III. On Probable Conscience and on Probabilism

33. "Probable conscience is that by which someone, relying upon a probable opinion, forms for himself a practical dictate of reason from certain reflex or concomitant principles, for acting licitly." L. I, n. 40. Thus, for example, Titius the confessor, relying upon a probable opinion, judges that he probably has jurisdiction. Then indeed he says, and this is the reflex principle: But, with jurisdiction truly probable standing, the Church certainly supplies it. Therefore, he concludes, and this is the practical dictate of conscience, I can validly and licitly absolve in the case; and he absolves.

34. "Various species of probabilities are given... An opinion slightly probable is one which rests upon some foundation, but not such as has power to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man... Probable is one which rests upon a grave moment, either of intrinsic reason or of extrinsic authority, which has power to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man, although with fear of the opposite. More probable is one which rests upon a weightier foundation, but still with prudent fear of the opposite, so that the contrary also is judged probable. Most probable is one which rests upon a most weighty foundation, on account of which the opposite is judged either slightly or doubtfully probable... An opinion or sentence morally certain is one which excludes every prudent fear of falsity, so that the opposite is reputed altogether improbable. Finally, a safe opinion is one which withdraws from every danger of sinning. Safer, however, is one which withdraws more from such danger, although it may not rest upon firmer reasons." L. loc. cit.

35. But St. Alphonsus speaks more exactly of a most probable opinion, H. A., tr. I, n. 65: "Unless we wish to confuse a most probable opinion with an absolutely certain opinion, it is necessary to say that the opinion contrary to the most probable is not slightly probable, but doubtfully probable." The reason is that a most probable opinion "is within the limits of probability," and therefore "does not exclude every prudent fear." "But slight probability is not true probability, and therefore does not bring with itself a prudent reason. But doubtful probability brings some prudent reason, although not one wholly certain and stable." Cf. Sporer, Op. Mor., I, n. 185.

"Truth known without fear is called certainty. But truth probably known is called opinion. The adversaries wish that a truly probable opinion be only that which, after all things have been weighed on both sides, is known to be true, so that the opposite seems certainly false. But they err in terms; for this must be said of science, or of moral certainty, but not of probable opinion, which of itself carries with it that it be fallible, and that its contrary also be probable, that is, probably true"; St. Alphonsus, Scholastico-moral Dissertation, year 1749.

36. Now from probable conscience which is to be followed practically, probabilism arises. Probabilism is reduced to one proposition applied to human action, as regards its licitness, in a case of doubt: A doubtful law does not oblige. Behold what probabilism is, and it is nothing else except this. It is called probabilism because whenever there is against the law a truly probable opinion, the law is doubtful, and consequently does not oblige. Hence probabilism is also called the moral system by which, in doubtful matters, it is simply lawful, as regards the licitness of acting, from some reflex principle, to follow a truly probable opinion against the law.

37. It differs altogether from the other moral systems. It differs from rigid and mitigated tutiorism, because the former states: It is not lawful to follow a sentence favoring liberty unless it is morally certain; otherwise the safer part must always be held in practice. The latter states: it is not lawful to follow the less safe opinion unless it is most probable.

38. It differs from laxism, which is also called broad or lax probabilism, because lax probabilists say: it is licit to follow an opinion slightly or doubtfully probable. Probabilism simply so called, or moderate probabilism, wholly excludes an opinion slightly probable and doubtfully probable, because these opinions are not truly probable. A truly probable opinion is only one which is gravely and certainly probable. For this alone is able prudently to move a prudent man to assent, in the doubt of some grave matter; and this alone truly rests upon a grave motive.

39. It differs from probabiliorism, because probabiliorists say that it is not lawful to follow an opinion probable for liberty when the other opinion for the law is more probable. - It differs from equiprobabilism, because equiprobabilists affirm that it is lawful to follow a truly probable opinion favoring liberty when the contrary opinion for the law is equally probable or a little more probable; but not at all when the contrary opinion for the law is certainly and notably more probable.

40. But from what has been said it is clear that probabilism is called minus-probabilism by its adversaries without any truth. For probabilists do not say that it is not lawful to follow any opinion except the less probable, as probabiliorists say that it is not lawful to follow any except the more probable, and equiprobabilists the equally probable; rather, they say that it is lawful simply to follow a probable opinion; not at all that it is not lawful to follow any opinion except the less probable.

41. These things having been set down, we must now speak of the directive force of probable conscience, and consequently of the truth of probabilism. And this will be declared and proved step by step in the following propositions.

42. Lest there be a cavil about words, as far as we are concerned we recognize no other opinions, as regards doctrine, within the limits of true probability, except the probable, the more probable, and the most probable opinion. Below the probable there is only the non-probable, the improbable, of which there can indeed be various grades; above the most probable there is only the certain. The probable is immediately opposed, by an opposition of comparison, to the more probable; mediately, however, to the most probable. Likewise the most probable is immediately opposed to the more probable, but mediately to the probable; unless someone should wish in fact to confuse the most probable with the certain.

43. But a twofold probability must be distinguished: intrinsic and extrinsic. The former is founded upon reasons taken from the thing itself; the latter upon the authority of doctors, and presupposes intrinsic probability, or at least causes it to be presumed. As intrinsic probability can be greater or lesser from the weight of reasons, so also extrinsic probability can be greater or lesser from the number and learning of authors.

44. It is wholly unlawful to operate with a practically probable conscience, which proximately directs an action really to be placed here and now. - For only subjectively certain conscience is the rule of morals. And consequently in this sense that saying is false: He who acts probably acts prudently. L. I, n. 58, 69, 80. Wherefore the whole question here is about speculatively probable conscience, which directs the action only remotely, by declaring the probable existence of a law; namely, whether by means of some reasoning we can by right make a step from a speculatively probable conscience to a practically certain conscience; or, what is the same, whether, with a probable opinion standing concerning the honesty of some action in general, we can form for ourselves a certain conscience concerning the honesty of such an action in a particular and individual case, and so licitly follow in practice an opinion speculatively probable. To resolve this question the following propositions are established.

45. It is not lawful practically to follow an opinion slightly or doubtfully probable, the safer having been left aside. - This proposition is against the lax probabilists, according to whom it is licit to follow an opinion slightly or doubtfully probable. - Proof of the first part. This first is established from proposition 3 condemned by Innocent XI: "Generally, when we do something relying upon probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not depart from the limits of probability, we always act prudently." - Besides, a slightly probable opinion is an opinion resting upon a slight motive; but a slight motive is a motive by no means sufficient to move a grave or prudent man to assent, and therefore it is not truly probable. Indeed, a truly probable opinion is called that which rests upon such a motive that it is sufficient to move a prudent man to assent. But if such an opinion is insufficient to move a prudent man to a judgment concerning the non-existence of the law, it is impossible to form for oneself a conscience concerning the licitness of the action. - Proof of the second part. Nor indeed is it lawful practically to follow a doubtfully probable opinion. For a doubtfully probable opinion is an opinion resting upon a doubtful motive, concerning which, namely, one can prudently doubt whether it is truly grave and prudent, or sufficient to move a prudent man to assent. But it is evident that a prudent man, in matters of grave moment, does not rely upon a motive of this kind; hence, if the matter in fact does not turn out well, all would justly and deservedly charge him with imprudence. But the moral goodness or malice of human acts is a graver matter than any temporal business whatever. - Besides, with slight or doubtful probability standing, it is impossible to form for oneself a practical dictate morally certain concerning the licitness of the action. For a slight or doubtful reason for liberty does not remove, nor can it remove, the certainty of the law. Wherefore, the law remaining morally certain, it must wholly be observed. - L. I, n. 40.

46. From the cited proposition condemned by Innocent XI nothing can be drawn against probabilism, both because in it there is question also of slight probability, and because it asserts too generally that we always act prudently when we do something relying upon probability. For slight probability is not true probability. Nor indeed is probabilism extended to the case where there is question of the truth of a thing and an end to be absolutely obtained. - To an opinion slightly probable there is opposed an opinion gravely probable; to an opinion doubtfully probable there is opposed an opinion certainly probable. But gravely probable and certainly probable is nothing other than probable, which, unless it rests upon a grave and certain foundation, is not truly probable. Wherefore the slightly probable and the doubtfully probable are wholly excluded from probabilism. - There are not lacking those who confuse an opinion doubtfully probable and an opinion slightly probable with one another. Practically, indeed, they are often confused; but speculatively, with attention to the nature of the thing, they are altogether distinguished from one another. La Croix, l. 1, n. 126.

47. It is not lawful to follow a probable opinion, concerning the very objective truth of a thing, where there is question of an end to be absolutely obtained, the safer having been left aside. - Proof. He who is absolutely bound to an end is bound to choose those means which least of all bring into danger the end to be obtained. But a probable opinion, since it can be false, brings the danger of frustrating the end which must be absolutely obtained. For the objective truth or existence of the thing will certainly not be had if the opinion about it is probable but false. Therefore. L. I, n. 42. To be absolutely obtained, "when, namely, from justice or charity someone is bound to avoid a harm which is present in the thing itself," Suarez apud St. Alphonsus, Op. Mor., Roman ed., year 1757, loc. cit., n. 33, or the danger of it. Then certainly "in doubt the safer way is to be chosen." C. Illud 5, De Cler. Exc. The case must also be added in which someone is bound to the safer course by some special positive law or precept, or by contract, or by vow. - Suarez, tr. 3, d. 12, s. 5, n. 8; s. 6, n. 10; De Censuris, d. 40, s. 6, n. 8, 9; L. l. 2, n. 10; l. 6, n. 918, p. ult.; L. l. 3, n. 700, p. 167, note, ed. P. Gaude.

48. Therefore it is not lawful to follow a probable opinion, but we must wholly choose the safer in all those things which are necessary, by necessity of means, to salvation, where the fact itself, or the truth of the thing, alone is considered. Hence we must embrace the safer religion. Proposition 4 condemned by Innocent XI; L. I, n. 43. - In the conferral of the sacraments the minister is bound to follow the safer sentence, unless necessity is present or the Church supplies; for again there is question of the truth of the thing. But the sacraments would not be had unless those things were really placed which Christ instituted for their validity. Proposition 1 condemned by Innocent XI. Unless necessity is present: "for in extreme necessity we can well use any opinion whatever, not only probable but even slightly probable, for the validity of the sacrament... provided the sacrament is conferred under condition; because the condition sufficiently repairs the injury to the sacrament if perhaps it is conferred invalidly; and, on the contrary, necessity is a sufficient and just cause for conferring the sacraments conditionally." L. I, n. 49. Unless the Church supplies: for "we can licitly use a probable opinion where the Church is presumed to supply, as can happen in the sacrament of matrimony for convalidating a contract only probably valid, if perhaps that contract is null because of an impediment which the Church removes by supplying, and in the sacrament of penance for supplying the jurisdiction of the confessor, if perhaps it is lacking." L. I, n. 50.

49. A physician is bound to apply the safer remedies which can be had in the case; for here there is question of the objective effect itself, that is, of the health of the sick person, to be absolutely obtained. And indeed a physician is bound not only from charity, but also from justice, by reason of his office and tacit contract, to provide in the better way for the health of the sick person from whom he receives a stipend. L. I, n. 44. - A judge cannot judge according to the less probable sentence; for he is bound by divine and human precept to render to each his own right. Proposition 2 condemned by Innocent XI; L. I, n. 47. - A hunter who probably judges that the object hidden in the forest is a man cannot shoot, although he more probably judges that it is a wild animal. For on the one hand the neighbor has a certain right to his own life; on the other hand the greater probability does not bring it about that, if in truth it is a man, he will not perish by the shot. L. I, n. 52; H. A., tr. 1, n. 33.

50. When scandals and graver evils are imminent, the safer part is to be chosen, by which they may be avoided, so that the utility of all may be consulted. C. Illud 5, De Cler. Exc. - Generally safer things are to be chosen, when as regards charity a danger of formally sinning is to be avoided, and as regards justice a harm is to be avoided to one who is in certain possession of his certain right.

"We cannot use a probable opinion with danger of spiritual or temporal harm to the neighbor whenever the neighbor is in certain possession of his right," St. Alphonsus, H. A., tr. 1, 33; Apology, year 1769, n. 4.

51. It is lawful to follow a truly most probable opinion, and even a more probable one, the safer having been left aside, where there is question of the honesty of the action alone. - This proposition is against rigid and mitigated tutiorists. The former say: It is not lawful to follow a sentence favoring liberty unless it is morally certain; otherwise the safer part must always be held in practice. The latter say: It is not lawful to follow the less safe opinion unless it is most probable. - The honesty of an action, about which there is question here, is quite diverse from the effect of the action itself or from the truth of the thing, about which there was question in the preceding proposition. The honesty of a human action depends upon the dictate of conscience, which is the proximate rule of human acts; the effect of the action, or the truth of the thing, depends upon the very fact of the action. The former is subjective; the latter objective. - Proof of the first part from the third proposition condemned by Alexander VIII in the year 1690: "It is not lawful to follow an opinion, even the most probable among probable opinions"; the author of this proposition was John Sinnigh, October 8, 1666, a Louvain doctor and defender of Cornelius Jansen, whom other Jansenists followed. Hence it is clear that the rigid tutiorism of the Jansenists has already been reproved by the Church. And indeed no obligation is given of doing what is safer; for it suffices to do what is safe. Likewise no obligation is given, nor can one be given, always to guard against the danger of materially sinning, for this would be morally impossible; there is only an obligation to avoid the danger of formally sinning. - Proof of the second part. The first part of this proposition is against rigid tutiorists, namely Jansenists; this second part is against mitigated tutiorists, favoring Jansen and his followers. Now, if it is not lawful practically to follow an opinion for liberty unless it is most probable, then either this most probable opinion is taken for morally certain, or, as the word sounds, for probable in the highest degree indeed, but not certain. In the first case mitigated tutiorism would fall back into condemned rigid tutiorism; in the other case it would fall into a false doctrine against the Apostle, saying, "all that is not of faith," that is, from a certain persuasion of honesty, "is sin," Rom. 14:23, unless recourse is had to a reflex principle, as is explained in the following proposition; and then it is lawful to follow any probable opinion whatever. Cf. following n. 52. - L. I, n. 40, 54; Suarez, tr. 3, d. 12, s. 6, n. 8; Antoine, De Consc., c. 4, q. 4.

52. It is lawful to follow a truly probable opinion, the safer having been left aside, equally probable, or even truly more probable, where there is question of the honesty of the action alone, by forming for oneself a certain conscience not directly, but from reflex principles. - This proposition is against probabiliorists, who say that it is not lawful to follow an opinion for liberty unless it is more probable. It is also against equiprobabilists, who say that it is not lawful to follow an opinion probable for liberty when the other opinion for the law is certainly or notably more probable. - There is again question of the honesty of the human action alone, that is, whether the human action is licit and consequently can be placed without sin. There is not question of objective truth, whether, for example, in conferring baptism the water is true water; nor is there question of an objective effect, whether grace is conferred by such a baptism; nor of a harm to be guarded against, whether, in hunting, for example, the harm necessarily to be guarded against and avoided, namely the killing of a man, is sufficiently guarded against by such a shot. In the former case the doubt and question is only about the licitness of the subjective action; in the others the doubt and question is about the suitability of the objective action for verifying the truth of the thing, for producing the effect, for guarding against harm. - It is lawful to follow a truly probable opinion, not directly by forming a conscience for oneself by the force of the opinion itself. "For for acting licitly probability alone does not suffice, but moral certainty concerning the honesty of the action is required." St. Alphonsus, I, n. 55, p. 25, ed. P. Gaude. But it is lawful to follow a truly probable opinion by forming for oneself a certain conscience by means of a reflex principle, by which "in practice the ultimate judgment morally certain is formed from that certain principle." St. Alphonsus, I, n. 36, p. 36, ed. P. Gaude. And thus an action which speculatively is only probably honest becomes in practice certainly morally honest. St. Alphonsus, loc. cit. But the fundamental principle of all is that of St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus: "No one is bound by any precept except through the mediation of knowledge of that precept." Hence an uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation; and a doubtful law does not oblige, "because it is not sufficiently promulgated." St. Alphonsus, I, n. 61, p. 31, ed. P. Gaude. - Billuart, De Act. hum., diss. 6.

53. The first part is proved. Probabiliorism and equiprobabilism are refuted. - Proof 1. The system of the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists is not practical. For even for these doctors it is very difficult to establish which sentence is more probable, which is notably more probable. What appears to one more probable or notably more probable appears to another less probable and notably less probable. Indeed, even what before appeared to one and the same person more probable, and much more probable, afterwards, when the matter has been weighed better, seems less probable and much less probable. - Proof 2. For either the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists say that it is lawful to act from the immediate judgment of the more probable or notably more probable sentence; or they say that it is lawful to act from a mediate judgment, namely by force of the principle: a doubtful law does not oblige; an uncertain law does not beget a certain obligation; since the will cannot be bound by its obligation without knowledge of the law. The first cannot be said, for although the sentence may be more probable or notably more probable, nevertheless it is not certain; and without certain conscience it is not lawful to act. But the second, as is clear, leads not into probabiliorism or into equiprobabilism, but into simple probabilism. For where true probability is had against the law, the law is now doubtful and uncertain, and knowledge of the law cannot be had. - Proof 3. For we would be bound to follow the more probable or notably more probable opinion insofar as these approach more nearly to truth. But now this is false; for an opinion simply probable can approach more to truth, and the sentence which bore before itself some greater appearance of truth can be false. Besides, here there is no question of speculative but of practical truth; there is no question of the adherence of the intellect simply to truth, but of the obligation of the will, which is not bound by the obligation of a law unless the law is certain and knowledge of the law is had.

54. Proof of the second part. Simple probabilism is proved. - Proof 1. The proposition established is clear from the authority of very many and very grave theologians, who not only hand it down, but even affirm it as common doctrine, such as Suarez, Lugo, Struggl, La Croix, Pignatelli, Vasquez, Elbel, Castropalaus, Sporer, etc. Hence St. Alphonsus in the Dissertation on the moderate use of probable opinion in the concurrence of a more probable one, second edition, Naples, 1755: "We undertake to prove the last, more benign, and most common sentence, namely that it is licit to use a probable opinion even in the concurrence of a more probable one for the law, whenever it has a certain and grave foundation." And indeed, although several after the Jansenists defended probabiliorism, nevertheless by far the greater part of theologians embraced probabilism. But he who follows in practice a doctrine which many and very grave theologians teach, and which doctors commonly hand down, acts prudently; but he who acts prudently acts honestly. For this reason, in the Dissertation just cited, the Holy Doctor immediately adds: "Add to these things the most powerful argument, namely, that if the benign sentence had been false, it certainly would least of all have been received commonly by doctors everywhere, as it truly was received, or at least the Church would not have tolerated it, permitting souls commonly to go along this path of perdition, as the adversaries cry out, deceived by such blind guides." And, as the same St. Alphonsus has, l. 6, n. 460, par. Haec autem: "Nor does it hinder that several opinions which are passed around are not condemned by the Church, and nevertheless by others are more commonly reputed lax; for the Church does not condemn all opinions which regard particular cases, although it does not approve them; but sentences which regard the universality of consciences the Church does not approve nor pass over in silence, as St. Augustine said, Epistle 119: The Church of God tolerates many things, and yet those things which concern faith or good life it neither approves nor passes over in silence." Cf. L. l. 3, n. 669, toward the end, Hoc unum, etc.

55. Proof 2. He who follows in practice an opinion which remains within the terms of right reason and prudence acts prudently, and consequently honestly. But he who follows in practice a truly probable opinion, the more probable and safer having been left aside, follows an opinion which remains within the terms of right reason and prudence. Therefore. - The major is clear of itself. For what is more honest than to follow right reason and prudence, which is right reason of things to be done? And Benedict XIV, C. Apostolica Constitutio, Sect. 21, indeed hands down this rule of acting: namely, that we should follow the sentence which reason persuades and authority confirms. Besides, it is by no means agreeable to right reason, and especially to divine goodness, to will to oblige a man to perform at all costs that which, after diligent inquiry, remains prudently uncertain to the man himself, whether it is required by order or not; especially since doubts of this kind are most frequent because of the weakness of the human intellect itself. This would be to impose unbearable burdens. L. 58, 86; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, a. 16 ad 1. But the minor is clear from the very nature and definition of a truly probable opinion, which is not changed by the concurrence of another opinion, although more probable and safer. And St. Alphonsus himself openly affirms this in the definition of a more probable opinion; for he says that its contrary is to be judged probable. Muzzarelli, Dissert. de Regul. mor. opin., Rome, 1807, p. 30 seq.; L. I, n. 79, p. 58, 59, ed. P. Gaude.

56. The Rev. Father Wouters replies, in De Minusprobabilismo, 2nd ed., Amsterdam, 1908, p. 128: "Let the major pass. I deny the minor. And indeed, an opinion which is more probably false than true, or an opinion to which as true not even a weak assent can prudently be given, indeed which is to be held by opinative assent as false, an opinion of this kind does not remain within the terms of right reason. But of this kind is an opinion certainly less probable." - But, once a confusion of words has been made, surely all things can be proved according to anyone's whim. For an opinion which does not include prudent assent, or which by opinative assent is simply to be held as false, is not a probable opinion, nor consequently is it a less probable opinion. Wouters himself, recognizing the weakness of his Reply, immediately adds: "I reply II: Granted, not conceded, that an opinion truly, but less, probable remains within the terms of right reason and prudence - since these words are ambiguous - relying upon the arguments brought forward in Chapter II, I deny that every opinion of this kind can be brought into practice." Wonderful! Are these words, right reason and prudence, ambiguous? But there is no time to refute that whole Chapter II, since this has already been done more than enough by others; indeed the whole work of Wouters has already been most abundantly refuted by others. But let Wouters hear St. Alphonsus: the Holy Doctor explicitly teaches: "For acting honestly it suffices to act prudently, and we are not bound to act more prudently. For that axiom is common and commonly received: He who acts probably acts prudently." Schol.-Mor. Dissertation for the moderate use of probable opinion, Sect. 1. And Theol. Mor., ed. P. Gaude, l. 1, n. 79, p. 59: "He who acts probably, etc., can be taken in two ways. If it is taken as resting upon other reflex principles, it is truly prudent and certain. But if it is taken as a direct principle, with reflection of judgment excluded, it is false." And was not the aforesaid principle used in the first way, reflection and reasoning having been made?

57. Proof 3. St. Alphonsus has this in his Moral Theological Work, 6th ed., Rome, 1767, in which the Holy Doctor explained more fully his sentence concerning probabilism and never afterwards changed it, Theol. Mor., ed. P. Gaude, p. XIX: "There are two principles upon which, relying, I defend the licit use of probable opinion. The first, that a doubtful law, in the conflict of two equally probable opinions, does not oblige, because a doubtful law is not sufficiently promulgated. The other, that an uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation, because the obligation of law is posterior to the liberty with which man has been endowed by God." Both these principles are explained fully and proved by the Holy Doctor, l. 1, n. 66 seqq.; H. A., tr. 1, n. 37 seqq. But when a truly probable opinion is present, although it is in concurrence with another more probable and safer opinion, both principles are still verified, namely that the law is uncertain, if there is question of its existence, or that it is doubtful, if there is question of its interpretation, because obscure; and therefore neither does the law have the power of actually obliging, since it has not been sufficiently or certainly promulgated; "for then the doubt whether the law exists has been sufficiently promulgated, but the law has not been promulgated," L. I, n. 70, Turin ed., 1846; nor is man, having certain possession of his liberty, bound to reckon himself stripped of it because of an uncertain law; for prior to every law each one possesses his own liberty, since man must first be conceived as free, and then the law which is imposed upon man. Therefore. - L. 54 seqq.

Now, that in that hypothesis the law is in fact doubtful or uncertain, so that it is prudently judged such, whence that twofold axiom flows, is clear from the very nature of probability; for where true probability is present, greater probability does not of itself destroy lesser probability; and this both philosophers and theologians commonly affirm, and St. Alphonsus expressly hands down, H. A., tr. 1, n. 29, and l. 1, n. 40, where he says that the contrary of the more probable is also judged probable. The same Holy Doctor explains it in this way in the Dissertation, ed. 1755, n. 13: Greater probability does not destroy the lesser, "unless that lesser probability is drawn from the same principle, or unless the more probable opinion has for itself so convincing an argument that the contrary seems truly improbable, or no longer gravely and certainly probable. Otherwise, however, one must speak if the excess is not notable, and the opposite probability receives its force from diverse principles, as almost always happens in the concurrence of opinions; for then the less probable opinion is by no means destitute of its grave probability." Indeed, the probability or improbability of some opinion is not the same as its truth or falsity, so that one excludes the other, but is a suitability for meriting prudent assent, arising from grave motives, which, although greater or lesser, do not contradict one another if they are taken from diverse principles. But if they exhibit an argument so convincing that the opposite is judged improbable, we are now outside the case of greater or lesser probability, since one opinion will then be certain or probable, the other false or improbable.

Hence St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 604, raising the question: "Can a penitent be absolved who wishes to follow an opinion contrary to that which the confessor holds?" replies: "The common and to-be-followed sentence teaches that the confessor not only can but is also bound under grave obligation, where namely there is question of grave matter, H. A., tr. 16, n. 118, to absolve a penitent who wishes to follow a probable opinion, although the opposite seems more probable to the confessor... With this common sentence standing, strengthened by so many authorities and reasons, I do not see how the confessor can with safe conscience deny absolution to one wishing to follow an opinion which appears probable to the penitent himself, indeed perhaps more probable, if not directly, at least reflexively, as the probabilist authors commonly think, who, in following a probable opinion in concurrence with a more probable one, judge that they embrace a sentence reflexively more probable, as one confirmed by weightier foundations and by the most common authority of doctors." The same Holy Doctor has the same doctrine in his last work, H. A., tr. 16, n. 118, to which sentence he adds no other limits than the following: namely, that "the opinion of the penitent have some probability, so that the confessor, although he does not hold it as solidly probable, nevertheless does not reckon it altogether false... evidently erroneous." Cf. also l. 1, n. 87, where the Holy Doctor, after Gerson, says: "Theologian doctors must not be easy in asserting that some things are mortal sins, where they are not most certain about the matter. Note, WHERE THEY ARE NOT MOST CERTAIN." - Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 1, d. 26, n. 3; Pignatelli, Cons. Can., tom. 8, cons. 15.

58. Proof 4. That a law may indeed oblige, it must be sufficiently promulgated, St. Thomas, I-II, q. 90, a. 4. But sufficient promulgation of law is not had if the law is not certain and manifest. Hence in Canon Law it is generally established: "In those things about which an express law is not found, proceed, equity having been observed, always by declining toward the more humane part, according as you shall see persons and causes, places and times to demand." C. Ex parte tua 11, De Transact. And in Civil Law it is decreed: "As often as there is a doubtful interpretation of liberty, the response must be made according to liberty." L. 20, De R. I. "In a doubtful matter, to follow the more benign interpretation is no less just than safe." L. 192, De R. I. But the reason is that law imposes a moral necessity, and therefore must necessarily bind the will. But it cannot necessarily bind the will except through knowledge. Wherefore, knowledge of the law being excluded, the will remains morally free. St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 17, a. 3. Now, if a most probable sentence against the law is present, it is evidently clear that knowledge of the law is lacking. For certainty and evidence cannot be had with the opposite maximum probability; indeed not even with simple probability. Hence St. Alphonsus says: "For constituting a law doubtful, true probability to the contrary suffices." L. I, n. 57, ed. years 1762, 1763.

59. Confirmation 5 by the authority of St. Thomas. Law is a certain rule and measure. In order that a rule may direct and a measure may measure, it must be applied to the thing which must be directed and measured. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 90, a. 4. Therefore law must reach the subjects whom it directs; but it reaches them through knowledge. St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 17, a. 3. Therefore law must be certain and evident. Wherefore, if the law is uncertain, namely if its existence is not established; if the law is doubtful, namely if the sentence of the law is obscure, the obligation of the law ceases; a precept does not bind except through knowledge. St. Thomas, loc. cit. Hence those axioms: An uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation; A doubtful law does not oblige. For an effect cannot surpass the cause. These things are altogether generally in St. Thomas, and he does not distinguish between a law having against itself a less probable, or equally probable, or more probable sentence. Wherefore from the Angelic Doctor the whole question is this: whether a law, having against itself a more probable, equally probable, or less probable sentence, can be said to reach man through knowledge, to bind him through the mediation of knowledge, through knowledge, through the virtue of knowledge. But knowledge is not given if true probability is opposed. Hence every question about mortal sin is determined dangerously unless truth is expressly had. St. Thomas, Quodl. 9, a. 15. And St. Alphonsus, l. 3, after n. 139, Epist. Resp.: "But that it may be affirmed absolutely that some action is a mortal sin, a probable opinion does not suffice, nor even a more probable one; for the more probable does not exclude the rational fear of erring; whence it does not bring about that the law does not remain doubtful, and that the opposite cannot be true, if it is truly probable."

60. Confirmation 6. Innocent III granted a three-year trial to a spouse laboring under impotence, C. Laudabilem 5, De Frig., and did not prescribe that one must first see whether the potency was more probable or at least equally probable. - In the seventeenth century, when certain Indians in the Kingdom of Paraguay had been converted to the faith, who had several wives, and questions arose concerning the validity of their marriages, Urban VIII responded to John de Lugo, later Cardinal: "Where opinions of doctors concur on both sides as probable, the opinions more favorable to the condition of the places and of barbarous men are to be followed." Urban did not say that the more probable opinions were to be followed, nor did he say where equally probable opinions concur, but absolutely where probable opinions concur. Carden., Cris. Theol., diss. 2, Sect. 553.

61. As regards the first: the Rev. Father Wouters replies, p. 101: "I retort the argument. But neither did Innocent III prescribe that one must first see whether the potency was probable and remained probable. Therefore - thus one may reason, if the argumentation of our adversary coheres aptly - it is not necessary that the sentence be truly probable in order that it can be brought into practice; which is admitted by no one." - If Wouters' retortion has force, it has force against St. Alphonsus, whose aforesaid argument it is. - Behold what St. Alphonsus has, l. 1, n. 78, p. 57, ed. P. Gaude: "In cap. Laudabilem, De Frigidit. et mal., it is had that the Pontiff granted to a certain spouse, who was doubtful about potency for intercourse, that he should try it for three years. If a doubtful law must always be observed, as the adversaries wish, and then the doubt was turning on whether the woman was another's, how could the Pontiff permit the man, while she was living, to approach her and try intercourse for three years?" Evidently therefore the Holy Pontiff supposed a doubtful potency, and consequently one probable at least in some way; but certainly not one certainly, notably more probable, or equally probable. - The Rev. Father Wouters replies secondly: "The decree of Innocent III, of which Bucceroni speaks, does nothing for our matter. For we are inquiring what it is right to do in a doubt which regards the honesty or dishonesty of an action, whereas the doubt intended by Innocent turns immediately around the validity of marriage." But was there not consequently question of the licitness of conjugal intercourse? Does not the Pontifical response regard this? And does not St. Alphonsus speak of this? Hence the Holy Doctor concludes that a doubtful law does not oblige. - Because there was immediate question of the validity of marriage, can the argument perhaps be weakened, because the Supreme Pontiff could by his authority make valid a marriage invalid because of impotence? - Wouters replies, p. 102, as to the second: "What Bucceroni narrates about the response given by Urban VIII to Cardinal de Lugo, when those things which Thyrsus Gonzalez discussed concerning that matter have been seen (Fundam. Theol. Mor., pp. 429-437), will be urged by no theologian." Nevertheless it is urged also by Cardinal D'Annibale, Summ., P. 1, n. 263, note 5, ed. 4.

62. Is the proposition established above, n. 47 seqq., some exception to probabilism, as though a true case of probabilism? - Reply. Negatively. For, if probabilism is true, it must always be true, and must be verified in every case. And indeed probabilism regards the very formal or subjective honesty or turpitude of an action; by no means the objective or real existence or non-existence of the effect of such an action. But that thesis precisely regards this objective effect to be obtained or not obtained. Therefore, if someone in that case, where the effect is to be absolutely obtained, should use a probable opinion, he will certainly sin; but he will not sin precisely because he uses a probable opinion about the licitness of the action, but because he uses a probable opinion about the validity of the act, exposing himself to the danger of frustrating an effect to be absolutely obtained. Then this would be a case of probabilism: when a probable opinion were that it is lawful by one's action to expose to danger an effect absolutely to be obtained; which is not a probable opinion, but a false and erroneous one. For he who is bound to the end is also bound to the means, and he who must guard against evil is also bound to guard against its danger. And thus, for example, a minister of the sacraments following in their administration a probable opinion as regards their validity certainly sins, not at all because he follows a probable opinion as regards the licitness of the action; indeed on the contrary, because he follows an altogether improbable opinion as regards the licitness of the action; because, since the effect of the sacrament certainly to be obtained, namely the remission of sins and infusion of grace, depends upon true matter and true form, someone applying doubtful matter or form exposes it to the danger of lacking such an effect, and therefore inflicts proximate harm, and consequently sins. - L. Op. Mor., Roman ed., year 1757, l. 1, n. 33; Laymann, l. 1, tr. 1, c. 5, Sect. 2, 3; D'Annib., ed. 4, p. 1, n. 266.

63. An exception, and a true and illogical exception to probabilism, is the limitation which some probabilists and equiprobabilists add to probabilism from the principle of possession: In doubt, the condition of the possessor is better. Wherefore, they say, a doubtful law, indeed, in doubt about the existence of the law, does not oblige, because liberty possesses. But a doubtful law in doubt about its cessation obliges, because the law possesses. Hence, if it is probable that you did not emit a vow, you are not bound by the vow. If you certainly emitted a vow, and it is probable that you satisfied it, you are still bound to satisfaction. But thus to admit probabilism by halves around the existence of law, but not the cessation of law, is to admit the principles and deny the conclusions. If a doubtful law does not oblige, precisely because it is doubtful, whenever it is doubtful it will not oblige. But the law is as doubtful in the doubt about its existence, namely about its first existence, as it is doubtful in the doubt about its cessation; for if its cessation is probable, by that very fact the very existence of the law becomes doubtful. But an obliging law is not a law which existed, but one which exists; nor is it a law which exists in the abstract, but one which in its present certain obligation binds us. But if a probable opinion is had about the cessation of a law, however this is understood, its obligation becomes doubtful, and its existence likewise becomes doubtful; namely, again, not the very existence of the law in the abstract, but its force of obliging in the concrete, in the particular case, here and now. L. I, n. 63, 78. And thus, although it is certain that a vow was emitted and once existed, if probably you have satisfied it, that certain vow, insofar as once existing, becomes doubtful insofar as obliging you here and now; and that saying has force: A doubtful law does not oblige. Possession indeed constitutes a prevailing right insofar as he who possesses, by possession itself, is shown, or at least presumed, to be lord of the thing which he possesses. But how can this be either shown or reasonably presumed when the opposite is established by true or grave probability? For then it is established by true and grave probability that the possession is not legitimate, which is the only one that can constitute a prevailing right. For if the bare fact of possession, without legitimate title, at least reasonably presumed, constituted that prevailing right, then all thieves and robbers could retain another's thing by a prevailing right of possession. - Troplong, Della Prescrizione, c. 2, del Possesso, a. 2228; D'Annib., ed. 4, p. 1, n. 260, 268.

64. St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 112, par. Secunda vero, says: "When it is probable that the obligation of a law never began, or that it has been abolished, then the presumption for the law ceases, and liberty possesses." Behold, the limitation of probabilism by the principle of possession has been dealt with, which, from St. Alphonsus, has no force except from presumption. The Holy Doctor joins indifferently two cases, that the law never began, or that it has been abolished; and when either is probable, from the Holy Doctor, the obligation of the law is not present. - Likewise in n. 290 he says that a probable custom suffices for excusing from the law. Behold, again, no account is taken by the Holy Doctor of possession of the law. And then, distinguishing between doubt and probability, he very well says: "that in doubt about custom the precept possesses, whence a dispensation is to be sought; otherwise, if it is probable that the custom is present."

65. The very material fact of possession by no means constitutes a prevailing right in the internal forum, as regards the very right of dominion and ownership of the thing, but only as regards proof in the external forum, which must be instituted by the plaintiff against the possessor because of the aforesaid presumption of dominion. But presumption yields to truth. Hence, if someone has possessed in bad faith, even for a very long time, he must restore the thing even spontaneously and without proof and petition from the plaintiff. D'Annibale himself, who in ed. 4, p. 1, n. 264 seqq., follows the rule of possession, asserts in n. 256, note 5: "Justice forbids giving harm to him who is in certain possession of his right... I said, who is in certain possession of his right; for if the right of another is uncertain, either the condition of the possessor will be better, or at least, because no certain right of another is injured, there will be no obligation of restoring." Behold how D'Annibale himself requires certain and legitimate possession in order that it really constitute a prevailing right. And D'Annibale himself, loc. cit., n. 259, note 18, furthermore asserts: "Namely, certainty against true probability is not given." How, therefore, will the obligation of a law be certain if it is probable that that obligation has long since ceased? See also ibid., n. 169, 181. - L. l. 3, n. 212, par. Secunda, n. 290, 325, par. Infirmi, n. 483; l. 4, n. 47.

66. For the rest, D'Annibale asserts the law of possession in a threefold case, namely in a doubt: 1. whether it receives a restrictive interpretation; 2. whether it is just; 3. whether it has ceased. P. 1, n. 262. And in the preceding n. 261, note 30, and n. 263, note 1, he affirms that St. Alphonsus used this rule of possession perpetually. - But D'Annibale himself, cited n. 262, note 35, says: "except for the second case, in which all agree, in the others even those who seem to profess it depart from our rule." And among these he expressly cites and reports only St. Alphonsus! - And while the praised author notes this against Probabilism, that it must use exceptions of which his rule of possession does not stand in need, loc. cit., n. 266, he then frankly admits that his own rule is not perpetual, and fails in several cases which he enumerates, loc. cit., n. 269, note 30. - But the alleged exceptions of Probabilism, namely when there is question not of the honesty of the action alone, but of an end to be absolutely obtained and of the objective truth of the thing, loc. cit., n. 266, 256, note 5, are not truly exceptions. - Likewise what he says, loc. cit., n. 267, that a probabilist is compelled to answer contradictories, is by no means true. And it is certainly strange that a learned theologian found a contradiction in cited n. 267 regarding that very same case in which he himself had expressly affirmed a little before, namely n. 263, that it is lawful to follow either probable contrary opinion. - Finally he asserts, n. 264, that this rule of possession enjoys better right; in n. 269, that it is better than the others not only as regards the truth of the thing alone but also as regards practice; but immediately after, in the following n. 270, he affirms that it is lawful to follow truly and gravely probable opinions; and in n. 263, after he has expounded the various systems and has also established his own rule in n. 262, he says that it is lawful for each one to choose what pleases him more. - To avert contradiction, perhaps it can be said that the illustrious D'Annibale considered this rule of possession not for the case of true probability, but for the case of doubt, which he seems sufficiently to insinuate in n. 269; and thus it is wholly true that the theologians most commonly teach that rule, n. 268, and in this sense we also admit it, and explain it diligently below. And indeed that rule is enunciated in doubt.

67. Does probabilism truly provide a safe norm for forming a certain conscience for oneself? - The norm which probabilism provides for forming a certain conscience for oneself in doubtful matters is most safe. For probabilism in fact is nothing other than this principle: A doubtful law does not oblige, applied practically, with a probable sentence standing against the law in a practical case.

68. The principle itself, considered in itself, is most safe. St. Alphonsus himself sustains his whole moral system by nothing other than this principle. And if someone asks, says the Holy Doctor, "why a doubtful law does not oblige, we shall answer with this concise argument: a law not sufficiently promulgated does not oblige; a doubtful law is not sufficiently promulgated; because while the law is doubtful, the doubt or question is sufficiently promulgated, but the law is not promulgated; therefore a doubtful law does not oblige. Whoever should wish to deny this argument," the same Holy Doctor continues, "would have to prove either that a law even not promulgated obliges, or that a doubtful law is truly promulgated, against that which St. Thomas and others commonly expressly teach; but he will never prove either of these propositions for all eternity," l. 1, n. 61, par. Posito igitur, p. 32, ed. P. Gaude.

69. Besides this most certain principle, there is another principle upon which all probabilism also rests; namely that, with a truly probable sentence standing against the law, it is metaphysically impossible that the law be certain. No one can deny this except the one who either does not understand the terms, or arbitrarily twists the terms into another signification.

70. It is worth the effort to hear from the Holy Doctor himself the definition of probable opinion and of certain sentence, so that it may appear from St. Alphonsus himself whether, with a truly probable opinion against the law, a certain sentence of the law can at the same time coexist. "Probable," says the Holy Doctor, "is that which rests upon a grave foundation, either intrinsic of reason or extrinsic of authority, which has power to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man, although with fear of the opposite... A morally certain sentence is one which excludes every prudent fear of falsity, so that the opposite is reputed altogether improbable." Loc. cit., p. 21, n. 40. If an opinion opposite to a certain sentence must be altogether improbable, it is clear that together with the probability of an opposite opinion a certain sentence is utterly incompatible. Therefore the norm which probabilism provides for forming a practically certain conscience in doubtful matters is most safe; for each of these is most true: both that a doubtful law does not oblige, and that the law is doubtful when a truly probable sentence stands against it.

71. And this has force, as is clear of itself, even if for the law there stands a more probable opinion, and an opinion more probable in whatever degree, even notably more probable, while nevertheless a truly probable opinion stands against the law. For then, unless someone changes the definitions of things, and unless someone changes the definitions handed down by St. Alphonsus himself, it is still verified that the law is not morally certain when its opposite sentence is not improbable but probable. Therefore the law will then also be doubtful, and the axiom will have force: a doubtful law does not oblige.

72. Besides, from the same Holy Doctor, who follows the doctrine of St. Thomas in this matter, certainty of law can be had only when knowledge of the law is had. However probable the notice of the law may be, knowledge of the law is not had; and therefore the law will then always remain doubtful, not sufficient for obliging. For under the name of knowledge of law probable notice cannot be understood. "This would be," says the Holy Doctor, "a new signification of a new vocabulary, since all philosophers, with the same St. Thomas, distinguish opinion from science, which is taken as certain cognition of some truth." Loc. cit., n. 74.

73. And the same St. Alphonsus always taught this. For as a younger man in the Dissertation on the Less Probable Opinion he wrote: "Nor is it of force to say that, when some more probable opinion for the law appears, then that greater probability declares the law and now exhibits knowledge of the law. For knowledge, as is clear to everyone, imports certain notice concerning the existence of the law; but opinion, even more probable, since it does not remove the opposite prudent fear, is wholly diverse from knowledge, which, every prudent fear having been excluded, carries certainty before itself." Indeed, the Holy Doctor most rightly, as regards doctrine, wrote also concerning a most probable opinion: "More and less do not vary the species... It is clear that a most probable opinion differs in species from a sentence called morally certain. For this latter excludes every prudent fear, so that the opposite seems improbable. But a most probable opinion, although among probable opinions it holds the first place, nevertheless is below the limits of probability, and therefore does not exclude every prudent fear, nor can the contrary be called improbable... But if someone were to take a most probable opinion for morally certain, this would imply a contradiction in terms." Schol.-Mor. Dissertation for the moderate use of probable opinion, Sect. 1.

74. Therefore from a speculatively probable conscience to a practically certain conscience we make a step by the following reasoning. What is forbidden by no certain law is lawful. But such and such an action, which is truly probably prohibited by no law, by that very fact is forbidden by no certain law. Therefore such an action is lawful. Since the major and minor of this syllogism are certain, the conclusion also will be certain. But the conclusion contains the judgment or dictate of conscience. - The same transition can be made by force of another reasoning. He who acts according to what prudence dictates acts honestly. But he who acts according to this or that probable opinion acts honestly. Since again the major and minor of this syllogism are certain, the conclusion also will be certain. - L. I, n. 67, 68, 69, 84; Muzzarelli, Dissert. de Regul. mor. opin., Rome, 1807, p. 30 seq.

75. What is the force of extrinsic probability? - There is no doubt that extrinsic probability constitutes an opinion truly and sufficiently gravely probable. "Someone of little knowledge," says St. Thomas, II-II, q. 4, a. 3, "is more certified about what he hears from some learned man than about what seems to him according to his own reason." This probability has force for this reason, that a person is not thought to speak without a grave foundation. L. I, n. 79, p. 59, ed. P. Gaude. Hence, if someone does not stop at authority alone, but weighs this foundation, then extrinsic probability is resolved into intrinsic. But sometimes this extrinsic probability constitutes intrinsic probability itself, namely when there is question of a thing which greatly depends upon the estimation of the wise, L. l. 3, n. 1032, that is, of a thing rather of fact than of law, for example, what is grave matter in canonical hours, in fasting, etc.

An extrinsically probable opinion is customarily designated as a common, more common, or most common opinion. Concerning these Sanchez, De Matr., l. 3, d. 44, n. 3, has the following, from which one can form a judgment concerning a common, more common, etc., opinion: "An opinion is not called common which has several doctors asserting it, no discussion having been premised, but perfunctorily and, as they say, following it in passing... Wherefore Navarrus says very well that an opinion approved by six doctors treating the matter ex professo is to be considered more common than one approved by fifty, led almost only by the authority of the former. Add to these John Lupus... saying that doctors, however much they excel in learning, are not to be believed when they lack foundation." - La-Croix, l. 1, n. 164, 165; Muzzarelli, Dissert. de Regul. mor. opin., Rome, 1806, p. 21 seqq.

76. From the common sentence of theologians "one must not easily depart in a practical matter." Lugo, De Iust. et Iur., d. 16, n. 106. Nevertheless this is not to be accepted too scrupulously, and much less extended. Hence St. Alphonsus does not hesitate to affirm that he "departed from the sentences of many and grave authors," l. 3, n. 547, and lower in the same place he says: "Where reason convinced me, I did not refuse to go against several authors." And in the Preface, p. LVI, ed. P. Gaude: "In the choice of sentences, it was always a great care for me to put reason before authority." Cf. also l. 6, n. 257, 427, where the Holy Doctor departs even from a most common sentence.

77. Does the authority of one doctor suffice for the probability of some sentence? - Reply. Negatively, speaking ordinarily. The reason is that if it belongs to some ancient author and has been deserted by all, by this very fact it ordinarily lacks sufficient foundation. But if it belongs to some more recent author, either he brings a grave reason, or not. If the former, his sentence is ordinarily handed down also by others.

78. Is there given an opinion speculatively, not practically, probable? - Reply. Negatively, speaking per se; for the reasoning established above, n. 74, can always be made, if the opinion in itself, or speculatively, is truly probable, by which we may proceed to practical conscience itself. - Reply. Affirmatively, per accidens, if, namely, when that opinion is brought into use, there is always or almost always present some extrinsic circumstance which renders the use of such an opinion illicit, for example, danger of a fall, scandal, hallucination, etc. - Pignatelli, Cons. Can., t. 8, cons. 15; Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. d. 26, n. 3; De Iust. et Iur., d. 10, n. 165, 189.

79. Can someone licitly follow in practice diverse probable opinions favorable to himself, although those opinions are opposed to one another? - It is indeed lawful, among diverse probable opinions, to choose now this one, now the opposite. But it is not lawful to choose them simultaneously, when either contradiction follows or a certain transgression of the law. The general reason for the assertion is that, if it is lawful for one person to follow one probable opinion, and for another it is lawful to follow the opposite probable opinion, the very same is wholly lawful for the same person; because for the same person in each case the law always remains doubtful. For from the fact that in one case someone used a probable opinion against the law, it does not follow that if the opposite opinion is truly probable against the law, the law becomes certain. Therefore he will be able to use this other opinion well at another time. And as someone the first time used that first opinion, so he could the first time, on the contrary, have used the opposite opinion. Therefore he will be able at another time to use the opinion which he has not yet used. Nevertheless someone cannot use an opposite probable opinion after he has used some probable opinion, if contradiction follows. The reason is that the principle of contradiction must always prevail immovably in the order of truth, whether speculative or practical. And thus, if someone has accepted an inheritance from a testament probably valid, he cannot fail to fulfill the legacies, whether pious or profane, prescribed in the same testament. For by doing this he would at the same time regard the testament as valid and as invalid. Likewise one cannot use an opposite probable opinion after he has used some probable opinion, if from this a certain transgression of the law follows. For then one cannot form one's conscience from that general principle that the law is doubtful; for then the law is certainly contained in one or the other, although in which of them it is contained cannot be determinately assigned. And thus, for example, it is probable that an irregularity is not incurred from baptism repeated, solemnly indeed, but conferred secretly; likewise it is probable that an irregularity is not incurred from baptism conferred privately but publicly before many; for both are required in order that a certain irregularity be contracted from the repetition of baptism, namely that baptism be conferred solemnly and publicly. Now who would ever say that he does not contract irregularity who first rebaptizes someone solemnly but secretly, then a third time rebaptizes him privately but before many? Likewise, if the law of abstinence urges today, and I wish tomorrow to approach Communion, and it is probable that midnight has now passed, and the opposite also is probable, it certainly is not lawful to eat meat and at the same time approach holy communion. - Elbel, De Act. hum., 190 seqq.

80. Is it expedient to prefer more rigorous opinions to more benign ones? - "Where there is question of removing a penitent from the danger of formal sin, the confessor ought, generally speaking, and insofar as Christian prudence suggests, to use benign opinions; but where benign opinions render nearer the danger of formal sin, as are some opinions of authors, for example, as regards avoiding proximate occasions, and others of that kind, then it is always expedient that the confessor use, indeed I say that he himself, as a physician of souls, is bound to use, the safer opinions, which conduce to preserving penitents in the state of grace." L. I, n. 87; l. 3, n. 547. - Where the penitent is prepared to follow the dictate of the confessor, whatever it may be, then "it belongs to the prudence of the confessor to weigh whether the use of the safer or of the less safe sentence will be profitable to his penitent... because although that in itself may be safer and more perfect, nevertheless it will be more dangerous to impose upon many the obligation of always operating according to the more rigid sentences." L. l. 6, n. 605. - Generally in practice, the confessor rather, insofar as can be done, ought to be benign than rigid with penitents.

L. loc. cit. The same is clear by the authority of the Fathers and Theologians, whom you have cited apud St. Alphonsus, loc. cit., and l. 1, n. 86, par. Ego, and n. 89, toward the end, Praeterea res; H. A., tr. 1, n. 79.

81. Must a confessor know all probable opinions? - "A confessor is not to be obliged to knowledge of all probable opinions, but to that knowledge which the moderately learned commonly have; just as an advocate, judge, physician, or artisans are not obliged to supreme and exquisite knowledge and expertise in their profession, but to a moderate one according to the degree of their office and condition... thus a penitent ought not to demand from an available confessor anything except common knowledge about common sins and also common opinions; but if he desires subtler remedies, let him go to a more learned confessor." Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 1, d. 26, n. 2.