canonries, provided they are not conferred by concursus; because, since such benefices are ordered to humble and very limited offices, such as reciting the office, celebrating Mass, singing the Epistle or Gospel, etc., it does not seem that grave damage is inflicted on the Church if sometimes a less unworthy man is placed over a worthier one.

I said in the conclusion, « regularly speaking, » because there are certain cases in which it is lawful to promote worthy men to benefices even with the cure of souls, worthier men being passed over.

1° If from the institution of the benefice it has been settled by the Church that the one to be promoted must be from the bosom of the Church, e.g., from a certain family. 2° If the founder of the benefice himself fixed beforehand who is worthy; for this privilege is granted to him by law, cap. Monasterium, causa 16, q. 7. 3° If in the election [...] it would not benefit the more worthy one.

You will ask 1° whether he who promotes an unworthy or less worthy person to benefices or ecclesiastical offices, one more worthy being passed over, is held to any restitution.

I answer. 1° He who promotes an unworthy person — both the promoter and the one promoted are held to restitute to the Church all the damages that come to it from this: the promoter, because he sins against commutative justice toward the Church, to which he is bound by his office to set over it worthy ministers; the one promoted, because he cooperated in the unjust action of the promoter, and from him immediately flow the evils of the Church.

I answer. 2° He who promotes a less worthy one, the more worthy being passed over, is also held, speaking of itself, by force of such promotion, to restitute to the Church; because toward it he violates commutative justice, since he is bound by his office, as was said, to set over it the best ministers. But it seems that the Church neither demands this restitution nor binds to it, in order to avoid perplexities: and thus the common sense [of theologians] apprehends it.

[The other opinion, no less probable, holds that the promoter is held to no restitution in this case. The reason is that ecclesiastical offices to which benefices are annexed were instituted primarily, indeed even solely, that the Church may be served by good ministers. Now, as is supposed, if the worthier are passed over, those chosen are worthy or good. Hence, if the good of the Church is not provided for in a better way, it is at least done sufficiently, and the intended end is essentially attained. Therefore ⁴⁷⁰ Moreover this question becomes purely speculative from what was said above, namely that the Church in the aforesaid case does not demand restitution.] ⁴⁷⁰ S. Lig., lib. V, n. 107.

I answer. 3° He who promotes an unworthy or less worthy person, one more worthy being passed over, outside the concursus, is held to restitute nothing to the more worthy one who was passed over; because with respect to him he does not violate commutative justice, but only distributive justice. For the more worthy one has not strict right to the benefice, but only a right of aptitude and proportion.

I said, « outside the concursus; » because, by force of the announcement of the concursus, anyone capable acquires the right to compete, and he who is judged the worthier has, from an implicit pact, strict right to the benefice. Hence, if it is conferred on a less worthy one, injury is manifestly done to the worthier one; just as, when many fight in a public contest, injury would be done to the victor if the proposed prize were denied to him.

[You will ask 2° whether a worthy man, clearly knowing another to be worthier, sins by accepting the benefice, and is held to repair the loss to him.

I answer. The first opinion affirms it, because he himself, by accepting the benefice, cooperates in the unjust election to the damage of the other. The other opinion, which seems truer, says that he neither sins nor consequently is held to restitution.

The reason why he does not sin is given by D. Thomas, IIae IIae, q. 185, a. 3, c, namely that, on the part of the one choosing, « he who must choose someone as bishop... is not held to take the better one simply,... but the better one for the governance of the Church... On the part of him who is taken up, it is not required that he consider himself better than others; for that would be proud and presumptuous: but it suffices that he find nothing in himself by which it becomes illicit for him to take up the office of prelacy. » Furthermore, what is said of the episcopate must be said a fortiori of inferior benefices ⁴⁷¹] ⁴⁷¹ Id., ibid., n. 110, dub. 2.

You will ask 3° whether what has been said thus far in the present article is to be extended to secular offices.

I answer, more commonly and more probably affirmatively; because these offices are likewise ordered primarily and principally to the common good of the state. Hence he who distributes them to the unworthy, or to the less worthy, sins against commutative justice toward the state, and against distributive justice, by acceptance of persons, toward the worthier.

You will say: He who holds dominion over some thing, and can sell it, is not an acceptor of persons if he hands it over or sells it to whom he wills. Now the prince or the state holds dominion over secular offices, and can sell them. Therefore.

I answer: I distinguish the major. If that thing is so much its own property that it is not to be appropriated to the common utility of the state, I concede; if it is to be appropriated to the common utility of the state, as public offices are, I deny. — To the minor ⁴⁷² Indeed, speaking absolutely and from the nature of the thing, secular offices can be sold; because the dignity, the ample stipend, the occasion of gain, and similar things annexed to these offices are assessable in price. But they must be sold to the worthier and for a moderate price, lest poor but more suitable men be shut out from them, and lest those who buy at an immoderate price practice rapine and extortion to keep themselves whole. And because they are accustomed to be sold indiscriminately to the higher bidders and at an immoderate price, without regard to greater or lesser unworthiness or worthiness, therefore it is not expedient that they be sold. ⁴⁷² D. Thom., Opusc. XXI, 1, 5°.

You will ask 4° what qualities are necessary for duly obtaining benefices.

I answer. The first is probity of life. The second is learning, which must be such as the office annexed to the benefice requires. The third is legitimate age, namely for the episcopate, the completed thirtieth year; for benefices having the care of souls, the completed twenty-fourth year; for a canonry of a cathedral church that age is required that the one receiving the benefice may be able within a year to receive the order annexed to that benefice; for other canonries and any simple benefices, the begun fourteenth year. The fourth, legitimate title, without which, or without a dispensation, the conferral is void. The fifth, clerical tonsure. The sixth, celibacy, so that a conferral made to a married man is null. The seventh is immunity from major excommunication, suspension, interdict, and irregularity. The eighth is immunity from heresy in oneself and in one's parents up to the second generation according to the paternal line, and up to the first according to the maternal line. The ninth is a determined intention of taking up the office annexed to the benefice, or, if none be annexed, of persevering in the clerical state. Hence he sins mortally who accepts a benefice with the mind of enjoying its fruits until, for example, he has finished his studies, or found a suitable wife, intending afterwards to resign it; and if it be a parochial benefice, he is held to restitute the fruits received. The last condition is that another benefice not be conferred on one who already has one without cause. Hence

You will ask 5° whether it is lawful to possess several benefices at once.

I answer: that it is illicit by natural and positive law ⁴⁷³, except in certain cases to be assigned below. ⁴⁷³ Quodlib. IX, a. 15, c.

By natural law; because for one man to hold several benefices at once contains in itself several disorders. First, the Church is deprived of a number of ministers and their service, since it is not possible for one man to serve several churches, and then prebends were established as it were stipends for those ministering there. Secondly, there follows a diminution of divine worship, while one man is instituted in place of many; for he who holds several prebends does not recite the hours, sing, or celebrate Mass more often, etc. Thirdly, there follows the frustration of the will of the founders, who contributed something to this church precisely so that, according to the number of benefices, there would be a number of beneficiaries ministering to God there. Fourthly, there follows inequality, while one man abounds in several benefices, and others equally or perhaps more suitable cannot obtain even one. Add that plurality of benefices is a foment of ambition, avarice, gluttony, lust, and many other vices.

By positive law. Cap. Sanctorum, dist. 70; cap. Clericis and cap. Clericum, causa 21, q. 1. Which ancient law the Tridentine confirms and renews, sess. xxiv, cap. 17 de Reform., in these words: « The holy synod... commands by the present decree that hereafter only one ecclesiastical benefice be conferred on each man, which indeed should suffice for his honorable support for life; nevertheless another simple one sufficient may be conferred on the same man, provided neither requires personal residence. »

I said, « except in certain cases. » The first is the one assigned by the Tridentine: if one benefice does not suffice for the honorable support of the beneficiary and his dependents in need.

The second. A dignity, for example a deanship or provostship, can be held together with a canonry in the same church. Thus declared the Congregation of the Council of Trent, 13 January 1594, as Gallemart testifies, on cap. 17 cited. And rightly; for these dignities

⁴⁷⁴ are more fittingly, and perhaps according to the intention of the founders, conferred on one man from the bosom [of the chapter]. ⁴⁷⁴ Ibid.

The third is, if a parish church is legitimately annexed to a canonry, because a benefice perpetually annexed to another is reckoned as one with it.

The fourth is the greater utility or necessity of the Church ⁴⁷⁵, as if someone on account of eminent learning or virtue could profit the Church more absent than another present, or by reason of power and authority could more effectively defend the Church against heretics or others; for this reason the supreme Pontiffs often dispense with the princes of Germany, that they may hold several bishoprics at once. In this last case the dispensation of the Pontiff is required, who alone can dispense in the law of the universal Church. More on plural benefices, when we treat of Religious. ⁴⁷⁵ Ibid.