Article — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Article First. On the virtue of penance.
215. Notion. 1. Penance in general signifies sorrow concerning some thing previously committed by oneself. Penance as a virtue signifies sorrow concerning sin previously committed by oneself. General and special penance are distinguished. He elicits general penance who sorrows for sin from the motive of some virtue having relation to God; and he elicits special penance who sorrows for sin from the particular motive of the virtue of penance.
Sorrow concerning a committed sin can proceed either from the peculiar motive of the virtue of penance, or from the motive of some other virtue. Now of these virtues some have relation to God himself, because their motive is the good of God, such as charity, hope, religion, obedience, gratitude; others do not have relation (at least immediate relation) to God, because their motive is the good of rational nature, such as temperance, fortitude, truthfulness, commutative justice.
- Penance insofar as it is a special virtue is defined: sorrow and detestation of a committed sin, insofar as it is an injury to God.
a. The virtue of penance taken fully and completely contains several acts in itself: alpha. hatred and detestation of sin, by which we will that this, as far as can be done, not be present or not have been done; beta. sorrow and sadness concerning the sin committed; gamma. the will of destroying sin in ourselves, and consequently of using the means necessary for this, namely confession, which is understood from the will of God to be necessary for destroying sins; delta. the will of satisfying God wounded by sin: for an offense and injury inflicted on another is followed by the obligation of satisfaction to be rendered freely by the offender; epsilon. the purpose of absolutely avoiding sins in the future.
b. The essence of the virtue of penance formally consists in detestation and sorrow. For true penance includes both acts: for a committed sin is apprehended as an evil in some way present, either insofar as it has not yet been fully destroyed as to guilt and punishment, or at least insofar as it is true that it was committed at some time. Now, as soon as the sinner apprehends the committed sin as an evil, an act of hatred (abhorrence), displeasure or detestation arises in the will; and because this evil is apprehended as present, in a will capable of sorrow there also arises at the same time sorrow and sadness, just as a good which is apprehended as present cannot be loved without joy arising concerning it.
c. True penance always implicitly contains the purpose of not sinning: for by the act of penance a man detests past sin; but since the same malice, on account of which he detests the past sin, is present also in future sin, he virtually detests future sin also. But if penance is conceived from a universal motive, by which a man detests every grave sin, in it there is likewise contained a universal purpose of committing no sin in the future. Therefore the Council of Trent says that contrition excludes the will of sinning, certainly also in the future.3
1 St. Thomas, III, q. 84-90. Supplement, q. 1-28. St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 425-705. Suarez, De poenitentia, disp. I-XXXVIII. Lugo, De poenitentia, disp. I-XXVII. Sporer-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis sacramentalis, Pars III, De poenitentia. Coninck, De sacramentis, Tom. II, De poenitentia. Stoz, Tribunal poenitentiae. Elbel-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis, Vol. III, pars 9, De sacramento poenitentiae. Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theologicum morale, Vol. V, sect. 5, De sacram. poenit. Lehmkuhl, Theol. moralis, II, tr. 5.
2 Cf. Coninck, De poenitentia, disp. 1.
216. Object of the virtue of penance. The material object of penance is sins committed by the penitent; the formal object is the malice of sin, which consists in an injury inflicted on God, and the honesty or goodness which is contained in repairing the injury brought upon God. For every sin is repugnant to divine authority and to the honor due to God, which honor the sinner has wounded by the greatest injury to God. And since the will cannot detest an evil unless it loves the good contrary to it, to the formal object of penance there also belongs the goodness which is contained in repairing the wounded honor of God.
In any sin there are diverse malices on account of which we can detest the sin: alpha. that it is against the will of God commanding and therefore disobedience; beta. that it is against the authority and honor of God and therefore an injury to God; gamma. that it is an evil of God and therefore an offense of God; delta. that it deprives us of eternal beatitude and constitutes us guilty of eternal punishment. Now he who detests sin because it is an injury to God exercises an act of the virtue of penance; he who detests it from another motive exercises another virtue, namely that from which the motive of detestation and sorrow has been taken.
217. When penance obliges. On a man existing in mortal sin there lies the obligation of turning himself to God through penance and of reconciling himself with offended God; this obligation Sacred Scripture intimates by these words: Be penitent and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out.1 Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven has drawn near.2
The precept of penance is a special precept distinct from other precepts, so that the sinner not doing penance is damned not only because of the sin of which he has not repented, but also because of the sin of impenitence.
The precept of penance does not oblige immediately after mortal sin has been committed.
a. It is an affirmative precept, which does not oblige always, but only at a determinate time; but by no argument can it be demonstrated that this time is that which immediately follows the sin committed.
b. Moreover, if it obliged immediately, it would oblige at individual moments; therefore he who delays penance would commit a new sin at least as often as, adverting to the obligation, he does not repent. But this is opposed to the common sense of the faithful, who do not think that they sin because they are not converted immediately after a sin has been committed, but defer conversion to a time.
The precept of penance obliges of itself in death: for if on a sinful man there lies the obligation of doing penance and converting himself to God, this obligation certainly presses when it is necessary and no other time remains in which satisfaction can be made to it.
Those offend against the precept of penance who defer conversion for a notable time, much more until death. But how much this notable time is, beyond which penance and conversion cannot be deferred without sin, different authors determine differently. Probable, indeed more common, is the opinion which Laymann establishes, namely that he who satisfies the precept of annual confession does not defer penance beyond the licit time.3
a. Concina thinks that penance cannot be deferred beyond a week without sin. St. Alphonsus (n. 437) "does not altogether acquiesce" in the opinion which holds that he does not sin who does not defer penance beyond a year; but he judges that penance cannot be deferred beyond a month without sin. Nevertheless he grants that sinners, especially the unlearned, are ordinarily excused from the sin of delayed penance, because they scarcely ever advert to this obligation.
b. There are those who with St. Thomas4 say that the precept of penance of itself obliges only in death; and they demonstrate this affirmation by this argument: the obligation of this precept, as affirmative, must be restricted only to that time for which it is certain to us, and must not be extended to other times; but no time can be assigned within which the precept of penance obliges, except in death. But those who with Suarez5 extend this obligation also to other times confirm their opinion in this way: alpha. Sacred Scripture6 and the holy Fathers7 urge penance with most grave judgments and with one voice condemn too great a delay of conversion, especially until death. beta. It is judged to be mortal sin voluntarily to persist through one's whole life in enmity with God and to defer until death the compensation of the injury inflicted on God by mortal sin: for this manner of acting seems to involve contempt of God, especially since he by his grace warns and moves one to conversion.8 gamma. He who, turned away from God, lives in the state of mortal sin is lacking in his primary obligation of tending to the ultimate end and of working his salvation; but it seems incredible that a man can without sin neglect this obligation for a long time, indeed through his whole life. Less efficacious for this end is the argument taken from this, that a man can die at any moment of time.
1 Acts 3:19.
2 Matt. 4:17. Cf. Ezech. 18:30; Rom. 2:5.
3 Laymann, De poenitentia, c. 2, n. 6.
4 Cf. II-II, q. 14, a. 2; yet the holy doctor himself deduces the necessity of penance outside danger of death from another head, namely from the obligation of avoiding mortal sin, which cannot be avoided for long in the state of sin. Cf. I-II, q. 109, a. 8.
5 Suarez, disp. 15, sect. 6, n. 2 ff.
6 Cf. Rom. 2:4, 5; Eccl. 5:8, 9.
7 Cf. Suarez, disp. 15, sect. 6, n. 3.
8 Lugo, disp. 7, n. 234.