Point II. On Penance

I. Notion of Penance. Penance, as regards the etymology of the name, signifies the same as poenae tenentia, a holding of punishment, "for he who truly repents does nothing else," says St. Augustine,¹ "except that he does not allow what he has done badly to be unpunished." It is suitably defined: a moral virtue inclining man to the destruction of his own past sin, insofar as it is an offense against God (St. Thomas, III, q. 85, a. 2). It is said:

1. To the destruction of his own past sin. By these words is indicated the material object of the virtue of penance.

2. Insofar as it is an offense against God. This indicates the specific reason under which the virtue of penance considers sin, and thus it is distinguished both from charity, which destroys sin as opposed to the friendship of God, and from religion, which considers sin as opposed to divine worship.

¹ Epistula 153, c. 3, n. 6.

II. Object of Penance. 1. The remote material object is every personal sin, even one remitted. It is said:

a) Sin, so that imperfections may be excluded; for these are acts morally good in species and in the individual, in which God is pleased. Therefore they do not contain an offense against God. If someone grieves over imperfections, he rather elicits acts of charity, since he grieves that by his acts he has not pleased God more perfectly.

b) Personal, so that both original sin and another's sin may be excluded, since neither can be an object of the virtue of penance. Not original sin: "for contrition is sorrow regarding and in some way breaking down the hardness of the will. And therefore it can be only concerning those sins which come into us from the hardness of our own will" (St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 2, a. 2). Now original sin was not brought in by our will, and therefore there can be no contrition over it, but only displeasure. Nor can another's sin be its object. For sin cannot be expiated unless reconciliation with God is had, and therefore the subjection of the offender himself with respect to God, whom he has offended. Therefore a virtue which regards sin as expiable through satisfaction cannot be occupied around another's sin.¹ Hence the Holy Office, on July 15, 1893, deservedly condemned the following expressions: "the penitent Heart of Jesus"; "Jesus penitent for us," etc.,² since on the one hand Christ is wholly impeccable, and therefore neither had nor could have a sin of His own, and on the other hand no one can repent of another's sins.

c) Every, whether it is mortal or venial, whether remitted or not remitted. Mortal sin is nevertheless the primary object of this virtue, since it is an offense simply; venial sin is secondary, since it is only an offense in a certain respect. But even if sin, both as to guilt and also as to temporal punishment, has been entirely destroyed, nevertheless it remains the material object of penance. For since penance falls short on the part of equality, and therefore no creature can repair according to equality the injury inflicted on God through mortal sin, penance can always be performed concerning mortal sins, even those already remitted, since they always remain expiable through satisfaction. Indeed, although more probably we can satisfy according to equality for venial sins,³ nevertheless they too, even with their remission and satisfaction according to equality being supposed, remain the remote material object of the virtue of penance, since this satisfaction has the aforesaid value from grace and is made through acts which are already owed to God under other titles. Hence it never has equality by the rigor of justice,⁴ and therefore venial sins always remain expiable through more abundant satisfaction.⁵

Corollary I. Although penance primarily and of itself is occupied around sin already actually committed, since only that is actually repairable or expiable, nevertheless secondarily it also attains future sin as something to be avoided, since true penance concerning past sins must include a purpose of avoiding future sins.⁶

Corollary II. Because penance tends remotely toward sin insofar as it is expiable through satisfaction, but proximately toward the acts by which the injury inflicted on God is repaired, the evil of punishment which the penitent embraces for satisfying for sins also pertains to the remote material object of the same virtue.⁷

The proximate material object of penance is its acts, whether elicited or commanded. The principal elicited acts are sorrow, detestation, and the purpose of not sinning any more; the commanded acts are all those acts of other virtues which the penitent places from the motive of penance, or which he directs to expiating the offense.

2. The remote formal object of penance is the divine right injured as to be repaired through satisfaction; the proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in repairing through satisfaction the injured divine right.

¹ Cf. Salmanticenses, De poenitentia, disp. 2, n. 63 sq. (p. 410 sqq.).

² Acta Sanctae Sedis, t. 26, p. 319.

³ Cf. Salmanticenses, De poenitentia, disp. 1, dub. 5, nn. 129-133 inclusive (t. 19, pp. 88-91 inclusive).

⁴ Cf. Salmanticenses, cited place, disp. 5, dub. 4, nn. 133-134 (t. 19, pp. 463-465 inclusive).

⁵ Cf. Billuart, De poenitentia, d. 2, a. 1, "dico 3. Si dicas"; Lugo, De poenitentia, d. 3, s. 1, n. 15.

⁶ Cf. Gonet, d. 2, a. 2, § 3; Salmanticenses, cited place, disp. 5, dub. 2, n. 40 (pp. 393-394).

⁷ Salmanticenses, De poenitentia, disp. 5, dub. 4, nn. 133-134.

III. Subject of Penance. 1. The subject by which is the will. For the acts of penance, since they are occupied around a debt toward God to be restored, are consummated by the will through a voluntary and free conversion to God and aversion from sin; hence the virtue too must inhere in the will.

2. The subject which and total of the virtue of penance is all just men who have at some time sinned, or are capable of sinning. For insofar as it is an infused moral virtue, it is only in the just, as was said above; but insofar as it is penance, it is only in those who are capable of its acts, since every virtue is given for the sake of acts. Such are only the just men mentioned above, since the sin of angels is irremissible, or not expiable through satisfaction, on account of the intrinsic inflexibility of free choice after deliberate election, by which it happens that they adhere immovably to the object once chosen (cf. St. Thomas, I, q. 64, a. 2; De malo, a. 5).¹ But penance, as was said above, is occupied around sin as expiable through satisfaction (cf. St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 16, a. 3).²

Hence it follows: 1. that Christ, as intrinsically impeccable, always lacked this virtue; 2. that probably the Blessed Virgin Mary similarly lacked it, since before all ages she was predestined to the fullness of graces by which impeccability belonged to her perpetually, and therefore the virtue of penance would have been given superfluously to this sweetest Mother of God and of us;³ 3. that the Blessed possess this virtue, even when they never sinned, as, for example, little children who died after Baptism. For God, as was said above, preserves all virtues in the Blessed, provided they are and insofar as they are compossible with their state. Nevertheless this virtue, as St. Thomas teaches, "will not have the same act which it now has, but another, namely to give thanks to God for mercy forgiving sins" (Supplement, q. 16, a. 2);⁴ 4. that the first parents had this virtue already before the fall.⁵

¹ Salmanticenses, De angelis, disp. 13 (t. 4, p. 764 sqq.).

² Salmanticenses, Commentary on III, q. 85, a. 4, n. 8 (t. 19, pp. 646-647).

³ Cf. Billuart, De poenitentia, d. 2, a. 2, inferes 2. Others admit the contrary opinion, because the Blessed Virgin is not, as Christ is, impeccable by her nature. Thus, for example, Salmanticenses, Commentary on III, q. 89, a. 4, n. 9 (t. 19, p. 647).

⁴ Cf. Billuart, cited place, dico 2; Salmanticenses, cited place, n. 10 (pp. 647-648).

⁵ Cf. Salmanticenses, cited place, n. 10 (p. 648).

IV. Necessity of Penance. 1. The habit of penance, or habitual penance, is necessary by necessity of means for salvation. The reason is that it is indivisibly connected with sanctifying grace, which is required for salvation by an absolute necessity.

2. The act of penance, or actual penance: a) In this economy of salvation it is necessary by necessity of means for all who have sinned mortally. I say in this economy of salvation, since it seems that it must be affirmed that even mortal sin absolutely can be pardoned without actual penance being prerequired on the part of the sinner. I say further who have sinned mortally, because venial sin, even if it is not remitted on this earth without at least an implicit act of penance, can also be remitted in the other life.

The proposition understood in this way is established from the Council of Trent,¹ and is abundantly clear from many places of Sacred Scripture.² It is confirmed by reason, since it is altogether fitting that the offender not obtain pardon from the offended one except by means of compensation for the injury inflicted, as by a necessary means.

Nevertheless, all concede that actual penance which is included in the act of perfect charity suffices for those who are forgetful of mortal sin. Whether or not the same virtual or implicit penance also suffices for those who have mortal sin in memory is disputed by authors. Perhaps it is more fittingly said that the case in which someone, mindful of grave sin and eliciting an act of perfect charity, does not also place an explicit act of penance, is hypothetical, since from a soul so disposed an explicit act of penance follows of itself. That an explicit act of penance is required in the sacrament of penance will be proved in its own place.

b) It is necessary by necessity of precept; for this, besides following from necessity of means, is taught in express words of Sacred Scripture.³

¹ Session 14, chapter 1.

² Ezek. 18:21; Luke 13:5.

³ Matt. 3:2; Acts 2:38.

V. Opposed Vices. Apart from positive law, the one sin opposed to penance is: not willing to repair the injury inflicted on God through sin. Delaying penance is not opposed to the virtue of penance, but to another virtue, for example to charity owed to oneself. I said apart from positive law, because positive law and precept are sometimes made from the motive of penance; in that case transgression contains a sin opposed to penance.