Case XIII: Riding in Cars Without Paying Fare

Case.—Paul, a student, makes it a practice to escape the paying of car-fares whenever he can, and even uses various tricks to evade the attention of conductors.

He claims that he may do this with a good conscience. First, he says, it is not the passenger’s business to look out for the pecuniary advantage of the company; this is the conductor’s affair, who is hired and paid to collect fares, and it is the conductor’s business to see that every passenger pays. Moreover, Paul is of the opinion that the company suffers no real injury from occasionally carrying a “deadhead” passenger, because no additional expense is incurred by the company; hence he is not cheating the company.

Questions:

1. Is Paul’s action lawful?

2. Is he obliged to make restitution and how may this be best accomplished?

Solution:

1. Paul is wrong in this practice. The reasons he adduces in support of it are false and without validity. It is of course the conductor’s duty to look out for the company’s interests, and for this purpose to keep count of the passengers as far as it is possible in respect to their large number and frequent change. But this duty of the employee does not in the least excuse the passenger from his obligation. It is an essential principle of commutative justice that in the case of a tacit agreement, which manifestly exists here, a certain performance of the one party (carrying the passenger to a certain distance by the trolley-car) conditions a reciprocal performance on the other party (payment of fare). Since Paul benefits himself by using the opportunity of travel, the company has eo ipso a claim upon his fare. Paul’s assertion, that the company is entitled to the fare only if the conductor makes positive demand for it, and that otherwise he is permitted to ride free, is absolutely unfounded. On the contrary, the fact that the companies despite heavy traffic place only one conductor in a car indicates that for getting their fares they trust to an extent in the honor of the public. Moreover, the matter of common decency should be sufficient inducement to pay one’s way, and to avoid the appearance of trying to cheat the conductor.

The second excuse advanced by Paul is no more valid than the first. Paul claims that he has not injured the company, because on his account there was no additional expenditure for coal or electricity. But was not the company deprived of rightful income? What would be the result if other passengers would act on the same principle as Paul?

2. From the above it is plain that Paul is obliged to make restitution, and this not merely if he was aware of the injustice of his actions, but even if he was under the impression that his action was permissible and not sinful. It can not be objected that according to the teaching of moralists one is liable to restitution only when he has been guilty before God (theologice culpabilis). Here it is not a question of injury that only harms the neighbor and does not benefit the perpetrator (cf. Noldin, n. 419): Paul has by his acts so to speak “become richer” (ditior factus est; cf. Noldin, n. 449, Ll. c.) or, more exactly, he is still in possession of the fares to which the railroad company has every legal right. Therefore he must be dealt with as a man in bona fide possession of the property of others. There is not the slightest reason, unless actually outlawed on account of time, why the original obligation of paying the fare has ceased to exist; it exists at present and presses for fulfilment.

But how may Paul carry out this obligation without attracting attention to his unlawful action? The easiest way would be to purchase a corresponding number of tickets and to destroy them (burning them, for instance). In this way complete restitution would certainly be made.