Article II: On the Object of Penance

S. Th. III, q. 84, a. 2; q. 85, a. 2 and ad 2; a. 3 and ad 1 and 2; q. 90, a. 1 and ad 3.

398. The proper object of Penance is a special good, which consists in rendering the right of due reparation for an offense or injury of God, and in restoring equality with God. But in this one object three things can be distinguished:

1° The material object, or that which penance intends and does, the matter about which it is concerned: these are the acts by which sin is repaired. Many distinguish this as proximate and remote: they say the remote object is any personal sin whatever as offensive to God and wounding the right of God, as to be removed and destroyed, blotted out and repaired; the proximate object is all actions by which due reparation is exhibited and sin is removed and repaired. "The matter of penance," says St. Thomas, q. 85, a. 3, ad 1, "is human acts by which God is offended or appeased."

2° The primary material object (others call it the formal quod), which penance principally, of itself, and by reason of itself intends and does in our acts, is the divine right wounded as repairable through some compensation; or the imperfect equality due between our reparation and the right of God to it, by which equality the reparation is proportioned, - according to the possibility of our weakness and the kindness of divine mercy, - to the right of reparation which is owed to God.

3° The formal object quo, or the proximate motive on account of which we render to God the debt of reparation and restore equality, is the special uprightness which shines forth in the restoration of wounded equality and the reparation of divine right: for we will to render to God the debt of reparation and thus to restore equality between us and God because this is good.

God, insofar as by reason of the offense there is for Him the right and debt that He be appeased by reparation, is not the matter of penance or the object which penance immediately attains, but only the end to whom reparation is made and the debt of violated right is rendered, or He to whom penance is ordered (a. 3, ad 1). Similarly, the title of right in God is not the proximate motive, but only the remote foundation why reparation is due and to be rendered.

From this it is understood that penance does not proximately intend the destruction of sin and of the offense of God from the motive of divine goodness: that is the office of charity; but precisely on account of the special uprightness of the act by which the injury inflicted upon God is compensated, although nevertheless this can proceed mediately and be commanded from the act and motive of charity. Hence it follows that the proper object of penance:

1. is not the destruction, detestation, or displeasure at sin absolutely, namely, insofar as it is dishonorable and evil; for a motive of this kind is either too common, since any virtue whatsoever strives to destroy the evil acts opposed to it,1 or, if it is special, sin is considered as opposed to the appetite of the last end or to the love of God, whether imperfect love of concupiscence or perfect love of friendship and charity;

2. nor is it, at least directly, to preserve the divine right uninjured, for this pertains either to the object of charity, or at once to all the other virtues, to which, just as it belongs to follow the straight guidance of reason, so it belongs to flee the evil opposed to them; by this the right of God is preserved uninjured;

3. much less is it the good of peace with God, or having God again appeased and at peace, as some have said after De Lugo, citing St. Thomas, in IV Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3, ad ult.: "just as it belongs to some virtue that man appease him whom he has offended, so it belongs to some virtue that man appease God whom he has offended by sinning." - For a) the good of peace is rather the end of the virtue than the object; it is the effect following satisfaction exhibited: "It must be said that in this which he says, that penance reconciles to God, the relation of penance to its object is not touched, but rather to its end. But its order to the object is touched in this, that it is said to weep over sins committed," ibid. qc. 4, ad 1. The object, namely, is the expiation of sin; the end is God to be reconciled. Moreover b) this is intended from another virtue: if the sinner for his own sake intends pardon and wills God appeased and at peace, it will be love of concupiscence and of the virtue of hope; if he wills this for God's sake, it will be love of friendship and charity.

399. The remote object of penance. - From what has been said, it is also understood that the remote material object, about which penance is concerned, is all actions which offend God and wound the divine right, and those things which concur toward this, namely:

1. properly and principally, actual mortal sins, which fully offend God and render one perfectly turned away;

2. properly and secondarily, venial sins, which also in some way offend God and render Him indignant, because they participate in the reason of offense;

3. likewise sins already remitted, both because their remission is not infallibly established, and so that we may exhibit a more perfect retraction and more abundant satisfaction; whence it is said Ps. L, 4: Wash me yet more from my iniquity...;

4. but not original sin, because that is not properly retracted nor removed by one's own act except what was perpetrated by one's own will; nevertheless there can be penance concerning it broadly taken for any detestation whatever of a past thing;

5. nor a fortiori the sins of others, as such, although penance is to be done concerning culpable cooperation toward them;

6. nor mere imperfections, unless perhaps indirectly insofar as by impeding the more abundant help of God they dispose toward fault, or insofar as they arise from fault and include it (cf. q. 84, a. 2, ad 3; suppl., q. 2, a. 2 and 3; q. 16, a. 3).

400. Corollary. - Hence, by reason of the end, there are distinguished three diverse species of acts of penance (which are called subjective parts), namely: penance before Baptism, penance for mortal sins, penance for venial sins: "It pertains to penance that it detest past sins with the purpose of changing life for the better, which is, as it were, the end of penance. And because moral things receive species according to the end..., it is fitting that diverse species of penance be taken according to the diverse changes which the penitent intends. But there is a threefold change intended by the penitent: the first indeed through generation into a new life, and this pertains to penance which is before Baptism; the second is through the reformation of a past life already corrupted, and this pertains to penance for mortal sins after Baptism; but the third change is into a more perfect operation of life, and this pertains to penance for venial sins, which are remitted through some fervent act of charity" q. 90, a. 4.

1. "Penance receives a special reason of object from this, that it regards sin committed by oneself and expiable through the act of the penitent; and thus the act of penance is not to detest sin absolutely, because this belongs to any virtue, but to detest something expiable through its actions, both as to fault and as to guilt of punishment: for no other virtue does this." St. Thomas, in IV, d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3.