Question Third. On Unjust Damaging

429. Declarations. 1. Unjust damaging (actively) is an action by which someone inflicts damage on another in external goods, taking no profit from it.

Damage can be inflicted on a neighbor in two ways: either because the neighbor's thing is destroyed (by action or by omission of a due action), or because the neighbor is impeded from obtaining a good which is owed to him.

2. Damaging is a sin grave from its kind. It is grave or light according as the damage which is inflicted on the neighbor is grave or light.

430. On him who impedes another from obtaining a good. 1. He who impedes another from obtaining a good to which he has a strict right (whether the right is in the thing or to the thing), acts against justice and is bound to restitution, whether he impedes him directly or indirectly, by just or unjust means; because he is the efficacious cause why the other does not obtain what is owed to him by strict right.

He who, even by means not unjust, for example, by prayers, induces a father to deprive his son of the legitimate part of the inheritance to which the son has a strict right from positive law, injures justice and must restore to the son the good of which he is deprived.

2. He who impedes another from obtaining a good to which he does not have a strict right, but does this by unjust means, likewise sins against justice and is bound to restitution; not so if he does this by just means, for example, by prayers and persuasions, although he does it from hatred. The reason for the first is that everyone has a right not to be impeded by unjust means from obtaining a good of which he is not unworthy. Here it must be noted that not only frauds, lies, and accusations, but also importunate prayers and troublesome flatteries by which another's liberty is impeded, are unjust means. The reason for the second is that everyone can use the right which he has of asking or persuading another for his own utility or that of others.

a. A poor man who by detractions or calumnies brings it about that another poor man is deprived of alms; a servant who by defaming another servant brings it about that this one does not obtain the service which he deservedly hopes for; an innkeeper who by calumnies spread against another innkeeper is the cause that guests are turned away from him, sins against justice and is bound to restitution. As to the obligation of restitution it makes no difference whether the injury is inflicted on him who is impeded from obtaining the good, or on him who was going to give the good. Therefore he too is bound to restitution toward the poor man who, by unjustly instilling fear in a rich man, impedes him from giving alms to a determined poor man to whom he was going to give it.

b. He who by prayers induces a testator not to leave an inheritance to Caius, who has no right to it, but to Sempronius; or he who, from hatred, by persuasions induces a bishop, already determined to confer a benefice on the more worthy man, to confer it on a less worthy man, does not act against justice if a strict right to the benefice does not belong to the more worthy man.

3. He who impedes another from obtaining a good of which he is unworthy does not sin against justice nor is he bound to restitution, even if he uses unjust means; because an unworthy man has no right to the good which he seeks, for example, to an office or benefice, nor does he have a right to demand that he not be impeded from obtaining that good by whatever means.

Therefore he who by calumny brings it about that another does not obtain an unjust legacy or office, of which he is not worthy, indeed sins against justice by calumny against the neighbor and is bound to repair the injury to reputation; but he does not sin by the fact that he impedes him from obtaining the good. A woman who by frauds turns her husband away from a prodigal donation is bound to repair nothing to the donee, because the gift can neither be given nor received without sin.

He too is considered unworthy who uses illicit means for obtaining a good; whence justice is not injured if he is turned away from obtaining the good by likewise illicit means. Thus, where Caius had corrupted with money the magistrates on whose vote the conferral of an office depends, in order to obtain their vote, he cannot complain of injustice if another by calumny brings it about that Caius does not obtain the office.

4. He who impedes someone from averting damage from another acts against justice and is bound to restitution by the same reason as he who unjustly impedes another from obtaining a good. Thus he who, by force inflicted, impedes someone from extinguishing fire applied to the house of the neighbor, is bound to restitution toward the neighbor.¹

¹ Sporer-Bierbaum II, tract, n. 242 ss.