Chapter — Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology

Chapter I. On the Notion of Human Acts

1.

A human act is called only that act which proceeds from the deliberate will of man. The reason from St. Thomas is that only that act can be called truly human by which man acts insofar as he is man, and differs from irrational creatures; but he differs from them precisely from this, that through free will he is master of his own acts. Therefore.

Nor say, 1st, that man differs essentially from brutes through the act of understanding; for it is answered that this difference must be considered here not only as to the substance of the work, but also as to the mode of operating; wherefore the act of understanding can be called the proper act of man, but not a human act taken strictly.

Nor say, 2nd, that the act by which we seek our beatitude in general is a human act properly so called, since it is perfectly voluntary and proceeds from perfect knowledge; for it is answered that here we consider man as he is a moral being, and his actions as they are worthy of praise or blame; but such they are not except insofar as they proceed from free will, which is the foundation of imputability. Hence although a necessary act of the will, if it is regarded according to its physical entity, can be called human, nevertheless in moral consideration, and in the usage especially current among theologians, it cannot. Hence it follows that human, moral, and free acts signify the same thing in moral matters, and can be used promiscuously.

But other acts, which are not referred to morals and are done in man or by man without any deliberation, such as first-first movements, or acts of a man wholly distracted, dreaming, raving, insane, drunk, or deprived of the use of reason in any manner whatever, are called acts of man, but not human acts. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 1, art. 1. - Suarez, in 1-2, tract. 1, disp. 2, sect. 2, n. 7. Baller., note (a), p. 1.

2.

A human act is distinguished in many ways; for it is:

1st. Elicited or commanded. It is called elicited when it is consummated in the will itself, as an act of love, hatred, desire; but commanded when, at the command of the will, it is completed by another power, either internal, as an act of thinking, or external, as an act of walking, writing.

2nd. Internal or external. An internal act is that which is completed only by the internal powers of the soul, such as an act of thinking, loving; but an external or mixed act is that which the will completes through the organs of the body. An internal act is more specially called an act, and an external act is rather named an action.

3rd. Good, bad, indifferent. A good act is called that which is conformable to right reason; bad, that which is repugnant to the same; indifferent, that which is neither conformable to, nor repugnant to, the norm of reason.

A good or indifferent act, because it is prohibited by no law, is also called licit; but a bad act, because it is opposed to natural or positive law, is called illicit.

4th. Natural or supernatural. The former is that which is produced by the powers of nature alone; but the latter, that which is completed by the aid of divine grace. A supernatural act is further called meritorious either de condigno or de congruo, according as some retribution is repaid to it either from justice, or from mere fittingness and from the benignity of God.

5th. Valid or invalid. A valid act is that which enjoys all the essential requisites for producing its proper effect; but an invalid act is that which lacks even any one of the essentials.

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