The Vice Against Distributive Justice

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 63-78.)

The Vice Opposed to Distributive Justice.—Favoritism (i.e., acceptance of persons, partiality) is defined as “a species of injustice which moves one to distribute the common goods or burdens of society, not according to merit or fitness, but according to some other and impertinent standard.”

(a) The common goods include offices, honors, functions, while the common burdens include taxes, contributions, and penalties.

(b) The common goods of which we now speak are those that belong to society and that must be portioned out to its members justly. Hence, there is no question of goods that belong to private persons, which the owners are not obliged to give to others unless it be in virtue of charity or liberality. A rich man is not guilty of acceptance of persons, if he bestows his largesses on those who are less in need or less deserving, but more acceptable to himself; and God is not unjust when he gives unequal graces to those who are equally sinners (Matt., xx. 14, 15).

(c) The right standard of just distribution is merit or fitness, as when an applicant is appointed to the post of teacher or superior on account of good character and knowledge. Any other standard which leaves merit and fitness out of consideration is unjust, as when a public official selects for offices or honors, not those who have worked the hardest or who give the most promise, but those who have more money or who are related to himself.

The Sinfulness of Favoritism from Revelation.—In Holy Scripture favoritism is reproved (“How long will you judge unjustly and accept the persons of the wicked?” Psalm lxxi. 2), and impartiality is praised (“Thou art a true speaker and teachest the way of God in truth, neither carest Thou for any man, for Thou dost not regard the person of man,” Matt., xxii. 16; “Masters, know that the Lord both of servants and you is in heaven, and there is no respect of persons with Him,” Eph., vi. 9). Distributive justice is commanded in many passages of Holy Writ (“Consider not the person of the poor, nor honor the countenance of the mighty; but judge thy neighbor according to justice,” Levit. xix. 15; “There shall be no difference of persons, you shall hear the little as well as the great, neither shall you respect any man’s person,” Deut., i. 17; “Thou shalt not accept persons nor gifts,” Deut., xvi. 19; cfr. James, ii. 1 sqq.).

The Sinfulness of Favoritism from Reason.—Favoritism transgresses a divine command and substitutes personal will for right in the treatment of subjects by superiors. Hence, it is morally evil, for disobedience is sinful in the high as well as in the low, and violation of rights is unjust whether the rights be of the community or of the individual.

The Gravity of the Sin of Favoritism.—(a) From its nature, favoritism is a mortal sin; for it is a form of injustice (see 1746), and indeed it is no less damaging than commutative injustice (e.g., theft) and is often accompanied by the latter. (b) From its matter and from the lack of deliberation or consent it may be venial. Thus, if favoritism is shown in a trifling matter (e.g., in conferring a post that is unremunerative and unimportant) or in a small degree (e.g., in preferring an applicant who is only slightly less worthy), there is only venial injustice.

Distributive injustice is also frequently accompanied by commutative injustice.

(a) Thus, a first class of common goods that are distributed are those intended primarily for the common good, and only indirectly and secondarily for the good of individuals, such as public offices, dignities, and benefices. He who distributes these offices unfairly, by appointing unworthy persons, or by appointing the less worthy when he is under contract to appoint the more worthy, violates commutative justice and is held to restitution to the community; but the worthy or more worthy persons slighted had no strict right, and hence no restitution is due them, unless there was a compact with them or unjust means were used to exclude them (see 1755).

(b) A second class of common goods are those that are intended primarily for the benefit of individuals, such as a fund created for the relief of the destitute or afflicted or pensions set aside for those who have deserved well of society. He who distributes these goods unfairly is guilty of commutative injustice against private persons, since the goods were destined for them, and they had a right ad rem to the goods, and hence to these persons restitution is owed.

Favoritism in Spiritual Matters.—(a) Partiality in granting favors is sinful, and gravely so when the matter is serious. Examples are the grant to the unworthy of the power of Orders or of jurisdiction, the concession of permissions and dispensations to one’s friends that are denied to others. (b) Partiality in imposing burdens is also sinful, as when a prelate issues an onerous command, and grants exemption to his friends. But if the thing commanded is obligatory already by reason of law, it should be observed in spite of the favoritism of the prelate.

Who is to be considered as more worthy for appointments in spiritual matters?

(a) The more worthy person is the one who will better serve the common good in the office. Hence, the more pious or the more learned man is not necessarily the more worthy, for another may have greater industry, influence, executive ability, initiative, prudence, experience, etc., and so be better suited to fill the position. But no person should be considered as worthy of spiritual offices unless his moral character is good, and excellence in temporal things does not compensate for negligence in spiritual matters.

(b) The more worthy person is the one who is more available when the appointment has to be made. Hence, the one who is better gifted for the office is not necessarily the more worthy, for another may be better known and it may be impossible to make investigations and comparisons at the moment.

Opinion of the Applicant or Appointee about His Own Fitness.—(a) The applicant need not think that he is worthy or the most worthy; indeed, according to St. Thomas, it would be presumptuous for him to think so highly of himself, and he would thus become unworthy. It suffices, then, that the applicant have in mind only to try for the office, leaving the decision about fitness to the examiner or appointer.

(b) The acceptor who feels that he is unworthy or less worthy is not guilty of injustice; for he is not the judge of his own abilities and may rely on the judgment of those who appoint him. Moreover, he can trust to divine grace and his own efforts to make up for any deficiency or inferiority of which he is conscious. But it seems that, if the appointee were absolutely certain that his appointment was unjust, he would be bound to surrender his office, if this were possible.

Favoritism in Secular Matters.—Do the conclusions in reference to ecclesiastical offices apply also to secular offices?

(a) In both cases distributive justice is violated by favoritism, for the standard followed is not merit or fitness, and thus the more worthy persons are injured. The opinion that civil society has dominion of public offices and therefore the right to distribute them at will, without regard to the merits or fitness of persons selected, is not probable; for civil rulers, like spiritual rulers, should consider themselves as ministers and dispensers only (I Cor., iv. 1), and even if they had dominion over offices, they would be bound to use that power for the benefit of the public for whom they rule.

(b) In both cases also commutative justice is violated in some instances, the offense being either against society or against individuals (see 1755, 1808). Thus, an official who appoints a subordinate knowing that he will oppress and rob, is responsible and bound to restitution to the victims as being a cooperator in injustice.

Favoritism in Marks of Esteem or Honor Shown to Others.—(a) There is no favoritism if honor and esteem are shown to those who deserve it on account of their virtue or position. Hence, it is not unjust but just to show special marks of veneration to holy persons, and even to those who are not holy, but whose authority or age deserves respect (such as rulers and prelates, parents and aged men).

(b) There is favoritism if honor and esteem are shown to those who have no genuine claim to it on account of goodness or rank. Thus, wealthy men are worthy of special respect on account of goodness when they employ their riches in useful ways, or on account of preeminence in the community in rank, ability, influence, etc., and he who shows special courtesy or attention to the wealthy for reasons such as these is not a respector of persons. But if mere wealth is worshipped, sinful favoritism is shown, as when a villainous rich man is honored and a worthy poor man is despised, or well-dressed persons are conducted honorably to comfortable seats in church and good persons whose attire is poor are treated with contempt (James, ii).

Favoritism in Judges (Umpires, Arbitrators) and the Like.—(a) In the course of a trial there may be favoritism in matters left to the judge’s discretion. This does not happen, however, when the discretionary power is intended for the judge’s own benefit (e.g., when on a free day he decides to hear one side rather than the other), but when it is meant for the benefit of the litigants (e.g., when he grants to one side a longer time for preparation of its case than to the other side and for no reason pertinent to the matter at issue).

(b) In the sentence pronounced there is favoritism, if the decision is not based on the merits of the litigants, but on extraneous considerations, such as the fact that one of the parties is a friend or relative of the judge or arbitrator, or belongs to the same political party or business, etc.: “It is not good to accept the person of the wicked, to decline from the truth of judgment” (Prov., xviii. 5). If the arguments are about evenly balanced on both sides, it would be favoritism to decide in favor of one against the other. Alexander VII condemned the proposition that a judge may take money in such a case of doubt to decide for one party (Denzinger, n. 1126).