What may be owned

WE will here consider the various objects which can be owned by men, and to the exclusive use of which they can lay claim as being due to them in justice. We saw above that God has reserved to himself the dominion of human life; he is the God of life and of death, so that an injury is done to God by suicide or by unjustifiable homicide. Not even the State can have the absolute ownership of human life; it can never directly kill the innocent, although, as far as the common good demands it, the State may take the life of malefactors, and may require that each and all should be ready to defend the common weal even at the risk of life itself. No one, then, but God has the absolute ownership of human life or of man’s limbs and members.

Each one, however, has a qualified ownership in the faculties which God has given him. His activities of mind and body have been granted to man that by using them in a proper way he may do good and avoid evil, and thus secure the end of human existence. A man, therefore, is under the obligation imposed by God of making use of his mental and bodily faculties, and he has a consequent right to do so, as far as he does not thereby injure others.

When man by his labour has produced something which serves his wants and convenience, he has a right to the fruit of his toil; this is his property, and he cannot be deprived of it without injustice. This applies to what he has produced with his own toil, out of his own material, with his own resources.

A man’s reputation, then, inasmuch as it is the fruit of his merit and industry, is his property, and he cannot be unwarrantably deprived of it without injustice. He may, however, surrender it himself for good reason; he may write his confessions, like St Augustine, for the purpose of self-humiliation and for the instruction and edification of others; otherwise he must have a care of his own good name, without which he can do little good, and may do great harm to others,

We saw above that no one except God can have an absolute property in man’s life or members. No man, then, can become the chattel of another so that he may lawfully be disposed of like a brute beast. Christian teaching has banished such an idea from Christendom at least. On the other hand, there is no difficulty in admitting that one man may make over his services to another for as long as he pleases. Theoretically, therefore, there seems no reason for saying that slavery is against the law of nature. We here understand by the term the state of perpetual subjection of one to another so that he owes that other his life service in return for board, lodging, and clothes. Practically, great abuses usually accompanied slavery, and we must allow that it is out of harmony with the spirit of the Gospel. Chiefly through the wise and gradual action of the Church, it has ceased to exist as an institution among civilized nations. However, we must not forget that penal servitude is still the just and recognized punishment for grave crime. Merely looking at the question from the point of view of the strict law of nature, we must acknowledge that a state of slavery arising from contract, or birth, or in punishment for crime, or as the result of a just war, is not in itself immoral.

Animals and the earth, together with all that they produce, may become man’s absolute property. God has imposed on him the obligation of maintaining himself and those who are dependent upon him, and he has-a consequent right to make his own whatever is necessary and useful for that purpose, if it has not been appropriated by someone else. He has a right to provide not only for his immediate wants, but for the future also; not only for himself, but for his offspring. In other words, nature herself gives man the right of private property. This right is not given by the State; it is anterior to the State, and its preservation and defence is one of the chief reasons for the existence of the State. It may indeed be regulated by the State, as far as is necessary for the common good, but it is beyond the power of the State to do away with it.¹ No Catholic is at liberty to deny the lawfulness of private property and its necessity in the general conditions of the modern world.

Socialists, indeed, advocate the nationalization of the land and of all the means of production and exchange as a sovereign cure for the economic evils of the world. The plan militates against the right of private property; it is unworkable, and even if it could be introduced it would be no cure for existing evils, and would introduce other new ones. The fuller treatment of this, a practical question in our days, scarcely belongs to moral theology; it is not in the confessional that such questions are treated. The student should consult books on ethics, or special works written on socialism or collectivism.

¹ Leo XIII, on the Condition of Labour, May 15, 1891.

Goods in relation to man are distinguished into:

1. Internal goods, to which belong goods of the body, such as life and members; likewise goods of the soul, both natural, such as faculties, sciences, and so forth, and supernatural, such as grace, virtues, and so forth.

2. External goods, such as houses, fields, money, in a word, goods of fortune. External goods are divided:

a) Into movable and immovable goods. Movable goods are those which can easily be transferred from place to place, such as money, furniture, and so forth. Immovable goods are those which are in no way, or only with difficulty, transferred.

b) Into consumable and non-consumable goods, according as the use of them consists, or does not consist, in their very consumption. Thus, for example, grain is consumable, but a book is non-consumable.

c) Into fungible and non-fungible goods. Fungible goods are those of which one can stand in the place of another of the same species, because it makes no difference whether the same thing individually, or another of the same species, is had; thus one who has borrowed money is not bound to return the same money individually. Non-fungible goods are those of which one cannot be substituted for another of the same species; thus one who has stolen a horse is bound to return the same individual horse.

3. Intermediate goods, namely reputation and honor, which, although they are founded in good qualities, nevertheless formally exist in others, who think well of someone or honor him. For the rest, compare also the division of goods or things with attention to the law of one's country. Moreover:

I. A man does not have direct ownership, but he does have useful ownership, of those goods which pertain to his substance and integrity, such as life, members, and the faculties of the soul. The first is proved from Sacred Scripture: "See that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me: I shall kill, and I shall make live."¹ The reason is that direct ownership exists only over a thing distinct from him who has ownership. Besides, ownership imports a certain superiority with respect to the thing of which direct ownership is had. But no one is superior to himself. The latter is clear; for to what end would those goods have been granted by God, if man lacked the right of using them?

II. A man has full ownership of those internal goods which do not pertain to his substance and integrity, such as operations and habits produced by natural activity. The reason is that a man is the owner of those things which he has acquired by his own industry. The same seems to be said in some way of grace, of habits, and of supernatural acts. For it is rightly admitted that these have truly been given by God as a gift to man. There is added, as regards an adult, that "through the use of free will with the help of God, man disposes himself to such goods, and therefore they are effects of cooperating grace, because man obtains them from God by cooperating with His help for receiving them."²

III. A man has full ownership of reputation and honor. The reason is that a man has acquired these by his own labor. Besides, "if a man were not owner of his own reputation, he could not condone or remit restitution of it; for no one can remit what is not his own. But nevertheless this is often done, and is done laudably."³

One who without proportionate cause neglects his reputation is guilty of the sin of prodigality, just as one who without cause dissipates riches.⁴ Hence Sacred Scripture says: "Have care for a good name; for this will remain to you more than a thousand precious and great treasures. The number of days of a good life is limited; but a good name will remain forever."⁵ This warning must especially be attended to if our reputation is necessary to our neighbors.

"Our reputation," says Lessius,⁶ "can be necessary to our neighbors in three ways. First, when the reputation of a neighbor so depends on our reputation that from our disgrace his disgrace follows; as from the disgrace of a monk there follows a certain disgrace of the monastery. Second, when our reputation is necessary so that we may render to a neighbor an office due to him by strict right; as the reputation of a public person, a Bishop, a Pastor, an Abbot, is necessary so that he may govern subjects well; and in these two events, in the judgment of many, one who disgraces himself sins against justice: not because precisely he deprives himself of reputation, but because as a consequence he harms his neighbor, either by bringing disgrace upon him, or by rendering himself unfit to perform the due office for him. Third, when we are bound to benefit a neighbor not from office but only from charity, and through disgrace we are rendered unfit for this, then one who disgraces himself sins only against charity; just as he sins against charity who throws away money by which he could have benefited the poor."

IV. A man can have full ownership of external goods or goods of fortune, provided they are such that they can be the object of ownership. The truth of the proposition is clear both from Sacred Scripture⁷ and from those things which we said concerning the legitimacy and necessity of private ownership.

I said, however: provided they are such that they can be the object of ownership. In order that this can have place, it is required: 1. that the thing can be subjected to man or occupied by him; hence, for example, the stars are excluded; 2. that the thing can be useful; nevertheless, observe that sometimes a thing which seems useless can be for some use; 3. that the thing is not of inexhaustible use, that is, such that all can use it without harm to anyone, of which sort are, for example, air and daylight.

To the question to what extent the sea can be the object of ownership, Waffelaert responds thus: "If there is question of the vast ocean, then it can scarcely be guarded; then certainly the use, which is major fishing and navigation, is inexhaustible. But if there is question of the parts of the sea washing the land, of gulfs and straits, the use, which is fishing, the finding of pearls and other precious things, the collecting of shells, and so forth, is not inexhaustible, especially since things of this sort and certain kinds of fish are frequently found in determinate and not very spacious places. Besides, provision would not be sufficiently made for the security of a maritime nation if, without any precaution, it were lawful for anyone to bring armed ships to the shore."⁸

V. A man cannot have direct ownership of those goods which pertain to the substance and integrity of the members of another; nevertheless he can acquire useful ownership of them. It is said:

1. A man cannot have direct ownership of those goods which pertain to the substance and integrity of the members of another. This is clear from the fact that ownership imports that the thing of which someone is owner is referred to him as to an end. But it is repugnant that one man be referred to another as to an end.

2. Nevertheless he can have useful ownership of these. This is clear from Sacred Scripture,⁹ and from those things which we shall say concerning the different titles on which the aforesaid ownership can rest. Moreover, the said ownership or servitude, by which someone is bound to furnish all his works to another for food and other things necessary for life, can be introduced:

a) By free agreement; for since man has useful ownership of himself, he can freely transfer it, and indeed entirely, to another.

b) By just condemnation, or as a penalty for a delict; as is clear.

c) By right of war, and by birth from slaves; these, however, with every fault set aside, even original fault, cannot be just titles. "There is," says St. Thomas, "a twofold subjection, one servile, according to which the one presiding uses the subject for his own utility; and such subjection was introduced after sin" (I, q. 92, a. 1, ad 2; I, q. 96, a. 4).

Corollary. Servitude which is extended so far that a man, as if an irrational animal with respect to his works, can be bought and sold, is altogether unbecoming to man, and therefore is judged to be abolished by law.¹⁰

VI. An author has a right in the fruit of his mind, that is, in literary, musical, or other works of the liberal arts; an inventor has a right in the art or industry invented, according as follows:

1. When the work has not yet been published by the author, he certainly has the right that another not seize and publish the manuscript, or steal the secret, for example of a known art. One who has violated that right is bound to restitution of the damage thence following; and therefore, if the author would have published the work, he must compensate the damage hoped for from publication. The same must be said of one who uses knowledge to which he has come by fraud or from a communication made by the author under secrecy.

2. When the work has been published in some measure, for example a writing printed for private use, lectures given, sermons delivered, the author seems to have the right that another not publish it. The reason is that from the circumstances themselves and from common estimation, the aforesaid things have not yet been made simply of public right, but he has retained them as his own. This posited, another also seems to lack the right of making them of public right. Nevertheless custom permits some publication, or even an entire publication, of sermons in newspapers.

3. When the work has been plainly published, one must speak thus:

a) With natural law considered, it is disputed whether the author has the right that another not further disseminate the work, for example by reprinting it.¹¹ Moreover, the opinion which is theoretically sufficiently probable and therefore safe in practice denies this, both because a work published by the author by that very fact becomes of public right, or destined for common use, and because the buyer of the work acquires ownership of it, and therefore can use it according to his will.

Finally, for the same reason the doctrine handed down seems also to be applied to a law which grants someone the right or privilege of using a commercial trademark exclusively.

Corollary I. If someone, within the limits determined by civil law, inflicts some detriment on an author or seller, he does not sin against justice; for by the very fact that civil law determines the right of authors, beyond these limits it takes away their right, if perhaps it exists, by force of high ownership. The same holds concerning international agreements.

Corollary II. The custom even of God-fearing persons commonly permits many things against the right of authors and inventors, namely: 1. the right of buying what has been publicly displayed, even though contrary to law; 2. the right of representing scenic and musical works in circles; 3. the right of making for private use some work for the manufacture of which the author's license is required, because the damage which the inventor suffers, if he suffers any, is very slight, since often it would not have been bought. From the said custom, laws which prohibit the things set forth rather seem to be merely penal.

Objection 1. The author has the right of receiving a fitting reward from the work.

Resp. The assertion is very ambiguous and must be distinguished: the author has the right that others buy the work and thus procure a reward for him, I deny; he has the right that others, for example by reprinting the work, not be the cause why less profit comes to the author, this must be proved; indeed, on account of the arguments adduced, it seems it must be denied.

Objection 2. Authors, at least today, by exposing their works for sale, add the tacit condition that others not reproduce the work by their own authority; in other words, authors sell the spiritual use, but not the commercial use of the work.

Resp. Besides the fact that that condition is asserted gratuitously, it seems one must deny that a condition so vague or indeterminate is validly attached.

Concerning the right of religious in manuscripts and so forth, we shall speak in the treatise on the duties of religious.

b) With civil law considered, which, as order and natural equity demand, has commonly determined this matter, an author, that is, a writer or inventor, seems to have a strict right to those things which the law establishes for his advantage; for legislators in this case expressly declare that they grant the author an exclusive right. Unless the nature of the thing or the context of the law suggests something else, this word seems to be understood of a full or strict right. Nor again should it be objected that the legislator does not care about obligation in conscience; for the explicit or implicit intention of granting a right suffices. Hence a transgressor of the law is bound to restitution of damage even before the sentence of a judge; but penalties established against transgressors do not oblige except after the sentence of a judge.

Some,¹² indeed, do not apply the doctrine handed down to inventors to whom patents (brevets) have been granted, because they are accustomed to increase too much the natural price of the invented thing, which is against the common good. But the fact that they act thus does not seem to impede Authority from being able to grant them a right in the thing invented and published; and that in fact it has granted them a right is to be deduced from the fact that, with the terms of the law considered, it equates them with writers and so forth.

¹ Deut. 32:39.

² Salmanticenses, tract XII, chapter 2, point 5, n. 46.

³ Billuart, IV, dissertation 3, article 2.

⁴ Billuart, loc. cit.

⁵ Ecclus. 41:15 ff.

⁶ Book 2, chapter IV, doubt XI, n. 59.

⁷ Gen. 1:28, 29; 9:1, 3; Ps. 8:7-9.

⁸ De Iustitia, I, n. 88.

⁹ Exod. chapter 21; Lev. chapter 25; Deut. chapters 20-21; cf. Eph. 6:5.

¹⁰ Cf. Leo XIII, letter In plurimis, May 5, 1888.

¹¹ Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 904; Goepfert (II, 68) and Sweens (n. 39), who affirm; Waffelaert (I, 171) and Vermeersch (n. 248), who deny.

¹² Vermeersch, Quaestiones de Iustitia, n. 250.

537. • Principles. I. Man has useful dominion of the goods which are intrinsic to him, namely of soul and body. Therefore he can, without injury to anyone, use them for his own utility, and for every use not prohibited by law.

Yet he does not have direct dominion of these goods. This is established from Sacred Scripture; thus Wisd. 16. 13: "You are, O Lord, who have power of life and death." - Likewise Deut. 32. 39: "I shall kill, and I shall make alive." - It is also established from natural law, as we said where treating of the fifth precept of the Decalogue, n. 389 and following.

538. • II. Man can have useful and direct dominion in external goods of fortune legitimately acquired. This is established, 1. as to useful dominion, because on the one hand these goods are of themselves apt for promoting the preservation or utility of man, and on the other hand the use of them is not opposed to divine and human right; indeed God Himself permitted at least the utility of the aforesaid goods by these words, Gen. 1. 28: "Have dominion over the fishes of the sea and the birds of the air," etc. - And Ps. 8. 8: "You have subjected all things under his feet." - It is established, 2. as to direct dominion, because the faculty of applying goods of fortune to one's own uses is restricted by no right; indeed it is expressly permitted by human right, as is clear from the various laws concerning the right of possessing, and by divine right in the words cited: "Have dominion," etc.

539. • Questions. Q. 1. Whether man has dominion of his own reputation?

Resp. Affirmatively, according to the common opinion; for even concerning reputation there belong to man the primary acts of dominion, such as to acquire it by labor, to condone restitution of it, etc. Therefore... Yet prudence requires that he not squander it without just reason, and sometimes he is bound under grave sin to preserve it carefully by reason of scandal, of removing harm to the family, etc. - St. Lig., lib. 3, n. 983. - Billuart, diss. 3, art. 2.

Q. 2. Whether man can have dominion over another man?

Resp. 1. Negatively, as to dominion of property; for that belongs to God alone, as is established from what has been said, n. 522.

Resp. 2. Affirmatively, as to useful dominion, or the works of man. The reason is that any man is master of his own work, and therefore he can alienate it for his own utility and hand it over into the dominion of another. For a master can dispose at will of the object of his dominion.

Hence 1. by natural right a man can even sell himself to another forever as to useful dominion. For if he can confer upon another the useful dominion of himself for some time, he can do the same forever, since he can yield whatever he has. 2. Per se servitude is not repugnant to the law of nature, or the state of perpetual subjection by which someone, in exchange for food, is bound to furnish all his works to another.

540. • Q. 3. From what titles can servitude be introduced?

Resp. From the four following titles: 1. From pact, or one's own renunciation. For it is not repugnant that someone renounce his liberty in order to relieve his own need, etc. - 2. From the right of war. For it is not repugnant that the victor should sometimes inflict this punishment. For sometimes he could kill captives for the security of the nation; therefore, a fortiori, reduce them to servitude. - 3. From an offense, or from just condemnation. For if a guilty person can be condemned to death, a fortiori to servitude, since deprivation of life is deservedly considered the greatest of all punishments. - 4. From birth in a state of servitude, since by law they are slaves who are born of slaves. Thus according to the law of nations, in accordance with the common opinion. - Lugo, disp. 6, n. 11 and 17.

541. • Q. 4. Whether the trade in Negroes is lawful?

Resp. 1. It is altogether unlawful by every right, as often as Negroes are unjustly despoiled of liberty, and are transported in bands from their own regions as cheap cattle, and are sold, as happens in their nefarious trade (Traites des Nègres). Against so monstrous a trade there have come forth various Apostolic Constitutions, namely of Paul III, Urban VIII, Benedict XIV, and lately Gregory XVI, in the Constitution In supremo apostolatus, December 3, 1839, as may be seen in the public sheet called Ami de la Religion, tom. 103, n. 3219.

Resp. 2. But if it is a matter of Black persons or others existing in legitimate servitude, it is not per se absolutely unlawful, because once servitude has been admitted as legitimate, the master has a true right in slaves, or in their works, and therefore is able to transmit it to others. I said, per se; for circumstances can stand in the way, for example, if a spouse would have to be separated from a spouse, or if civil laws forbid it, just as in reality servitude is generally interdicted in Europe.

32. The goods of body and soul are of a twofold kind: some which are not distinguished from man himself, such as life (soul and body), the faculties of the soul, and the members of the body; others which are distinguished from man himself, inasmuch as they proceed from him and from his faculties, although they inhere in him, such as actions (not their external effects), both natural and supernatural, and habits, whether acquired or infused. - Concerning these goods let the following propositions be given.

33. Thesis: Man has useful dominion, but not direct dominion, over the internal goods which are not distinguished from himself.

The first part is proved (as to useful dominion). It is certain. For man has all those rights which God has granted to him; but God, by the very fact that He created and conserves man, and assigned to him a supernatural end, granted to him useful dominion over the goods internal to him, as altogether necessary for attaining his end.

The second part is proved (as to direct dominion). Thus commonly. The right of disposing of his own life cannot be attributed to man unless he has received it from God, either absolutely, so that he can use it in all cases and at will, or relatively, that is, for certain determinate cases and grave causes. But neither can be said to have been granted to man by God.

1. Not an absolute right. For the primary end of divine creation is that man promote the glory of God, and the secondary end is that he perfect himself and serve other men; and to obtain this end God assigned to man duties from the execution of which the whole harmony of the moral world ought to result. But that end would be endangered if it were permitted to each one at will to leave the course of life, since the possibility of greater perfection would vanish and society would suffer grave harm.

2. Not a relative right. For the express consent of God is lacking, nor can tacit consent be invoked; for, from the things to be said in nn. 297, 298, 299, 300, where we speak of suicide, the reasons alleged have no force.

Therefore man cannot, whether at will or for grave causes, dispose of internal goods which are not distinguished from himself.

Hence it is seen how the texts are to be interpreted: "I will kill and I will make to live,"¹ "For You are, O Lord, He who has power of life and death,"² and especially the precept of the Decalogue: You shall not kill.

¹ Deut. XXXII, 39.

² Wis. XVI, 13-14.

34. Thesis: Man has full dominion over internal goods which are distinguished from himself.

For from the things said in the preceding proposition, man has useful dominion over his faculties, whose actions and the goods acquired by them can be regarded as fruits; but each one has full dominion over those things which he acquires by his own industry, or produces by his own activity: therefore man can dispose at will of internal goods which are distinguished from himself, without violating justice toward God.

With regard to supernatural habits, it must be noted that they are infused gratuitously, and therefore that they and their acts are less perfectly subject to the dominion of man, although it cannot be said that a man is unjust who disposes of them, e.g., by losing them through sin; otherwise it would have to be said that he who has lost grace is immediately bound by justice to penance (which no one asserts).

35. Corollary. Princes do not directly have true dominion over the life or members of subjects, but indirectly, inasmuch as, from the right of jurisdiction, they are able to dispose of these for the public good, insofar as they act in the place of God.

(A) Not directly indeed, because the right of life and death directly belongs to God alone, from the things said; nor can it be proved that it was directly delegated to Princes.

Nevertheless indirectly they enjoy this privilege; for, by force of the power of jurisdiction with which they are endowed, they can do all those things which the public good truly demands; but the common good of society sometimes requires that the Prince be able to dispose of the life and members of subjects; thus, in the case of a just war, he can order soldiers to expose their life in order to defend the rights of the fatherland; likewise he can punish certain criminals with the death penalty, so that others may be deterred from similar crimes, when the public good requires it. Then he acts as bearing the place of God: "For he does not bear the sword without cause: for he is the minister of God, an avenger unto wrath against him who does evil."³

³ Rom. XIII, 4.

I. What Things Can Become One's Own, What Cannot. 1. Never can the person himself, but only a thing, pertain to a man as his own. Of themselves all things can become one's own: exterior things and the powers of the body, members; not only material things but also immaterial things, say our higher faculties; not only things physically existing, but also beings of reason, or things which are in moral estimation, e.g. reputation.

Of themselves, I say. For law can place certain things outside commerce, so that they cannot come into the private or quasi-private dominion of anyone: say streets, in civil law.

Nevertheless, several things can be the object only of imperfect dominion. Thus full dominion of the body and faculties is reserved to God, while merely useful dominion has been conceded to man. Reputation, however, is situated in the perfect dominion of man.

Nor can all things be possessed by all. Thus full useful dominion of faculties, powers, and life cannot belong to another than the man who is constituted from them. Thus also certain sacred things can be excluded from the dominion of laymen by ecclesiastical authority. But what parts of the useful dominion of a person can be possessed by others is established differently in different laws and periods of time. Once a very ample power over slaves was conceded, while today very slight power belonging to another is conceded by civil law, since human works cannot be leased in perpetuity; nor can one who has promised works be compelled against his will to furnish them, but is held only to damages for the refused work.

2. Not only things, but also rights concerning things can be possessed.

Indeed, only concerning perfect dominion can it indifferently be said either that the thing itself or the dominion of the thing is had. When dominion is imperfect, the right rather, or more directly, than the thing itself is situated in our dominion. Wherefore, since the English deny that perfect dominion of an immovable thing can be had, they quite logically designate by the name estate the quantity of right possessed, and speak of estate rather than of the things themselves.

3. Certain things could not be or become one's own without positive law. Thus those rights of exclusively publishing a book or making machines, which are often designated by the common name of authors' dominion. Concerning these things, which daily increase in number, cf. what is to be said about Monopolies.

II. How Things Are Divided. Moreover, some things are movable, which move themselves or can easily be moved from place; others are immovable. But some things are called immovable by their own nature, whether of themselves, as fields, houses, or as adhering to an immovable thing, as such: for example, mirrors inserted into a wall; others are such as assigned to the service or utility, for example, of an estate: thus instruments and animals deputed to cultivating a rural estate are called immovable by their destination.

That division is transferred in several laws to the rights themselves, so that rights which affect an immovable thing are called immovable, and rights which affect a movable thing are called movable. Wherefore they are called immovable by object of application.

Therefore attention must be given to what the laws have concerning that division, and what jurists pronounce concerning the sense of the laws.

Some things are fungible, others non-fungible. Fungible things are determined by genus; non-fungible things by individual body. Circumstances can effect that the same thing, for the most part fungible, must by accident be treated as non-fungible, and conversely.

Some things are consumptible, which by first use are naturally or civilly (as monies are) consumed: their use is said to consist in abuse. Other things are not consumptible.

— I. 1. Only things, never persons, can become one's own. Of themselves all things can become one's own: both material and immaterial; both physically existing and beings of reason, of which moral estimation is had, say reputation. But several things are placed outside commerce, at least that of private persons, by positive law, whether ecclesiastical or civil.

Rights also are one's own; indeed, if you except perfect dominion, we possess rights rather than things.

2. Not all things can be the object of perfect dominion. Thus man has only useful dominion of his body and faculties. Reputation can be situated in perfect dominion.

3. Nor can all things subject to possession be possessed by all. Thus private persons are excluded from possessing certain things; and the full useful dominion of faculties and powers cannot be ceded to another.

4. There are things or rights which cannot become one's own without positive law. Thus what is called authors' dominion.

II. Some things are movable, others immovable, either by their own nature, by destination, or by object of application. - Some things are fungible, others non-fungible. - Some are consumptible, others non-consumptible.

Goods, as objects of dominion, are 1° internal or external; 2° of soul or of body; 3° of reputation and honor; 4° of the person, i.e. of liberty and independence in those things in which man, as an individual, is his own right; 5° of fortune.

591. Principles. - I. Man has useful dominion of the goods of soul and body which are naturally inalienable; God has direct dominion.² Cf. n. 461.

II. Man has direct dominion of the goods of the person, in the sense above under 4°; likewise of the soul, insofar as they are abdicateable without legal injury, though very often not without moral injury, i.e. without sin: namely of his free acts, indeed also of habits, whether natural or supernatural, such as virtues and graces; likewise of reputation and honor in the sense explained at n. 525.

592. III. The proper objects of dominion are goods of fortune or external things,³ provided 1° they can be subjected to the power of man and insofar as they can; and thus things not beneath the moon, such as the sun, moon, and stars, can be subjected to it according to their effects and influences, not according to themselves; 2° they are not inexhaustible in use, such as air, wind, etc., of which only the use or particles already exhausted by someone, not the things themselves considered generically, are objects of particular dominion (n. 599); 3° they are not outside dominion by law. Van Egeren.

593. • Goods of fortune are distinguished in our law in this way. Property is ... divided:

1. Into things real and things personal. Things real include every valuable thing of a fixed and immovable nature, and pass under the general description of lands, tenements, and hereditaments, or simply realty. Things personal include every valuable thing of an unfixed and movable nature, and pass under the general description of goods and chattels, or simply personalty: "There are certain things occupying a sort of intermediate position between the two, some of which are called chattels real, others fixtures";¹ to understand which, it should be borne in mind, that "although immobility is the distinguishing characteristic of realty, an indefinite duration of interest also enters into the idea; and therefore certain determinate interests in land, as leases for years, are called chattels real, because, although they have that immobility which is denoted by the term real, yet for want of an indefinite duration, they are treated as chattels." So also "there are various articles of personalty, which become realty by being annexed thereto; and these are called fixtures."²

2. Real property is again subdivided into things tangible and things not tangible. Things tangible include land and every corporeal thing permanently connected therewith to an indefinite extent above and below the surface, and pass under the general description of corporeal hereditaments, or simply land. Things not tangible include certain rights, privileges, or easements, annexed to land in the ownership of another, and pass under the general description of incorporeal hereditaments.³

For Louisiana, see "Civil Code of Louisiana."⁴

594. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Does man have dominion of his reputation?

Resp. See n. 525.

599. • Quaer. 4° Can seas and the ocean be subject to someone's dominion?

Resp. with Kent:² "Navigable rivers which flow through a territory, and the sea-coast adjoining it, and the navigable waters included in bays, and between headlands and arms of the sea, belong to the sovereign of the adjoining territory as being necessary to the safety of the nation, and to the undisturbed use of the neighboring shores. The open sea is not capable of being possessed as private property. The free use of the ocean for navigation and fishing is common to all mankind and the public jurists generally and explicitly deny that the main ocean can ever be appropriated."

166. The object of right and dominion is all things, not considered in themselves, but insofar as they bring utility and can be appropriated, and thus yield to man's own advantage, and therefore are called goods. These, comparatively to man, are divided into three species, according to the diverse mode in which they are referred to our utility:

1st. man's internal goods: of the body, such as life, health, members; and of the soul, whether natural, such as faculties and their exercise, sciences and arts, or supernatural, which have been infused by God through the mediation of human operation;

2nd. external goods of fortune, whether movable or immovable;

3rd. intermediate goods (or mixed goods) of reputation and honor, which radically are internal, founded in the excellence of man and in his faculties; formally they are external, in others who honor us and think and speak well of us.

Concerning each it is asked whether man can have right and dominion over them, namely, whether there can exist between them and man a connection or bond, which is founded either in the exigency of the person, or in the common necessity of men.

167. Principle I. Concerning internal goods it must be said:

1. Over those goods which pertain to the integrity of man and are not distinct from him, such as life and the members of the body, and the faculties of the soul, man has right by the very fact that he is man, for by that very fact there is had a bond between him and these goods; yet he does not have direct and full dominion, which belongs to God, but only useful dominion, so that he is their guardian and administrator and user.

For no one can possess himself or be lord of himself, for dominion is something essentially relative, by which one has right in something other (the foundation of dominion does not fall under dominion); but God, as the first principle and last end, is the supreme lord of us, of life and death, and therefore he commits injustice against God who deprives himself of such a good, just as also each one has the duty and right of preserving those things, because they are means given him by God so that he may reach the end.

Yet man can use those goods, for this is required that he may attain the end, so that by acting well he may have eternal life; and therefore he can make their fruits his own (namely, operations and the things which are obtained by operations) for his own utility.

2. Over goods distinct from man, such as the operations of faculties and the things which are acquired through the mediation of human operations or are given by God, man has direct and full dominion: for they are distinct from his entity and therefore can be possessed by him; but they are possessed because they have been acquired by his industry or obtained by his cooperation.

Hence he is lord a) of natural and supernatural virtues, and therefore in these he is not injured unjustly by others, unless it is done in some way against his will by employing some unjust means, such as deceiving or threatening;

b) of intellectual and bodily acts, to which therefore no other can have a title of connection or a right before a contract or some legitimate fact;

c) of bodily or intellectual labor and its fruits, provided he acts in his own name and in his own thing, not in the name of another and in another's thing.

168. Principle II. Concerning external goods it must be said:

1. Man has right to terrestrial goods according as, with attention to the laws of nature and positive laws, he has acquired them for himself by a legitimate fact: for they are destined for his use, as imperfect things for a perfect being, and can be appropriated by him (Gen. I, 26, 28; Ps. CXIII, 16; VIII, 8). And indeed he has not only useful dominion and by a transient use, because they are necessary for him for the preservation of life and thus for the due end, but also full and permanent dominion, by which in a stable and perpetual way he may possess not only fruits but also immovable things, indeed the earth itself. This is fitting to the nature of the thing and necessary from a threefold bond; for:

a) The individual man, since he is a rational being, has before brute animals this, that he himself provides for his necessities and progress and enjoys aptitude for possessing those things which serve his necessity; therefore, since he foresees necessities perpetually recurring, for relieving which terrestrial things are apt, it is conformable to natural ordination that he possess in a stable way not only those things which are consumed by use, but also immovable goods and the earth itself, which are necessary for providing for future necessities (in time of sickness, old age, want, and poverty).

b) Indeed, as a father of a family, he must provide not only for the things necessary for his own preservation, but also for those necessary for the preservation of the species, namely, for his wife, and for his children, who are something of the father, and in whom his personality is prolonged, and who expect from the father food and cultivation by which they may become men sufficient to themselves. Whence a fortiori to man, as father of a family, there belongs the right of possessing, who must acquire for his own and transmit to them goods even immovable, especially fruitful possessions, from which he may be able to sustain the family in time of poverty, or of broken strength, or even after death.

c) Finally, man has full dominion in that which he has produced and in which he has prolonged his own personality: for it is just that the thing made should follow the cause from which it was made. Therefore, if by his own labor he has made a thing or the earth itself fruitful, or even has improved it and has as it were sealed it with the seal of his own personality, it is conformable to reason that he possess the thing itself and the earth (as being now inseparable from the labor); otherwise the fruits of labor would not come to the laborer himself, or even others would have the right of enjoying them.¹

¹ Cf. Leo XIII, Rerum novarum, and Pottier, De Iure et Iustitia.

2. Over the heavenly bodies according to their substance he does not have dominion, because, although they were founded for our utility, they are nevertheless not so subject that we can dispose of them; but according to certain effects, he has indirect dominion, which he can use for his own advantage, for example, light, from which consequently he cannot prohibit others who have a right to it.

3. Over the person of one's neighbor as such (insofar as he can bring utility) man does not have perfect dominion, since all men by nature are peers, and the human person is inviolable, which cannot be ordered to the good and end of other persons (the foundation of dominion does not fall under dominion); yet he can have useful dominion as to his works.

Whence personal servitude, or a state of subjection by which someone, in exchange for sustenance, is bound to furnish all his works to another in perpetuity, of itself (abstracting from excess of oppression and tyranny) is not repugnant to natural right, although nevertheless it is less fitting to human dignity.²

² The Scriptures do not hold servitude as illicit: for Moses did not absolutely prohibit it but moderated it (cf. Ex. XX, 17; XXI, 2; Lev. XXV, 45-46; 54-55); and in the New Law they admonish masters to treat servants kindly, indeed they exhort them to free them, but do not command this (I Cor. VII, 20-24; Eph. VI, 9; Col. IV, 1; to Philem.). Yet Christian doctrine and the Church do not favor servitude, but always tend toward expelling servitude; and under their influence it happened that among cultivated nations servitude was abolished and now by positive law is illicit.

The Scholastics admitted four titles by which servitude could be constituted not unjustly: 1) purchase-sale or donation, both that by which someone freely reduces himself into servitude, for since man can transfer dominion of his own work for a time, he can also do this in perpetuity; and that by which someone already legitimately a servant is handed over by the master to another; 2) right of war, provided the war was just, which now contradicts the modern law of nations; 3) servile birth, by force of which those who were born from servants were held as servants; nevertheless this can seem less equitable if the servitude is perpetual; 4) penalty from a delict: for if someone has deserved death, this penalty can be commuted into servitude. Moreover, forced labor to which some guilty persons are condemned seems to be a certain servitude. - Cf. Billuart, diss. 3, art. 2; and Tanquerey, Th. M., t. III, de Virtute Iustitiae, n. 133-141.

169. Principle III. Concerning the intermediate goods of reputation and honor it must be said:

Man has strict and full dominion over these goods, because he acquires and increases honor and reputation for himself, like external goods, by his own acts and by manifestation of his moral and natural qualities; - and moreover because reputation is necessary for cultivating virtue and preserving peace in society with others.

Hence, just as man can reclaim in judgment an injury of reputation and honor, so he can also condone it; - indeed the very defamation of oneself of itself is not against justice, since man has full right over his reputation; although, if it is done without sufficient reason, it can be prodigality against charity toward oneself, or scandal against charity toward one's neighbor.

Yet per accidens it can be against justice, not indeed insofar as it is defamation of oneself, but by reason of others insofar as it harms one's neighbor, namely: if the reputation of one's neighbor depends upon one's own reputation, and from one's own infamy there follows the infamy of another (for example, of a father, monk, accomplice), or if reputation is necessary to oneself for fulfilling an office of justice, as the reputation of a bishop or pastor. Whence Augustine: Our life is necessary to us, our reputation to others.

170. Division of goods and various genera. - The various species of goods are divided variously:

A. Into corporeal and incorporeal goods (biens corporels et incorporels; stoffelijke en onstoffelijke goederen). The former are those which fall under the senses, such as a house, field, clothing, furniture, money; the latter are said to be those which are not presented to the senses but are perceived by the human intellect, namely, rights of fishing, hunting, receiving fruits, inheritance, etc.: for right is held after the manner of a good about which an owner can dispose.

B. Into movable and immovable goods (biens meubles et immeubles; roerende en onroerende goederen). The former are all things which are not immovable; the latter are those which either altogether, or at least in the state in which they are, cannot physically be transferred or transfer themselves while preserving their substance (C.C., a. 516 sq.).

The distinction of itself and from the nature of the thing falls upon external corporeal things, but by civil law it is also applied to incorporeal things, which by their nature are neither movable nor immovable, yet are judged so by reason of the object to which they are applied.

Therefore, by French law,³ 1st. immovable goods are held to be: a) by their nature, such as lands, buildings, forests, or crops as long as they adhere to the soil; b) by destination, such as animals, machines, and other objects assigned to cultivating fields (objets d'exploitation) or applied in perpetuity; c) by reason of the immovable object about which they are concerned, such as the real rights of usufruct, use, servitude, and mortgage from immovable things, and every real action upon an immovable thing (a. 517 sq.).

³ On this matter the Italian Code, a. 714 sq.; Spanish, a. 333 sq.; Dutch, a. 562 sq.; Austrian, a. 291 sq.; German, a. 90 sq.

2nd. Likewise movable goods can be: a) by their nature, such as ships, wagons, animals, furniture (a. 528); b) by determination of law, such as rights concerning movable things, or of receiving rents, shares in an anonymous society, etc. (a. 529 sq.).

C. Movables according to nature are 1) consumable (verbruikbare), which are consumed by first use, either physically through destruction or loss of form and properties (as happens in paper, food, and drink), or morally when the thing is alienated and by first use is drawn away (for example, money) or changed (cloths turned into clothing); - and 2) non-consumable (onverbruikbare), which are by no means destroyed or changed by first use, such as houses, furniture, clothes, a horse, etc.

D. Movables according to relative and accidental quality are fungible and non-fungible (vervangbare of onvervangbare). The former, in payment of a debt, according to common estimation, can supply other things of the same species and stand in their place, such as generally those things which are usually counted, measured, or weighed, for example, coined money, oil, wheat, sugar, wood for burning, etc. Non-fungible things cannot be substituted for another thing, but the same identical thing must be handed over, for example, this horse which I have carefully selected, this statue, this painting, etc.

Fungible things generally are at the same time consumable, and conversely. Yet there are exceptions: thus the last barrel of wine of such a year which is promised, or gold coins which are lent as a pledge, are consumable but not fungible; - on the opposite side, if one hundred acres of fields are promised to settlers, or if a bookseller asks for a copy of a book for selling, these are fungible but not consumable.

THERE OCCUR first the seas, which adjoin some land: for these are of those who dominate the shores, cap ubi periculum, §. Porro, de electione, in 6. and the Gloss there, praised by the Doctors of Canon Law, which Baldus also follows in cap. 1. enitio, quibus modis feudum amittatur, and in Leg. penult. at the end Cod. de infant. et substit. sub conditione factis, and in Authent. Ut omnes obed. iudicibus, §. 1. and l. 1. col. 2. de sent. ex brevi recitat. and cap. ex litteris, de probat. and cap. accedens 2. ut lite non contest. and the Doctors in Fagundez lib. 2. cap. 8. The holy Doctor indicates this ad 6. Lucae, where he observes that the sea of Galilee was fierce, because it adjoined the shores of Galilee, and was called of Tiberias, because it adjoined the City of Tiberias, built in honour of Tiberius Caesar. For on this account he who is on the adjoining sea, where it is maritime, is said to be in the district of that city, as appears from Leg. Insulae, ff. de iudiciis.

THEY SAY, however, that dominion is extended from the shore to 100 miles, Bartol. in tract. de Insula, col. 2. Caepola Tract. de servit. rust. praediorum, and it is found in Tom. 6. 2. part. tract. iuris, cap. 16. de mari, num. 13. and is gathered from Leg. Quicumque Cod. de Episcopis, et clericis.

THIS is understood provided that islands in the midst of the sea have not been found and cultivated; for then the whole sea in circuit, through the said space, belongs to the Prince, the finder, and the settler.

AND indeed the sea by the first division remained common; yet the utilities of fisheries, and navigations belonged first to the one who took them; but they belong rather to some one by the concession of a legitimate Prince, as the navigation of the Ocean was conceded by the Pope for sowing the Gospel, as Cabedo testifies he saw the Bulls of this concession, 2. part. decis. 47.

SO also the most illustrious Venetians enjoy by legitimate right the navigation of the Adriatic Sea, to remove Pirates, placed by divine providence.

YET fishing in the sea adjoining the land of some King, and in public rivers, is free to all the subjects of that Prince, ex Leg. 2. and Leg. Nemo, ff. de rerum divisione.

YET Princes have been able to reserve certain fisheries to themselves, as of Tunny, or of Whales, for the common good of the Kingdom. See Lessium Tom. 1. de iust. lib. 2. cap. 5. and Fagundez lib. 2. cap. 8. de contract.

ON the acquisition indeed of dominion over animals, over treasures, and the rest, I have briefly indicated something in the Disput. de restitut. nor does the holy Doctor suggest more to me on this matter.