The Virtue of Penance

215. Notion. 1. Penance in general signifies sorrow concerning some thing previously committed by oneself. Penance as a virtue signifies sorrow concerning sin previously committed by oneself. General and special penance are distinguished. He elicits general penance who sorrows for sin from the motive of some virtue having relation to God; and he elicits special penance who sorrows for sin from the particular motive of the virtue of penance.

Sorrow concerning a committed sin can proceed either from the peculiar motive of the virtue of penance, or from the motive of some other virtue. Now of these virtues some have relation to God himself, because their motive is the good of God, such as charity, hope, religion, obedience, gratitude; others do not have relation (at least immediate relation) to God, because their motive is the good of rational nature, such as temperance, fortitude, truthfulness, commutative justice.

2. Penance insofar as it is a special virtue is defined: sorrow and detestation of a committed sin, insofar as it is an injury to God.

a. The virtue of penance taken fully and completely contains several acts in itself: alpha. hatred and detestation of sin, by which we will that this, as far as can be done, not be present or not have been done; beta. sorrow and sadness concerning the sin committed; gamma. the will of destroying sin in ourselves, and consequently of using the means necessary for this, namely confession, which is understood from the will of God to be necessary for destroying sins; delta. the will of satisfying God wounded by sin: for an offense and injury inflicted on another is followed by the obligation of satisfaction to be rendered freely by the offender; epsilon. the purpose of absolutely avoiding sins in the future.

b. The essence of the virtue of penance formally consists in detestation and sorrow. For true penance includes both acts: for a committed sin is apprehended as an evil in some way present, either insofar as it has not yet been fully destroyed as to guilt and punishment, or at least insofar as it is true that it was committed at some time. Now, as soon as the sinner apprehends the committed sin as an evil, an act of hatred (abhorrence), displeasure or detestation arises in the will; and because this evil is apprehended as present, in a will capable of sorrow there also arises at the same time sorrow and sadness, just as a good which is apprehended as present cannot be loved without joy arising concerning it.

c. True penance always implicitly contains the purpose of not sinning: for by the act of penance a man detests past sin; but since the same malice, on account of which he detests the past sin, is present also in future sin, he virtually detests future sin also. But if penance is conceived from a universal motive, by which a man detests every grave sin, in it there is likewise contained a universal purpose of committing no sin in the future. Therefore the Council of Trent says that contrition excludes the will of sinning, certainly also in the future.³

¹ St. Thomas, III, q. 84-90. Supplement, q. 1-28. St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 425-705. Suarez, De poenitentia, disp. I-XXXVIII. Lugo, De poenitentia, disp. I-XXVII. Sporer-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis sacramentalis, Pars III, De poenitentia. Coninck, De sacramentis, Tom. II, De poenitentia. Stoz, Tribunal poenitentiae. Elbel-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis, Vol. III, pars 9, De sacramento poenitentiae. Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theologicum morale, Vol. V, sect. 5, De sacram. poenit. Lehmkuhl, Theol. moralis, II, tr. 5.

² Cf. Coninck, De poenitentia, disp. 1.

³ Cf. sess. 14, c. 4, and sess. 6, c. 6.

216. Object of the virtue of penance. The material object of penance is sins committed by the penitent; the formal object is the malice of sin, which consists in an injury inflicted on God, and the honesty or goodness which is contained in repairing the injury brought upon God. For every sin is repugnant to divine authority and to the honor due to God, which honor the sinner has wounded by the greatest injury to God. And since the will cannot detest an evil unless it loves the good contrary to it, to the formal object of penance there also belongs the goodness which is contained in repairing the wounded honor of God.

In any sin there are diverse malices on account of which we can detest the sin: alpha. that it is against the will of God commanding and therefore disobedience; beta. that it is against the authority and honor of God and therefore an injury to God; gamma. that it is an evil of God and therefore an offense of God; delta. that it deprives us of eternal beatitude and constitutes us guilty of eternal punishment. Now he who detests sin because it is an injury to God exercises an act of the virtue of penance; he who detests it from another motive exercises another virtue, namely that from which the motive of detestation and sorrow has been taken.

217. When penance obliges. On a man existing in mortal sin there lies the obligation of turning himself to God through penance and of reconciling himself with offended God; this obligation Sacred Scripture intimates by these words: Be penitent and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out.¹ Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven has drawn near.²

1. The precept of penance is a special precept distinct from other precepts, so that the sinner not doing penance is damned not only because of the sin of which he has not repented, but also because of the sin of impenitence.

2. The precept of penance does not oblige immediately after mortal sin has been committed.

a. It is an affirmative precept, which does not oblige always, but only at a determinate time; but by no argument can it be demonstrated that this time is that which immediately follows the sin committed.

b. Moreover, if it obliged immediately, it would oblige at individual moments; therefore he who delays penance would commit a new sin at least as often as, adverting to the obligation, he does not repent. But this is opposed to the common sense of the faithful, who do not think that they sin because they are not converted immediately after a sin has been committed, but defer conversion to a time.

3. The precept of penance obliges of itself in death: for if on a sinful man there lies the obligation of doing penance and converting himself to God, this obligation certainly presses when it is necessary and no other time remains in which satisfaction can be made to it.

4. Those offend against the precept of penance who defer conversion for a notable time, much more until death. But how much this notable time is, beyond which penance and conversion cannot be deferred without sin, different authors determine differently. Probable, indeed more common, is the opinion which Laymann establishes, namely that he who satisfies the precept of annual confession does not defer penance beyond the licit time.³

a. Concina thinks that penance cannot be deferred beyond a week without sin. St. Alphonsus (n. 437) "does not altogether acquiesce" in the opinion which holds that he does not sin who does not defer penance beyond a year; but he judges that penance cannot be deferred beyond a month without sin. Nevertheless he grants that sinners, especially the unlearned, are ordinarily excused from the sin of delayed penance, because they scarcely ever advert to this obligation.

b. There are those who with St. Thomas⁴ say that the precept of penance of itself obliges only in death; and they demonstrate this affirmation by this argument: the obligation of this precept, as affirmative, must be restricted only to that time for which it is certain to us, and must not be extended to other times; but no time can be assigned within which the precept of penance obliges, except in death. But those who with Suarez⁵ extend this obligation also to other times confirm their opinion in this way: alpha. Sacred Scripture⁶ and the holy Fathers⁷ urge penance with most grave judgments and with one voice condemn too great a delay of conversion, especially until death. beta. It is judged to be mortal sin voluntarily to persist through one's whole life in enmity with God and to defer until death the compensation of the injury inflicted on God by mortal sin: for this manner of acting seems to involve contempt of God, especially since he by his grace warns and moves one to conversion.⁸ gamma. He who, turned away from God, lives in the state of mortal sin is lacking in his primary obligation of tending to the ultimate end and of working his salvation; but it seems incredible that a man can without sin neglect this obligation for a long time, indeed through his whole life. Less efficacious for this end is the argument taken from this, that a man can die at any moment of time.

¹ Acts 3:19.

² Matt. 4:17. Cf. Ezech. 18:30; Rom. 2:5.

³ Laymann, De poenitentia, c. 2, n. 6.

⁴ Cf. II-II, q. 14, a. 2; yet the holy doctor himself deduces the necessity of penance outside danger of death from another head, namely from the obligation of avoiding mortal sin, which cannot be avoided for long in the state of sin. Cf. I-II, q. 109, a. 8.

⁵ Suarez, disp. 15, sect. 6, n. 2 ff.

⁶ Cf. Rom. 2:4, 5; Eccl. 5:8, 9.

⁷ Cf. Suarez, disp. 15, sect. 6, n. 3.

⁸ Lugo, disp. 7, n. 234.

I. Notion of Penance. Penance, as regards the etymology of the name, signifies the same as poenae tenentia, a holding of punishment, "for he who truly repents does nothing else," says St. Augustine,¹ "except that he does not allow what he has done badly to be unpunished." It is suitably defined: a moral virtue inclining man to the destruction of his own past sin, insofar as it is an offense against God (St. Thomas, III, q. 85, a. 2). It is said:

1. To the destruction of his own past sin. By these words is indicated the material object of the virtue of penance.

2. Insofar as it is an offense against God. This indicates the specific reason under which the virtue of penance considers sin, and thus it is distinguished both from charity, which destroys sin as opposed to the friendship of God, and from religion, which considers sin as opposed to divine worship.

¹ Epistula 153, c. 3, n. 6.

II. Object of Penance. 1. The remote material object is every personal sin, even one remitted. It is said:

a) Sin, so that imperfections may be excluded; for these are acts morally good in species and in the individual, in which God is pleased. Therefore they do not contain an offense against God. If someone grieves over imperfections, he rather elicits acts of charity, since he grieves that by his acts he has not pleased God more perfectly.

b) Personal, so that both original sin and another's sin may be excluded, since neither can be an object of the virtue of penance. Not original sin: "for contrition is sorrow regarding and in some way breaking down the hardness of the will. And therefore it can be only concerning those sins which come into us from the hardness of our own will" (St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 2, a. 2). Now original sin was not brought in by our will, and therefore there can be no contrition over it, but only displeasure. Nor can another's sin be its object. For sin cannot be expiated unless reconciliation with God is had, and therefore the subjection of the offender himself with respect to God, whom he has offended. Therefore a virtue which regards sin as expiable through satisfaction cannot be occupied around another's sin.¹ Hence the Holy Office, on July 15, 1893, deservedly condemned the following expressions: "the penitent Heart of Jesus"; "Jesus penitent for us," etc.,² since on the one hand Christ is wholly impeccable, and therefore neither had nor could have a sin of His own, and on the other hand no one can repent of another's sins.

c) Every, whether it is mortal or venial, whether remitted or not remitted. Mortal sin is nevertheless the primary object of this virtue, since it is an offense simply; venial sin is secondary, since it is only an offense in a certain respect. But even if sin, both as to guilt and also as to temporal punishment, has been entirely destroyed, nevertheless it remains the material object of penance. For since penance falls short on the part of equality, and therefore no creature can repair according to equality the injury inflicted on God through mortal sin, penance can always be performed concerning mortal sins, even those already remitted, since they always remain expiable through satisfaction. Indeed, although more probably we can satisfy according to equality for venial sins,³ nevertheless they too, even with their remission and satisfaction according to equality being supposed, remain the remote material object of the virtue of penance, since this satisfaction has the aforesaid value from grace and is made through acts which are already owed to God under other titles. Hence it never has equality by the rigor of justice,⁴ and therefore venial sins always remain expiable through more abundant satisfaction.⁵

Corollary I. Although penance primarily and of itself is occupied around sin already actually committed, since only that is actually repairable or expiable, nevertheless secondarily it also attains future sin as something to be avoided, since true penance concerning past sins must include a purpose of avoiding future sins.⁶

Corollary II. Because penance tends remotely toward sin insofar as it is expiable through satisfaction, but proximately toward the acts by which the injury inflicted on God is repaired, the evil of punishment which the penitent embraces for satisfying for sins also pertains to the remote material object of the same virtue.⁷

The proximate material object of penance is its acts, whether elicited or commanded. The principal elicited acts are sorrow, detestation, and the purpose of not sinning any more; the commanded acts are all those acts of other virtues which the penitent places from the motive of penance, or which he directs to expiating the offense.

2. The remote formal object of penance is the divine right injured as to be repaired through satisfaction; the proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in repairing through satisfaction the injured divine right.

¹ Cf. Salmanticenses, De poenitentia, disp. 2, n. 63 sq. (p. 410 sqq.).

² Acta Sanctae Sedis, t. 26, p. 319.

³ Cf. Salmanticenses, De poenitentia, disp. 1, dub. 5, nn. 129-133 inclusive (t. 19, pp. 88-91 inclusive).

⁴ Cf. Salmanticenses, cited place, disp. 5, dub. 4, nn. 133-134 (t. 19, pp. 463-465 inclusive).

⁵ Cf. Billuart, De poenitentia, d. 2, a. 1, "dico 3. Si dicas"; Lugo, De poenitentia, d. 3, s. 1, n. 15.

⁶ Cf. Gonet, d. 2, a. 2, § 3; Salmanticenses, cited place, disp. 5, dub. 2, n. 40 (pp. 393-394).

⁷ Salmanticenses, De poenitentia, disp. 5, dub. 4, nn. 133-134.

III. Subject of Penance. 1. The subject by which is the will. For the acts of penance, since they are occupied around a debt toward God to be restored, are consummated by the will through a voluntary and free conversion to God and aversion from sin; hence the virtue too must inhere in the will.

2. The subject which and total of the virtue of penance is all just men who have at some time sinned, or are capable of sinning. For insofar as it is an infused moral virtue, it is only in the just, as was said above; but insofar as it is penance, it is only in those who are capable of its acts, since every virtue is given for the sake of acts. Such are only the just men mentioned above, since the sin of angels is irremissible, or not expiable through satisfaction, on account of the intrinsic inflexibility of free choice after deliberate election, by which it happens that they adhere immovably to the object once chosen (cf. St. Thomas, I, q. 64, a. 2; De malo, a. 5).¹ But penance, as was said above, is occupied around sin as expiable through satisfaction (cf. St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 16, a. 3).²

Hence it follows: 1. that Christ, as intrinsically impeccable, always lacked this virtue; 2. that probably the Blessed Virgin Mary similarly lacked it, since before all ages she was predestined to the fullness of graces by which impeccability belonged to her perpetually, and therefore the virtue of penance would have been given superfluously to this sweetest Mother of God and of us;³ 3. that the Blessed possess this virtue, even when they never sinned, as, for example, little children who died after Baptism. For God, as was said above, preserves all virtues in the Blessed, provided they are and insofar as they are compossible with their state. Nevertheless this virtue, as St. Thomas teaches, "will not have the same act which it now has, but another, namely to give thanks to God for mercy forgiving sins" (Supplement, q. 16, a. 2);⁴ 4. that the first parents had this virtue already before the fall.⁵

¹ Salmanticenses, De angelis, disp. 13 (t. 4, p. 764 sqq.).

² Salmanticenses, Commentary on III, q. 85, a. 4, n. 8 (t. 19, pp. 646-647).

³ Cf. Billuart, De poenitentia, d. 2, a. 2, inferes 2. Others admit the contrary opinion, because the Blessed Virgin is not, as Christ is, impeccable by her nature. Thus, for example, Salmanticenses, Commentary on III, q. 89, a. 4, n. 9 (t. 19, p. 647).

⁴ Cf. Billuart, cited place, dico 2; Salmanticenses, cited place, n. 10 (pp. 647-648).

⁵ Cf. Salmanticenses, cited place, n. 10 (p. 648).

IV. Necessity of Penance. 1. The habit of penance, or habitual penance, is necessary by necessity of means for salvation. The reason is that it is indivisibly connected with sanctifying grace, which is required for salvation by an absolute necessity.

2. The act of penance, or actual penance: a) In this economy of salvation it is necessary by necessity of means for all who have sinned mortally. I say in this economy of salvation, since it seems that it must be affirmed that even mortal sin absolutely can be pardoned without actual penance being prerequired on the part of the sinner. I say further who have sinned mortally, because venial sin, even if it is not remitted on this earth without at least an implicit act of penance, can also be remitted in the other life.

The proposition understood in this way is established from the Council of Trent,¹ and is abundantly clear from many places of Sacred Scripture.² It is confirmed by reason, since it is altogether fitting that the offender not obtain pardon from the offended one except by means of compensation for the injury inflicted, as by a necessary means.

Nevertheless, all concede that actual penance which is included in the act of perfect charity suffices for those who are forgetful of mortal sin. Whether or not the same virtual or implicit penance also suffices for those who have mortal sin in memory is disputed by authors. Perhaps it is more fittingly said that the case in which someone, mindful of grave sin and eliciting an act of perfect charity, does not also place an explicit act of penance, is hypothetical, since from a soul so disposed an explicit act of penance follows of itself. That an explicit act of penance is required in the sacrament of penance will be proved in its own place.

b) It is necessary by necessity of precept; for this, besides following from necessity of means, is taught in express words of Sacred Scripture.³

¹ Session 14, chapter 1.

² Ezek. 18:21; Luke 13:5.

³ Matt. 3:2; Acts 2:38.

V. Opposed Vices. Apart from positive law, the one sin opposed to penance is: not willing to repair the injury inflicted on God through sin. Delaying penance is not opposed to the virtue of penance, but to another virtue, for example to charity owed to oneself. I said apart from positive law, because positive law and precept are sometimes made from the motive of penance; in that case transgression contains a sin opposed to penance.

The virtue of penance is a habit inclining man to the destruction of his own past sin, insofar as it is an offense against God (St. Thomas, part 3, question 85, article 2). Moreover:

The remote material object is every personal sin, even one remitted. The proximate material object is its acts, whether elicited or commanded. The chief elicited acts are detestation, sorrow, and the purpose of not sinning further; the commanded acts are all those acts of other virtues which the penitent performs from the motive of penance, or which he directs to expiating the offense.

The remote formal object is the violated divine right as to be repaired by satisfaction; but the proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in repairing, by satisfaction, the violated divine right.

Corollary I. Penance is a special virtue. "The species of habits," says Aquinas, "are distinguished according to the species of acts; and therefore, where a special praiseworthy act occurs, there it is necessary to posit a special habit of virtue. But it is manifest that in penance there is found a special aspect of a praiseworthy act, namely, to work for the destruction of past sin, insofar as it is an offense against God, which does not belong to the aspect of another virtue. Hence it is necessary to posit that penance is a special virtue" (part 3, question 85, article 2).

Corollary II. The special virtue of penance is a potential part of the cardinal virtue of justice; or, in other words, it participates in the nature of justice, yet is not perfect justice. The former is clear from the fact that justice regards those things which are owed to another (vol. I, n. 755). But penance regards the reparation of an offense owed to another, that is, to God. The latter follows from the fact that perfect justice renders what is owed according to equality (vol. I, n. 755). But man cannot render according to equality the reparation of the offense owed to God.

The Virtue of Repentance.—This virtue is a gift of God and a permanent habit of the soul, but there are certain acts by which man cooperates with God and prepares himself for the gift. Sometimes a sinner is converted through consideration of God’s goodness or of the rewards of heaven; but usually those who have been drawn by sinful delights are first deterred from them by the thought of God’s justice, and amendment begins from fear. Faith, hope, fear and love, at least virtually, are always found in the process of turning to God, and usually they follow one another in that process in the order here given. (a) The beginning of conversion is with God who draws the heart: “Convert us to Thee, O Lord, and we shall be converted” (Lament, v. 21). (b) Then follows the movement of faith, for he that would come to God must first believe that He is (Heb., xi. 6). (c) Next follow servile fear, which removes one from sin, and hope, which leads one to God, for faith holds out both threats of punishment and promises of mercy. (d) Then come the movements of love, which detests sin for its own sake, and of filial fear, which offers satisfaction to God out of reverence.

Repentance.—Repentance may be defined as “a moral virtue that inclines the will of one who is subject to sin to grieve over it and to make reparation to God for the injury it does to His rights.”

(a) Thus, repentance has its remote subject in one who is subject to sin, that is, in a person who has sinned or who is able to sin. Hence, it is not in Christ, who is impeccable, nor in the holy Angels, whose wills are fixed in good; but it is found in the Saints, inasmuch as their former sin is displeasing to them and their former contrition and satisfaction pleasing.

(b) The proximate subject of repentance is the will, for its acts of regret, resolution, and reparation belong to the higher appetitive faculty, Hence, repentance does not consist in emotional sorrow, and it does not need to be sensibly felt or joined with tears.

(c) The formal object or motive of repentance is reparation to Goal for the injury done Him by one’s own personal sin. Sin may be considered as opposed to the divine goodness, and in this respect it is detested by charity; or as opposed to the good of man himself, and so hope detests it; or as opposed to the moral goodness of some particular virtue, and in this respect it is hated by that virtue, as temperance shuns intemperance; or as opposed to the right which belongs to God, the Last End, that all actions be done for Him, and in this respect sin is considered by repentance. One may regret original sin or sins done by others, but one is not properly said to repent of them.

(d) The material object or subject-matter of repentance is the acts by which reparation is made to God, namely, grief over sin and its accompaniments, hatred of moral wickedness in the present, regrets for the past, and good resolutions for the future. Thus, repentance differs from religion, for religion looks upon God as Lord and Benefactor and offers Him worship, while repentance considers Him as the Last End who has been offended and offers Him satisfaction. The difference between filial fear and repentance is seen in this, that the former falls back upon its own littleness, whereas the latter throws itself at the feet of God.

The Character of Repentance.—(a) It is a virtue, since it is commanded (“Do penance,” Matt., iii. 2), and also since it moderates according to reason the sorrow felt for sin, keeping it from the extreme of despair, lest it become the remorse of a Cain or a Judas.

(b) It is a moral virtue, since its direct object is the human acts by which reparation is made to God, and its office the regulation of those acts within the bounds of moderation.

(c) It belongs to justice, being a compensation offered for injury to another’s right; but it is only a potential part of justice, as there is not perfect justice between an inferior and the superior to whose power the former is subject (2142). It is classed under commutative justice on account of the return that is offered for the offense;

The Excellence of Repentance.—(a) Its Dignity.—Repentance ranks below other virtues, for, while they are naturally advantageous to man, repentance is beneficial only hypothetically, namely, in the supposition of sin. In one respect, however, it holds a certain preeminence, for the infused virtues are bestowed only in justification, whereas the acts of repentance that prepare for justification come before those virtues.

(b) Its Necessity.—In the actual providence of God no mortal sin is remitted unless it be first repented of, and hence it is said: “Unless you do penance, you shall all likewise perish” (Luke, xiii. 5). This is reasonable, since it is fitting that he who has turned away from God by his own act, should also return to God by his own act. As to venial sin, since it consists in an inordinate cleaving to created things and must be removed by its contrary, there is need of an actual rejection of the exaggerated attachment, and hence need of repentance; moreover, since one should be restored to God’s friendship before being restored to His familiarity, penitence in regard to a venial sin does not avail, unless the penitent is in the state of grace. The act of repentance need not be formal (i.e., one in which a person expressly thinks of his sins and expressly detests them), but a virtual act suffices, that is, an act of love of God which implicitly includes repentance, though the latter is not expressly taken into consideration.

Is Repentance Necessary as a Means or as a Precept?—(a) It is necessary as a means of salvation because, if it be omitted, salvation cannot be attained. God desires that the sinner assist in and consent to his own forgiveness, and repentance, as we saw, is the most suitable way in which the sinner can do this. (b) It is also necessary as a precept. The natural law requires that those who have done an injury, make reparation; the divine law calls on sinners to repent and be converted to God (Acts, ii. 38, iii. 19, viii. 22), and the church law prescribes annual confession.

How Soon Does the Precept of Repentance Oblige?—(a) It obliges at once (i.e., without any delay), when there is immediate necessity for it. This happens per se, when one is in grave danger of death, for at that moment one is bound to prepare immediately to meet God, which supposes repentance. It happens per accidens, when by reason of some urgent precept distinct from that of repentance one is obligated here and now to rid oneself of sin (e.g., when one is called on to administer a Sacrament and must have a pure conscience, or when one is gravely tempted and will surely fall unless one repents of the past).

(b) It obliges soon (i.e., without any unreasonable delay), when there is no immediate necessity. It is not a new sin to put off repentance until tomorrow or next week in such a case; for the commandment of repentance, being affirmative, does not bind for each instant, but only for a reasonable time. But the common opinion is that a new sin is committed when repentance is delayed for a considerable time, since this exposes the sinner to further sins, impenitence, and damnation. Practically, it seems that those who comply with the church law of yearly confession commit no sin of unrepentance, though some consider it a mortal sin to delay repentance beyond a month.

Accompaniments of Repentance as to Mortal Sin.—(a) When one mortal sin is forgiven, every other mortal sin is forgiven at the same time. For no one can be truly repentant unless he grieves over his separation from God, and this means that he grieves over each individual mortal sin. But, since venial sin does not separate from God, it is possible to be sorry for one venial sin without being sorry for another.

(b) When mortal sin is forgiven, the eternal punishment is also forgiven, for forgiveness makes man a friend of God and an heir to heaven. But the temporal punishment may remain due, as is proved by the examples of Adam (Gen., iii. 23; Wisd., x. 2), of Mary, the sister of Moses (Num., xii.), of Moses (Num., xx. 12), of David (II Kings, xii. 13, 14), and of others. God is not only a merciful Father, but also a just Ruler, and it is fitting that He should exact satisfaction even for sin forgiven. But if repentance is very perfect like that of Magdalen and St. Paul, even the temporal punishment is forgiven.

The Fruits of Repentance.—(a) Every sin, no matter how grievous, is removed by repentance (Is., i. 18), and hence there is always room for forgiveness. For man is always able to repent and God is always ready to pardon the penitent (Joel, ii. 13). The unpardonable sin is refusal to repent of sin, if one continues in that refusal, but even impenitence is forgiven when laid aside (see 900).

(b) Sin once forgiven does not return, for God does not regret His gifts (Rom, xi. 29), and His pardon means that the guilt of a sin is destroyed and wiped out forever, But he who falls into the same sins after pardon increases his guilt by reason of his ingratitude.

(c) The repentant sinner recovers the infused virtues he lost by sin and also his former merits (Luke, XV. 22; Joel, ii. 25; Ezech., xxxiii. 12; Heb., vi. 10). Virginity of body and innocence of soul are not recovered as to their material elements (i.e., bodily integrity and freedom from all sin), but they are restored as to their formal part, which is the resolve to abstain from all venereal pleasure or to avoid all sin. It seems that former merits are also recovered, not necessarily in their entirety, but in a degree that corresponds with the greater or less excellence of repentance.

Forgiveness of Sin through the Use of the Sacraments.—(a) Mortal sins are forgiven by the Sacraments in virtue of the rite itself (ex opere operato) and immediately; that is, the Sacraments either per se or per accidens (according as they are Sacraments of the Dead or Sacraments of the Living) produce in the soul first grace or justification, which is the opposite of mortal sin.

(b) Venial sins are forgiven by the Sacraments in virtue of the rite itself but not immediately; that is, the Sacraments produce directly either first or second grace, and indirectly through this grace they may awaken fervor, which is the opposite of venial sin. The sacramentals, on the contrary, remit venial sins, not in virtue of the rite itself but in virtue of the intercession of the Church attached to the rite (ex opere operantis Ecclesiae); for the prayers of the Church are acceptable to God and can obtain from Him a grace of repentance that will remove venial sin.

412. Penance, considered generally, signifies the same as sorrow of soul, which anyone experiences after he has done or omitted something which he would wish not to have done or not to have omitted. But in the strict and proper sense, penance is sorrow of soul insofar as it is referred to God offended and hostile to us ¹.

¹ Take care to distinguish properly the twofold sense in which an offense against God is the formal object now of charity, now of penance; otherwise you may perhaps fall into the false doctrine which finds penance only where there is contrition perfected by charity. Cardinal De Lugo speaks well concerning these things: It is one thing, and a far different one, to detest sin because it is opposed to God, or because it is an evil of God, at least extrinsically, and because it displeases God, which pertains to charity; but it is another thing to detest sin because it offends God, or because it provokes God and turns Him away from man, which pertains to this other virtue of Penance.... For even among men these two things are distinguished, and I can be unwilling to offend another lest I reasonably render him averse to me, although otherwise I have no friendship with him nor desire to have it; for friendship tends to avoid his evil because it is his evil; but this other virtue tends formally to avoid an offense, not because it is his evil, but rather because it is evil and dishonorable for me to have another reasonably averse to me (On Penance, disp. 2, no. 52).

But he had previously explained the object of Penance more clearly thus (ibid., nos. 50-51): Even among men another virtue inclines one to remove an offense, which prohibits giving someone a sufficient and reasonable cause of indignation and aversion..., and inclines one also to remove it when it has been committed, by offering sufficient satisfaction through acts of service, through a petition for pardon, and other similar things according to the magnitude of the offense; for when this satisfaction has been made, the offense is extinguished. For if the offended person were harsh in accepting satisfaction, prudent men would nevertheless no longer judge him to remain reasonably averse, but entirely unreasonably so.... This being supposed, we say that there is another similar virtue of man toward God, which inclines one to have peace with God, or to avoid an offense against God and to remove it by every means when it has been committed. Its formal object is the goodness of peace with God, or not to have God averse and indignant. But since God is offended by all sins, this virtue hates all of them under that formal aspect, because they are offenses against God; and it endeavors to remove all of them, so that it may again have God pacified and appeased. And therefore it is called a reconciliatory virtue, because it tends to this, that it may reconcile to us the God who is averse.... But that this virtue is Penance is proved from the fact that, etc. And in this sense indeed the Author is to be understood when he presently adds that Penance is a moral virtue which inclines to the detestation of sin insofar as it is an offense against God, namely, insofar as it renders God averse and indignant toward us.

I. Penance, as a virtue, is defined: A moral virtue inclining to the detestation of sin insofar as it is an offense against God, and to an efficacious purpose of avoiding it in the future and of satisfying divine justice.

Penance is necessary for the sinner by a necessity of means for salvation. For in the present economy it is repugnant that an impenitent sinner be received by God into friendship.

It is also necessary by a necessity of divine precept, as is clear from many testimonies of Sacred Scripture, for example, Luke 13.5: Unless you do penance, you shall all likewise perish, etc.

The effect of penance ², however, is twofold: 1. the remission of sins, as is established from six hundred passages of Sacred Scripture; 2. the remission of eternal punishment. For a justified man cannot be liable to eternal punishment. This is also established from Trent, sess. 6, ch. 7.

² Understand this of perfect penance, namely, that which leads to those acts of service by which God Himself has revealed that, from His immense mercy, He is appeased and reconciled with sinful man.

II. Penance, as a Sacrament, is defined: A Sacrament of the new law instituted by Christ after the manner of a judgment, for remitting, through priestly absolution, to a contrite man who has confessed, sins committed after

Baptism.

This Sacrament differs from the others especially in this, that it is administered after the manner of a judgment; for there is present the penitent, at once the accused, witness, and accuser; and the Priest, the judge pronouncing sentence.

Definition. The virtue of penance is a supernatural habit whereby a man is rendered prompt to grieve over a sin committed insofar as it is an offense against God, with a purpose of amendment.⁴

⁴ Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol. 3, q. 85, aa. 1-3. St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 434) gives the following definition: "Penance is a virtue tending toward the destruction of sin, insofar as it is an offense against God, by means of sorrow and satisfaction."

307. Explanation. It is said, first: penance is a supernatural habit, because, although a man even by natural powers and on account of natural motives can repent of sins committed, nevertheless such penance is neither a perfect virtue nor does it destroy the stain of sin. Hence the Council of Trent⁵ defined: "If anyone says that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit and His assistance a man can ... repent as he ought, so that the grace of justification may be conferred upon him, let him be anathema." The same Council⁶ and, after it, the Roman Catechism⁷ teach that a man arrives at the true virtue of penance through five supernatural movements or degrees, namely, there is required:

a) An act of divine mercy moving and illuminating us, according to that saying: "Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted."⁸

b) An act of faith. For a man moved and illuminated by the merciful God must tend toward God through faith. For whoever wishes to approach God must believe that God exists and rewards human works.⁹

c) An act of fear. For a man, believing God to be the just avenger of crimes, is necessarily struck by fear of God angered and punishing.

d) An act of hope. For the sinner cannot approach God unless the hope of obtaining divine mercy and the remission of sins shines upon him.

e) An act of initial love. For a man believing in a God equally just and merciful is necessarily induced to love such a God. Moreover, no justification is possible for an adult man unless he wills to turn himself toward God and to be united with Him. Now such conversion and union include at least an imperfect act of love.

A man prepared by these five movements or degrees can elicit an act of true penance and thus be justified, his sins having been blotted out. Certainly it is not always required that these five movements or degrees be really distinct or separated before the act of true penance; but sometimes a man moved by divine grace elicits one formal act of penance which nevertheless virtually contains all the other requisites.

It is said, second: whereby a man is rendered prompt to grieve over a sin insofar as it is an offense against God. Therefore not every sorrow over sins committed is an act of the true virtue of penance, but only when sin is held in hatred as an offense against God; and therefore the formal object of penance is the offense or injury against God to be repaired. For example, sorrow over sins arising from the natural turpitude of sin or from its evil natural effects is not an act of true penance. It is not indeed necessary that the motive of penance be perfect love of God, but it is required that it be referred to God in some manner; for example, temporal or eternal punishments are a sufficient motive, not indeed as they are in themselves, but as they are to be inflicted by divine justice.

Finally it is said, third: with a purpose of amendment, because true sorrow for sin includes detestation of the past and a purpose of amendment for the future.

⁵ Session 6, can. 3, On Justification (Denz., n. 813).

⁶ Ibid., c. 6 (Denz., n. 798).

⁷ Part 2, c. 5, q. 7.

⁸ Lam. 5:21.

⁹ Cf. Heb. 11:6.

308. Acts of penance. From what has been said, it follows that several acts are contained in the virtue of penance, namely: a) hatred and detestation of sin; b) sorrow over the offense inflicted upon God; c) the will to destroy sin in us; d) the will to make satisfaction to God who has been injured; e) the will to avoid future sin. Commonly, however, only three acts included in penance are assigned: sorrow, detestation, and purpose.

309. The proximate subject of penance is the will.

For penance is a potential part of justice, which resides in the will, as was stated above, II, n. 70. Although other faculties of the soul concur in the act of penance, for example, memory represents the sin committed and its malice, and sorrow is sometimes felt in the body, nevertheless it belongs to the will to elicit and command the act of penance; and therefore the faithful are not to be disturbed if, when eliciting contrition, they do not sensibly perceive sorrow, as they say; for acts of the will are not always felt in the body.

310. The remote subject of penance is every man guilty of sin or at least capable of it.

Since penance is an infused virtue, it is in all who are in the state of sanctifying grace and who have sinned or at least can sin. Therefore it is also in baptized infants. In Gehenna there is no true penance, because true virtue does not exist there; but in heaven the virtue of penance remains in the blessed, insofar as they have displeasure over sins formerly committed and joy over the satisfaction rendered. Neither Christ nor probably the Blessed Virgin has the virtue of penance properly so called, since they were not capable of any sin.¹⁰

¹⁰ Cf. Billuart, De poenit., diss. 2, a. 2. Hence the Holy Office on July 5, 1893, deservedly proscribed the following formulas: "Penitent Heart of Jesus, penitent Jesus, Jesus doing penance for us."

311. The material object of penance is any actual personal sin insofar as it injures divine justice and accordingly demands satisfaction.

Hence penance properly concerns neither original sin nor the sins of others, because no one can retract anything except that which was done by his own personal will. In a broader sense, however, insofar as penance signifies detestation, someone can repent of all sins, just as Christ Himself also detested all sins. In this broader sense Christ can be said to have had the virtue of penance.

312. The formal object of penance is an expiable offense against God, or the divine right injured and reparable through satisfaction.

Penance therefore does not regard God as He is the supreme lovable good or as He is worthy of the highest worship, but as He is the supreme lord over all human actions, which therefore must be done according to His good pleasure. The sinner injures this right. The penitent repairs the same right. If these things are kept before the eyes, it is easily understood why St. Thomas and theologians commonly teach that penance is a special virtue, and not something intrinsically composite or a quality annexed to every virtue. For since penance has a special material and formal object, it must be a special virtue. St. Thomas¹¹ writes most rightly: "Penance, although it is directly a species of justice, nevertheless in some manner comprehends those things which pertain to all the virtues." Perhaps in no other virtue does the connection of all the virtues shine forth as it does in perfect penance. A truly penitent man exercises all the other virtues. Wherefore it is also easily understood why many truly penitent sinners, both men and women, arrived at great sanctity. The Angelic Doctor treats excellently of the virtue of penance in several articles of the Summa theologica, 3, q. 85.

¹¹ S. theol. 3, q. 85, a. 3 ad 4.

313. Necessity of the virtue of penance. Penance, either within or outside the sacrament, is necessary for all sinners by a necessity both of means and of precept.

a) Necessity of means. St. Thomas¹² says: "It is impossible for an actual mortal sin to be remitted without penance, speaking of penance which is a virtue"; and the Council of Trent¹³ defined: "Penance was necessary at every time for all men who had defiled themselves with some mortal sin in order to attain grace and justice." The Savior said: "Unless you do penance, you shall all likewise perish."¹⁴ The reason, however, is that mortal sin is essentially an aversion from God. Now this aversion must be destroyed through conversion to God or through detestation of sin, which is certainly penance. Cf., however, below, n. 346.

b) Necessity of precept. Penance is commanded by natural law, divine law, and ecclesiastical law alike. Natural law requires that injured justice be repaired. But sin injures justice by violating the honor due to God. The reparation of justice injured in this manner is made through penance. That penance is also necessary by a necessity of divine precept is evident from several texts of Sacred Scripture, for example: "Do penance, and be baptized every one of you.... Be penitent, therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out."¹⁵ "Do penance therefore for this thy wickedness, and pray to God, that perhaps this thought of thy heart may be forgiven thee."¹⁶ Ecclesiastical law prescribing annual confession also commands penance.

¹² Ibid., q. 86, a. 2.

¹³ Session 14, c. 1, On Penance (Denz., n. 894).

¹⁴ Luke 13:5.

¹⁵ Acts 2:38 and 3:19.

¹⁶ Acts 8:22.

314. You will ask: When does the precept of penance oblige?

Theologians do not agree. The following things seem to be admitted: The precept of penance obliges per se and per accidens.

It obliges per accidens whenever some precept urges which cannot be fulfilled without true penance, for example, if a priest existing in the state of mortal sin must administer some sacrament, or if someone cannot otherwise overcome a grave temptation.

The precept of penance obliges per se at the moment of death or in grave danger of death, because then a sinful man must obtain the remission of sin; but it does not oblige immediately after sin has been committed. For although it is greatly to be counseled that a man repent as quickly as possible after sin has been committed, nevertheless neither natural law nor positive law contains a clear precept of this kind. Hence St. Thomas¹⁷ says: "It is not of the necessity of bodily salvation that medicine be sought immediately, except when the necessity of a cure presses; and it is similar with spiritual illness." The reason, however, is that the precept of penance is an affirmative precept which does not oblige at every time, but at a determinate time. Moreover, if someone were held under grave sin to repent immediately, then he would sin gravely as often as, while thinking about an obligation of this kind, he deferred penance, which certainly is asserted gratuitously and is taught by no one in practice.

Nevertheless, a notable delay of penance is a special and mortal sin. Thus holds the truer opinion against Cajetan, Durandus, and a few others. It seems at least that penance cannot be deferred beyond a year, since the precept of the Church concerning annual confession does not seem to anticipate the natural and divine obligation of penance. St. Alphonsus¹⁸ does not altogether acquiesce in this opinion, saying: "For the space of a year seems sufficiently notable to me that one who remains in mortal sin for so long a time could avoid the danger of easily relapsing into other sins. Nor is it valid to say that the Church determined the period of a year indiscriminately for all; for the Church determined this period only for the obligation of confession, but not of penance. I do not deny, however, that sinners, especially the uneducated, can for the most part, indeed almost always, be excused from this sin of delayed penance because of inadvertence." Since, therefore, the Holy Doctor almost always excuses sinners from the grave special obligation of doing penance within a year, let the confessor indeed strongly counsel frequent penance, but let him not condemn for a special mortal sin those who have deferred penance until annual confession.

¹⁷ In IV Sent., dist. 17, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 4 ad 2.

¹⁸ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 437.

315. Scholion. On resipiscence insufficient for penance. Luther taught that true penance is nothing other than resipiscence toward a good life. Against this error the Council of Trent¹⁹ declares "that this contrition contains not only cessation from sin and the purpose and beginning of a new life, but also hatred of the old life." And in truth, he who considers the cries of the penitent Psalmist and the Prophet, for example: "I have labored in my groaning; every night I will wash my bed,"²⁰ and: "I will recount to Thee all my years in the bitterness of my soul,"²¹ easily understands that they flowed from a certain vehement hatred of the life previously led and an immense detestation of sins. Wherefore St. Gregory aptly says: "To do penance is both to bewail the evils committed and not to commit the things that must be bewailed."²²

¹⁹ Session 14, c. 4, On Penance (Denz., n. 897).

²⁰ Ps. 6:7.

²¹ Isa. 38:15.

²² Book 2, Homily 34 on the Gospels, n. 15 (Migne, Patr. lat. 76, 1256).

S. Th. III, q. 85, a. 1-3.

395. Penance according to the name. - According to some, penance is said from poenam tenere, to hold punishment, or to be held by the punishment of that which has been committed, because it imposes punishment for sin; according to others, from pene or penitus, because it designates something inward which greatly affects the heart.

In the more general sense it signifies:

a) in the broadest sense, weariness or displeasure at anything whatever, even that which does not depend on our will, as for example old age, and thus especially it is a passion;

b) in a less broad sense, sorrow or retraction of a past will, whether it was good or evil, and a change of counsel;

c) more strictly, sorrow and retraction concerning an evil act on account of the evil effects which have followed, for example imprisonment or dishonor.

In a similar way the Greek word metanoia, which etymologically is resipiscence, a change of mind, a retraction of a prior will.

In the strictest and theological sense it is sorrow of the soul concerning sin committed, conceived on account of God; this can be considered in act and in habit.

Penance considered in act (boete) can be defined with St. Thomas, a. 1: moderate sorrow concerning past sins, insofar as they are an offense of God, with the intention of removing them.

The sorrow is called moderate, i.e., according to right reason and not excessive, casting into despair; but it is with hope of pardon and the intention of removing sins, and therefore with a firm purpose of amendment and satisfaction.

Considered in habit, penance (boetvaardigheid) is the habit by which the penitent assumes this sorrow; it can be defined: the virtue by which a man grieves concerning sin committed insofar as it is an offense of God, or a habit inclining to repair the injury inflicted upon God through sin, as Billuart has it.¹

¹ Diss. 2, art. 1. - There is no place for distinguishing between offense and injury, as we did in sins against the neighbor (I, n. 891, in note): for every offense of God is also an injury, because God has the highest right to all our acts, and therefore every sin wounds the right of God and is an injury.

396. Penance is a virtue. - For virtue is an elective habit according to right reason. But through penance a man deliberately grieves concerning sins committed, insofar as they are an offense of God, with the purpose of amendment,1 which is according to right reason. Therefore.

"Virtue," says St. Thomas, "is an elective habit according to right reason. But it pertains to right reason that someone grieve a) concerning that about which one must grieve, b) and in that mode, and c) for the end for which one must grieve. This indeed is observed concerning penance of which we now speak; for the penitent assumes a) moderate sorrow b) concerning past sins c) with the intention of removing them. Whence it is manifest that penance of which we now speak either is a virtue or an act of virtue" (a. 1). And therefore a precept is given concerning it (Mt. IV, 17; Luke XIII, 3; XXIV, 45-47; Acts II, 38).

It is a special virtue, because it has a special object or an uprightness of special reason: the offense of God as to be repaired and moral equality with God as to be restored, or the debt of reparation toward God. For the injury of God, on account of His singular excellence, is of a special disorder; therefore there is present a special debt of reparation.

"The species of habits," says St. Thomas, "are distinguished according to the species of acts, and therefore where a special reason of a praiseworthy act occurs, there it is necessary to posit a special habit of virtue. But it is manifest that in penance there is found a special reason of a praiseworthy act, namely, to work for the destruction of past sin, insofar as it is an offense of God, which does not pertain to the reason of another virtue" (a. 2).

Likewise, there is a special virtue where a special reason of a difficult act occurs. But in penance there is present a great and special difficulty, both from the fact that man removes sin to which he voluntarily adheres, and in which he has already been delighted, and from the fact that he exercises vengeance against himself unto the punishment of himself. Whence it is necessary to posit that penance is a special virtue. Hence a special precept is given concerning penance.

It is one virtue, because it has one object: for it considers all sins and grieves concerning them under one reason, insofar as they are offenses of God to be repaired.

Although each virtue has a formal motive from which sorrow concerning the sin opposed to it can arise, for example justice the motive of preserving equality, chastity moderation in delectation, charity the divine good, from the love of which a man grieves concerning the wounding of justice, chastity, or charity; nevertheless there is a certain special virtue distinct from all these, which by one and the same act grieves concerning all sins, not insofar as each one is opposed to diverse virtues, but under the special reason insofar as they are an offense of God which demands reparation: "insofar namely as they are amendable through the act of man cooperating with God toward his justification" (a. 2, ad 2).

It is a virtue connected with justice, a certain species of commutative justice. For this is toward another with a certain exchange, and inclines to rendering to each one his own strict right unto equality: but it is strictly owed to God that an offense committed against Him be repaired by the guilty one, either unwillingly or spontaneously, which is a certain exchange. But penance impels to this, that it be repaired spontaneously. Therefore penance is a certain species of commutative justice. Whence it is said by Cajetan, in a. 4: "A virtue rendering to God His right for sin committed against Him."

Nevertheless it is not a properly so-called and strict species of justice, as Durandus used to say, but justice in a certain respect and imperfectly, or a potential part of commutative justice. For this requires strict right which is between equals. Penance is not between equals, since man is constituted under the power of God. Whence also he cannot render unto perfect equality, both because he does not render as much as he owes, since an infinite offense is not adequately compensated by finite satisfaction: indeed penance subjects the creature to God, but sin subjects God to the creature; and because he renders from the goods of God Himself, and something already owed under several other titles. And therefore penance falls short of the perfect reason of justice and is analogically reduced to commutative justice, like observance, piety, and religion (a. 3, and ad 2).

397. Observation. - All the aforesaid things are not to be understood of penance which is a passion of the sensitive appetite and does not pertain to reason; but of penance of the will, which is with election and pertains to reason: it retracts past sin, not from an intention of striving for this, that what was done had not been done, - this would be foolish, - but with the intention of removing the consequence of it, namely, the guilt of fault and the debt of punishment (q. 84, a. 9, ad 2 and 3; q. 85, a. 1, and ad 2 and 3).

1. The purpose of amendment or emendation is the intention of removing sins, whether past or future.

S. Th. III, q. 84, a. 2; q. 85, a. 2 and ad 2; a. 3 and ad 1 and 2; q. 90, a. 1 and ad 3.

398. The proper object of Penance is a special good, which consists in rendering the right of due reparation for an offense or injury of God, and in restoring equality with God. But in this one object three things can be distinguished:

1° The material object, or that which penance intends and does, the matter about which it is concerned: these are the acts by which sin is repaired. Many distinguish this as proximate and remote: they say the remote object is any personal sin whatever as offensive to God and wounding the right of God, as to be removed and destroyed, blotted out and repaired; the proximate object is all actions by which due reparation is exhibited and sin is removed and repaired. "The matter of penance," says St. Thomas, q. 85, a. 3, ad 1, "is human acts by which God is offended or appeased."

2° The primary material object (others call it the formal quod), which penance principally, of itself, and by reason of itself intends and does in our acts, is the divine right wounded as repairable through some compensation; or the imperfect equality due between our reparation and the right of God to it, by which equality the reparation is proportioned, - according to the possibility of our weakness and the kindness of divine mercy, - to the right of reparation which is owed to God.

3° The formal object quo, or the proximate motive on account of which we render to God the debt of reparation and restore equality, is the special uprightness which shines forth in the restoration of wounded equality and the reparation of divine right: for we will to render to God the debt of reparation and thus to restore equality between us and God because this is good.

God, insofar as by reason of the offense there is for Him the right and debt that He be appeased by reparation, is not the matter of penance or the object which penance immediately attains, but only the end to whom reparation is made and the debt of violated right is rendered, or He to whom penance is ordered (a. 3, ad 1). Similarly, the title of right in God is not the proximate motive, but only the remote foundation why reparation is due and to be rendered.

From this it is understood that penance does not proximately intend the destruction of sin and of the offense of God from the motive of divine goodness: that is the office of charity; but precisely on account of the special uprightness of the act by which the injury inflicted upon God is compensated, although nevertheless this can proceed mediately and be commanded from the act and motive of charity. Hence it follows that the proper object of penance:

1. is not the destruction, detestation, or displeasure at sin absolutely, namely, insofar as it is dishonorable and evil; for a motive of this kind is either too common, since any virtue whatsoever strives to destroy the evil acts opposed to it,1 or, if it is special, sin is considered as opposed to the appetite of the last end or to the love of God, whether imperfect love of concupiscence or perfect love of friendship and charity;

2. nor is it, at least directly, to preserve the divine right uninjured, for this pertains either to the object of charity, or at once to all the other virtues, to which, just as it belongs to follow the straight guidance of reason, so it belongs to flee the evil opposed to them; by this the right of God is preserved uninjured;

3. much less is it the good of peace with God, or having God again appeased and at peace, as some have said after De Lugo, citing St. Thomas, in IV Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3, ad ult.: "just as it belongs to some virtue that man appease him whom he has offended, so it belongs to some virtue that man appease God whom he has offended by sinning." - For a) the good of peace is rather the end of the virtue than the object; it is the effect following satisfaction exhibited: "It must be said that in this which he says, that penance reconciles to God, the relation of penance to its object is not touched, but rather to its end. But its order to the object is touched in this, that it is said to weep over sins committed," ibid. qc. 4, ad 1. The object, namely, is the expiation of sin; the end is God to be reconciled. Moreover b) this is intended from another virtue: if the sinner for his own sake intends pardon and wills God appeased and at peace, it will be love of concupiscence and of the virtue of hope; if he wills this for God's sake, it will be love of friendship and charity.

399. The remote object of penance. - From what has been said, it is also understood that the remote material object, about which penance is concerned, is all actions which offend God and wound the divine right, and those things which concur toward this, namely:

1. properly and principally, actual mortal sins, which fully offend God and render one perfectly turned away;

2. properly and secondarily, venial sins, which also in some way offend God and render Him indignant, because they participate in the reason of offense;

3. likewise sins already remitted, both because their remission is not infallibly established, and so that we may exhibit a more perfect retraction and more abundant satisfaction; whence it is said Ps. L, 4: Wash me yet more from my iniquity...;

4. but not original sin, because that is not properly retracted nor removed by one's own act except what was perpetrated by one's own will; nevertheless there can be penance concerning it broadly taken for any detestation whatever of a past thing;

5. nor a fortiori the sins of others, as such, although penance is to be done concerning culpable cooperation toward them;

6. nor mere imperfections, unless perhaps indirectly insofar as by impeding the more abundant help of God they dispose toward fault, or insofar as they arise from fault and include it (cf. q. 84, a. 2, ad 3; suppl., q. 2, a. 2 and 3; q. 16, a. 3).

400. Corollary. - Hence, by reason of the end, there are distinguished three diverse species of acts of penance (which are called subjective parts), namely: penance before Baptism, penance for mortal sins, penance for venial sins: "It pertains to penance that it detest past sins with the purpose of changing life for the better, which is, as it were, the end of penance. And because moral things receive species according to the end..., it is fitting that diverse species of penance be taken according to the diverse changes which the penitent intends. But there is a threefold change intended by the penitent: the first indeed through generation into a new life, and this pertains to penance which is before Baptism; the second is through the reformation of a past life already corrupted, and this pertains to penance for mortal sins after Baptism; but the third change is into a more perfect operation of life, and this pertains to penance for venial sins, which are remitted through some fervent act of charity" q. 90, a. 4.

IV. Penance is a true virtue. Since those things which are commanded by God pertain to virtue. But penance is frequently commanded by God, Matthew 3: Do penance. … Bring forth fruit worthy of penance. Again, Luke 6: Do penance. See St. Thomas, III, q. 85, art. 1.