Section — Konings, Theologia Moralis
§ I. On the object of dominion
Goods, as objects of dominion, are 1° internal or external; 2° of soul or of body; 3° of reputation and honor; 4° of the person, i.e. of liberty and independence in those things in which man, as an individual, is his own right; 5° of fortune.
- Principles. - I. Man has useful dominion of the goods of soul and body which are naturally inalienable; God has direct dominion.2 Cf. n. 461.
II. Man has direct dominion of the goods of the person, in the sense above under 4°; likewise of the soul, insofar as they are abdicateable without legal injury, though very often not without moral injury, i.e. without sin: namely of his free acts, indeed also of habits, whether natural or supernatural, such as virtues and graces; likewise of reputation and honor in the sense explained at n. 525.
- III. The proper objects of dominion are goods of fortune or external things,3 provided 1° they can be subjected to the power of man and insofar as they can; and thus things not beneath the moon, such as the sun, moon, and stars, can be subjected to it according to their effects and influences, not according to themselves; 2° they are not inexhaustible in use, such as air, wind, etc., of which only the use or particles already exhausted by someone, not the things themselves considered generically, are objects of particular dominion (n. 599); 3° they are not outside dominion by law. Van Egeren.
Notes to n. 592. (1) Mar. p. 18. n. 18. (2) S. Th. 1. D. 8. q. 2. a. 1 ad 6. (3) Ib. de malo. q. 13. a. 1.
- Goods of fortune are distinguished in our law in this way. Property is ... divided:
Into things real and things personal. Things real include every valuable thing of a fixed and immovable nature, and pass under the general description of lands, tenements, and hereditaments, or simply realty. Things personal include every valuable thing of an unfixed and movable nature, and pass under the general description of goods and chattels, or simply personalty: "There are certain things occupying a sort of intermediate position between the two, some of which are called chattels real, others fixtures";1 to understand which, it should be borne in mind, that "although immobility is the distinguishing characteristic of realty, an indefinite duration of interest also enters into the idea; and therefore certain determinate interests in land, as leases for years, are called chattels real, because, although they have that immobility which is denoted by the term real, yet for want of an indefinite duration, they are treated as chattels." So also "there are various articles of personalty, which become realty by being annexed thereto; and these are called fixtures."2
Real property is again subdivided into things tangible and things not tangible. Things tangible include land and every corporeal thing permanently connected therewith to an indefinite extent above and below the surface, and pass under the general description of corporeal hereditaments, or simply land. Things not tangible include certain rights, privileges, or easements, annexed to land in the ownership of another, and pass under the general description of incorporeal hereditaments.3
For Louisiana, see "Civil Code of Louisiana."4
Notes to n. 593. (1) Signor. Eth. P. 2. n. 198. 199.
- Quaer. 2° Can man have dominion over another man?
Resp. 1° In the negative, as to direct dominion; for that belongs to God alone, as is clear from what was said at n. 591, and men are metaphysically independent of one another; or:
Resp. 2° In the affirmative, as to useful dominion, or the works of man. The reason is that any man is owner of his own work, and therefore can alienate it and hand it over into the dominion of another. For an owner can use and abuse his own thing insofar as the character of right permits.
Hence 1° by natural right man can sell himself to another, even in perpetuity, and indeed hand himself over gratuitously as to useful dominion of himself. For if he can confer upon another useful dominion of himself for some time, he can do the same in perpetuity, since he can cede all that of which he is owner. 2° Servitude, or a perpetual state of subjection by which someone is bound to provide all his works to another for sustenance, is not of itself repugnant to the law of nature. I say: his works; for servitude in the strict sense, namely that by which slaves properly so called are counted not among persons but among things, which the master can use and abuse, can be called licit in no case.
- Note. - Although servitude has been abrogated among us, nevertheless it is fitting that confessors receiving the Confession, especially general, of former masters or slaves know the sins to which they were more commonly liable. Wherefore in this place we briefly enumerate them. Therefore I. As to masters:
1° They sinned and are bound to restitution, if any exercised the so-called traffic in Negroes, or cooperated with it, or bought for themselves as slaves those whom they knew had been unjustly despoiled of liberty. - Against so inhuman a trade various Apostolic Constitutions have come forth, namely of Paul III, Urban VIII, Benedict XIV, and lately Gregory XVI, Constitution In supremo Apostolatus, 3 Dec. 1839. And rightly indeed. For although someone, either from pact or his own renunciation, or, as formerly, by the law of war, or from delict or from just condemnation, or from birth from a slave mother, can sometimes be bound to hand over his works to another in perpetuity,1 nevertheless he is unjustly forced to this where none of these titles can be invoked. But in the traffic in Negroes none of these titles can be invoked; for through it free men, against their own will and without any delict on their part, are carried away from their own regions and sold. Therefore:
I said: free men; for if it is a question of Negroes or others in servitude legitimate by one of the aforesaid titles existing, of itself that commerce is not absolutely illicit, because, once servitude has been admitted as legitimate, the master has a true right in the slaves, or in their works, and therefore can transmit it. I said: of itself; for either circumstances or civil laws can stand in the way.
2° They sinned because of circumstances standing against sale:
a) Those who by selling separated spouse from spouse, or offspring from parents, without grave cause. I said: without grave cause; which would have been present, for example, if a slave had been wicked, whom the master had tried in vain to bring back to good fruit, and from whom he feared death or some other grave evil.1
b) Those who by selling a slave, especially a Catholic, cared nothing about seeking for him a Catholic, humane, and just buyer; for it was not licit for a master to cast the care of a slave upon just anyone at hand. Yet those would be excused who had sold to anyone at hand slaves from whom they feared death for themselves or their own, unless they were immediately dismissed from the house, provided nevertheless that damage was not inflicted on an unsuspecting buyer.2 Those also are to be excused, as is clear of itself, through whom it did not stand that slaves were sold to anyone at hand, as if they had been sold at auction in the distribution of an inheritance, or by authority of law for punishing crimes or for satisfying creditors.3
3° They sinned who did not supply them necessary food and clothing; who did not care for the sick; who did not endeavor to relieve with remedies the old, or those otherwise no longer fit for labor.4
4° Those who selected or retained overseers whom they knew imposed harsher burdens upon bondmen, or treated them more severely and cruelly;5 and likewise those who, carried away by anger, flogged slaves for a light cause, or ordered them to be flogged, especially with danger to limbs or life.6
5° Those who did not leave to slaves the liberty of entering marriage and of using its rights, although slaves would not on account of this be drawn away from providing the work owed.7
6° Those who did not take care that the children of their slaves be baptized.
7° Those who did not provide for the salvation of the slaves themselves; of this kind were a) those who did not take care that they learn the rudiments of Christian doctrine, and that a supply of priestly ministry for receiving the Sacraments be made available to them; b) those who omitted every precaution for preserving integrity of morals among them, not taking care, for example, lest they use promiscuous sleeping together; c) those who fostered corruption of morals by their very bad example and wicked solicitations; d) those who favored the delicts of a female slave because of the utility that would come to them from offspring.1
Notes to n. 596 - note sequence 1. (1) Lugo. de Jure et Just. disp. VI. n. 11 seq. Notes to n. 596 - note sequence 2. (1) Sanch. de Mat. L. VII. disp. XXII. (2) Kenr. Tr. VIII. n. 97. (3) Ib. (4) Ib. n. 98. (5) Ib. n. 94. (6) Ib. n. 95. (7) Ib. n. 96.
- II. As to former slaves. They sinned 1° who neglected the work enjoined upon them, or the care of things committed to them; yet they did not violate justice, but obedience owed to the master; for the actions of a slave are not owed to the master by the law of justice, as are those of a hired man, who receives a price for them.2
2° Those who stole from the master things other than common edibles; and these are bound to restitution, if they have the means from which they may repay, and unless by their works they seem to have repaired the damage inflicted.3
3° Those who ran around at night, so that they might visit women, and this not only because of immodesty, but also because of other crimes to the danger of which they exposed themselves.4
4° Those who lived in concubinage, whether simple fornication, or adulterous; and this simple or double.
5° Those who, when opportunity was offered, neglected to learn the documents of the faith and to fulfill the duties of religion.5
Notes to n. 597. (1) L. VI. 130. (2) Kenr. Tr. VIII. n. 102. (3) Lessius de Just. et Jure, S. II. c. VIII. dub. III. n. 20. (4) Kenr. Tr. VIII. n. 104. (5) Ib.
- Quaer. 3° Whether and by what right does man have dominion in the fruits of his industry and talent?
Resp. In the affirmative, and indeed 1° by natural right. For if a thing bears fruit for the owner, a fortiori this must be true of internal faculties, since nothing can be more proper to man.
Hence a) it is certain that both he who steals from the inventor of some art, for example whose machine has not yet been handed over to commerce, his secret and divulges it publicly against his will; and he who prints the manuscript work of another, are bound to restitution and compensation of damages; for a work remains under the dominion of the author or inventor as long as it has not been given to public use.
b) It is disputed whether he who has printed a book has, positive law being set aside, the right of impeding lest anyone commit it to the press and sell it with damage to the author or bookseller to whom the author has transmitted his right. Those who deny bring forward this reason for their denial: that a thing handed over to the community, as a book published in print is, by that very fact becomes of common right, and for the same reason neither would those be guilty of injustice who brought to light the public lectures of some professor or the sermon of an orator. Those who affirm respond to the reason of those denying: the natural right which all attribute to the author in the fruit of his talent cannot be exercised by him unless he hand over this fruit to the community; and therefore it is absurd to say that that right is lost through that very thing without which it cannot be exercised. Practically, this question is of lesser moment; for usage today everywhere has it that works published in print are committed to the press and sold by others in the case in which either the author neglected to do those things which are required by positive law in order to provide for himself, or positive law does not assist him, whether because it does not sanction the property of some genus of books, or because it denies its protection to books edited in another region.
Resp. 2° In the affirmative, also by the positive law of almost all nations. And indeed by a law passed by Congress among us provision is made that one who wishes to claim as proper to himself the right of a thing invented by himself (Patent right) deposit a model in the public office (Patent-office) at Washington. But one who wishes to have the right of publishing his own books (copyright) ought to deposit a copy in the public office of the librarian of Congress in the same city, and on the title page of the book committed to type, or on the page immediately following the title page, to state it in the following words: "Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year by N., in the office of the librarian of Congress at Washington." He who desires to know more should go to Kent,1 or Wells's Every Man his own Lawyer,2 or New Amer. Encycl.3
If someone violates a privilege of this kind, a civil action is given against him. But although the inventor, or author or bookseller to whom the privilege belongs, does not bring a lawsuit, nevertheless the violator is bound in conscience to repair the damage inflicted on them. The same seems to be said whenever someone, by a certain change of a new machine or book, renders the force of the law and privilege void.1
Notes to n. 598. (1) Vol. II. n. 365-384. (2) p. 204-215. (3) V. Patents et Copyright.
- Quaer. 4° Can seas and the ocean be subject to someone's dominion?
Resp. with Kent:2 "Navigable rivers which flow through a territory, and the sea-coast adjoining it, and the navigable waters included in bays, and between headlands and arms of the sea, belong to the sovereign of the adjoining territory as being necessary to the safety of the nation, and to the undisturbed use of the neighboring shores. The open sea is not capable of being possessed as private property. The free use of the ocean for navigation and fishing is common to all mankind and the public jurists generally and explicitly deny that the main ocean can ever be appropriated."