Article — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
First Article. On The Nature Of Human Acts
40. Definition. Human acts in the broadest sense are called all those which are done by man, and they are rightly divided into acts of man and acts strictly and properly human.
If human acts taken in the broadest sense are compared with the acts of brutes, there are found acts which are common to man with brutes, for man is a rational animal, and acts which are proper to man, for man is a rational animal. And indeed acts of four kinds can be distinguished: a. some are common to man with brutes both as to substance and as to the mode of operating, such as seeing, hearing, walking; b. others are proper to man as to substance, but common with brutes as to the mode of operating, such as spiritual acts, understanding and willing, which, like acts of brutes, happen necessarily or indeliberately; c. others are common to man with brutes as to substance, but proper as to the mode of operating, such as sensitive acts, seeing, hearing, walking, which are done deliberately; d. finally, others are proper to man both as to substance and as to the mode of operating, such as spiritual acts, understanding and willing, which are done deliberately.
- Those are called acts of man which are common to man with brutes, because they do not depend upon the free will, such as acts of sensing, acts of thinking, and acts of willing which are done indeliberately.
To acts of man belong: a. acts which are done by man when he does not actually have the use of reason, as are infants, the drunk, the sleeping, and the delirious; b. acts which are done by man actually having the use of reason indeed, but not using reason, such as acts of the intellect, will, imagination, and motions of the sensitive appetite which precede advertence of the mind.
- Those are called human acts which are proper to man, because they depend upon free will, of which therefore man is master; and they are usually defined: acts which proceed from a deliberate will, that is, which are done with advertence of the mind and with the free consent of the will, such as free acts both of understanding and willing, and also of sensing.
a. That these alone are strictly and properly human is clear: for acts are called truly and properly human which are done by man insofar as he is man and differs from irrational creatures, or those which are proper to man as to the mode of operating, whether as to substance they are proper to man or common with brutes. But only acts which proceed from a deliberate will are of this kind: for the necessary acts of intellect and will are indeed truly proper to man and can be called human as to the substance of the action, but they are not proper to him and cannot be called human as to the mode of action, because that proper mode of operating does not belong to them, namely to act with dominion over the act.
b. The reason why only acts which are done freely are called properly human and proper to man, insofar as man is a rational being, although there are also other acts proper to man, namely spiritual acts, is this: Since in moral doctrine it is asked which acts are proper to man, and in morals not the essence of acts but the operation is attended to, the essential difference between man and irrational beings is rightly taken not from the essence of the acts, but from the mode of operating. But the mode of operating proper to man, insofar as man is a rational being, is to operate freely or with dominion over the act.
1 St. Thomas I-II, q. 6-21. St. Alphonsus, l. 5, n. 144. Sporer-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis decalogalis (Paderborn: Typographia Bonifaciana, 1897), tr. 1, c. 2. Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theologicum morale^2 (Prato: Giachetti, 1880), tr. 1. Lehmkuhl, n. 1-40. Bouquillon, n. 318-408. G. Walsch, Tractatus de actibus humanis^2 (Dublin: Gill, 1891). F. Frins, De actibus humanis (Freiburg: Herder, 1897). Tepe, De actibus humanis, n. 1-107. Pesch III, n. 536 ff. Bucceroni, Commentarii de actibus humanis^2 (Rome: Typographia iuvenum opificum, 1906).
41. Division of human acts. 1. Some human acts are elicited, others commanded. Those are called elicited which proceed from the will and are completed in it, such as acts of love, hatred, desire. Those are called commanded which, from the command of the will, are exercised by another power, whether internal, as an act of thinking, or external, as an act of walking.
a. Nothing prevents acts which proceed immediately not from the will but from another power from also being called elicited. Thus acts of thinking with respect to the intellect, acts of seeing and hearing with respect to the senses, can be called elicited. But since in moral matters only free acts are attended to, only acts of the will are usually called elicited.
b. The command of the will is called the act of the will by which the will moves the powers subject to itself to an act, or causes them to cease from an act. Thus the will can bring it about that the intellect think about some matter or cease to think about it, and likewise that the members of the body be moved or cease from motion.
c. The will exercises command over the intellect, the external senses, the sensitive appetite, and the motor power, insofar as this pertains to animal life. The operations of these powers, by force of this command, are and are called voluntary, free as to exercise, namely insofar as their exercise depends upon free will.1 Every commanded act is physically composed of a twofold act; morally, however, it is and is called one act.
d. The will can command not only the acts of other powers, but also its own acts, for example it can command itself to elicit acts of love of God. Therefore there are elicited acts of the will which are at the same time commanded.
e. Acts are also called elicited by reason of the internal motive, and commanded by reason of the external motive on account of which they are exercised. Thus prayer, which is an elicited act of religion, can be an act commanded by penance, if it is done for redeeming sins. From these things it is understood what theologians mean when they teach that one virtue commands the acts of other virtues, namely if someone, from the motive, for example, of charity, gives alms to the poor; charity is said to command the act of mercy.
- Some acts are internal, others external, others mixed. Internal acts are called those which are completed by the merely internal powers of the soul, such as an act of thinking. External acts are called those which are completed by the will through the external organs of the body, such as an act of walking or seeing. Mixed acts are called those which are exercised by external and internal powers together, such as attentive vocal prayer, or devout adoration through genuflection.
According to another way of considering, acts elicited by the will are called internal, and acts commanded by the will are called external, since they are external to the will, whether they are then exercised by internal or external powers.
Acts are good, evil, indifferent. Good acts are called those which are conformable to right reason; evil acts, those which are repugnant to right reason; indifferent acts, those which are neither conformable nor repugnant to right reason. These become good or evil especially from the end for the sake of which they are done. A good or indifferent act is also called lawful, because it is prohibited by no law; but an evil act is called unlawful, because it is opposed to either divine or human law.
Some acts are natural, others supernatural. Natural acts are called those which are produced by the powers of nature alone; supernatural acts, those which are completed by the help of divine grace. Acts, both natural and supernatural, are called meritorious insofar as they are worthy that some retribution be repaid to them.
The difference between natural and supernatural acts is taken not from the object of the act, but from the eliciting principle: for in order that an act be supernatural, a supernatural principle is required and suffices; on the contrary, a supernatural object is neither required nor sufficient. Surely an act of the intellect placed with the help of grace concerning a natural truth is supernatural; but an act placed without the help of grace concerning a revealed truth is not supernatural.
- Some acts are valid, others invalid. Valid acts are called those which possess all the requisites for producing their proper effect; invalid acts, those to which some condition necessary for this is lacking. Thus a vow is called valid which has the necessary conditions for inducing obligation. Valid acts are either rescindable or unrescindable, insofar as they can or cannot be rescinded, or deprived of their force, by human will, as vows and contracts can, but sacraments cannot.
1 On the command of the will over the other powers, cf. St. Thomas I-II, q. 17. Suarez, De voluntario, disp. 10. Cathrein, Moralphilosophie, p. 54 ff. Meyer, Institutiones iuris naturalis, p. 93 ff.