Question Two: On Vindication

S. Th. II-II, q. 108.

881. Vindication (strafvaardigheid) in the strict sense is the infliction of some penal evil for sin. It is illicit if the intention of the one vindicating is principally borne toward the evil of him from whom he takes vengeance and rests there: for this is hatred; but if it is principally borne toward some good at which one arrives through the punishment of the sinner, for example, toward the amendment of the sinner, or his restraint and the quiet of others, and toward the preservation of justice and the honor of God, it can be licit, because punishment is deservedly assigned to the evildoer; nevertheless it will not be licit in fact unless other due circumstances are observed, namely, that vindication be made by public authority and according to the measure of the delict.

882. A special virtue of vindication is given. - For to any natural inclination whatever which is to be duly ruled there is ordained a special virtue; but there is in man a natural inclination to defend himself against injuries, lest they be brought upon him, or to avenge injuries already brought upon him, not indeed with the intention of harming but of removing harms; therefore, that it may duly go forth into act, it must be directed by some virtue, by which man preserves due measure in vindicating.

Moreover this has a special object: for it seeks punishment precisely so that the order of justice may be preserved or restored, for example, so that there may be reparation of injury and satisfaction of the injured party. It has two acts: one principal, to avenge; the other secondary, to prevent injuries. Hence it is defined by St. Augustine, De div. quaest. 83, q. 31, from Tully: The virtue by which force or injury, and in general everything which is going to be, is repelled by defending or avenging.

Moreover that virtue is present not only in superiors but also in private persons: for although they cannot exercise vengeance by themselves, they ought nevertheless to desire it, not from hatred, but from an honorable end, not greater nor otherwise to be inflicted than is fitting.

But as Cajetan remarks, this is the difference between a public and a private person, that a public person is bound by a legal debt to vindicate injuries brought upon those committed to him, but a private person is bound only by a moral debt to vindicate an injury brought upon himself: for he cannot be compelled to avenge himself, but a judge can be compelled to exercise vindication.

Hence the virtue of vindication, which is also present in private persons, is not justice properly so called but its potential part. But insofar as it pertains to a public person, vindication is an act of justice itself. As it is exercised by a public person on account of the common good, it pertains to legal justice; by reason of form, insofar as it inflicts punishments proportionately to delicts, to distributive justice; by reason of matter, to commutative justice, while it renders an equal debt to someone according to quantity.

883. Two vices are opposed to vindication: one by excess, cruelty or savagery, which exceeds measure in punishing; the other by defect, when someone is too remiss in punishing (Prov. XIII, 24).