Vindication (Just Punishment)

Anger is the inordinate appetite for revenge.

Revenge is the infliction of pain in satisfaction for an injury. As private individuals we are not allowed to avenge injuries which have been done us: “To no man rendering evil for evil. . . . Not revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath, for it is written: Revenge to me; I will repay, saith the Lord.¹ Sometimes, however, in trivial matters the immediate punishment of an injury is allowed to private persons, in order to prevent a recurrence of the injustice, or under circumstances in which such an action is really an act of self-defence. In other cases private revenge is not allowed, but belongs to those whose duty it is to correct delinquents and to avenge outraged justice. Anger, then, will be inordinate whenever revenge is sought without just cause, or more severe than the cause requires, or when private vengeance is indulged in, or when it is sought merely to satisfy hatred and spite. In these cases anger is of itself a grave sin because it is against justice and charity; if there be merely want of moderation in the manner of seeking or executing lawful vengeance, the sin will be venial.

¹ Rom. xii 17.

The potential parts of justice are several. For justice is a virtue toward another, rendering to him what is owed according to equality. Therefore every virtue which by its nature is toward another, but falls short of justice by reason either of debt or of equality, must be joined to justice as a potential part. Now the virtues which fall short by reason of debt, or in other words which regard not a juridical debt but only a moral debt, that is, one to be rendered from the moral goodness of virtue alone, are of two species. For some regard a debt "so necessary that without it moral goodness of conduct cannot be preserved" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 80, single article); and these are truth, gratitude, and vindication. Others regard a debt which "is necessary as contributing to greater moral goodness, without which nevertheless moral goodness can be preserved" (St. Thomas, cited place); and these are liberality and affability. By reason of equality those virtues fall short, or in other words regard a debt which can in no way be rendered according to equality: religion, penance, piety, and observance.

Therefore there are nine virtues which are referred to justice as potential parts; two of them regard a debt toward God, namely religion and penance; the remaining seven have as their object a debt toward the neighbor.

I. Notion of Vindication. Vindication is a moral virtue inclining a private man to seek vengeance for an injury inflicted, by due punishment, according to the prescription of right reason illumined by faith. It is said:

1. Inclining a private man. Thus is indicated the subject of this virtue; concerning by what virtue a public person is bound to vengeance for an injury, see n. 382.

2. To seek vengeance for an injury inflicted by due punishment, etc. By these words is assigned the material object.

II. Object of Vindication. 1. The material object is constituted by all acts by which a private man seeks that due punishment be inflicted on the injurer by legitimate public authority. Hence the material object of the virtue of vindication is not the execution itself of the due punishment; for an act of this sort is dishonorable for a private man, because he lacks legitimate power to punish. And because man is more inclined to greater than to milder vengeance, the virtue of vindication serves especially to moderate the appetite for revenge.

2. The remote formal object is the special reason of debt for seeking vengeance for an injury inflicted; the proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in seeking this debt (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 108, aa. 1 and 2).

III. Opposed Vices. To vindication are opposed all acts by which either excessive punishment, or an unduly milder punishment, or unduly no punishment, is sought. Nevertheless, as regards omission of the petition for punishment, it must be observed that it is often more perfect to forgive an injury and thus for the sake of a higher good to omit the petition of vindication; but not always, since supernatural reason dictates that sometimes, for the good either of the community or of the delinquent himself, punishment is to be sought.

Degrees of Moral Debt.—The remaining potential parts of justice are those in which there is not a legal debt, which is enforced by some law, but a moral debt to which one is obliged from the decency or the greater decency of virtue. There are, then, two degrees of moral debt.

(a) A moral debt is more urgent, when without its fulfillment one cannot keep to the decency of virtue, that is, one cannot preserve the character of a virtuous man. Thus, if a moral debt is considered from the side of the debtor, he is obliged to show himself in words and deeds to others what he really is, has been, or intends to be (virtue of truthfulness); if the debt be viewed from the side of the creditor to whom some recompense is owed, there is the duty of gratitude to him for his benefits and of punishment for his injuries (virtues of gratitude and vindication). These parts of justice just mentioned are readily distinguishable from acts that pertain to general or particular justice and that are owed as legal debts. Thus, truthful testimony on the witness stand is a legal obligation, for the person who questions has a strict right to hear the truth; but veracity in social intercourse, or the habit of speaking the truth to others, is a moral obligation, one imposed by God but not enforced legally. Compensation for services bestowed according to contract is a legal duty, and the debtor can be compelled to pay; but thankfulness for gifts or other benefits is only a moral duty, and generally laws do not take account of ingratitude. Punishment of a delinquent by public authority is an act of commutative justice; but punishment meted out by a private person in self-defense, who appeals to the law or who forcibly but lawfully repels an injury, is an act of a virtue annexed to justice.

(b) A moral debt is less urgent, when without its fulfillment one can preserve virtue, but not the more becoming or more perfect course of virtue. The chief examples here are the virtues of friendship or affability and of liberality. To treat others in a friendly manner and to make oneself agreeable in company is suitable, not chiefly because of any benefits one has received from others, but because one is better for this oneself and by it the ways of life are made easier for all. Likewise liberality is not due, but it shows a better disposition as to money and other temporal goods to be willing to distribute them to others willingly and generously. Without friendship and liberality the peace and harmony of social intercourse may be maintained, but with them it is maintained more easily and receives an added grace and distinction.

The Virtue of Vengeance.—Just as gratitude returns good for evil, so does vengeance (vindicatio) return evil for evil, that is, the evil of punishment for the evil of sin. Vengeance is defined as “a moral virtue that inclines a private person to use lawful means for the punishment of wrongdoing, with a view to the satisfaction of public or private justice.”

(a) Vengeance is a virtue of private persons; that is, it belongs to those who are not charged officially with the punishment of offenses. The duty of public persons, such as judges, is a much stricter one and pertains to the virtue of vindictive justice, which is a form of commutative justice; whereas vengeance is only a virtue annexed to justice (see above, 2141 sqq.). Vindictive justice attends to the equality between fault and punishment, vengeance to the protection of the person who has been injured.

(b) Vengeance is concerned with the punishment of wrongdoing, or the infliction of some painful retribution upon one who has already committed an injury. Thus, this virtue is not strictly identical with lawful self-defense, which is directed against an evil that is not past but present, though self-defense may be rated as a secondary act of the virtue of vengeance.

(c) Vengeance uses only lawful means; that is, it seeks redress or reparation from the authorities who have the right to give it and follows due process of law. This virtue differs, then, from private revenge, vendetta, lynch law, exercise of the “unwritten law,” etc., which are acts of sinful violence, though sometimes subjectively excusable on account of ignorance. The virtue of vengeance is also exercised by those who desire that justice may be done against malefactors, or who visit upon them with moderation such punishments as are not forbidden to private persons (e.g., denial of friendship). Parents also exercise this virtue whenever they properly correct and chastise their children.

(d) Vengeance has for its ends public and private justice, that is, the vindication of the right order of society or the compensation or satisfaction of an injured person. If some other good motive causes one to desire requital of evil deeds, the act will pertain to another virtue: thus, if one aims at the amendment of the evil-doer, one’s act pertains to charity; if one desires by the deterrent of punishment to secure the peace and prosperity of the commonwealth, the act is one of legal justice; if one seeks the honor of God, the act is one of religion, etc. If an evil motive prompts the desire of punishment, the wish is not virtuous at all, but sinful. Thus, he who labors to have a criminal captured, sentenced and executed, and whose intention is not the vindication of justice but the gratification of jealousy, hatred, cruelty or other like passion, sins grievously and perhaps makes himself worse than the criminal. To return evil for evil in this way is to be overcome by evil (Rom., xii. 17-21).

The Morality of Vengeance.—(a) Vengeance is lawful, since it pertains to justice, and Our Lord declares that it is found in the just and is approved by God (Luke, xviii. 7). It is, moreover, a special virtue, for it regulates the special natural inclination which moves man to attack what is harmful and injurious and has its own distinctive ends (see 2381). It is closely related to fortitude and zeal, which prepare the way for it; zeal, being a fervent love of God and man, inspires indignation against injustice, while fortitude removes the fear that might keep one back from attack on injustice. Accidentally, however, on account of greater evils, vengeance is sometimes unlawful, as when it would involve the innocent with the guilty, or fall more heavily upon the less guilty (Matt., xiii. 29, 30).

(b) Vengeance is obligatory when an injury to oneself is also an injury to a public or other necessary good (e.g., to the rights of God or of the Church). Hence it was that Elias and Eliseus punished those who maltreated them (IV Kings, i. 9 sqq., ii. 23, 24), that inspired writers pray God to punish the wicked (Psalms xviii, xxxiv, lxviii, cviii, lxxviii, cxxxvi; Jeremias, xi. 20, xvii, 18, xviii. 21, xx. 12), and Pope Sylvester excommunicated those who sent him into exile. If an injury to oneself is merely personal, one should be willing to forego punishment of the guilty person, and should actually do so when this course is expedient, as Our Lord teaches in Matthew, vi. 14, 15 (see 1198 sqq.). When no necessity requires one to vindicate a personal wrong, the more perfect course is to pardon the wrong for the sake of God; for in avenging injuries to self there is always the danger of such evils as selfish motive, arrogance, hatred, scandal, and the loss of such goods as peace of mind, conversion of the other party, edification, and greater claim on God’s forgiveness of self. Hence, vengeance is called “a little virtue,” since it is so often the less perfect way.

Excess and Defect.—Punitive justice is a moral virtue and hence should be characterized by moderation as to all its circumstances. It should avoid the extremes of excess and defect.

(a) The sin of excess here is cruelty, which in the quality or the quantity of the punishment offends human rights or surpasses the measure of the crime or the custom of the law. Thus, it is immoral to associate young prisoners with hardened criminals, to deprive an offender of religious opportunities; it is inhuman to treat a human being as if he were a brute or less than a brute (e.g., by confinement in a loathsome dungeon, by overwork with starvation, by torture); it is unfair to use severe punishments unknown to law or custom, or whose rigor far surpasses the degree of offense. There is excess even in medicinal or reformatory penalties, if a higher good is sacrificed for a lower (e.g., the spiritual for the temporal, a major for a minor good quality), for then the remedy is worse than the disease.

(b) The sin of defect in punishments is laxity, which rewards crime, or allows it to go unpunished, or imposes penalties which are agreeable to offenders, or not a deterrent, or not at all equal to the offense. Scripture condemns this lenity when it declares that the parent who spares the rod spoils the child (Prov., xiii. 24). In weighing the gravity of a delinquency account should be taken of the fault itself, of the injury done and the scandal given. In the fault consideration must be had of the objective element (i.e., the nature and importance of the law violated), of the subjective element (i.e., the age, instruction, education, sex, and state of mind of the offender), of the circumstances (e.g., the time, the place, the persons involved, and the frequency). See Canon 2218.

Circumstances of Punitive Justice.—(a) Punishments that May Be Used.—Punishment is virtuous only in so far as it restrains from evil those who cannot be restrained by love of virtue, but only by fear of penalty. Hence, penalties should consist in the deprivation of goods that are more prized than the satisfactions obtained through delinquencies. Both divine and human laws, therefore, have established as punishments the loss of a bodily good (e.g., by death, flogging, imprisonment) or of an external good (e.g., by exile, fine, infamy), the chief inducements to crime being found in bodily or external things. The extreme penalty of death should be reserved for extreme cases, and the other penalties should be suited to the crime, so as to remove the incentive or means (e.g., dishonesty should be punished by loss of goods, calumny by infamy, lust by pain, etc.).

(b) Persons Who May Be Punished.—Punishment again is virtuous only because it pertains to justice and rights the inequality caused by sin. Accordingly, no one should be punished unless he has sinned or voluntarily transgressed. It is unlawful to punish the innocent for the guilty, or to punish an innocent person in order to keep him from future sins. It should be noted, however, that God inflicts temporal evils on the just for the sake of spiritual goods (e.g., that they may not become attached to this world, may have opportunities of merit, and may give good example); that one person may be punished for the sin of another when he associates himself with or approves of that sin, as when careless parents have bad children or careless subjects bad rulers (Job, xxxiv. 30; Exod, xx. 5); that for a sufficient reason an innocent person may be deprived of a good for which he is unfitted (e.g., ordination when one is irregular by defect) or to which he has no personal or absolute claim (e.g., the family property when it is lost to the children because the father is fined).

What is justice, and what are its parts? - R. To the first. Justice is the virtue which renders what is owed according to equality. Hence other moral virtues hold the mean of reason, according namely to prudent estimation. For since they are concerned with ruling passions, that which is right for one person is little or too much for another. But justice attains the mean of the thing, according namely to the equality of thing to thing, so that as much is rendered as is owed. For the equal is really the mean between greater and lesser. And thus the mean of justice cannot vary according to persons, places, and time; but whoever it may be, wherever and whenever, who owes one hundred, and whoever the creditor may be, he ought to render one hundred to him. If he renders fifty he injures justice; if one hundred and fifty he exercises liberality. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 58, 59, 61, 80.

R. To the second. The parts as it were integral of justice are: to decline from evil and to do good, namely to do owed good and to decline from the opposite evil. Owed; for if the speech is about good and evil in common, then to do good and to avoid evil pertains to every virtue. But if it is considered under the account of what is owed, then it pertains to justice. For justice is one kind general, namely legal, another special, namely distributive and commutative; these are the three subjective parts, or its species. To general or legal justice it pertains to do owed good in order to the Community and to God, in order to divine or human law; and accordingly as to the proper account of legal justice it pertains to attend to the debt of the precept, to do good, so to the proper account of transgression it pertains to attend to contempt of the precept, to decline from evil. - But to special justice, distributive and commutative, it pertains to do good owed to the neighbor and to avoid the opposite evil, namely that which is harmful to the neighbor. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79.

But as to do good is a certain special part of justice distinct from the declining of evil, so omission, which is opposed to the former, is altogether distinguished from transgression, which is opposed to the latter. For omission is properly of owed good, e.g., if someone does not show owed reverence to parents; and transgression is properly in doing evil, e.g., if someone inflicts contumely or any injury upon parents. The former is opposed to the affirmative precept, to do good; the latter to the negative precept, to decline from evil. Properly omission; for this imports the passing over of good not just any whatsoever, but of owed good. But good under the account of what is owed properly pertains to justice; to legal justice indeed, if the debt is taken in order to divine or human law; but to special justice if in order to neighbor. Properly transgression; for transgression materially taken is common to all species of sins, because by any species of sin man transgresses some divine precept. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79. "But these two parts of justice, general or special, are called as it were integral, because each of them is required for the perfect act of justice. For it pertains to justice to constitute equality in those things which are toward another. But it belongs to the same thing both to constitute something and to conserve what has been constituted in those things which are toward another. But someone constitutes the equality of justice by doing good, i.e., by rendering to another what is owed to him; and he conserves the equality of justice already constituted by declining from evil, i.e., by inflicting no harm upon the neighbor." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 72, a. 1.

The potential parts of justice, or the virtues annexed to it, are: religion, piety, observance, truth, gratitude, vindication, friendship, liberality. For these virtues are annexed to justice because they too in some way render what is owed according to equality. In some way; for since it belongs to justice to render what is owed according to equality, some of these fall short of the account of the equal, others of the account of what is owed. Religion, piety, and observance fall short of the account of rendering the equal, as is clear of itself. But truth, gratitude, vindication, liberality, and friendship fall short of the account of what is owed. For religion, piety, and observance cannot render worship and service to God, Parents, and Persons constituted in dignity according to equality. But the debt is deficient on the part of the one owing, in truth, so that namely man shows himself in words and deeds such as he is. Likewise the debt is deficient on the part of him to whom it is owed, in gratitude, by which someone recompenses another according to the things he has done in good things; and in vindication, by which another is recompensed according to the things he has done in evil things. Finally the debt is deficient in the account of the debt itself, in liberality and friendship, which are only toward a certain greater honorableness. For liberality renders us prompt to spend easily our things estimable by price, when right reason requires it; to this liberality avarice and prodigality are opposed. But friendship moderates our intercourse with neighbor, so that it may be pleasing to him, and such as according to right reason it ought to be. Likewise the debt is deficient in other things of this sort, which have little of the account of debt. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 80, a. 1.

Obedience is included in observance; for to preeminent persons there is owed both reverence of honor and obedience. In truth is included fidelity, through which the things said are done, as regards the observance of promises. But vengeance which is done by the authority of public power, according to the sentence of a judge, pertains to commutative justice; but vengeance which someone does by his own motion, not however against the law, or which someone requires from a judge, pertains to the virtue joined to justice. S. Th. 2. 2. l. c. ad 1, 3. Friendship or affability is a special virtue according to which "man is fittingly ordered to other men both in deeds and in words." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 114, a. 1. Flattery and quarrelsomeness are opposed to friendship. Flattery is a sin by which someone beyond the due mode of virtue wishes to delight others by words or deeds in common intercourse, with the intention of obtaining some advantage. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 115, a. 1. But quarrelsomeness, by which someone contradicts another because of defect of love toward the person speaking, is a species of discord contrary to charity; but that by which someone contradicts another rather in order to sadden him than to contradict him is especially opposed to the virtue of affability and friendship. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 116, a. 1.

Since justice renders what is owed according to equality, it of itself brings a precept, and injustice is opposed to justice, which falls short of rendering that debt and of preserving that equality. Justice and its various species are treated especially in the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, and tenth precepts of the Decalogue. But the other virtues annexed to justice are treated in the first, second, third, fourth, and eighth precepts of the Decalogue. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 122.

What order especially is to be observed among neighbors? The order to be observed in charity regards both the love itself, and the goods, and the persons. - As to love, one must attend whether it is a love merely appreciative and of simple complacency and joy concerning goods possessed, which is followed by worship, honor, reverence; or a love of efficacious benevolence and mercy by exterior work, by which we will and procure for another goods not yet possessed. - As to persons, there must be attended both the comparison to God, according to which some are more excellent and better than others, and the comparison to us, according to which some are more joined to us than others; but with ourselves we do not have conjunction, but unity and identity. As to goods, some are more excellent than others and more necessary, as was already declared in n. 389. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, aa. 7, 9, 11, 12.

First, by the love of simple complacency, the better are to be loved more. - "Among neighbors, we ought to love more the better and those more closely related." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 44, a. 8 ad 2. For since "the principle of love is God and the one loving himself, it is necessary that according to greater nearness to either of these principles, the affection of love be greater." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 6. - Hence by appreciative love of simple complacency and joy, parents are to be loved more than children or wife, benefactors more than those benefited; for the former have a greater likeness with God, the common parent and benefactor of all, and are more closely joined with God, the chief object of charity. By the other love of beneficence and mercy, those more closely joined are to be loved more. "It must be said that from this very fact that it is said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, it is consequently given to be understood that those who are more near are to be loved more." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 44, a. 8 ad 3. If the intensity of love is considered, "those who are more near to himself a man loves with more intense affection toward that good to which he loves them, than better persons toward a greater good." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7. For every movement has intensity of speed from the disposition of the movable thing and the power of the mover. S. Th. ibid.

If conjunction with God and conjunction with us are considered at the same time, "some neighbors are near to us according to natural origin, from which they cannot depart, because according to it they are what they are. But the goodness of virtue, according to which some approach God, can come and recede, increase and diminish; and therefore from charity I can will that this person, who is joined to me, be better than another, and thus be able to arrive at a greater degree of blessedness." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7. "But there is also another mode by which we love more from charity those more joined to us, because we love them in more ways. For toward those who are not joined to us we have only the friendship of charity; but toward those who are joined to us we have certain other friendships, according to the mode of their conjunction to us. But since the good upon which any other honorable friendship is founded is ordered as to an end to the good upon which charity is founded, it follows that charity commands the act of any other friendship." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7.

For there are various friendships of men: the supernatural friendship of charity is founded upon communication of supernatural goods; other friendships are founded upon communication of particular goods. All these friendships can be subordinated to the first. Hence the same Angelic Doctor, 2. 2. q. 103, a. 3 ad 2, says: "The reason of loving neighbor is God. And therefore the charity by which God and neighbor are loved is the same. Nevertheless there are other friendships different from charity, according to other accounts by which men are loved." Therefore, other things being equal, by love of benevolence and desire, by which we will and wish for another a good not yet possessed, which beneficence follows by doing good, those who are more joined to us are to be loved more as to those goods which are owed to such conjunction. The reason is that communication of goods is the foundation of friendship and charity. And thus in those things which pertain to nature we ought to love blood relatives more; in matters pertaining to civil communication, our fellow citizens; in military matters, fellow soldiers ought to be preferred to others. But in spiritual helps greater account is to be had of those who are judged our sons, fathers, or brothers according to the spirit. Nevertheless not improbably carnal parents, even in spiritual matters, are to be preferred, partly because their conjunction with us is founded also in these things; partly because carnal conjunction, the foundation and basis of other conjunctions, is by its own nature prior and more stable, while other conjunctions supervene upon it and can be removed, as S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 8, warns. But the grace of charity does not destroy the inclination of nature, but perfects it and directs it to a supernatural end. S. Th. l. c., a. 7. And what has been said of parents ought by the same reason to be said of children and carnal brothers, in comparison with spiritual sons or brothers.

Finally in goods pertaining to nature and to conserving bodily life, help must be given, other things being equal: 1. to one's wife, because she is one flesh with the husband; 2. to children, for whom by natural right parents are more obliged to provide than conversely; for children ought not lay up treasure for parents, but parents for children, says the Apostle, 2 Cor. 12:14, and teaches S. Th., a. 9; 3. to parents, but more to the father than the mother, because he obtains the more excellent account of principle, S. Th., a. 10; indeed, in a case of extreme necessity, S. Th., a. 9, 11 ad 3; q. 31, a. 3 ad 4, thinks that parents must be helped before all others, even wife and one's own children, since they were the cause and principle of our existing; therefore equity demands that in extreme necessity, by freeing them from destruction, we repay as much; 4. to brothers, sisters; 5. to other blood relatives; 6. to benefactors, friends. Other things being equal; for to a distinguished benefactor or friend, for example, help must be given by the law of charity rather than to a blood relative not very near or not well deserving of us. Similarly it seems that spiritual brothers must be helped more, even in temporal goods, than relatives not very near, since spiritual conjunction excels carnal conjunction.

There is indeed no order on the part of the good which we wish for the neighbor through supernatural charity, if generally such good is considered according to itself. "As to this we love all men equally from charity, because we wish for all the same good in genus, namely eternal blessedness." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 6 ad 1. Yet if the aforesaid good is considered according to the diverse participations of blessedness, we ought from charity to will a greater good to those who are nearer to God. "And this pertains to charity, that it wills the justice of God to be preserved, according to which the better participate more perfectly in blessedness." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7.

But if necessary good is attended to, other things being equal, those are to be loved more, and indeed with efficacious love, who are in greater necessity. For since the obligation of this efficacious charity is not except by reason of necessity, it is clear that generally the greater necessity obliges more. But since a greater or lesser obligation also depends on greater or lesser conjunction, and there are diverse degrees both of need and of nearness, no universal rule can be determined for all cases as to whom help should be given more. Therefore this requires the judgment of a prudent person. And thus, generally, a stranger in grave spiritual necessity must be helped rather than a blood relative in grave temporal necessity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26; q. 31, a. 3; q. 32, a. 9; q. 44, aa. 7, 8; q. 64, a. 6 ad 2; L. 27.

Is it licit to serve prostitutes or concubinarians? Is it licit for Catholics to attend civil funerals? R. To the first. Negatively, per se and ordinarily speaking, both because of the scandal of others and also because of the greatest danger of falling. Therefore those cases which are to be excepted in practice will have to be judged from the degree of necessity and the circumstances of persons, removing scandal and proximate danger of sinning. R. To the second. Affirmatively, per se, because the homage is merely civil. Per accidens, by reason of scandal, it can easily be illicit.

What is sacrilege? - Sacrilege is the violation of a sacred thing, insofar as sacred; that is, of a thing dedicated to divine worship, taken not materially but formally, namely insofar as it is ordered to this worship. That is to say, for some action to be sacrilege, the thing must be violated in that by which it is sacred. Whence if someone speaks badly about someone who has a vow of chastity, his detraction does not assume the nature of formal sacrilege, because that person is sacred to God only as to bodily purity, but not as to integrity of reputation. Moreover, only that thing is properly judged sacred which is not sacred in just any way, or dedicated to divine worship in just any way, but by public rite and divine or ecclesiastical institution, or by the power of the Church, has been deputed to the worship of God. Therefore it is not sufficient that a thing has been simply blessed, namely by a merely invocative blessing, by which we pray for the good of a thing or person; but a constitutive blessing is necessary, by which a thing from profane becomes sacred, as can be seen in holy water or blessed candles. Indeed, even more, a constitutive blessing is necessary by which a thing is consecrated uniquely and perpetually to divine worship; and this is properly consecration, as sacred vessels, churches, priests, clerics. And thus it is not illicit "to throw to dogs the bones of a lamb or eggs which are blessed... just as it is also licit to use holy water and candles for profane use." L. l. c., n. 94. By the blessing of these things only the special assistance of God is invoked concerning the use of those same things. La-Croix, l. c., n. 227; Struggl 9; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 76, a. 1; q. 99, aa. 1, 2; Cajetan on 2. 2, q. 88, a. 11; L. l. 6, n. 94.

Blessing is numbered among the sacramentals. It is an invocation of good: one merely invocative; another constitutive, by which a thing from profane becomes sacred; another constitutive and consecrative, by which a thing is destined uniquely and in perpetuity to divine worship. Blessings which are made without sacred oils are called verbal; those made with these employed are real, and are accustomed to be called consecrations. Real blessings, or consecrations, are of the episcopal order; of verbal blessings, some are of the episcopal order, others of the presbyteral. Some presbyteral blessings are parochial, such as the blessing of bridegroom and bride, the blessing of a ship, of houses on Holy Saturday. Which verbal presbyteral and episcopal blessings there are must be deduced from the Ritual, Pontifical, and Missal; but parochial blessings are those which bear before themselves some jurisdiction.

610. Notion. Vindication strictly taken is the avenging of an injury through some penal evil inflicted upon the sinner; or, more briefly, the return of penal evil for culpable evil. St. Augustine,¹⁰⁶⁷ following Cicero, defines the virtue of vindication as "the virtue through which violence or injury, and altogether everything that will be harmful, is repelled by defending or avenging." Just as gratitude returns to one's neighbor a good work received, so vindication compensates for an evil inflicted by one's neighbor. Vindication has two acts: one principal, namely, to avenge injuries committed; the other secondary, to prevent intended injuries.

Vindication is a special virtue. For where there is in man some natural inclination which can easily be deflected from the right way, a special virtue is necessary. Now man has a natural inclination to avenge injuries suffered and to defend himself against future injuries. This inclination can easily deviate either by excess or by defect. Therefore a virtue is necessary which restrains this inclination in the mean; and this virtue is vindication.

The motive for which vindication is taken must, however, be noted. For if someone takes vindication with the end that evil be inflicted upon the sinner, it is not a virtue but a sinful act of hatred; if someone takes vindication so that the evildoer may be amended, it is an act of charity, namely, of fraternal correction; if so that public tranquility may be preserved, it is an act of legal justice; if for the honor of God, it is an act of religion; if a judge or superior takes due vindication, it is an act of vindicative justice;¹⁰⁶⁸ finally, if a private man seeks vindication so that there may be some reparation for the injury committed and satisfaction of the injured party, it is an act of the virtue of vindication.

An act of vindication ordinarily cannot indeed be exercised by a private man, but by legitimate public authority, for no one can punish another unless he is his superior; nevertheless, if it is a question of lesser punishments, the permission of the legitimate superior can rightly be presumed, so that even a private man can take lawful vindication. Thus, for example, it does not appear unlawful to give a light slap to a boy who has inflicted some injury.

In practice it is rarely expedient that a private man take or seek vindication, because beneath the appearance of sought equity there often lies excessive self-love or, what is worse, hatred of one's neighbor. Hence vindication is customarily called a little virtue, and it is advised rather to forgive the offenses of one's neighbor than to punish them, unless, however, the charity of God or of one's neighbor, or the public good, demands reparation for the injury.

¹⁰⁶⁷ De diversis quaest. 83, q. 31 (Migne, Patr. lat. 40, 21). In the German language vindicatio can perhaps be called Ahndung zur gerechten Selbstbehauptung [punitive redress for just self-assertion].

¹⁰⁶⁸ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 80, a. un. ad 1.

611. Opposed vices. Two vices are opposed to the virtue of vindication: one by excess, namely, the vice of cruelty or savagery; the other by defect, namely, excessive leniency in punishing. Let him who desires more concerning the virtue of vindication consult St. Thomas¹⁰⁶⁹ or Billuart.¹⁰⁷⁰

¹⁰⁶⁹ Ib., q. 108.

¹⁰⁷⁰ De virt. iust. annexis diss. 3, a. 3.

VI. Concerning vengeance Berardi asks, Praxis confessariorum, n. 195: "When, whether in desire or in joy concerning the evil of the neighbor, or in avenging injuries received, will sin be present?

Resp. In practice the more common cases are the following.

1. If this is done from a cause not honorable or not at all reasonable, for example from envy, as Cain acted against innocent Abel..., or from impatience, weariness, and anger, as those act who wish death to their own querulous, tedious, sick relatives, etc.

2. If vengeance is... excessive: namely if between the injury received and the quantity of punishment inflicted or desired there is no proportion, for example by extending signs of indignation too long; by exceeding too much in rebukes, in blows, or in other deeds having the character of vengeance; by from the heart imprecating most grave evils, for example death, hell, etc., against him who has inflicted on you a damage not so grave.⁴

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, a. 2; q. 159, a. 1.

3. If vengeance is indeed just, but induces scandal of the little ones: for in this case care will have to be taken that, at least by explaining the matter, scandal be removed.

4. If one wishes vengeance to be done by private authority, even in those cases in which this is altogether not lawful, namely a) if it can be obtained by means of tribunals; b) if it is too great; c) if it is useless, namely if it is no longer apt to protect our rights, but rather to provoke new injuries and to effect that discords and suits never have an end, as too frequently happens in practice.

5. If vengeance is done or sought either from profound hatred, or from an end not so much of obtaining reparation and protection of one's own rights, as of delighting oneself concerning the punishment of the neighbor. Moreover this is wicked. St. Thomas said⁵ that vengeance indeed is lawful, but not with the intention of harming; truly, with the intention of removing harms. It is also to be noted that delight concerning the punishment of the neighbor can degenerate into cruelty and savagery."⁶

⁵ II-II, q. 108, a. 3.

⁶ Ibid., q. 159, a. 2.

S. Th. II-II, q. 108.

881. Vindication (strafvaardigheid) in the strict sense is the infliction of some penal evil for sin. It is illicit if the intention of the one vindicating is principally borne toward the evil of him from whom he takes vengeance and rests there: for this is hatred; but if it is principally borne toward some good at which one arrives through the punishment of the sinner, for example, toward the amendment of the sinner, or his restraint and the quiet of others, and toward the preservation of justice and the honor of God, it can be licit, because punishment is deservedly assigned to the evildoer; nevertheless it will not be licit in fact unless other due circumstances are observed, namely, that vindication be made by public authority and according to the measure of the delict.

882. A special virtue of vindication is given. - For to any natural inclination whatever which is to be duly ruled there is ordained a special virtue; but there is in man a natural inclination to defend himself against injuries, lest they be brought upon him, or to avenge injuries already brought upon him, not indeed with the intention of harming but of removing harms; therefore, that it may duly go forth into act, it must be directed by some virtue, by which man preserves due measure in vindicating.

Moreover this has a special object: for it seeks punishment precisely so that the order of justice may be preserved or restored, for example, so that there may be reparation of injury and satisfaction of the injured party. It has two acts: one principal, to avenge; the other secondary, to prevent injuries. Hence it is defined by St. Augustine, De div. quaest. 83, q. 31, from Tully: The virtue by which force or injury, and in general everything which is going to be, is repelled by defending or avenging.

Moreover that virtue is present not only in superiors but also in private persons: for although they cannot exercise vengeance by themselves, they ought nevertheless to desire it, not from hatred, but from an honorable end, not greater nor otherwise to be inflicted than is fitting.

But as Cajetan remarks, this is the difference between a public and a private person, that a public person is bound by a legal debt to vindicate injuries brought upon those committed to him, but a private person is bound only by a moral debt to vindicate an injury brought upon himself: for he cannot be compelled to avenge himself, but a judge can be compelled to exercise vindication.

Hence the virtue of vindication, which is also present in private persons, is not justice properly so called but its potential part. But insofar as it pertains to a public person, vindication is an act of justice itself. As it is exercised by a public person on account of the common good, it pertains to legal justice; by reason of form, insofar as it inflicts punishments proportionately to delicts, to distributive justice; by reason of matter, to commutative justice, while it renders an equal debt to someone according to quantity.

883. Two vices are opposed to vindication: one by excess, cruelty or savagery, which exceeds measure in punishing; the other by defect, when someone is too remiss in punishing (Prov. XIII, 24).

VINDICATION is defined by D. Bonavent. 3. part. Centil. sect. 44. and in the declaratorio terminorum Theologiae: Vindication is the virtue by which force, or injury, and absolutely everything that would harm, is repelled by defending, or avenging. Or: It is the virtue by which everything unjust is repelled and duly punished.

HENCE certain conditions are required, that a vindication be good.

THE FIRST is, that the intention be good, not resting in the evil from which vengeance is taken; for that would be to be overcome by evil, against the Apostle, Rom. 12. but it is necessary that the mind of the avenger be carried principally toward the good to come from the punishment of the sinner, namely, either for the amendment, or at least for the restraint of the sinner himself, and the quiet of others, the preservation of peace, and the honor of God, as D. Thom. teaches, art. 1.

THE SECOND condition is, that vengeance, properly so called, be done by one having power, which only a superior is, as is had in Rom. 13. For he is God's minister: an avenger in wrath upon him who does evil. as D. Thom. says, quaest. 108. art. 1. ad 1.

THE THIRD is, that it be done according to the order of law and due moderation, lest the punishment exceed the fault.

VINDICATION can be done through any kinds of punishments defined by the laws. So D. Thom. art. 3. The reason is, because vindication is licit insofar as it tends to restrain evils; but men are restrained from sinning insofar as they fear to lose things they love more than what they gain by sinning; otherwise fear would not check sin. Whence it comes that vengeance for sin must be taken by the subtraction of all that a man loves most, such as life, possessions, etc.

BUT S. Thom. warns, art. 1. ad 5. and art. 3. ad 1. that when the whole multitude sins, it is to be punished, either as to the whole sinful body, yet so that the good are not swept up in it; or as to a part, as the Saintly Doctor reports in Bibliis pauperum, cap. 105.

THEREFORE vindication of sins is a principal part of justice. So S. Thom. art. 2. D. Bonavent. in the places cited, from M. Tullius lib. 2. de Inventione.

YET Suarez opusc. ult. sect. 5. and others deny that vindicative justice is a special virtue.