What makes an act human

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. I, Art. 2. Acts as Human, Introduction · Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. I, Art. 2. Acts as Human, Definition · Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. I, Art. 2. Acts as Human, Knowledge Requisite for a Human Act · Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. I, Art. 2. Acts as Human, Consent Requisite for a Human Act

THE Christian faith teaches that the end of human life is to know, love, and serve God. If a man fulfils this obligation faithfully till death, it further gives him the assured hope of eternal happiness with God in heaven. All our actions should be directed towards the end for which the whole man exists; if an action is such that it conduces to that end, it is a good, moral action; if, on the contrary, it does not conduce to that end, it is a bad, immoral action.

Not all man’s actions, however, are capable of being invested with this moral quality. There are many actions of man which have no more moral quality than the growth of a tree in the garden or the running of a dog in the street. Good or bad digestion is an operation to a great extent removed from man’s control; he is in general no more responsible for it than for the condition in which he was born. Or, if some immoral picture is suddenly thrust under his eyes, he cannot help seeing it. Such acts are neither moral nor immoral; they are neither capable of conducing to the end of moral human action, nor of diverting the agent from it: they merit neither praise nor blame.

n. 2.

A man is a good man morally if he performs well the good actions over which he has control; he is a bad man if he wilfully performs bad actions. So that the actions over which a man has control, the actions which he freely performs, are alone capable of making him a good or a bad man; they are the only actions of man which have a moral quality; they alone are treated of in moral theology. It is the task of moral theology to frame rules for human conduct according to the teaching of the Catholic Church, to decide what actions are good and what bad according to the principles of the Christian faith.

n. 3.

The actions over which a man has control are in a special sense called human if acts, because they are due to his free choice. That man has the power of free choice or free will, is clearly taught in Holy Scripture, and is a dogma of faith.¹ It is also a truth of sound philosophy,” vouched for by the consciousness of each individual and by the common sense of mankind. It does not belong to our province to prove the doctrine. We suppose that, at any rate in many of his daily actions, when all the conditions requisite for action are present, a man is free to act or not, to perform this action rather than that other. A man must indeed have a motive for action, but that motive does not constrain him to act; if he has the use and control of his reason, he may as long as he is in life perform or abstain from the action proposed to him. Man has the wonderful power, unique in all the visible creation, of directing his mental and bodily activity in this way or that according to his good pleasure; and it is this wonderful power which makes him a moral agent, and makes it worth while to discuss and formulate rules of human conduct. Man himself is the cause of his human acts; he freely directs them to the end of human existence, or to some perverse end of his own choice.

¹ Ecclus. xxxi 10; Trent, sess. 6, can. 5, 6.

n. 4.

This power of free choice is a property of the rational will, and is the natural complement of the deliberative reason with which man is also endowed. For among the various objects offered to the will’s acceptance, the reason can propose motives for the selection of one object rather than of another, and, at any rate in many actions, until the deliberation is finished, the will need not decide between them. If an object capable of satisfying all our desires were presented to us, there would indeed be no room for deliberation; as Dante expresses it: Such one becomes, admiring that blest Ray, That, whatsoever else allure the sight, Impossible it is to turn away; Because the one sole wished-for Good is there, A.d everything defective elsewhere found, In it is perfected beyond compare. Paradiso, xxxiii 100. Wright’s translation. In the presence of such an object, the whole man, with all the vehemence of his will made for good, would rush into the embrace of his God. For God alone is capable of wholly satisfying all man’s desires. Or again, if some object of ardent natural desire were suddenly thrust upon us, leaving no time for deliberation, overwhelming us with the idea of its power¹ to satisfy our appetite, it might be that no room was left for free choice, that we should be necessitated to action. There would be at least some indeliberate motion towards the object, a movement of the will which divines call motus primo-primus. If in such a case the power of deliberation is not altogether smothered, but is exercised, though imperfectly, the movement of the will which follows is called secundo-primus. If the power of deliberation is wholly wanting, the act which follows cannot be sinful, however wrong objectively; if the act is semi-deliberate, however grievously wrong in itself, it will be imputed to the agent only as a more or less serious venial sin.²

These principles are of great importance for forming an estimate of the moral guilt of children, of habitual drunkards, of persons long habituated to sins of the flesh, and persons with weak intellect.

It follows from what has been said that previous knowledge of, and deliberation about, the object proposed by the intellect to the will, is necessary to free and moral action, which is defined by divines to be action which proceeds from man’s deliberative will.³

¹ M. Maher, Psychology, 5th ed., p. 394.

² St Thomas, 1-2, q. 77, a. 7.

³ St Thomas, 1-2, q. I, a. 1.

n. 5.

Human acts are by theologians divided into various classes:

(a) Internal acts are performed by the internal powers of the soul; external, by the bodily organs.

(b) Elicited acts are such as proceed immediately from the will and are performed by it alone. They are usually said to be six in number; three having reference to the end, and three others to the means for the attaining of the end. A wish is a simple inclination of the will or an ineffectual desire of an object; an intention is a firm resolve to attain an object by the use of the appropriate means; fruition is a peaceful delight in the possession, real or imagined, of a loved object. The act of selection between various means to an end is called choice; if no alternative is offered by the intellect, acceptance of the means by the will is called consent, though this term is more commonly used of every act of acceptance by the will of an object proposed to it; use or execution is said of the act of the will which applies the means chosen to the obtaining of the end proposed.

Commanded acts are executed by other faculties than the will by which they are commanded.

(d) Good actions are conformed to the rules of morality; bad actions are contrary to them; those that are indifferent may be good or bad according to circumstances.

(e) Valid acts are such as have all the conditions requisite, and so produce their effect; invalid acts are destitute of some condition necessary to produce their effect.

Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

Ludovicus Wouters, C.SS.R. — 3 passages

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. I, Part I. Summary Doctrine of the Human Act

n. 15.

I. Notion of a human act. A human act is an act which proceeds from the deliberate will of man. For "those actions alone are properly called human which are proper to man insofar as he is man. Now man differs from irrational creatures in this, that he is master of his acts. Hence those actions alone are properly called human of which man is master. But man is master of his acts through reason and will; hence free choice is said to be a faculty of will and reason. Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from deliberate will" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, V, I).

Other acts, which do indeed proceed from man, but not from the will, or not from deliberate will, are called acts of man. Such are, for example, the first thought of the intellect, the desire for beatitude, and the beatific love of the saints (St. Alphonsus, V, II).

n. 16.

II. Intrinsic principles of the human act. As follows from the definition handed down, the intrinsic principles of the human act are intellect and free will, or, as others prefer, intellect, will, and liberty: the intellect deliberates; the will, once deliberation has been placed, freely chooses.

n. 17.

III. Division of human acts. Human acts are distinguished:

Into elicited and commanded acts. Elicited acts are those elicited by the will itself, such as the act of loving. Commanded acts are those elicited by another faculty from the command of the will, such as the act of walking; likewise acts elicited by the will, but from the command of a preceding act of the will. Acts of this kind can be called both elicited and commanded, as when someone detests sin from charity toward God.
Into internal and external acts, according as they are completed by the internal powers alone, as thought is, or proceed to the external powers, as the act of speaking does.
Into commanded, forbidden, and free acts. Of free acts, some are simply permitted, some are advised, and some are dissuaded.
Into good and bad acts, according as they agree with the divine law or differ from it (n. 60). Good acts are distinguished into natural and supernatural acts, according as they are elicited by the powers of nature alone or with the help of grace.
Into valid and invalid acts, according as they produce or do not produce the effect for which they are destined. Then, of valid acts, some are irrescindable or firm, while others are rescindable or infirm (St. Alphonsus, V, III and IV).

McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology

John A. McHugh, O.P., and Charles J. Callan, O.P. — 18 passages

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. I, Art. 2. Acts as Human, Introduction

n. 22.

(Summa Theologica, I-II, qq. 6-17.)

Human acts are a means to man’s Last End, inasmuch as they are meritorious—i.e., labors that deserve a recompense (I Cor., iii. 8), struggles that deserve a crown (II Tim., ii. 5). But works are not meritorious unless they are one’s own (human) and good (moral); and, since the reward is supernatural, they must also be the fruit of grace. Hence, we shall speak of acts in the following order: (a) acts as human and free (Art. 2); (b) acts as morally good (Art. 3); (c) acts as supernaturally meritorious (Art. 4).

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. I, Art. 2. Acts as Human, Definition

n. 23.

Definition

Definition.—Those acts are called human of which a man is the master, and he is master of his actions in virtue of his reason and his will, which faculties make him superior to non-human agents that act without reason and freedom. Hence, the following kinds of acts done by a human being are not called human: (a) those that are not under the control of the mind, because one is permanently or temporarily without the use of reason or without knowledge (e.g., the acts done by the insane; by those who are unconscious or delirious, under the influence of hypnotism or drugs, distracted or carried away by vehement fear, anger, etc.; by infants and uninstructed persons); (b) those that are not under the control of the will, even though they are known (e.g., automatic acts, such as the acts of the vegetative powers, growth, circulation of the blood; pathological acts, such as convulsions; acts done under external violence).

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. I, Art. 2. Acts as Human, Knowledge Requisite for a Human Act

n. 24.

Knowledge Requisite for a Human Act

Knowledge Requisite for a Human Act.—An act is human, or voluntary, when it is deliberately desired; and, since nothing can be deliberately desired unless it is known, an act done without knowledge is not human or voluntary. Thus, a delirious patient does not will the language he uses, for his mind is confused and he does not understand what he is saying.

n. 25.

The condition of a person without knowledge is ignorance, which is defined as the absence of knowledge in one who is capable of knowing. Ignorance is of various kinds. From the viewpoint of that which is not known (i.e., of the object of the ignorance), there is ignorance of the substance of an act and ignorance of the quality of an act. For example, Titus driving rapidly in the dark runs over and kills a pet animal of his neighbor, but knows nothing of this happening (ignorance of the substance of the act); Balbus, a child, fires a pistol at his playmate, not knowing that this causes death (ignorance of the physical quality of an act), and that it is the sin of murder (ignorance of the moral quality of an act).

n. 26.

With reference to the will of the person who is ignorant, three kinds of ignorance may be distinguished.

(a) Ignorance is concomitant (simultaneous with the act of the will), when it is not voluntary, and yet is not therefore the reason of the act that follows it, since that act would have been done, even had there been knowledge. This may be illustrated by the example of a hunter who intended to kill an enemy, and killed him only accidentally while shooting at an animal.

(b) Ignorance is consequent (after the act of the will), when it is voluntary, which may happen in different ways: first, when ignorance is affected, as when a person expressly desires to remain ignorant about his duties, so that he may have an excuse for his sins, or that he may not be disturbed in his evil life; secondly, when he neglects to acquire the knowledge he ought to possess, as when a hunter kills a man, thinking him an animal, because he took no pains to be sure before firing.

(c) Ignorance is antecedent (before the act of the will), when it is not voluntary, and is the cause of the act that follows since the act would not have been done, if there had been knowledge. For example, a hunter who has used reasonable diligence to avoid accidents, kills a man whom he mistook for a deer.

n. 27.

With reference to the responsibility of the person who is ignorant, there are two kinds of ignorance. (a) Ignorance is invincible when it cannot be removed, even by the use of all the care that ordinarily prudent and conscientious persons would use in the circumstances. Thus, a person who has no suspicions of his ignorance, or who has tried in vain to acquire instruction about his duties, is invincibly ignorant. (b) Ignorance is vincible when it can be removed by the exercise of ordinary care. There are various degrees of this species of ignorance: first, it is merely vincible, when some diligence has been exercised, but not enough; secondly, it is crass or supine, when hardly any diligence has been used; thirdly, it is affected, when a person deliberately aims to continue in ignorance.

n. 28.

Influence of the Various Kinds of Ignorance on the Voluntariness of Acts

Influence of the Various Kinds of Ignorance on the Voluntariness of Acts.—(a) Ignorance of an act, whether as to its substance or quality, makes an act involuntary, when the ignorance itself is involuntary, as will be explained in paragraph 29. Hence, if we refer to ignorance that is not blameworthy and to the guilt of violating the law of God, we may say: “Ignorance excuses.”

(b) Ignorance does not make an act involuntary before human law, unless the law itself presumes the ignorance or the ignorance is proved, as will be explained in the Question on Law (see 489 sqq.). For, when law is sufficiently promulgated or a fact pertains to one’s own self, the presumption is that ignorance does not exist, or that it is culpable. Hence, the general rule of law common to all forms of jurisprudence: “Ignorance does not excuse” (cfr. Canon 16 of the Code of Canon Law).

n. 29.

Effects of Concomitant, Consequent, and Antecedent Ignorance

Effects of Concomitant, Consequent, and Antecedent Ignorance.—(a) Concomitant ignorance does not make an act involuntary, because it does not cause anything that is contrary to the will; but it does make the act that is performed non-voluntary, since what is unknown cannot be actually desired.

(b) Consequent ignorance cannot make an act entirely involuntary, since such ignorance is itself voluntary; but it does in a certain respect make an act involuntary, i.e., inasmuch as the act would not have been done save for the ignorance. (c) Antecedent ignorance makes an act entirely involuntary.

n. 30.

Effects of Invincible and Vincible Ignorance

Effects of Invincible and Vincible Ignorance.—(a) Invincible ignorance, even of what pertains to the natural law, makes an act involuntary, since nothing is willed except what is understood. Hence, no matter how wrong an act is in itself, the agent is not guilty of formal sin (see 249), if he is invincibly ignorant of the malice involved.

(b) Vincible ignorance does not make an act involuntary, since the ignorance itself is voluntary; hence, it does not excuse from sin. It does not even make an act less voluntary and less sinful, if the ignorance is affected in order that one may have an excuse; for such a state of mind shows that the person would act the same way, even though he had knowledge.

n. 31.

Vincible ignorance makes an act less voluntary and less sinful: (a) when the ignorance is not affected, for the voluntariness is measured by the knowledge, and knowledge here is lacking; (b) when the ignorance, though affected, was fostered only through fear that knowledge might compel a stricter way of life; for such a state of mind seems to show that one would not act the same way if one had knowledge.

n. 32.

Like to ignorance are the following: (a) error, which is a judgment not in agreement with the facts (e.g., Balbus, a young child, thinks stealing is lawful, because older persons are represented as stealing in the moving pictures); (b) forgetfulness, which is ignorance of what was once known (e.g., Titus made a study of his duties as a Catholic when he was young, but at present what he does not know about those duties is not inconsiderable); (c) inadvertence, which is a lack of attention to what is being done (e.g., Caius, who is absent-minded, sometimes gets his hair cut and goes away without paying, or takes money that does not belong to him).

n. 33.

The principles and conclusions given above with regard to ignorance will apply also to error, forgetfulness and inadvertence; for in all these cases the lack of actual knowledge at the moment an act is done, is either willed or not willed, and accordingly the act itself is either voluntary or not voluntary. In the examples mentioned above, Balbus does not will the guilt of theft, since he does not know it; but his elders do will that guilt, because they should know it. Titus is responsible for neglecting his duties, if he has forgotten them through his own neglect of them or other fault; otherwise, he is not responsible. Caius’ inattention is involuntary, if due to mental concentration or distraction, and if it is not desired by him; it is voluntary, if he is aware of it and cultivates it, or if he does not try to be more attentive to his duties.

n. 34.

Consent Requisite for a Human Act

Consent Requisite for a Human Act.—To be human, an act must proceed not only from knowledge, but also from inclination; that is, it must be voluntary. Three things are necessary in order that an act be voluntary: (a) it must be agreeable to an internal principle, i.e., in most moral matters to the will. Hence, an act that is done against one’s will on account of external violence is not voluntary; (b) it must be caused by the will. Hence, a shower of rain is said to be agreeable to the gardener, but not voluntary since his will is not its cause; (c) it must be performed with a conscious purpose. Hence, natural acts (such as sleeping) and spontaneous acts (such as stroking one’s beard absent-mindedly) are not voluntary acts.

n. 35.

Kinds of Voluntary Acts.-(a) A voluntary act is free or necessary, according as one can or cannot abstain from it. The vision of God in heaven is voluntary to the blessed, since they look at Him knowingly and gladly; but it is not free, since they cannot avert their gaze from that which makes them blessed. The love of God on earth is voluntary, since chosen; but it is also free, since man is able to turn away from God.

(b) An act is perfectly or imperfectly voluntary, according as the deliberation and consent that precede it are full or only partial.

(c) An act is said to be simply—that is, absolutely—voluntary, when it is wished under circumstances that exist here and now, although in itself, apart from those circumstances, it is not wished. It is said to be voluntary under a certain aspect, when it is desired for itself, but not under existing conditions. Thus, if an arm needs to be amputated to save life, the amputation is absolutely voluntary, while the preservation of the arm is voluntary only in a certain respect. Hence, an act is voluntary simply or absolutely when one chooses it, all things considered; it remains involuntary under a certain respect, inasmuch as the choice is made with reluctance.

(d) An act is voluntary in itself or directly, when it is desired in itself for its own sake (i.e., as an end), or for the sake of something else (i.e., as a means). It is voluntary in its cause or indirectly, when it is not desired in itself, either as a means or an end, but is foreseen as the result of something else that is intended. Examples: Titus quarrels with his neighbors, at times because he likes to quarrel, and at other times because he wishes to make them fear him; hence, his quarrels are directly voluntary. Caius is a peaceful man who dislikes quarreling; but he likes to drink too much occasionally, although he knows that he always quarrels when he is under the influence of liquor. Thus, his quarrels are indirectly voluntary.

n. 36.

An act is voluntary in its cause in two ways: (a) approvingly (physically and morally voluntary in cause), when one is able and obliged not to perform the act that is its cause (e.g., the quarrels of Caius mentioned above are approved implicitly by him, since he could and should prevent the intoxication which is their cause); (b) permissively (physically voluntary in cause), when one is not able or not obliged to omit the act that is its cause (see 94 sqq.). Examples: Balbus, in order to make a living, has to associate with persons of quarrelsome character, and as a result often hears shocking disputes. Titus, a military commander, orders an enemy fortification to be bombarded, although he knows that this will involve the destruction of other property and the unavoidable killing of some non-combatants or neutrals. Caius writes a book whose purpose and natural result is edification, but he foresees that evil-minded persons will misunderstand it and take scandal.

n. 37.

Omissions, as well as acts, may be voluntary. (a) Thus, they are directly voluntary, when they are willed as an end or as a means to an end. Example: Titus fails to reprove the disorders of those in his charge because he likes disorder, or because it illustrates his theory that everyone should go through an evolution from roughness to refinement. (b) They are indirectly voluntary, when their cause is willed with approval or permitted with disapproval. Example: Balbus does not like to miss Mass, but he fails to rise from bed when he hears the church bell ringing, and as a result does not get to church. If his failure to get up was due to laziness, the omission of Mass was approved by Balbus; if it was due to illness, the omission was only permitted.

n. 38.

The effect that follows upon an omission may also be voluntary. (a) Thus, it is directly voluntary, if the omission is chosen as a means to the effect. Example: Caius hears Titus say that he is going to make a certain business deal, and he knows that Titus will suffer a great loss thereby; but he wishes Titus to lose his money, and therefore says nothing about the danger. (b) It is indirectly voluntary, if one foresees the effect, and approves or permits it. Examples: Balbus sees Titus attacked by a hoodlum and realizes that, unless assisted, Titus will be badly beaten up; but he is such an admirer of pugilism that, in spite of his sorrow for Titus, he decides not to stop the fight. Caius sees his friend Sempronius drowning, and fails to go to his assistance, because to his regret he is not an expert swimmer.

n. 39.

The effect of an omission is indirectly voluntary and approved by the will when one is able and bound to do what one omits. Example: Balbus receives some confidential documents with the understanding that he will guard them sacredly; but fearing to lose the good graces of Titus, who is curious and loquacious, he omits to put the papers away as promised, with the result that Titus finds them and reads them.

Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)

Jean-Pierre Gury, S.J.; notes by Antonio Ballerini, S.J. — 4 passages

Vol. I, Treatise on Human Acts, Chapter I. On the Notion of Human Acts

- DEFINITION. An act in general is the determination of a potency, or it is the faculty of acting placed in exercise, or also it is the exercise of the faculty of acting. The potency itself is customarily called first act, and its determination second act.

But a human act is that which proceeds from the deliberate will of man; or it is an act proceeding from a free will with advertence to the goodness or malice of the act.

For that alone can be called a human act which proceeds from man insofar as he is man, and differs from irrational creatures ¹. Now man acts then only, as such, when in acting he uses the faculties essential to himself, namely of knowing, willing, and freely determining himself; therefore there is not given an act properly human unless it proceeds from the deliberate or free will of man. Hence a human act at length is the same as a moral act. - St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, art. 1.

¹ From this manner of speaking certain moderns, after Alasia, ineptly conclude that also any acts of the intellect, such as thought, perception, judgment, reasoning, and likewise acts of the will even not free, are altogether human acts, because, they say, they are perfected by those powers by which man essentially differs from brutes. They did not understand, namely, that the distinction of man from brutes is employed here by the Doctors not only as to the substance of the faculties, but especially as to the mode of operating (see Suarez, on I-II, Treatise 1, Disputation 2, Section 2, from no. 7). And indeed this abuse of innovating can bring only this fruit: both that men do not understand one another and move controversies which arise merely from the opinions of another not being perceived, and that in reading the books of the Doctors, indeed also ecclesiastical monuments and decrees, they undergo the gravest danger of erring.

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tr. II, Chapter I. On The Nature And Divisions Of Human Acts · Vol. I, Pt. I, Tr. II, Ch. II, Art. I, § 1. On The Advertence Required For A Human Act

Hence it differs from an act of man ², which is done in man, or by man, without any deliberation, such as indeliberate acts, first-first motions, or acts of a man wholly distracted, sleeping, delirious, insane, drunk, or deprived in any way whatsoever of the use of reason ³.

² A certain modern, having rejected the customary distinction of the ancients into acts of man and human acts, introduced a new one of natural or animal acts and personal acts; for, as he says, the faculties of intellect and will, as the highest active principle, constitute personality. But from this an easy path lies open to grave errors; for if personality is constituted in the highest or supreme active principle, then God, for one nature or active principle, will have one person, but Christ, for a twofold nature, will have two.

³ It has pleased some to distinguish manifold acts in man according as St. Gregory the Great (Homily 29 on the Gospel) said that man has something from every creature, so that consequently 1. some acts are called natural, as to live, vegetate, grow, etc.; 2. others animal, common also to brutes, as to eat, walk, etc.; 3. others of man, as to speak, laugh, understand, etc.; and 4. finally human, which proceed from a deliberate will; in these the intellect holds itself as condition, but the free will as cause.

Tanquerey

Adolphe Tanquerey, S.S. — 5 passages

Vol. II, Fundamental Moral Theology…, On Human Acts — Chapter I: On Free Acts

n. 66.

Concerning Free Acts.

State of the question. Among the acts which are performed by man, some are voluntary, others involuntary. The former are performed by the will with a previous cognition of the intellect. But the latter are done without previous cognition or will. Of this kind are the acts of one fully dreaming, drunk, or delirious, who are incapable of conscious cognition;¹ likewise the acts of vegetative life, such as the digestion of foods or the circulation of the blood, which are not subject to the will; and also the acts of a fully distracted man who, although he is capable of attention, in fact does not notice those things which he does, because his attention is turned aside to other things. - The former acts, namely voluntary acts, can be called human acts, because they proceed from man insofar as he is rational man; but the latter are called acts of man, because they indeed proceed from man, but not insofar as he is rational, since they are done without advertence and will.²

¹ Thus voluntary acts are distinguished from spontaneous acts, which are done with merely sensitive cognition, such as the acts of infants or the mentally unsound.

² Sometimes, however, only those acts are called human which are truly free, and therefore proceed from the deliberate will, according to those things which are set forth below. To the point St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 1: "Of the actions which are done by man, those alone are called human which are proper to man insofar as he is man. But man differs from other irrational creatures in this, that he is master of his own acts. Whence those actions alone are properly called human of which man is master. But man is master of his own acts through reason and will... therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from deliberate will."

Here we treat concerning voluntary acts; nor will there be discussion of the others, except that they may be distinguished from the former. Among voluntary acts, some are necessary, but others free or deliberate. The former indeed proceed from the will with previous cognition, but in such a way that the will cannot abstain from them; thus we necessarily will good in common;¹ for we do not embrace evil except under the species of good, or insofar as in some way it appears to us to be good. On the contrary, free acts so proceed from the will that the will according to its own pleasure can posit the act or not posit it. Thus the voluntary is, as it were, a genus which contains under itself two species: the necessary voluntary and the free or deliberate voluntary; but, since the former is occupied only with good in common, often voluntary and free are taken promiscuously. - We shall declare this more fully by setting forth: 1. the notion and species of a free act; 2. the principles which concur toward its production; 3. the causes which influence a free act.

¹ Certain ones, however, think that man is free even concerning good in common, because, they say, he tends toward it naturally indeed, but not from necessity; thus Piat, La Liberte, t. II, Le Probleme, p. 262-269. - Nevertheless it is established psychologically that there is some distinction between the desiring of beatitude, which all elicit at least implicitly, and the willing of the means which lead to it: for since these are diverse, and consequently limited goods, they do not solicit our assent necessarily. - For the rest, in practice, it matters little, provided it is admitted that we are truly free concerning the choice of means for obtaining beatitude.

n. 67.

Art. I. Notion and Species of Free Acts. — I. Notion of Free Acts.

1. Definition. An act is called free which is immune from coercion and necessity.

² St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 8-17; Suarez, Tr. de voluntario et involuntario, disp. I, II, VI-X; Salmanticenses, De principiis moralitatis, cap. I, n. 9-21; Billuart, De actibus humanis, diss. I-III; Bouquillon, n. 318-330; Ballerini-Palmieri, t. I, n. 1-34.

(a) Liberty or immunity from necessity, which is also called liberty of exercise, or free will, is the faculty of choosing one thing before another, so that the agent is not intrinsically determined to one thing. For liberty it is by no means required that the will be in a state of indifference; but it suffices that, notwithstanding various causes, whether external or internal, which influence it, it ultimately be able to choose either part. - It is threefold: liberty of contradiction, which is exercised concerning contradictories, for example, when we can choose between loving and not loving; liberty of contrariety, which chooses between contraries, for example, between loving and hating, good and evil; liberty of specification, to which belongs choosing between objects diverse in species, such as eating and walking. Now for the essence of liberty the sole faculty of choosing between contradictories suffices, or between acting and not acting.

(b) Liberty from coercion, or liberty of execution, is the unimpeded faculty of acting according to one's pleasure, so that the agent is not forced to act by external violence, nor impeded from acting. Necessity therefore affects the very internal faculty of choosing, while coercion only binds the external power of executing.

n. 68.

1. Existence. (A) The existence of liberty today is denied by determinists,¹ who contend that all actions of man depend on antecedent or concomitant circumstances in such a way that they are truly determined by them, but are not freely chosen by the will. It is not our purpose to vindicate against them the existence of free will; Philosophers do this.

¹ Thus, among others, A. Fouillée, La liberté et le déterminisme, 4th ed., Paris, Alcan, 1895. Yet he himself confesses that we become free little by little: for we have the concept of liberty; but every concept tends to burst forth at some time into act and to become real. For the rest, most determinists confess that there is in us some power of changing circumstances, and so of indirectly attaining what we will.

n. 69.

Let it suffice to recall their principal arguments to memory:

(a) Psychological.² From the inward testimony of conscience it is established that we, at least in many acts, are truly free. For notwithstanding the various motives which impel us to acting in this or that way, we can, according to our own judgment, consider these motives attentively or not, and make a practical judgment about them; we are conscious that we can choose between delightful good and honorable good; at the very instant in which we choose good, pleasure often allures us to evil, and therefore the fulfillment of duty requires an effort, that is, an act of the will contrary to pleasure; if we do good, we impute the action to ourselves as to true authors, as worthy of praise; if we have acted badly, conscience reproves us as worthy of blame. At length sometimes we perceive the distinction between acts arisen from an invincible propensity and those which are performed freely. Therefore unless conscience manifestly deceives us, we are truly free at least in many things.

² Piat, Le problème de la liberté, p. 37-127; Mercier, Psychologie, t. II, n. 203-206; Meyer, op. cit., n. 109-114; Fonsegrive, Essai sur le libre arbitre, 2nd ed., Paris, Alcan, 1896, p. 434-452, where he joins the psychological and the metaphysical argument together.

This is confirmed from the concept of duty to be fulfilled, which is present in all, as was shown above. For by duty we are not forced nor determined, but solicited to acting; hence sometimes we resist the command of duty, while conscience resists; sometimes we give consent to it, while concupiscence resists; in the former case, we repent that we have violated the order of nature; in the latter, we rejoice concerning good freely chosen.

(b) Metaphysical. The proper and adequate object of the will is universal good; wherefore, if some object is proposed to the will which is, and evidently appears to be, universally good, according to every consideration, of necessity the will will tend toward it, if it wills anything; for it will not be able to will the opposite. But if some object is proposed which is not, and does not appear, good according to every consideration, the will is not of necessity borne toward it. Now any particular goods, insofar as they are not the universal good, but are deficient from some good, can be taken as not good; and according to this consideration, they can be rejected or approved by the will.¹

¹ Thus St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 10, a. 2.

Therefore the subject of liberty is properly the will, to which belongs choosing between acting and not acting, doing this or that. But the root of liberty is reason, which can have diverse conceptions of good:² it conceives the highest good and proposes it to the will as something necessary; but particular goods it conceives and proposes as desirable insofar as they are more or less connected with beatitude.

² St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 17, a. 2 ad 2; I, q. 83, a. 1.

n. 70.

(B) Theologians likewise, against Lutherans, Calvinists, and Jansenists, prove that the human will, even in the state of fallen nature and under the influence of grace, remains free from necessity.³ (a) This surely is established from the general manner of speaking of Scripture; for precepts are given to man; rewards are promised to those doing good, but punishments are inflicted on the evil; sinners are called to penance, the just are warned lest, trusting too much in themselves, they fall into sin; there are in us two kinds of propensities mutually opposed to one another, by which we are allured to good and to evil;⁴ but, if without God's help we can do nothing from ourselves, we can do all things in Him who strengthens us.⁵

³ Which we proved in the treatise concerning Grace, n. 94-98.

⁴ Rom., VII, 15-25.

⁵ Philip., IV, 13. - Fonsegrive sets forth the doctrine of Scripture and the Fathers concerning liberty, op. cit., p. 79-124.

(b) Therefore the Council of Trent deservedly declares that by Adam's prevarication the free will of man, although weakened and inclined in its powers, was by no means extinguished, and that it can dissent from the grace of God, if it wills.¹ Likewise, as heretical, the third proposition of Jansenius was reproved: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, liberty from necessity is not required in man, but liberty from coercion suffices."

¹ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 1 and can. 4-5 (Denzing., nn. 675, 696, 697).

Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis

Arthur Vermeersch, S.J. — 10 passages

Vol. I, Tr. II, Title I: Notions and Divisions

n. ¶1.

Usefulness. By accurate notions the distinct knowledge of things is prepared for the intellect. Especially to be attended to are the notions of the commanded act and the elicited act, and of moral liberty.

n. 31.

The notion of a human act. An act is called human insofar as it is voluntary, that is, insofar as it proceeds from the will, with advertence of reason, toward human finality.

For it belongs to the specific dignity of the rational animal that he act by conscious reason and will. The acts by which we seem to operate in a way similar to the other living beings have customarily been called acts of man. Cf. St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 1, art. 1.

Therefore a fully human act is a fully voluntary act.

In our present life, an act is at the same time human and free. For in heaven the most fully voluntary act of adhering to God, our beatific end, cannot be psychologically free.

For we know from philosophy that a psychologically free agent is one who, all things required for acting being posited, can do or omit the action (liberty of contradiction), and can choose this action or a different one (liberty of specification).

Whether an act can be free without some attention to finality, or to the order of reason; or whether, when only temporal utilities are adverted to, then we necessarily embrace the greater utility: this is disputed. Those who think that this attention is not required admit human acts which are not moral. We, as is evident from our very definition of a human act, rather hold the contrary side with St. Thomas, l.c.; cf. Suarez, De bonitate et malitia humanorum actuum, d. 1, s. 1, n. 9, 10.

¹ Recently Victor Frins, S.J., treats the matter fully and learnedly in De actibus humanis, 3 vols., Freiburg im Breisgau, 1897-1904.

n. 32.

The notion of a moral act. An act is called moral insofar as it pertains to morals, or to the manner and custom of human life. Therefore acts are formally moral insofar as they give quality and value to life in rational estimation ¹.

According to St. Thomas, the genus of morals begins where dominion of the will is first found. Wherefore all human acts are at the same time moral. Cf. 1, 2, q. 18, art. 5, 9; and q. 19, art. 1, ad 3.

Therefore there will also be a twofold division of human acts: one psychological, by which they are considered in their physical constitution, or as acts; the other moral, by which they are considered in their rational estimation, or as human. A third division, from efficacy, is not common to all acts.

¹ In explaining the notion of morality, theologians labor rather considerably. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 93.

n. 33.

I. Psychological division of human acts. 1. Human acts are internal or external. The former are completed by internal powers, and do not appear outwardly in any way: to think, to imagine. The latter either are manifested by some sensible sign, or proceed to external powers: words by which interior affections are expressed; genuflection for adoring.

Strictly speaking, the act which is called external ought to be called mixed: for unless the will had a part in it, it would not be human.

Acts are natural or supernatural. The former are done by the natural powers alone, with the ordinary concurrence of the First Cause; supernatural acts are done with the aid of grace transferring the act to the supernatural order.

Moreover, graces are granted which are called medicinal, insofar as they confer strength for avoiding sins. Yet are they purely medicinal, so that, when they are given to unbelievers, acts consonant with these graces do not transcend the natural order? Many, perhaps most, admit such graces as purely medicinal; we rather incline to the negative side.

Human acts are elicited or commanded.

To command is to move someone toward doing something, by intimating or announcing (proposing) to him the thing to be done, as if you were to say: Do this. We can command ourselves and others. Yet others only if they are inferior to us; and then the external manifestation of our will is necessary.

Now acts are elicited or commanded in a twofold way.

a) With attention to their efficient causality, elicited acts are acts which, commanded by no other act, are consummated in the will itself which determined itself to acting: such can be an act of love of God. Commanded acts, on the contrary, are those which, from the command of the will, are effected by other powers, whether internal or external, indeed even by the will itself. Think of the various acts of divine worship which the will exercises through mind and body: prayer, psalmody, inclinations of the head.

b) With attention to final causality, or motive, acts are called elicited with respect to the proximate motive; commanded, with respect to another motive by which the agent is moved to perform the act under its proximate motive: as if from fear you were to make an act of charity.

Since the question concerns final causality, not efficient causality, a nobler action can be commanded by an inferior one. But it is clear that, for the command to be efficacious, the powers for making the nobler act must be at hand, or, in the example alleged, grace for making an act of charity.

An act can be done under its own proper motive, and also simply under a nobler motive. Thus, a poor man asks alms of me. I can bestow alms upon him from mere charitable benevolence; and the same charity can command in me an affection of mercy or compassion, under which, with charity commanding, I bestow the alms. In the latter case the act is strictly commanded; in the former, only broadly, because not mercy itself, but charity alone, is exercised in it.

n. 34.

Moral division. As moral, human acts can be right or depraved, according as they are done according to the order of reason, or apart from or against that order.

They are licit or illicit, according as they are consonant with a law that commands or even counsels, or are repugnant to a law that commands.

They are good or evil, with attention to the proportion which they have to the agent, to whom they can be fitting or unfitting.

We do not add indifferent acts, because, as they are received in the subject, they cannot affect him except well or badly. Yet those acts are called indifferent which, with attention to their object or genus, cannot yet be denominated good or evil.

Insofar as they are referred to another, the same acts are imputable unto praise or blame, unto reward or punishment, and consequently meritorious or demeritorious.

n. 35.

Moral liberty. Just as psychological liberty coheres with the psychological account of a human act, so moral liberty is connected with the moral account of the same act.

This, however, is understood in two ways.

In the more frequent use, moral liberty denies an obligation of the will: I have moral liberty of praying, studying, walking.
In the less frequent use, it denies an impediment of the will, when, as much as the will itself wishes, so much can it unfold itself. Therefore it denies those several servitudes, more or less full, of concupiscences or of bodily weight, which we have to undergo with groaning, as when we complain that the mind was lacking to us for rising at the appointed hour.

This moral liberty has been wounded by original sin, yet not destroyed. Therefore the proposition was condemned that, in the present state, man, left to himself, would have power only for sinning. Cf. propositions 25, 27 and 65 of Baius, among the propositions condemned by St. Pius V, respectively as "heretical, erroneous, suspect, rash, scandalous, and offensive to pious ears." 1 Oct. 1567. Prop. 25: "All the works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices." Prop. 65: "Only by Pelagian error can some use of free will be admitted as good or not evil; and he who so thinks and teaches does injury to the grace of Christ." Prop. 27: "Free will, without the aid of the grace of God, has power only for sinning." (Denz., n. 1025, 1917, and 1065.)

Wherefore the love of charity, in heaven, will be at the same time psychologically necessary and morally supremely free: by loving God there, the will perfectly effects what it wills to effect.

n. 36.

Division of certain acts from efficacy. Not all acts, but not a few, are done less for their own sake than for a further efficacy: thus the buyer and the seller make a contract of sale in order to have the thing or the money. These acts are distinguished as valid or invalid. The former have what is essentially required for that efficacy; the latter lack an essential element. Valid acts themselves are, some, rescindable by human authority: for example, several contracts, on account of injury to the other party; others cannot be rescinded; and this either absolutely, as a consummated marriage, or less absolutely, as a ratified marriage, which, by power divinely conferred, can be destroyed by the Supreme Pontiff for a just cause.

Concerning not a few acts, questions of no small importance arise in law and in moral theology: whether they are invalid ipso facto and from the beginning, and by what law, divine or human; or whether they can be weakened only by the sentence of a judge or by the authority of a legitimate superior.

Not every valid act is licit: for instance, a marriage made against a legitimate prohibition; nor is every invalid act illicit: for instance, a testament lacking form. Yet in ecclesiastical law an invalid act must be said to be per se prohibited.

n. 37.

Various things to be noted. 1. The will, both by acting and by omitting an act, can observe or violate the order of reason. Wherefore, under the name of human act comes also a conscious and free omission, which can be good and meritorious, evil and deserving of punishments.

Although we refer human acts to the will, the intellect also has its own parts in these acts. No understanding is mere understanding, no willing mere willing; but each faculty, in various degree, conspires in every action.
Nor do acts exist separated as we consider them; but they are prepared in a certain continuous series of actions, and are completed by various consequences. None is without antecedent roots, none without subsequent effects. But no less than physical science, moral science must estimate continuous motion as an infinite series of disjoined or momentary motions, so that in some imperfect way it can know and explore them.

n. 38.

Arrangement of the treatise. The human act is essentially voluntary. In our present condition it is at the same time free, moral, and imputable. Yet per se it is not repugnant to its essence that it be psychologically necessary; and we have adduced the example of the beatific vision. Likewise the observance of precepts was psychologically necessary to Christ. For this reason liberty, morality, and imputability unto merit or punishment ought rather to be called properties of the human act as it is done by a wayfarer. Nevertheless liberty is joined more closely with voluntariety, so that a separate exposition of liberty and voluntariety would be without usefulness and not without inconvenience. Therefore this will be the arrangement of the treatise, that we treat: 1. Of the human act as voluntary and free; 2. Of the impediments of the human act; 3. Of the human act as moral; 4. Of the human act as imputable.

n. 39.

Summary

I. A human act, under which name also omission comes, is an act which proceeds from the will with advertence of reason. In this life this act is psychologically free; according to the estimation of reason, it qualifies our life, whence it is called moral; and, according as it is referred to another, it is meritorious or demeritorious.

II. Psychologically it is distinguished, with attention to the executing power, as internal or external; with attention to the subjective principle, as natural or supernatural. With attention to its consummation in the will or in a power moved by the will, or also with attention to the proximate or remote motive under which it is done, it is called elicited or commanded.

III. As moral, an act can be, with attention to the order of reason, right or depraved; with attention to law, licit or illicit; with attention to proportion to the agent, good or evil (in the subject, none is indifferent); with attention to relation to another, meritorious or demeritorious.

With this notion is connected liberty, which is called moral, insofar as it signifies either licitness or human possibility.

IV. With attention to further efficacy, some acts are valid, others invalid. Valid acts can be rescindable or not. An invalid act is not necessarily illicit, nor is a licit act always valid.

V. The intellect does not act without the will, and vice versa; nor do acts exist separately from the continuous actuation of human energy; and none fails to flow into the following disposition.

VI. The reason for the order to be followed is established.

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 13 passages

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tr. II, Chapter I. On The Nature And Divisions Of Human Acts

n. 26.

26. Definition. A human act can be defined: an act which proceeds from the deliberate will of man; or: which proceeds from reason knowing and will moving; or: of which man is master.

The Angelic Doctor writes very well to the point:¹ "Actions which are done by man are properly called human only when they are proper to man insofar as he is man. But man differs from irrational creatures in this, that he is master of his acts; whence those actions alone are properly called human of which man is master. But man is master of his acts through reason and will. Whence free choice is also said to be the faculty of will and reason. Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from deliberate will. But if any other actions befit man, they can indeed be called actions of man, but not properly human, since they are not of man insofar as he is man." - Acts of man are commonly called those acts which indeed proceed from man as man, but without the intervention of reason or will, as the acts indicated below under nn. 2, 3, and 4.

From the given definition it is plain that the following acts are not properly human acts:

1. All natural acts and all acts of the vegetative power in man, for example, nutrition, digestion of foods, motion of the heart, bodily excitations coming from an influx of humors or from extrinsic causes not freely admitted by the will. But because of the intimate conjunction between soul and body, the will can exercise some influence upon those acts; for example, the will can vividly excite the imagination and, by means of the imagination so excited, is able to produce palpitations of the heart or motions of sensuality. In these cases acts of sensuality of this kind are certainly human and moral acts, but not if they arise without the intervention of the will.

2. All acts elicited by the perfectly insane, by those sleeping, by infants lacking the use of reason, by persons put to sleep by hypnotism, by the drunk (if, however, the hypnosis or drunkenness is perfect and the acts committed could not have been foreseen before the hypnosis or in the state of sobriety). The reason is that acts of this kind proceed without the use of reason and therefore are not produced by man as a rational animal.

3. All acts so-called "first-first,"² which are indeed produced by a man having the use of reason, but occur so suddenly that they precede every use of reason and will, for example, instantaneous and unforeseen motions of anger from an unexpected grave offense. Such acts are neither human nor moral, but amoral. But the motions so-called "second-first," which occur with half-full deliberation and advertence, are human acts, and therefore moral, although imperfect.

4. All coerced acts, that is, those which occur under the influence of force or violence. Hence violent rape is not for the virgin an act either human or moral, but merely physical. For the virgin is not mistress of this act, which is altogether against her will.

¹ S. theol. I-II, q. 1, a. 1.

² Concerning the controversy whether the first motions of sensuality are venial sin, see Billuart, De peccatis diss. IV, a. 2, § 1. The negative opinion seems to be far truer.

n. 27.

27. Scholion. On the love of felicity and beatific love. Authors dispute whether the love of felicity on this earth and beatific love in heaven is a human act or not. Suarez, Sylvius, Billuart, Haine, and others stand for the negative side. Wiggers³ and Vermeersch^3a are for the affirmative side. It seems to be a dispute about words. The love of felicity on this earth, just like beatific love, is psychologically necessary, but it is not an act, but a habit (either innate or infused). But the individual acts which from this habit are indeed elicited necessarily, but not coercively,^3b are altogether according to and in no way against the will; moreover they are proper to man insofar as he is man, and for this reason nothing prevents them from being called human acts.^3c Whence Wiggers⁴ deservedly says: "It seems very absurd to despoil the most perfect operations of man, and those for which he was chiefly created, of the name and dignity of human action." Therefore some theologians do not call the act of beatific love human, but superhuman. But there is no disputing about words.

³ Commentary on I-II, q. 1, a. 1.

^3a Theol. mor. I, n. 38.

^3b St. Thomas (De malo q. 6, a. unic.) says: To desire beatitude is necessary to man "as to the determination of the act, because he cannot will the opposite; but not as to the exercise of the act, because someone can then not wish to think about beatitude, since even the particular acts themselves of intellect and will are."

^3c If an act otherwise necessary could not be a human act, then Christ on this earth would not have elicited human acts in observing the divine precepts, because He could not transgress those precepts.

⁴ Commentary on I-II, q. 1, a. 1.

n. 28.

28. Note. St. Thomas⁵ says: "Moral acts and human acts are the same." Nevertheless the account of each is not the same; for an act is called human because it proceeds from reason and will, but it is called moral insofar as it is conformed to or deformed from right reason and divine law (cf. below, on the notion of morality, n. 99).

⁵ S. theol. I-II, q. 1, a. 3. This opinion of the Angelic Doctor is much truer than the opposite opinion defended by some, for example by Noldin, De princip. n. 63 at the end.

n. 29.

29. Divisions. Of human acts one is:

1. An elicited act and a commanded act. This division occurs very often in Moral Theology, but it is not explained by all in the same way. We call an act elicited which is produced immediately and formally by some power or habit; but a commanded act is one which is elicited by one power or by one habit, but from the command of another power or habit. Elicited acts of the will are, for example, to love, to hold in hatred, to consent, etc. An elicited act of the habit of faith is to believe; an elicited act of the virtue of justice is to render to each one what is his.⁶ A commanded act is a fast performed from the motive of penance; for it is elicited by the virtue of temperance, but commanded by the virtue of penance. Every act indeed is elicited, but not every act is commanded.

Even the highest powers of man not rarely act under the command of another. Thus the will itself can elicit commanded acts, as the Angelic Doctor expressly teaches: "An act of the will can be commanded."⁷ Only the first act of the will is to be excepted, namely, the simple volition of the end, which is not from the command of reason, but from the instinct of nature or of a higher cause.⁸ Experience testifying, inordinate passions in some men altogether command both the will and reason. - By the way, it is already permitted here to observe that, in a case in which one and the same act is elicited by one habit and commanded by another, that act derives its morality rather from the commanding habit than from the eliciting habit; for example, the virtue of mercy elicits an act of succoring the poor man, but this act of mercy is done from the motive or command of the love of God. In this case the act thus perfected pertains rather to the virtue of charity toward God. More broadly on this below, where there is discussion of the morality of acts from the end (n. 99 sqq.).

⁶ Many authors, such as the old Scholastics and Noldin, Tanquerey, Aertnys-Damen, take an elicited act as that which is immanent in the will, by which it is perfected and consummated, such as volition, choice, etc. But they call commanded acts those which are produced by other powers from the command of the will, for example, to think, to walk.

⁷ S. theol. I-II, q. 17, a. 5.

⁸ Cf. ibid. ad 3.

n. 30.

30. 2. An internal act, an external act. Again, authors do not use this division in the same way. According to some, internal acts are only acts elicited by the will, such as to love; for they are and remain in the will. But external acts are all acts commanded by the will, since they are outside the will and are elicited by internal powers (an interior act, for example, to understand) or external powers (an exterior act, for example, to walk). According to others, in the more common and clearer sense, those acts are called internal which are manifested by no external sign, for example, acts of faith, meditations, morose delectations, of evil joy, of evil desire, etc.; but those acts are external which are exercised through the external organs of the body, such as to steal, to fornicate, to genuflect, to sing psalmody, etc.

Note. a) An act outwardly perceptible remains external, although accidentally it is perceived by no one; and this indeed must be well attended to in the matter of censures. For a censure is not incurred unless, besides the other requisites, an external act has been committed. Hence if someone has denied the faith interiorly, he is not excommunicated; but if he has committed his denial to writing or uttered it, although no one else knows this, he incurs the censure.

b) There are authors who, besides external and internal acts, also distinguish mixed acts, namely, those which are exercised by external and internal powers at the same time; but this distinction is superfluous, not to say erroneous, since every external human act must at the same time proceed from an internal act, otherwise it is no longer a human act. Yet we concede that several interior acts can be joined to some external act; for example, mental prayer, study, etc., can be joined to walking.

n. 31.

31. 3. A good act, an evil act, an indifferent act, according as it is either conformed to right reason as the norm of morality, or deformed from it, or indifferent to right reason. For example, a good act is prayer to God, an evil act is a lie, an indifferent act is walking (considered objectively). Below (n. 129 sqq.) we shall prove that indifferent acts are not given except when taken in the abstract, but that in the concrete every act is either good or evil because of the end or the adjoining circumstances. A good or indifferent act is called a licit act insofar as it is prohibited by no law; but an evil act is the same as an illicit act.

n. 32.

32. 4. A natural act and a supernatural act, according as it is elicited by natural powers alone (for example, to think, to speak) or is produced by the help of supernatural grace (for example, to elicit an act of contrition, of faith, etc.). An act is not supernatural from the fact that it turns upon a supernatural object, but from the fact that it is elicited by a supernatural principle. Hence if someone considers the mystery of the Trinity by the light of natural reason alone, he does not elicit a supernatural act; on the contrary, if someone by the help of grace resists a carnal temptation, he performs a supernatural act. - All supernatural acts elicited in this life are meritorious⁹ (either de condigno or at least de congruo, properly or broadly so called).

⁹ Cf. below, on merit, n. 139.

n. 33.

33. 5. A valid act and an invalid act, according as it either has or lacks the necessary conditions prescribed by positive law for producing some certain effect. This distinction often comes into use in sacraments and contracts. Thus, for example, the act of baptizing is valid if all things pertaining to the essence of baptism are observed; otherwise it is invalid. An invalid act is not to be confused with a rescindible act, since the latter is valid in itself, but can be annulled by competent authority.

n. 34.

34. Scholion. On the genesis of the human act. Here it is permitted briefly to add the series of acts both of the intellect and of the will which, according to St. Thomas,¹⁰ must concur for any external moral work. They are twelve, namely, six on the part of the will, five on the part of the intellect, and one on the part of the executive powers. Therefore, first there are six acts elicited by the will, of which three turn upon the end and three upon the means to the end. Concerning the end: simple volition, intention, and fruition. Concerning the means to the end: consent, choice, and active use. To these six acts of the will correspond five acts on the part of the intellect, and on the part of the executive powers only one act. On the part of the intellect there are two concerning the end, namely, simple apprehension and judgment; three concerning the means, namely, counsel, discretive judgment, and command. That act which is elicited by the executive powers is called by the scholastics passive use. Now the order of all these acts is the following: The first act is on the part of the intellect, namely, cognition or simple apprehension of the end to be obtained, for example, health of body to be recovered. This act of the intellect is followed in the will by simple volition, which is the bare complacency or love of the good to be had. This act in itself is ineffective, for it is only a wish; yet it disposes the intellect to considering whether the loved good can be had. Therefore a third act approaches, and indeed on the part of the intellect, namely, judgment that the loved end can be obtained, for example, that lost health is truly recoverable. After this act of the intellect there follows in the will an efficacious intention of actually obtaining the proposed and possible end through means.¹¹ These four acts having been posited concerning the end itself, the intellect attentively inquires about suitable means to be employed for obtaining the end; this act indeed is called counsel or consultation about means. In the example brought forward this counsel would be the deliberation of the sick man or of the physician, by what means health is to be obtained. Such counsel having been had, there follows on the part of the will an act which is called consent, by which it approves and appetitively seeks the usefulness of the means. By force of this consent the intellect is applied to discerning in particular what means are to be employed; this discernment indeed is called discretive judgment. This having been had, the will truly chooses or appetitively seeks the means thus proposed in particular by the intellect; this act is called choice or the appetite of what has been pre-counseled.¹² For example, all things having been weighed, the sick man chooses a surgical operation for recovering health. Once the particular choice has been completed, the intellect commands the execution of the means chosen; this act is called command. To this command on the part of the will there corresponds the application of the executive powers to the work, which act is called active use. The executive powers obey this application of the will and truly execute the external work, which act is called passive use; for example, the sick man goes to the hospital and prepares all things for the surgical operation. Finally, all these acts having been premised, the intended end is obtained and the will rejoices and rests in it; this act indeed is called fruition in the possessed end; for example, the surgical operation having been happily performed, health is recovered, and the man, who previously was sick, now rejoices in perfect health. - All these things are explained more broadly by the Angelic Doctor in the cited place. We have made mention of them, not indeed because of immediate practical utility, since that twelvefold number of acts is wont to be performed so quickly that the agent does not become conscious of all of them, but to show how accurately and wisely the scholastics made an analysis of human acts.

¹⁰ S. theol. I-II, q. 8-17.

¹¹ Intention is distinguished from simple volition in this, that simple volition has as its object the good as such; but intention has the good as attainable through the means necessarily to be employed (cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 12, a. 1 ad 4). Whence, properly speaking, God indeed wills His goodness, but He does not intend it, since He does not need means for having it.

¹² S. theol. I-II, q. 14, a. 1. Concerning the relation between consent and choice, see ibid. q. 15, a. 3.

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tr. II, Ch. II, Art. I, § 1. On The Advertence Required For A Human Act

n. ¶28.

Divisions. Advertence, which is the act by which the mind attends to something, is distinguished:

n. 36.

36. 1. Full and half-full. Full advertence is that by which a man capable of the use of reason perfectly notices the things which he does. Half-full is called that in which, because of some obstacle, the mind does not fully advert to the act or its morality. Thus, for example, actions are wont to occur with half-full advertence during drowsiness.

2. Distinct and confused. The first is that by which a man clearly and distinctly perceives the act and its morality; for example, if one committing incest clearly knows that a twofold malice is included in this act. The other is that by which a man indeed adverts that he is acting badly or well, but does not clearly distinguish the morality of the act.

3. Actual and virtual. The first is that by which a man actually attends both to the physical act and to its morality. The other is that which indeed is not actually present, but could and morally ought to have been present; because of an obstacle, however, the mind does not fully advert to the act.

n. 37.

37. Principle. Virtual advertence (which by some is less correctly called interpretative) certainly suffices so that some act can truly be called human.

The reason is that although virtual advertence is physically actual inadvertence, nevertheless morally (by force of advertence and of an actual intention previously had) it truly flows into the act and causes it so that it occurs according to the free intention of the agent. From this three things follow:

1. Virtual advertence suffices for constituting a venial sin. Thus all.

2. Virtual advertence suffices for the valid administration of sacraments. Thus again all; at least if the sacrament of matrimony is excepted, in which not unsuitably actual advertence is required by some in the contracting parties, who are the ministers of this sacrament.

3. Virtual advertence suffices for true prayer and notably for the divine office. Thus also all. - As a general rule it can be held: Other things being equal, the degree of the morality of the act is measured by the degree of advertence. Whence the less advertence there is, the less voluntary is the act thus arisen. And concerning the morality of acts committed with actual inadvertence, that which the Angelic Doctor writes concerning ignorance is valid - for inadvertence is nothing other than actual ignorance: "Because every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish sin insofar as it diminishes the voluntary. But if it does not diminish the voluntary, in no way does it diminish sin."²

It was disputed between Patuzzi and St. Alphonsus whether virtual advertence would suffice even for mortal sin, or whether actual advertence would be required.³ Yet there seems not to be so great a real difference between the disputants. For among all it is agreed that perfect cognition and perfect liberty are required for mortal sin, and therefore, if either one is lacking, mortal sin is not present. Therefore the question remains whether virtual advertence is still sufficiently perfect cognition. Theoretically speaking, a negative response must be given, since virtual advertence is truly actual lack of consideration and distraction of mind, which certainly are incompatible with perfect cognition. But practically speaking, one must first investigate whether actual inadvertence is indirectly willed and gravely culpable or not, for example, because of culpable negligence or passion or an evil habit. But if it is indirectly willed and culpable, it certainly suffices for mortal sin. Hence, for example, he who has a habit (not retracted) of blaspheming, even if here and now while blaspheming he does not attend to the malice of this act, nevertheless sins gravely. The reason is that he who knowingly does not fight against an evil habit of blaspheming foresees with moral certainty that he will often break out into blasphemies with or without actual advertence. But if he does not prevent this, all following acts of blasphemy are truly mortal sins, because they are indirectly willed. On the contrary, a good Catholic who is accustomed diligently to observe ecclesiastical laws, if from inadvertence he eats meat on Friday, sins in no way.

² S. theol. I-II, q. 76, a. 4. Billuart treats this whole question concerning inadvertence very well, De peccat. diss. 5, a. 6.

³ Cf. Patuzzi, Eth. christ. tract. 2, c. 3, and St. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 4, who explains the true doctrine very well.

n. 38.

38. Note. According to the diverse actual advertence of the mind, acts of three kinds are customarily distinguished: 1. first-first acts, which precede all advertence;⁴ 2. second-first acts, which proceed with half-full advertence, for example, acts which occur in drowsiness, when a man neither sleeps perfectly nor is perfectly awake; 3. second acts, which proceed from perfect advertence.

⁴ Cf. above, n. 26.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 39 passages

Vol. I, General Moral Theology, Treatise: On Human Acts in Themselves

n. ¶1.

Introduction

S. Th. I-II, q. 1 and q. 21.

47. Notion of a Human Act. - After the treatise on the ultimate end, human acts must be considered, by which we must arrive at that end.

According to St. Thomas, who first of all wrote a distinct treatise on human acts:

Cf. our article: Le traite des Actions humaines dans la Morale thomiste, in Revue des Sc. phil. et theol. 1926.

Those actions alone are properly called human which are proper to man insofar as he is man, or which proceed from a man acting insofar as he differs from irrational creatures, not only as to substance but also as to the mode of operating.

But he differs in the mode of operating from irrational creatures insofar as he acts freely, and thus is master of his acts.

Hence those actions alone are properly called human of which man is master.

But he is master of his acts through deliberation of reason and election of will.

Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will. Other actions, however, which are done by man, are called acts of man; and although some are human as to substance, for example necessary actions of intellect and will, nevertheless they are not human as to the mode of operating, nor properly human, since they are not of man acting as man (q. 1, a. 1).

Therefore a human act can be defined as an act which proceeds from the deliberate will of man (q. 1, a. 1), or as an act which, proceeding from reason, is voluntary (De Malo 2, a. 6).

St. Thomas sometimes asserts that acts are human insofar as they are from reason (e.g., Q. D. De Malo 2, a. 4 and 6; I-II, q. 88, a. 6; q. 63, a. 2; q. 19, a. 1, ad 3; q. 18, a. 5 and 9; q. 58, a. 2; III, q. 19, a. 2), sometimes insofar as they are from deliberate will (De Malo 2, a. 5; a. 4, ad 10; a. 7, a. 3; I-II, q. 18, a. 5 and 6; q. 19, a. 1; Q. D. De Veritate 5, a. 10; II Sent. d. 24, q. 3, a. 2; d. 41, q. 2, a. 1; C. Gent. II, 23; III, 9-10). But there is no contradiction. They are from deliberate will as from the immediate and formal principle and proximate foundation; from reason as from the first, radical principle, and therefore the higher regulating principle: for reason, as the first principle, is their measure, and it also is the very thing which can order to the end, which is the principle in things to be done. Hence all acts which proceed from rational powers are human, whether through essence, or through participation, as is the concupiscible and irascible appetite. Cf. II Sent. d. 25, q. 1, a. 3.

Hence:

The following are not human:

a) acts (of vegetative or sensitive life) which man has in common with beasts both as to substance and as to mode of operating, such as eating, seeing, walking, sensing without deliberation;

b) acts of one who is incapable of deliberating: an infant, one fully sleeping, one delirious, drunk, or mad, one perfectly dependent upon the influence of hypnotism;

c) acts of one who can deliberate but which are placed without any deliberation, e.g., by a man fully distracted: these are called first-first movements.

Acts proper to man as to substance, such as understanding, willing, laughing, weeping, wondering, speaking, nevertheless are not human unless they are done from deliberation; on the contrary, acts common with beasts, such as eating, drinking, rubbing the beard, walking, are human if they are done from deliberation.

Beatific love, although it is an act proper to man as to substance, nevertheless is not such as to the mode of operating, because it is not free; whence it is not a human act.

It can nevertheless be called eminently human: for the necessary voluntary in the love of the highest good with full universality is the root of freedom, and therefore contains the free virtually and eminently, and so such an act is human eminently but not formally. Cf. Billuart and Gredt in o. c.

48. Properties of a Human Act.

Human acts, so called insofar as they are posited according to the mode of acting proper to men, are also called free insofar as they proceed from a free will; moral insofar as they are conformed or deformed with the rules of morals, inclination to the ultimate end, right reason, law, and therefore have the character of rectitude or sin; imputable insofar as they can be attributed to man as author and master, who must render an account of them, and thus are worthy of praise or blame, praiseworthy or culpable; meritorious insofar as they are referred to another into whose profit or harm they yield, whether an individual person, or a community, or God, the ruler of the universe and ultimate end.

Imputability and responsibility differ. Imputation is the attribution of a moral act, or the judgment by which a moral act is attributed to the author as master of the act itself; whence imputability is the property of a human act by reason of which it is attributed to the author as master of the act itself. - The concept of responsibility is related; but imputability is on the part of the act, responsibility on the part of the agent: the act is imputable, man is responsible in his act. Responsibility is the property by force of which man is obliged to answer for his acts. It is twofold: moral and juridical, according as someone must answer in the forum of conscience or in the external forum before a judge. Thus Lehu, Philosophia Moralis et Socialis, c. 4, a. 2.

All these acts are really the same, although they are distinguished by reason insofar as they are considered under a diverse respect (q. 21).

Cajetan, in I-II, q. 21, a. 1: "A human act is constituted in the being of good or evil as if from a formal cause, and upon this is founded that from order to the end it has the notion of right or sin, from order to the efficient cause, of praiseworthy or culpable, from order to another, of meritorious or demeritorious." Conformably to St. Thomas: "Thus therefore it is clear that a good or evil act has the notion of praiseworthy or culpable according as it is in the power of the will; but the notion of rectitude and sin according to order to the end; but the notion of merit and demerit according to the retribution of justice toward another" q. 21, a. 3.

49. Division of the Treatise. - The treatise is divided into three parts:

The first treats of human acts according to material or physical and psychological being:

A. Concerning the condition of human acts: 1) concerning the subjective element of the human act: a) concerning the voluntary, both according to itself, and positive and negative, direct and indirect, and in itself and in cause; b) concerning the impediments of the voluntary, that is, violence, fear, concupiscence, ignorance; c) concerning the free; d) concerning the impediments of the free, namely, passion, habit, and more remote impediments; 2) concerning the objective element of the human act: a) the object, b) circumstances.

B. Concerning the division of human acts: a) elicited acts; b) commanded acts.

The second part treats of human acts according to formal or moral being:

A. Concerning the morality of human acts in general: 1) concerning the essence and species of morality; 2) concerning the foundations of morality: a) concerning the intrinsic distinction between good and evil; b) concerning the subjective criterion or norm of morality; c) concerning the objective criterion and ultimate foundation of morality; d) concerning errors to be noted in this matter; e) concerning the cognitive faculty of morality; 3) concerning the principles or sources of morality in general; 4) concerning the specific distinction between a good and an evil act; 5) concerning the specific distinction between various good or evil acts a) from the object, b) from circumstances, c) from the end.

B. Concerning the morality of human acts in species: 1) concerning the goodness and malice of the interior act; 2) concerning the goodness and malice of the exterior act; 3) concerning the goodness and malice of the external effect; 4) concerning the goodness and malice of the passions; 5) concerning the goodness and malice of other circumstances.

The third part treats of human acts according to supernatural and meritorious being: 1) concerning supernatural merit; 2) concerning the conditions of merit.

n. 50.

50. The Treatise Is at Once Theological and Philosophical.

n. 50.

In the established division, the first part is rather philosophical, providing notions necessary for the understanding of the remaining parts; the third is wholly theological, as treating of the supernatural element; the second is at once theological and philosophical, because it is taken not only from reason but also from revelation. For revelation, by divine oral tradition and partly by the sacred Scriptures, also and more certainly teaches us the most universal moral principles and their immediate and more general conclusions, from which the whole moral science is deduced. Whence to declare, confirm, explain, and apply these belongs to theology as to philosophy.

51. Importance of the Treatise.

The treatise is the most principal of all, because it is:

More universal, since it hands down the most general notions and principles of the whole moral science, to be applied in all parts; and therefore

More fundamental, because upon it the edifice of the whole moral science is built. For moral science treats of nothing except human acts, and all other things, whether ends, means, rules or counsels, virtues or vices, it considers only insofar as they pertain to human acts. Whence the treatise is entitled concerning human acts in themselves. Hence

It is more necessary: for it is impossible to acquire for oneself a knowledge, not common or merely historical, of moral things, but scientific, founded in reasonings, unless the doctrine concerning human acts is well understood and rightly applied.

Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology

Aloysius Sabetti, S.J., and Timothy Barrett, S.J. — 2 passages

Vol. I, Tr. I, Chapter I. On the Notion of Human Acts